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Prologue
Assessment Bills from Aceh
In the summer of 2017, while conducting field research for this disserta-
tion in Aceh, I met with an enthusiastic local historian who showed me his 
private collection of historical artefacts from the colonial era, housed in his 
‘Museum Mapesa’, in Banda Aceh.1 Scattered on the table were a collection 
of eighteenth-century gold coins, guns and rencong (Acehnese daggers), but 
my eye was caught by the paperwork he had collected and piled up, rather 
dangerously high, on a tiny wooden desk (no doubt a colonial antiquity as 
well). He opened a drawer and much to my amazement, pulled out two 
filled out tax-forms, dating from the early twentieth century.
One might wonder why I would prefer to look at scraps of old paper 
instead of seemingly more spectacular items such as gold coins and 
daggers, but for me, this was the first time I encountered such forms, which 
represent substantial remnants of a practice of colonial taxation which at the 
time I still struggled to understand. They are palpable witness to how the 
colonial state entered the houses and lives of the people it tried to subject, by 
categorizing, documenting, assessing and taxing them, as ordained by the 
accordant ordinance (see figure 0.3). It offers a glimpse into how the govern-
ment’s paper instrumentation related to the material reality experienced by 
taxed subjects. In two languages, Dutch and Jawi (Malay in Arabic script), 
the forms confirm the identity, place of residence and the amount of tax 
due, according to the government. They are signed by the chief or geucik (or 
keucik) of the small villages of Deah Baru and Reubéë in North Aceh (see map 
7.1, Chapter 7), emphasizing the role of village governance in the colonial 
tax system. The forms were designed to identify the taxpayer and capture 
his status or income into taxable classifications as efficiently as possible.
The very fact that these forms have been preserved, testifies to the 
importance attached to them. It shows that at the time they were, perhaps, 
the only material artefacts that structurally connected people with the state, 
evidence of their bond with that state, or providing verification of their 
status. As such, the study of tax policies and practices, coming together in 
these forms, gives us access to a colonial reality otherwise obscured. They 
represent both an orderly paper bureaucracy of tax assessment, as well as 
the reality of negotiation and reinterpretation. In particular the second form, 
covered in scribbles, demonstrates that assessment bills were actively read 
and used, perhaps to renegotiate the assessment or maybe just as scrap 
paper. Either way, the forms exemplify a hybrid reality in which the world 
of colonial officialdom and paper-based rule met with the complex realities 
of taxpayment it attempted to capture.
1  https://www.mapesaaceh.com/.
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2 Prologue: Assessment Bills from Aceh
This dissertation casts a light on this reality. It aims to look at the imple-
mentation of colonial tax policy through the eyes of both policy-makers 
and taxpayers, as well as all in between. Thus, it emphasizes the fact that 
there was more to colonial governance than states categorizing the lives of 
subjects, that the ways in which subjects and their societies categorized the 
state, was equally important.
Figure 0.1. Filled in tax form from Reubee, Pidie. The form is filled in in Dutch on the right 
side and in Malay in Jawi script on the left. It is signed by the kampong chiefs or geucik. 
As can be seen, the villager was assessed for 1.53 guilders, and the tax bill was awarded in 
September.
Source: Private collection of Masykur Syafruddin/Museum Mapesa Aceh, Banda Aceh.
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Figure 0.2. Another filled in tax form from Reubee, Pidie. Covered in scribbles and scrawls, 
this tax form has perhaps been reused to object and (re)calculate assessments, either for the 
next or former term of the tax year. The villager was assessed for 2.50 guilders.
Source: Private collection of Masykur Syafruddin/Museum Mapesa Aceh, Banda Aceh.
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4 Prologue: Assessment Bills from Aceh
Figure 0.3. First page of the tax ordinance according to which the income tax of the forms 
from Aceh (1907) was levied. Formally ratified by the Governor-General in name of the 
queen, these ordinances expressed both the royal and legal authority of the state and set out 
the legal instructions for taxation. Tax ordinances could range in length from two, to well 
over a hundred pages. They contained various chapters, subdivided into numerous articles, 
detailing information about taxable or rateable persons, principles of tax payment, exemp-
tions, the tax rates, the methods of assessment, payment and collection and possibilities for 
objection. Basically, ordinances continued the written law based upon which taxes were 
levied.
Source: Stbl. 1907 n184.
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Introduction
Between 1870 and 1920, the colonial government of the Dutch East Indies 
(current-day Indonesia) strove to introduce a regime of centralized income 
taxes. Dutch colonial officials envisioned a full-fledged tax state in which 
all subjects paid their taxes equally, to capacity, fairly and in accordance 
with a system of laws, bureaucracy and governance. In 1920, the colonial 
administration finalized this process by unifying the separate tax regimes 
for Java, the ‘Outer Territories’ (the islands outside of Java), and for various 
ethnic groups within the colony. If anything, colonial policy-makers saw the 
unification as the crowning achievement, after half a century of reforms, 
that to them symbolized the fiscal consolidation of a purportedly modern 
colonial empire.
Yet even after 50 years of continuous reform the colonial administra-
tion was ill prepared to fulfil this ambitious agenda. Despite decades-long 
work on the system, the Dutch colonial tax regime, based on laws, kohieren 
(tax registers) and procedures proved, in practice, difficult to maintain. In 
1919, upon being informed about the imminent introduction in Bali of the 
‘unified income tax’, controleur (colonial administrator) V.E. Korn sighed:
“Every year, when going into the desa […] I see hundreds of poorly dressed Bali-
nese sitting around me, all listening unmoved to their assessments of 1.50 to 
2 guilders […] Even if I knew their incomes, where would I find the time to 
assess 250.000 people and calculate their assessments?”1
Korn’s quote reveals an interesting dynamic between policy and practice, 
between that to which the colonial state aspired and what local officials 
could actually achieve. This dynamic is reflected in the tax forms from 
Aceh, as exemplified above, and is symptomatic of deeper problems of 
governance, which studying the methods of taxation can bring to light.
This dissertation analyses the processes of the introduction of the new 
income taxes in the Dutch East Indies between 1870 and 1940. The subject 
is fascinating, not simply as a case study of the implementation of colonial 
tax policy, but even more so for the insight it gives into specific mechanisms 
of colonial governance and the relationships between the Dutch colonial 
state, local officials and colonized subjects. Studying tax regimes has been 
recognized as important because they reflect the key priorities, the organi-
1 ANRI AS Besl. 17-3-1920, n742-743, herein: Res. Bali en Lombok to DirFin, 21-12-1919: 
Controleur Badung to Ass-Res South Bali, 17-12-1919.
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6 Introduction
zation and the purposes of states, from which even the “thunder of world 
history” may be discerned.2 As taxes address patterns of income, property, 
consumption and production, the very elements of a society colonial offi-
cials aimed to transform, tax policies demonstrated how the colonial state 
observed and aimed to recondition colonized subjects.3 But its conduct, 
rules and paperwork, while intended to document and subject societies into 
comprehensible categories, also seemed to present opportunities for turning 
around the power of the state4, and provided a playing field for people 
to negotiate the impact of the state on their lives. This challenges much 
about how colonial states are currently understood: while a lot of research 
during the past decades has focused upon how production of knowledge 
has informed practices of extraction and domination to further the colonial 
agenda, the sort of governance exemplified by Korn seemed to have been 
characterized rather by a lack of knowledge, by incapacity and speculation. 
This is an aspect of colonialism that has not yet received the attention it 
deserves. Thus, to properly understand why after more than half a century 
of reforms the colonial tax system was still experienced as unworkable by 
Dutch officials actually working on the ground, this dissertation closely 
investigates local experiences of colonial taxation as exemplary of gover-
nance, paying attention to the limitations of colonial statecraft and the roles 
of local governors, indigenous intermediaries and subjected societies.
In this introduction, I will first set out the theoretical context and histo-
riographical relevance of this dissertation. Using these observations as a 
basis, I will outline the overarching research problem, questions and aims 
of this dissertation. Subsequently, I will outline the methodology used and 
provide an overview of the structure and chapter organization of this book.
1 Theoretical context
Taxation and governance
What ‘modern’ fiscal governance and state organization encompassed, and 
what it was supposed to look like according to colonial officials (and many 
historians), has been informed to a large extent by the fiscal-political devel-
opment or ‘evolution’ of Europe. Previous scholarship has described how 
this evolution brought about a development from feudal ‘domain states’ 
2 J.A. Schumpeter, “The Crisis of the Tax State”, in R. Swedberg (ed.), The Economics and 
Sociology of Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 99-140: 108.
3 As put by a former Dutch colonial offi cial: “Tax inspections seemed to be an appropriate 
tool to get to know a bit more about local inhabitants.” A. Visser, Een Merkwaardige Loop-
baan: Herinneringen van een Bestuursambtenaar in Nederlandsch-Indië/Indonesië (1932-1950) 
(Franeker: Uitgeverij T. Wever B.V., 1982), 39.
4 B. Kafka, “The Demon of Writing: Paperwork, Public Safety, and the Reign of Terror”, 
Representations 98 (2007), 1-24: 18.
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via ‘fiscal-military states’ to the ‘modern fiscal states’ of the early twentieth 
century.5 This entailed an increasing engagement between state and society, 
fostering integrated and self-enhancing processes of commercial growth, 
and an increase in public involvement in state finances, democratization 
and bureaucratization. The interests of growing commercial elites of 
urban bourgeoisies and states were aggregated, taxation serving as the 
lubricant that bound together the interests of subject-citizens and states. 
Feudal domains were ruled by overlords who were mostly concerned with 
continuing their dynasties and enhancing their own wealth. During the 
early modern age, these were gradually replaced with states that, driven by 
increasing military competition, maintained standing armies and navies to 
protect commerce at home and overseas, such as Britain, the Dutch Republic 
and France.6 This furnished the furthering of international commerce, secu-
rity of property rights and public wealth which enabled people to invest 
in the state’s economy and the state to levy new taxes and secure loans.7 
This engendered increasing mutual trust, interdependence and coopera-
tion between people and states, further guaranteeing the stability of state 
revenue.8 Taxes were agreed upon instead of imposed, as people negotiated 
with states through ‘revenue bargaining’, fostering representative govern-
ment and public finance, the origins of which are intimately bound up 
with the establishment of transparent, impersonal and rational Weberian 
5 Schumpeter, “The Crisis of the Tax State”, 102-104, 108-111; E. Kiser and S.M. Karceski, 
“Political Economy of Taxation”, Annual Review of Political Science 20:1 (2017), 75-92: 
76-78; A. Monson and W. Scheidel, “Stuyding Fiscal Regimes”, in A. Monson and W. 
Scheidel (eds.), Fiscal Regimes and the Political Economy of Premodern States (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 3-28: 17-19.
6 R. Bonney and W.M. Ormrod “Introduction: Crises, Revolutions and Self-Sustained 
Growth: Towards a Conceptual Model of Change in Fiscal History”, in W.M. Ormrod, 
M. Bonney, and R. Bonney (eds.), Crises, Revolutions and Self-Sustained Growth: Essays in 
European Fiscal History, 1130-1830 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 1-21: 8; M.J. 
Daunton, Trusting Leviathan: the Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799-1914 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 5-7, 11-2, 22-24; J. Glete, War and the State in Early 
Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500-1660 
(London: Routledge, 2002).
7 Hence, it has been argued that political tolerance for taxation often increased during 
wartime. See J.L. Campbell, “The State and Fiscal Sociology”, Annual Review of Sociology 
19 (1993), 163-185: 165 and K. Scheve and D. Stasavage, “The Conscription of Wealth: 
Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation”, International Organization 64:4 
(2010), 529-561.
8 C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, A.D. 990–1990 (Cambridge: Blackwell, 
1990),22-23, 30-31, 56-58; M.C. ‘t. Hart and R. Van Schaik, “Coercion and Capital Revis-
ited. Recent Trends in the Historiography of State-Formation”, in R. van Schaik (ed.), 
Economies, Public Finances, and the Impact of Institutional Changes in Interregional Perspective. 
The Low Countries and Neighbouring German Territories, 14th-17th Centuries (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2015), 23-32: 24; M.C. ‘t. Hart, The Making of a Bourgeois State: War, Politics and 
Finance during the Dutch Revolt (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 2-3, 
15-26, 32-14, 69-77, 187-194, 216-120.
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bureaucracies.9 This enabled people to pay taxes to capacity in accordance 
with public values, such as equal payment and public trust, which enforced 
a shared moral obligation among citizens to contribute to, and share in, 
public responsibility.10 Taxation became a self-enhancing process of collec-
tive action, in which subjects and states were mutually interested in each 
other’s wealth.11 This strengthened a sense of justice, boosted political rights 
and encouraged greater compliance to taxes.12
By collecting taxes into a “central consolidated fund”, wealthier, indus-
trialized and indeed, unified tax states accumulated such large amounts of 
capital in the nineteenth century that they became able to durably operate 
on the international financial market, securing more loans and raising 
bonds, thereby developing into ‘modern fiscal states.’13 Their perceived 
fiscal stability and reliability helped them to mobilize long-term financial 
resources to increase their spending capacity even more in the nineteenth 
century and further invest in their populations by taking care of public 
hygiene, infrastructure and education, facilitating more economic growth. 
Ultimately, this “cemented” the establishment of ‘fiscal social contracts’ 
in Western-European fiscal states, through high levels of centralization, 
9 M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Ed. by G. Roth and C. 
Wittich; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 54, 958-959; M. Weber, “Politics 
as a Vocation”, in M. Weber, H.H. Gerth, and C. Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology (London: Routledge, 1991), 77-128: 78; E. Kiser and J. Schneider, “Bureaucracy 
and Effi ciency: an Analysis of Taxation in Early Modern Prussia”, American Sociological 
Review 59:2 (1994), 187-204: 188, 194, 201.
10 M. Levi calls this “quasi voluntary compliance”: the obligation to pay on the condition 
that the state sanctions the noncompliant or ‘free-riders.’ The growth of bureaucracy 
increased the risk of detection and punishment in case of non-payment. As such, 
transparent, representative institutions increased the power of states to tax rather than 
hindering it, as it enhanced compliance and reduced transaction costs and enhanced 
effi ciency and the predictability of tax payment, leading to even higher levels of public 
approval, thrust and consent as it enabled more economic security for taxpayers to 
accumulate wealth and consume. Hence, “Once revenue production policy is understood 
as a result of bargaining, the need for rulers to reduce the cost of this bargaining makes 
parliaments attractive.” M. Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: 
University of California Press,1989), 182, 564-565.
11 Y. Barzel and E. Kiser, “Taxation and Voting Rights in Medieval England and France”, 
Rationality and Society 14:4 (2002), 473-507: 473-474, 497, 500.
12 D. Bräutigam, O.-H. Fjeldstad, and M. Moore, Taxation and State-Building in Developing 
Countries: Capacity and Consent, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 2, 5-6. 
See also M.C. ‘t Hart, Waarom Belastingen Goed zijn voor Democratie. Staatsvorming en 
Politieke Cultuur in Wereldhistorisch Perspectief (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 
2014).
13 W. He, Paths Toward the Modern Fiscal State: England, Japan, and China (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2013), 1-7.
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democratization and consolidation of the social welfare state.14 As such, 
taxation fostered what might be read as a process of Foucauldian gover-
nance, or governmentality, in which the raison d’état of European states 
became serving the wealth, benefit and productivity of populations, 
which was necessary for modernizing states to sustainably exist and grow. 
Governmentality, according to Foucault, is exercised when social objects 
(populations) became thinkable and disciplined, hence governable, which 
strengthened a governments greater interest and investment in popular 
wellbeing.15 Popular behaviour was no longer actively herded through 
disciplinary techniques and mutual surveillance, but rather influenced at 
a distance through economic governance by educating desires and config-
uring habits, aspirations and beliefs. Interfering was done no more or less 
than necessary and determined by whether it was “necessary and useful 
or [...] superfluous and harmful” to govern.16 State and society no longer 
opposed each other, but fused and cooperated. Instead of dominating, 
stimulating, prescribing and decreeing, modern Europe relied on laissez-
faire principles where the market created foundations of governmental 
action and which presupposed and commanded economic behaviour of 
subject-citizens in a new liberal world order.17
Of course, the above presents an ideal type, a “triumphal narrative” of 
state formation rather than an actual depiction of Europe’s fiscal develop-
ment. Few states followed such as smooth path towards capitalization and 
fiscal consolidation. Until quite late in the twentieth century, they rarely 
delivered the kind of collective prosperity, equality, wealth distribution and 
fiscal justice that they promised.18 A longue durée perspective demonstrates 
that fiscal developments lingered between autocracy and democracy, 
revenue bargaining and coercion, tax farming and tax administration, in 
which states moved away from centralization and bureaucratization, as 
14 S. Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American Approaches to Financing 
the Modern State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 22, 52-53, 104-105, 107-109; 
Bräutigam, Fjeldstad, and Moore, Taxation and State-Building, 10; M.L. Ross, “Does 
Taxation Lead to Representation?”, British Journal of Political Science 34:2 (2004), 229-249: 
230-231, 233-236, 246-248; M. Dincecco, “Political Regimes and Sovereign Credit Risk in 
Europe, 1750–1913”, in European Review of Economic History 13:1 (2009), 31-63.
15 Foucault, “Governmentality”, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon, P. Miller and M. Foucault (eds.), 
The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1991), 87-104: 103-104, and M. Foucault, Lectures on the Will to Know and Oedipal Know-
ledge: Lectures at the Collège de France 1970-1971 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 30.
16 Foucault, “Governmentality”, 103-104; T. Lemke, Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction 
(New York: New York University Press, 2011), 46-47.
17 I.M. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System IV: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789–1914 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 8-11.
18 See T. Piketty, “Income Inequality in France, 1901–1998”, The Journal of Political Economy 
111:5 (2003), 1004-1042 and Piketty, Top Incomes in France in the Twentieth Century: Inequa-
lity and Redistribution, 1901-1998 (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2018).
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often as towards it.19 The fiscal-military states accumulated huge debts to 
continue warfare, which may be read as a sign of their increasing creditwor-
thiness related to public thrust and democratization, but also of a limited 
tax revenue capacity due to the effects of revenue bargaining or adminis-
trative insufficiency.20 In the Netherlands, colonial profits were crucial to 
cope with the burden of heavy public debt and limited tax capacity. The 
development of colonial Indonesia, often portrayed as a linear march from 
practices of exploitation (ca. 1830-1870), to a liberal transition (ca. 1870-1900) 
of ethical or ‘modern’ colonialism (from ca. 1900 onward)21, might equally 
be problematized by critically analysing the practical elaboration of the tax 
system.
Governmentality overseas
Despite the limits to effects of Europe’s fiscal evolution in practice, its 
precepts of interrelated processes of fiscal progress, social development 
and governmentality are important in order to understand the context of 
colonial fiscal policy. Colonial states, especially those of the later nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, have often been characterized as driven by 
a constant ‘governmental rationality’ and a ‘will to improve’; the quest to 
produce subjects, govern their conduct, and optimize and increase their 
welfare standards and lives, by using, amongst other things, fiscal policy.22 
This suggests that the modes of governmentality that Foucault identified 
as characteristic of modern(izing) Europe, would also characterise colonial 
states. This ‘governmental reality’ had much to do with the frame through 
19 Monson and Scheidel, “Fiscal Regimes”, 4; E. Kiser and M. Levi, “Interpreting the 
Comparative History of Fiscal Regimes”, in Monson and Scheidel (eds.), Fiscal Regimes, 
537-556; P.F. Bang, “Tributary Empires and the New Fiscal Sociology, Some Compara-
tive Refl ections”, in ibid., 537-556: 535-536; M. Dincecco, “Fiscal Centralization, Limited 
Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650–1913”, in The Journal of Economic 
History 69:1 (2009), 48-103.
20 H. Scott, “The Fiscal-Military State and International Rivalry during the Long Eighteenth 
Century”, in C. Storrs (ed.), The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Europe: Essays in 
Honour of P.G.M. Dickson (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2009), 23-53; C. Storrs, “The 
Savoyard Fiscal-Military State in the Long Eighteenth Century”, in ibid., 201-236; See on 
the topic of debt, democratization and fi scal state-formation also D. Stasavage, Public 
Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: France and Great Britain 1688–1789 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) and States of Credit: Size, Power, and the Development 
of European Polities (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); K. Scheve and D. 
Stasavage, “Democracy, War, and Wealth: Lessons from Two Centuries of Inheritance 
Taxation”, in The American Political Science Review 106:1 (2012), 81-102; D. Stasavage, 
“Why Did Public Debt Originate in Europe?” in Monson and Scheidel (eds.), Fiscal 
Regimes, 492-522.
21 R.B. Cribb, “Introduction: the Late Colonial State in Indonesia”, in R.B. Cribb (ed.), The 
Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and Economic Foundations of the Netherlands Indies, 
1880-1942 (Leiden: KITLV, 1994), 1-9.
22 T.M. Li, The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 5.
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which colonizers observed indigenous societies, politics and organization. 
Attempts at Foucauldian governance were certainly fundamental to the 
self-image of colonial officials, many of whom held earnest convictions 
on the actual need for improvement of colonized societies, and played an 
important role in European claims to political sovereignty overseas. In the 
Dutch East Indies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, it was 
expressed in a purportedly increased concern for popular welfare which 
infused new types of ‘civilizational imperialism’ and ‘ethical’ colonial poli-
cies. The ‘will to improve’ was not only presented as a vehicle for ‘inward’ 
change, but also for ‘outward’ participation of people in global economic 
progress, and as such, to power.
Colonial governmental ambitions have traditionally been tied to the 
intersection of knowledge and empire. Extensive literature on this topic 
has demonstrated how colonial administrations across the globe became 
obsessed with producing knowledge to further their agendas, shaping 
a vast ‘paper empire’ of data, knowledge and records.23 In their attempts 
to make society ‘legible’, as J. Scott described it, archetypical, nineteenth-
century and scientifically trained officials measured, mapped, documented 
and thereby simplified the detailed realities of the world beneath them, into 
targeted, schematic categories of what he calls ‘high-modernism’ to inter-
vene in the daily lives of subjects.24 States attempted to define the implicit 
norms of power and arrive at ‘accepted’ foundations of knowledge and 
power which defined implicated norms of ‘truth’, by maintaining the state’s 
order, expressed in ever increasing written records such as maps, censuses, 
cadastral lists, tax registers and standard units of measurement.25 Bureau-
cracy and paperwork reflect Foucault’s’ “small techniques […] of arranging 
facts”, enabling the state to tax and spend, protect and serve, discipline and 
punish.26
23 F.A. Noor, Data-Gathering in Colonial Southeast Asia 1800-1900: Framing the Other 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020), 59; T. Richards, The Imperial Archive: 
Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire (London: Verso, 1993), 3-4; B.S. Cohn, Colonialism and 
its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 
ix-xvii.
24 J.C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 33, 47. Thereby he indeed ignores 
much of the “critique, dissent, subjectivity, indeed wild creativity that was fundamental 
to modernism (see above), and leaving only a one-dimensional view of scientific 
rationality” (see below); F. Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 140.
25 M. Foucault, History of Madness (London: Routledge, 2006), 4; M. Foucault and C. Gordon,
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other Writings, 1972-1977 (Harlow: Pearson 
Education, 2008), 111-113, 117. See also B.O’G. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Refl ec-
tions on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006), 164-178.
26 Kafka, “The Demon of Writing”, 17; M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the 
Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 190-191; B. Kafka, “Paperwork: the State of the 
Discipline”, Book History 12 (2009), 340-353: 341, 342, 349-350, 351.
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However, the knowledge and ‘facts’ produced by colonial officials were 
far from innocent. Since E. Said’s fundamental work historians have started 
to realize that colonial knowledge was always geared towards shaping and 
maintaining distinctions between the ‘Orient’ and the ‘West’ to express 
colonial power. Such views of Asian society also became deeply interwoven 
into canonical self-understandings of Europe.27 In Southeast Asia, a colonial 
‘discursive construction’ of society employed a capitalist lens that explained 
the value of the region and its people in the narrow terms of their use to 
European colonialism.28 As such, “European categories of thought” were 
made “the civilized ‘standard’ against which other cultures were measured 
and often found wanting.”29 The European state came to serve as the 
dominant and only valuable model of political organization. In the inherent 
political differences of Asian polities from European states, colonial officials 
spotted a need for intervention, in order to bring indigenous society to 
‘higher’ (European) standards of political and socioeconomic organization 
under colonial tutelage, serving the ‘modernizing’ aims of the state.30 The 
colonial ‘will to improve’ was not only a claim to “pastoral expertise”, but 
also to “liberal power.”31
Taxation, power-knowledge and discipline
Taxation was a fundamental part of this claim. Direct taxation in particular 
has been identified as an important instrument in the toolbox of officials 
to intervene in society, not only because it funded governance, but also 
because, contrary to indirect taxes, they enabled redistribution of the tax 
burden. Direct tax also offered a more stable revenue source (than, for 
instance, trade taxes which were more vulnerable to fluctuations in market 
27 E. Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 2003), 8-9, 46.
28 F.A. Noor, The Discursive Construction of Southeast Asia in 19th Century Colonial-Capitalist 
Discourse (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2016). Such discrusive reasonsing 
also existed in Europe, see for instance J. Morrissey, “Foucault and the Colonial Subject: 
Emergent Forms of Colonial Governmentality in Early Modern Ireland”, in P. Duffy and 
W. Nolan (eds.), At the Anvil: Essays in Honour of William J. Smyth (Dublin: Geography 
Publications, 2012), 135-150.
29 J. Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400-2000 (London: Penguin 
Books, 2008), 339.
30 D. Chakrabarty, “Postcoloniality and the Artifi ce of History: Who Speaks for “Indian” 
Pasts?”, Representations 37 (1992), 1-26: 16-18; Said, Orientalism, 39-40, 42-43, 49, 226-230, 
300-301, 332-333; See also: A. Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism (London/New York: 
Routledge, 1998), 43-69, 104-133.
31 U. Kalpagam, “Colonial Governmentality and the ‘Economy’”, Economy and Society 29:3 
(2000), 418-438: 420.
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prices)32, required a more mature administration and stimulated integration 
of indigenous power structures into the colonial administration.33 Attempts 
to impose taxes across the world have been interpreted as a Foucauldian 
exercise of power to discipline subjected populations, map societies, 
innovate government regimes and execute state-building processes and 
maintain public order.34 Likewise, in colonial empires taxes have frequently 
been used to carry out colonial civilizing missions.35 In British Nigeria for 
instance, F. Lugard’s memorandum on tax policy framed African societies 
as incapable of proper resource management and in dire need of colonial 
instruction in the proper techniques of accounting, to reach higher stan-
dards of civilization. To Lugard, taxation was “of great importance” in 
securing recognition of British suzerainty and promoting “confidence in 
governance” which constituted a cultural project directed at “moralizing the 
natives.”36 Taxes were used as a disciplinary instrument to correct behav-
iour, instil productivity, and provide answers to “questions of morality” to 
shape a population of obedient, civilized taxpaying subject-citizens, living 
according to the patterns desired by the state.37 These patterns included, for 
instance, settled life of structural village inhabitancy and landownership, or 
32 Indirect taxes, such as customs, were easier and cheaper to collect and posed smaller 
political risks, but also rendered smaller revenues. “Tax revolts in colonial Africa”, 
according to Frankema, “were almost always provoked by taxes that were levied directly 
on people’s income or assets; these were the most visible taxes. Import duties, which 
constituted the bulk of custom revenues before 1940, were mainly levied on luxury items 
[...]”, E. Frankema, “Colonial Taxation and Government Spending in British Africa, 1880-
1940: Maximizing Revenue or Minimizing Effort?”, Explorations in Economic History 48:1 
(2010), 136-149: 141.
33 S. Berry, No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 235; L.A. Gardner, “Decentraliza-
tion and Corruption in Historical Perspective: Evidence from Tax Collection in British 
Colonial Africa”, Economic History of Developing Regions 25:2 (2010), 213-236: 218-223. 
Studying indirect taxes such as import and export rights, tariffs, duties and excises, 
in turn discloses issues of trade and intercolonial competition left unaddressed in this 
dissertation. See for instance B. de Roo, “The Trouble with Tariffs. Customs Policies and 
the Shaky Balance Between Colonial and Private Interests in the Congo (1886-1914)”, 
Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis 12:3 (2015), 1-22; “Customs in the Two 
Congos: A Connected History of Colonial Taxation in Africa (1885–1914)”, Journal of 
Colonialism and Colonial History 19:1 (2018).
34 See for instance A. Likhovski, ““Training in Citizenship”: Tax Compliance and Moder-
nity”, Law & Social Inquiry 32:3 (2007), 665-700 and H. Yeomans, “Taxation, State Forma-
tion, and Governmentality: The Historical Development of Alcohol Excise Duties in 
England and Wales”, Social Science History 42:2 (2018).
35 See for instance P.J. Havik, A. Keese, and M. Santos (eds.), Administration and Taxation 
in Former Portuguese Africa, 1900-1945 (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2015) (Preface), xi.
36 B. Bush and J. Maltby, “Taxation in West Africa: Transforming the Colonial Subject into 
the ‘Governable Person’”, Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15:1 (2004), 5-34: 22.
37 As shown by Rose Hunt in the case of Belgian Africa: N.R. Hunt, “Noise Over Camou-
fl aged Polygamy, Colonial Morality Taxation, and a Woman-Naming Crisis in Belgian 
Africa”, Journal of African History 32:3 (1991), 471-494: 474.
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wage labour to enter the money economy and enable tax payment, to stimu-
late the creation of a working class under longer periods of employment.38
In many colonial empires, disciplinary power was initially exercised 
through various forms of coerced labour. In Belgian Congo, for instance, if 
a plantation required workers, officials raised taxes, and whoever could not 
pay was immediately forced to sign up for compulsory labour.39 Coerced 
labour was central to early colonial revenue-raising strategies that often 
exceeded the total monetary component.40 In the Dutch East Indies, coerced 
cultivation and labour services were crucial as a low-cost way to maintain 
colonial export economies and infrastructures. Later in the nineteenth 
century, as explained in Chapter 2-5, they were seen as remnants of the old 
colonial order and unsuitable for a role in the monetary tax system, hence 
attempts were made to abolish them. Hence, monetary taxes replaced 
coerced labour as the suitable instruments to remodel society according to 
standards better suited to the idea of ‘benevolent’ colonialism, and that way 
became indicative of colonial governmentality.
However, coerced labour remained in use in the archipelago until the 
end of the Dutch colony. This is symptomatic of the problem of the afore-
mentioned colonial incapacity to resolve the conflict between towering 
ambitions to reform and colonial uses of knowledge. In Europe, taxation, 
though surely never producing the utopic conjunction of the interests of 
state and society, at least brought some level of administrative certainty in 
the twentieth century, but in colonial context, as this dissertation will show, 
it remained connotated by arbitrariness, practices of extortion and attempts 
to ‘frame and identify the other’ in service of colonial capitalism. This 
entailed the elaboration of a ‘power-knowledge’ that normalized specific 
kinds of behaviour and desire while condemning and criminalizing others 
by using the power of surveillance, which is “permeant in its effects, even 
if it is discontinuous in its action.”41 Colonial states tried to balance their 
exercises of governance with that of domination, resulting in the tensions 
that are at the core of this dissertation’s research.
38 L. Gardner, “New Colonies, Old Tools: Building Fiscal Systems in East and Central 
Africa”, in A. Booth and E. Frankema (eds.), Fiscal Capacity and the Colonial State in Asia 
and Africa, 1850-1960: Studies in Economic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2019), 193-229: 218; A. Booth, "Towards a Modern Fiscal State in Southeast Asia, 
c. 1900–60", in ibid., 36-76: 61.
39 V.J.H. Houben and J. Seibert, “(Un)freedom. Colonial labor relations in Belgian Congo 
and the Netherlands Indies compared”, in E. Frankema and F. Buelens (eds.), Colonial 
Exploitation and Economic Development. The Belgian Congo and the Netherlands Indies 
Compared (New York: Routledge, 2013), 178-192: 185.
40 The design of forced corvée labour regimes, she adds, were often exchanged. The design 
of the forced corvée labour system in French West Africa was for instance partly copied 
from the Dutch East Indies, Indochina and Madagascar. M. van Waijenburg, “Financing 
the African Colonial State: The Revenue Imperative and Forced Labor”, The Journal of 
Economic History 78:1 (2018), 40-80: 43, 51, 48-50, 52, 60, 69-70.
41 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 202; T. Lemke, “An indigestible meal? Foucault, Govern-
mentality and State Theory”, Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 8:2 (2007), 57.
Promise Pretence and Pragmatism.indb   14 22-04-21   17:34
Introduction 15
2 Relevance
Colonial governance and standoffishness
The last point deserves to be made more explicit, as it reflects on a core 
problem of colonialism in general. All colonial states experienced a paradox 
between their ‘modernizing’ governmental ambitions and their inherently 
exploitative and parsimonious nature, related to the above described 
propensity to exert sovereignty and discipline. As recent literature has 
emphasized, aspects of statecraft, self-evident in Europe, such as a represen-
tative government and a system of checks and balances to ensure legitimacy 
and justice, characteristics of a ‘modern fiscal state’, were requirements 
“that colonial rule per definition could never meet”, as it was based on 
external power rather than internal approval.42
As argued by E. Frankema and A. Booth, a true ‘fiscal modernization’ 
was never fully accomplished in colonial Indonesia because taxes were not 
intended to raise revenue to fight foreign powers or provide public services, 
but used to maintain and control a local administration and internal order, 
rooted not in legitimacy but coercion.43 Colonial states, they explain, 
were reluctant to “place the burden of imperial expansion on the backs 
of metropolitan taxpayers.”44 Instead, officials sought to minimize state 
responsibility and maximize exploitation, so they balanced their budgets 
by increasing the fiscal burden on indigenous populations.45 In the Dutch 
East Indies for instance, 90% of export taxes was levied from agricultural 
production by indigenous people46, while around 1931, only half of the 
42 K. Alexopoulou, “Local Conditions and Metropolitan Visions: Fiscal Policies and Prac-
tices in Portuguese Africa, c. 1850–1970”, in Booth and Frankema (eds.), Fiscal Capacity 
and the Colonial State, 230-263: 257.
43 E. Frankema and A. Booth, “Fiscal Capacity and the Colonial State: Lessons from a 
Comparative Perspective”, in Booth and Frankema (eds.), Fiscal Capacity and the Colonial 
State, 1-35: 5, 11-13.
44 Ibid., 4-5.
45 In French Africa, for instance, colonial administrations were not so much the metro-
politan taxpayers’ but all the more a “black men’s burden” – especially since French 
civil servant’s salaries absorbed large shares of local expenditures; the contribution of 
French taxpayers to the colonial state revenue was almost negligible compared to that 
of the African taxpayer. E. Huillery, “The Black Man’s Burden: The Cost of Colonization 
of French West Africa”, The Journal of Economic History 74:1 (2014), 1-38: 29-34. The 
concern that governing ‘tropical empires’ would cost more than they were worth also 
drove much of British colonial fi scal policy in Africa, see: Gardner, “Decentralization and 
Corruption”, 215.
46 Additionally, the taxes paid by indigenous people were most vulnerable to economic 
crises, such as on land, agriculture and consumption. A. Booth, “Night Watchman, 
Extractive, or Developmental States? Some Evidence from Late Colonial South‐East 
Asia”, Economic History Review 60:2 (2007), 241-266; A. Booth, “The Burden of Taxation 
in Colonial Indonesia in the Twentieth Century”, JSAS 11:1 (1980), 91-109: 94, 101-104, 
108; A. Booth, Economic Change in Modern Indonesia: Colonial and Post-Colonial Comparisons 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 104-110.
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colonial state’s expenditures were devoted to its own upkeep.47 Though 
it could be argued that colonial states were not all just the type of ‘night-
watchmen states’ that tried to minimize their responsibilities (performing 
a minimum set of tasks at minimum costs), nevertheless, seeking economic 
self-sufficiency, efficiency, balanced budgets and equity were at the core of 
colonial officials’ fiscal concerns. This resulted into a potential structural 
underinvestment in local economies, potential erosion of tax bases and 
economic differentiation within, between and among, colonial and metro-
politan states.48 Ultimately, what mattered most in colonial states was 
that order was preserved.49 Similarly, D. Slater and D. Kim observe that 
many (colonial) states did not seek structural expansion of governance 
and knowledge accumulation to maximize control or revenue extraction, 
but rather a minimisation of political resistance and challenges through 
‘standoffishness.’50
The influence of local conditions
As summarized by Frankema and M. van Waijenburg, because colonizers 
sought to “limit the burden of empire-building on domestic taxpayers”, 
and “make colonies fiscally independent”, the pace of colonial state expan-
sion depended not on ‘metropolitan blueprints’ but on the development of 
a local tax base.”51 And such a ‘local tax base’, this dissertation upholds, 
should be understood not simply as the economic capacity of local 
taxpayers but rather as contextualized in the whole of the local politics, 
rulership, popular behaviour and institutions of social organization encoun-
tered on the spot.
Recent research on the British, French, Spanish and Portuguese 
colonial empires has demonstrated how important it is to pay attention 
to local geographic, social, political, economic and legal conditions and 
circumstances. When studying colonial taxation, the relationships between 
colonizers and colonized, the pragmatic choices of ‘men on the spot’ and 
47 A.J. Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies: its Government, Problems and Politics (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1942), 172.
48 A. Booth, Colonial Legacies: Economic and Social Development in East and Southeast Asia 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2007), 12-15, 67-87, 112-117, 197-198.
49 A. Booth, “The Evolution of Fiscal Policy and the Role of Government in the Colonial 
Economy”, in A. Booth, W.J. O’Malley, and A. Weidemann (eds.), Indonesian Economic 
History in the Dutch Colonial Era (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 
1990), 210-243: 210-219, 223-225, 239-242; Frankema and Booth, “Fiscal Capacity and 
the Colonial State”, 9-10; Frankema, “Colonial Taxation and Government Spending”, 
137-138; See also Gardner, “Decentralization and Corruption”, 216.
50 D. Slater and D. Kim, “Standoffi sh States: Nonliterate Leviathans in Southeast Asia”, 
TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia 3:1 (2015), 25-44.
51 E. Frankema and M. van Waijenburg, “Metropolitan Blueprints of Colonial Taxation?: 
Lessons from Fiscal Capacity Building in British and French Africa, c. 1880-1940”, The 
Journal of African History 55:3 (2014), 371-400: 372.
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the limitations in government capacity and metropolitan planning should 
be taken into account.52 Various authors demonstrate how colonial fiscal 
institutions, rather than being carbon copies of those in Europe, were 
invented locally.53 In British Bengal, in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth century for example, instead of recreating their state bureaucracy 
abroad, the British entrusted daily governance to private actors, subtly 
deconstructing existing orders and “facilitating the marketability of tax 
farms outside the discretion of patrimonial rulers.”54 This accords with C. 
Bayly’s assertion that in all its aspects, the British colony in India, “was 
erected on the foundation of its Indian precursors [...] incorporated into the 
British canon by means of the testimony of native informants.”55 Indeed, 
the Raj was reluctant to introduce new taxes, and modified the existing 
system of land taxes in specific regions to provide a fiscal basis for the 
entire colonial state.56 Local traditions and indigenous writing classes were 
integral to the expansive power of colonial taxonomies, and greatly assisted 
the emergence of the colonial fiscal state but also the ways in which poli-
52 See L. Gardner, Taxing Colonial Africa: the Political Economy of British Imperialism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 41, 100-116, 123-125, 157-163, 190-191; Frankema, 
“Colonial Taxation and Government Spending”, 138; A. Keese, “Tax in Practice: Colonial 
Impact and Renegotiation on the Ground”, in P.J. Havik, A. Keese, and M. Santos (eds.), 
Administration and Taxation in Former Portuguese Africa, 1900-1945 (Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015), 82-97: 82-97, 93-94; A. Keese, “Taxation, Evasion 
and Compulsory Measures in Angola”, in ibid., 98-137: 106, 131, 184; P.J. Havik, “‘Taxing 
the Natives’: Fiscal Administration, Labour and Crop Cultivation in Portuguese Guinea 
(1900-1945)”, in ibid., 167-227; R. Grafe Grafe and A. Irigoin, “A Stakeholder Empire: the 
Political Economy of Spanish Imperial Rule in America”, Economic History Review 65:2 
(2012), 609-651: 611-613, 620, 637-638; R. Grafe and M.A. Irigoin, “The Spanish Empire 
and its Legacy: Fiscal Redistribution and Political Confl ict in Colonial and Post-Colonial 
Spanish America”, Journal of Global History 1:2 (2006), 241-267; L. Channing, “Taxing 
Chiefs: The Design and Introduction of Direct Taxation in the Sierra Leone Protectorate, 
1896–1914”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 48:3 (2020), 395-424.
53 Even in the plantation society of colonial Jamaica, for instance, colonial governors were 
trying not to “recreate metropolitan fi scal-military structures in miniature” but rather 
to “persuade local [white plantation] elites to use whatever means they had at their 
disposal, of support the aims of imperial policy”; state formation became “a product of 
negotiation” in which taxation shaped the “sinews of imperial power.” A. Graham, “The 
Colonial Sinews of Imperial Power: The Political Economy of Jamaican Taxation, 1768-
1838”, Journal of imperial and Commonwealth History 45:2 (2017), 188-209: 203.
54 M. Martin, “Patrimonialism, Bureaucratization, and Fiscal Systems of British Bengal, 
1765–1819”, in M.M. Charrad and J. Adams (eds.), Patrimonial Capitalism and Empire 
(Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2015), 191-216: 193-195.
55 C.A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 
1780-1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 179.
56 T. Roy, “Why Was British India a Limited State?”, in Booth and Frankema (eds.), Fiscal 
Capacity and the Colonial State, 77-109..
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cies were communicated to the population.57 Consequently, the fusion of 
‘patrimonialism’ and ‘bureaucratization’ was as common in colonies, as it 
was in the metropolitan homelands.58
As this study will show, investigating Dutch colonial taxation adds to 
our understanding of how colonial states relied on the institutions, patterns 
and structures they claimed to replace or reform, enforcing ongoing reinter-
pretations of the hybridity and instability of colonial power.59 Indonesia’s 
rich diversity in local patterns of political, legal, economic and social orga-
nization and rulership, presents an ideal case in an investigation into, how 
in general, colonial statecraft elaborated in practice. Taxation binds together 
into an interlocking reality the mentalities of colonial statesmen and local 
patterns of social organization. This is the result of interaction between 
colonial metropoles and peripheries, beyond the reach of governmental or 
disciplinary motivations of the state. By demanding taxes, colonial states 
enforced interaction, and it is within this interaction that numerous aspects 
of colonial governance, otherwise obscured, are drawn into the spotlight. 
Attempts towards modernization, unification and monetization of the colo-
nial tax system thus impacted the relationships and entanglements between 
metropoles, colonies and colonized populations. How this worked in the 
case of Indonesia remains unclear.
3 Research problems, questions and aims
From paper to practice
Twentieth-century Dutch colonial governance requires a reinterpretation 
which that the state’s ideology and ambitions were structurally limited by 
specific characteristics of local governmental mechanisms and conditions. 
57 H.J.A. Bellenoit, The Formation of the Colonial State in India: Scribes, Paper and Taxes, 1760-
1860 (London/New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2017), 131, 135, 139-140, 
148, 198. As a result, many Indonesian ‘indigenous’ or ‘traditional’ culture practices later 
considered authentic had their origins in colonial use of ritual. H.C.G. Schulte Nordholt, 
The Spell of Power: a History of Balinese Politics, 1650-1940 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996), 13, 
254-260, 335-336.
58 J.P. Adams, “Trading States, Trading Places: The Role of Patrimonialism in Early Modern 
Dutch Development”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 36:2 (1994), 319-355; J.P. 
Adams, “Principals and Agents, Colonialists and Company Men: the Decay of Colonial 
Control in the Dutch East Indies”, American Sociological Review 61:1 (1996), 12-28; J.P. 
Adams, The Familial State: Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Modern Europe 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); J.P. Adams and M.M. Charrad, “Introduction: 
Old (Patrimonial) Political Forms Made New”, in Adams and Charrad (eds.), Patrimonial 
Capitalism and Empire, 1-5.
59 See H.K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994), 21, 89, 111, and T.G. 
Ruiter, “State Policy, Peasantization and Ethnicity: Changes in the Karo Area of Langkat 
in Colonial Times”, in G. Benjamin and C. Chou (eds.), Tribal Communities in the Malay 
World: Historical, Cultural and Social Perspectives (Singapore, ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 
2002), 401-421.
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In Scott’s model, registration and documentation served as the manuals 
based on which officials took action, enabling them to “transform the facts 
they took note of.”60 But colonial states, as argued by A.L. Stoler, were “not 
always intent on accumulating more knowledge” but more intent “on 
a selective winnowing and reduction of it”, in order to keep governance 
manageable and affordable.61 Briefly put, “[imperial] bureaucracy always 
meets with limitations; a linear narrative of ever-increasing bureaucratic 
complexity on a grand march towards modernity will not do.”62 This would 
obscure the many “ongoing unresolved conflicts at the heart of European 
culture and politics”, and would be “a simplification of the state in itself – 
an attempt to make the state ‘legible.’”63 Indeed, as F. Cooper has argued, 
colonial regimes were not always able to “routinize and normalize their 
exercise of power” or to “supplant older forms of discipline and punish-
ment with modern governmentality”64, as also apparent from the problems 
encountered by Korn, quoted at the beginning of this introduction.
Viewing colonial governmentality and its associated processes of 
bureaucratization, knowledge accumulation and standardization as “an 
ugly reflection of modernity [...] placed the unevenness of the colonizing 
processes and the small, profound effects of the evasions, deflections and 
struggles within colonized territories in a vaguely defined meta-history, 
rather than in the situations in which people actually acted.”65 In other 
words, we understand much about metropolitan ideologies, and what 
drove colonial states to unify and reform the fiscal system. We understand 
the paper-bureaucracy of Korn’s superiors, the texts they produced, the 
categories they imposed upon villagers across Indonesia and the ‘govern-
mental rationality’ that drove them. We understand how the tax forms 
demonstrated in the prologue, tried to categorize and standardize taxpayers 
and tax payment. However, how the government practices that these forms 
represent influenced policy making, how policy making related to processes 
of government practice, how it worked out in the experience of Korn, and 
how colonized people reinterpreted colonial power systems or communi-
cated with the state, is less well understood.
60 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 47.
61 A.L. Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 49-50. See also K.J.P.F.M. Jeurgens, “Infor-
mation on the Move. Colonial Archives: Pillars of Past Global Information Exchange”, 
in K.J.P.F.M. Jeurgens, A.C.M. Kappelhof, and M. Karabinos (eds.), Colonial Legacy in 
Southeast Asia. The Dutch Archives (‘s-Gravenhage: Stichting Archiefpublicaties, 2012), 
45-66: 51.
62 P. Crooks and T.H. Parsons, “Empires, Bureaucracy and the Paradox of Power”, in 
P. Crooks and T.H. Parsons (eds.), Empires and Bureaucracy in World History: From Late 
Antiquity to the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 3-28: 
20. See also F. Cooper, “From Chief to Technocrat: Labour and Colonial Authority in 
Post–World War II Africa”, in ibid., 391-411: 401-403.
63 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 141-142.
64 Ibid., 143
65 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 54.
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Research questions and aims
In exploring these problematic relationships between colonial theories and 
practices of colonial tax reform, the main question to be kept in mind is as 
follows:
What were the consequences of the modernization of the tax system to Dutch colonialism 
in Indonesia, between ca. 1870 and 1940?
To elaborate on this question, this dissertation distinguishes between colo-
nial theory or ideology and practice. In the first place, it seeks to answer 
what this ‘modernization’ of the colonial state and tax system entailed. 
How can we contextualize it in, firstly, the overarching changes in colonial 
ideology and governance, and, secondly, the colonial political and economic 
transformations at the time? And what ideas and ambitions of governance 
and social improvement motivated the colonial state to reform its tax 
system?
These questions reflect on the idea of ‘modernization’ as produced by 
contemporary colonial officials and scholars. ‘Modernization’, to them, 
presented “a goal to which rest of the world aspires”, an ideal model of 
capitalism, industrialization, monetization, democratization and state-
centralization, “held up before colonized people” marking the colonial 
“right to rule.”66 Subsequent perspectives on modernization have rein-
vented and problematized the use of term, and taken it out of its historical 
straightjacket by questioning its Western origins and sense of accomplish-
ment and suggesting a ‘plurality of modernities.’67 As F. Cooper argues, 
such variable considerations have obfuscated rather than clarified the 
term, leading to confusion over, for instance, how to distinguish between 
“conditions of modernity and its representations.”68 This dissertation 
follows Cooper’s, and S. Protschky and T. van den Berge’s more recent call, 
to engage in a historical practice that acknowledges the various everyday 
experiences of modernization without consolidating these into uniform 
models, to simply understand “how modernity as being used and why.”69 
The following chapters do not see (only) an “ideal state that has rarely, if 
ever, manifested as the model predicts”, a “failed project of colonial moder-
nity that is inevitably usurped and reshaped under an indigenous/nation-
alist banner”, or ‘multiple exclusive modernities’ opposing each other.70 
Rather, they aim to explore how the modernizing attempts of colonial officials 
66 Ibid., 113, 115.
67 Ibid., 113-114.
68 Ibid., 114; S. Protschky, “Modern Times in Southeast Asia, 1920s–1970s”, in S. Protschky 
and T. van den Berge (eds.), Modern Times in Southeast Asia, 1920s–1970s (Leiden/Boston: 
Brill, 2018), 1-14: 2, after Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 114.
69 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 115; Protschky, “Modern Times in Southeast Asia”, 11.
70 Protschky, “Modern Times in Southeast Asia”, 2-3.
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were reinterpreted and changed in the context of governance practice. 
What circumstances, factors and mechanisms influenced the ways in which 
modernization of the tax system played out and was experienced on the 
spot? What was the impact of the modernization of the tax system on the 
relationships between the central colonial state, local officials, indigenous 
intermediaries and taxpaying subjects? And what does this tell us about 
colonial governance? Through these questions, this dissertation appreciates 
how fiscal modernization in colonial Indonesia resulted from both colonial 
ideology and governance practice, and accepts the many incongruences, 
incoherencies and contradictions that emerged from it, resulting in new 
forms of governance and taxation.
Such a focus on conditions and circumstances will help to explore 
specific forms of taxation beyond the colonial governmental mentalities and 
ideologies of social improvement and conflicting programs of exploitation. 
It pays special attention to specific factors within the methods officials used 
in their attempts to influence the societies below them and mechanisms 
of colonial taxation as they played out on the spot in exchange between 
colonized societies and the state. This will help us to see colonialism beyond 
the scope of the “privileged white men” who “struggled to uphold their 
moral authority, while maintaining a gendered, racialized and coercive 
form of power.”71 It tries to contextualize colonial governance as rooted in 
interaction between the colonizers and the colonized. This is of course not 
to reduce the responsibility of colonial states for the consequences of their 
domination. Rather, this dissertation intends to include experiences from 
outside the frameworks of colonizers, to value the agency and perspec-
tives of colonized societies and not just their responses to, but also their 
initiatives within processes of colonial state-formation by emphasizing the 
roles of specific individuals. Thereby, this dissertation aims to show how 
colonial power was diffused and delegated and that the precepts, principles 
and boundaries of the colonial order were constantly contested and rein-
terpreted.72 In that sense, the two tax forms exemplified above represent 
not simply a Foucauldian exercise of knowledge accumulation, standardiza-
tion and disciplinary power, but rather a process of endless modification, 
bargaining and interaction. This will add to the ongoing reinterpretation 
of colonial history in which the decrees and precepts of ‘colonizers’ are 
no longer seen as fundamental in shaping the individual experiences and 
social realities of the ‘colonized’, but rather the other way around.73
71 D. Heath, “Bureaucracy, Power and Violence in Colonial India: The Role of Indian Subal-
terns”, in P. Crooks and T.H. Parsons (eds.), Empires and Bureaucracy in World History, 
364-390: 364.
72 S. Guha, Beyond Caste: Identity and Power in South Asia, Past and Present (Leiden: Brill, 
2013), 112-118.
73 See for a recent example N.L. Immler and S. Scagliola, “Seeking Justice for the Mass 
Execution in Rawagede/Probing the Concept of ‘Entangled History’ in a Postcolonial 
Setting”, Rethinking History 24:1 (2020), 1-28.




This dissertation comparatively analyses how centrally coordinated policies 
and theories of fiscal reform resonated in the governmental reality of five 
distinct regions, each revealing specific important aspects of the practice 
of colonial governance. The first two chapters investigate colonial ideology 
and policy making, both in The Hague and Batavia (the political capitals 
of the Netherlands and colonial Indonesia), and are based on sources that 
express the vision of colonial officials located in the ‘top layers’ of the 
colonial archives in The Hague, or in published materials housed in the 
University Library of Leiden.
The following five chapters focus on the personal experiences of local 
colonial officials, various intermediaries and local taxpayers, and the influ-
ence they attempted to exert over policy formulation. These chapters are 
based on more local sources, found hidden deep in archival collections in 
Jakarta and various other locations spread across Indonesia. They analyse 
specific debates among officials at different levels, based on their varied 
expectations and their understandings of indigenous society, and try to 
understand how these informed new tax policy. They examine how these 
policies, codified in written law or ordinances (as exemplified by figure 
0.3), related to everyday practices and rituals of taxation, by defining the 
differences between what these ordinances prescribed and what officials, 
village chiefs and taxpayers actually did. Ultimately, the dissertation seeks 
to connect the reality of tax ordinances to that of tax forms, and that of tax 
forms to the experiences and actions of taxpayers.74
This is not merely a matter of the replacement of “great men with crafty 
rebels”, but rather an attempt to combine the everyday perspectives of 
top statesmen, parliamentarians and officials with those of local officials, 
middlemen, indigenous aristocracies and taxpayers, all of whom, on their 
own terms, occupied specific roles in the elaboration of colonial taxation, 
reinterpreted the state’s instructions, confronted each other and adapted 
and negotiated.75 This way, the roles and functions of state institutions, its 
directors, its executioners and those subjected to its policies, in the larger 
body politic of the colonial state, are examined in the wider context of their 
mutual interaction with society.
74 Ordinances were usually endlessly revised, corrected, updated and (re)published in the 
Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië (1816-1948), the colonial State Gazette.
75 A. Eckert and A. Jones, “Introduction: Historical Writing about Everyday Life”, Journal of 
African Cultural Studies 15:1 (2002), 5-16: 7.
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Sources
This dissertation relies on a variety of state, local and private archives, 
contemporary publications and current-day literature. Selection and clear 
reading strategies are critical to distinguishing the specific purposes and 
motivations of these sources’ authors, and the ways they produced knowl-
edge and laws.
However, in the case of the state archives, which forms the core of this 
dissertations’ analytical body, a more detailed knowledge of the colonial 
state’s basic anatomy is required.76 The most fundamental level of the Dutch 
colonial administration was that of the controleur, who administrated at 
district level. Together with their superiors – (Assistant-)Residents, provincial 
and assisting sub-provincial governors – controleurs personified local colo-
nial authority to colonized populations, gathered information about them, 
maintained relations with indigenous rulers and carried responsibility for 
conducting state activities, such as collecting taxes. They were appointed 
in the ‘Interior Administration’ (Binnenlands Bestuur), and coordinated poli-
cies which were executed by a collection of local administrators and chiefs 
appointed in the local indigenous pillar of the civil service, the ‘Inlands 
Bestuur’, below the controleurs. Outside of Java, larger, overarching stretches 
of territory were administered under the supreme authority of a governor.77
While controleurs were expected to communicate with the Residents, 
and Residents and/or Governors communicated with what I see as the 
second most important level of colonial administration. These were the offi-
cials seated in the bureaucratic centre of Batavia: The Director and servants 
of the ‘Department of Interior Administration’ and various other Depart-
ments78, the Governor-General and his supportive Algemeene Secretarie 
(General Secretariat) and the Raad van Indië, the central advisory council. 
Frequently, these were recruited from senior officials in the Interior admin-
istration. In order to issue new policy, plans, opinions and bits and pieces 
of information were rotated among these bodies of administration and the 
provincial governments of Residents and controleurs, in a bureaucratic ping-
76 N.F. Dwiandari, “Archives Management and Bureaucracy Development: The Case of 
Transitional Dutch East Indies, 1816-1830”, in K.J.P.F.M. Jeurgens, T. Kappelhof and M. 
Karabinos (eds.), Colonial Legacy in Southeast Asia: the Dutch Archives (The Hague: Stich-
ting Archiefpublicaties, 2012), 113-124.
77 In 1925, Java was sub-divided into three overarching ‘provinces’ under a governor as 
well. The colonial administrative division of Indonesia was subjected to continuous 
expansion and reform.
78 In 1866 a series of reforms led to the establishment of the Departments of Interior 
Administration, Finance, Education, Religion, and Industry and Public Works, followed 
by a Department of Justice in 1870 and one of Agriculture in 1904 (from 1911 onward 
Agriculture, Industry and Trade), and a Department of War housed in Bandung. All 
Departments were headed by a Director.
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pong game that usually lasted years.79 The ultimate goal of arriving at new 
legislation in the form of an ordinance was a daunting task, with potentially 
disastrous consequences, which many officials eagerly bequeathed to their 
successors.
In thematically ordered volumes, the Algemeene Secretarie compiled 
and stored (copies of) all incoming and outgoing correspondence, reports 
and information addressed to the Governor General, to allow future staff 
access to relevant information when necessary. Access to information was of 
course restricted and full access to the circuits of knowledge represented in 
these volumes remained exclusive to only the highest echelons of power.80 
Each of these volumes usually comprises material from over a couple of 
decades on a specific issue.
The Governor-General held supreme authority in the colony. However, 
as representative of the Dutch crown, no single ordinances could be 
effectuated without deliberation with the Dutch national government and 
confirmation by the royal signature. From 1860 onward, the Governor 
General mandatorily corresponded with the ‘Ministry of Colonies’ in the 
Hague (representing the top layer of the colonial administration), through 
so-called Mailrapporten (Mail-reports), describing the most relevant events 
and developments, often including attached copies of correspondence and 
related materials. Once processed and classified by Ministerial officials and 
depending on the topic and its relevance or urgency, the package was either 
stored as a ‘Verbaal’ (decision, or procedural document on which a decision 
was taken), or prepared and sent to Parliament for political hearsay and 
the Raad van State (Dutch Council of State) for legislative consultation. In 
the case a new law was passed by parliament, it went to the King for his 
required signature. Once processed through all these layers and back at the 
Ministry, Ministerial decisions and orders were dispatched to Batavia and 
the bureaucratic proceedings of all these bodies was stored in the chrono-
logically ordered, Verbaal archives.81
This movement of information created a dynamic upward of knowl-
edge and a downward one of ordinances. As a result, in both in the archives 
of the Ministry of Colonies, the Verbalen and Mailrapporten, as well as in 
79 Reliable information was valuable, and after the British interregnum specifi c commis-
ionair-generals were appointed to ensure sharing of knowledge among various levels of 
the administration, though with limited success. See K.J.P.F.M., Jeurgens, “Op Zoek naar 
Betrouwbare Informatie. De Commissarissen-Generaal en de Stichting van de Kolonial 
Staat, 1816-1819”, in J.Th. Lindblad and A.F. Schrikker (eds.), Het Verre Gezicht: Politieke en 
Culturele Relaties tussen Nederland en Azië, Afrika en Amerika. Opstellen Aangeboden aan Prof. 
Dr. Leonard Blussé (Franeker: Uitgeverij van Wijnen, 2011), 266-285: 276-277, 278-280.
80 K.J.P.F.M. Jeurgens, “Networks of Information: The Dutch East Indies”, in C. Antunes 
and J.J.L. Gommans (eds.), Exploring the Dutch Empire: Agents, Networks and Institutions, 
1600–2000 (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 95-130.
81 Often, attachments were transposed from Mailrapport the Verbaal during this process. 
Each ‘Verbaal’ is rendered to us including this extensive documentation of parliamen-
tarian and Ministerial consultation, and spans a number of months, while its attachments 
date back several years or even decades.
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the archival volumes produced by the Algemeene Secretarie and the Depart-
ments in Batavia, the full archival genealogy of specific colonial problems 
has been preserved and can be found, in usually quite hefty bundles, in The 
Hague and Jakarta. When opening one of such, on top we find the decisions 
of the Ministry (in the case of the Verbalen stored in The Hague), or of the 
Governor-General (in the case of the archives of the Algemeene Secretarie in 
Jakarta), the ‘end point’ of the decision or policy-making process. Often, 
these papers are folded around the included materials such as the advice 
of the councils and commentaries of civil servants at various levels. Within 
the commentaries and advice, the correspondence and attachments (reports 
and advices) of local officials is folded. These attachments easily comprise 
hundreds of pages.
To understand the ideology and policy-making process of the state, 
it is tempting to ignore the majority of the attachments, and follow the 
‘paper-realities’ written by high-echelon governors, directors and statesmen 
in Batavia and The Hague. As mentioned, much of the first two chapters 
consists of these sorts of materials, explaining how colonial ideology and 
fiscal policy came about and changed over the course of the long nineteenth 
century, drawn from the personal archives of contemporary officials, from 
state archives (including explanations of ordinances, instruction manuals, 
published correspondence and published government reports), or articles 
in colonial journals written by European officials and statesmen preserved 
in various libraries and collections. Together with the draft-ordinances 
and high-level correspondence found in the ‘top-layer’ of the archival 
genealogy, they also present, discuss and summarize quite well, usually 
adequately, the regional problems and findings as addressed and commu-
nicated by lower, local officials through letters, reports and attachments, 
which are much harder to grasp. I could have gained a fair idea of the 
development of Dutch tax policies and practices, simply by reading these 
final decisions, or for instance the published ordinances, parliamentarian 
colonial reports (Koloniaal Verslag), or publications written by important 
officials and statesmen.
However, for the kind of understanding of colonial taxation and gover-
nance this dissertation requires, such an approach does not suffice. A narrow 
focus on the materials produced by ‘high’ placed officials such as ministers, 
Governor-Generals, politicians and directors would inevitably induce an 
adoption of their views, understandings, opinions and aspirations. The 
higher up the bureaucratic ladder, the more information is summarized, 
winnowed, thwarted and selected, and the less we learn about local gover-
nance practice. As argued by Stoler, colonial archives are sites not of “knowl-
edge retrieval but of knowledge production” and “intricate technologies 
of rule in themselves.”82 In a way, they are the autobiography of the state 
and can be treated as a roadmap into the colonial state’s mentality and its 
82 A.L. Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance”, Archival Science 2:1 (2002), 
87-109: 90.
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particular configurations of power.83 Reports, ordinances and colonial corre-
spondence are as much the creation of an institution as an individual, and 
therefore need to be examined in the context of that institution – its vested 
interests, its administrative routine and its record-keeping procedures. 
Colonial reports, for instance, should be studied not just as testimonies 
to specific events but as aspects of the administrative process and judicial 
policy making of colonialism, in itself an object of enquiry.
It is therefore crucial to see beyond the internal logic, language, and 
areas of interest of colonial governance as expressed in these archives by 
including the scope of the Residents, controleurs and the body of indigenous 
officials they headed. Their communication, reports and recommendations 
are omnipresent in these archives, and demand thorough, painstaking scru-
tinization in order to comprehend them, but they yield valuable information 
and offer exciting new aspects of and perspectives into the local workings 
of the colonial state. So the archival volumes I requested, I usually turned 
upside down and then read backwards, starting with letters from subjects, 
indigenous officials and controleurs, via Residents and governors, to the 
correspondence between Batavia and The Hague. In this way, I followed the 
grain of information gathering, selection and reinterpretation, succeeded 
by the same cycle, but then backwards, of law-making and implementation 
from king to controleur. This shapes the core of the research of Chapters 3 to 7.
Because colonial state archives were produced and survived in much 
greater abundance than indigenous sources, it is often claimed that it 
is difficult to find counter perspectives for cross-reference of practices of 
colonial governance.84 But it would be a misconception to claim there are 
no indigenous sources at all. Indeed, “wherever there have been kingdoms 
in Indonesia, historical [written] traditions have been maintained.”85 In 
this dissertation, such sources are collected from provincial archives in 
private collections in Yogyakarta, Bandung, Aceh and Padang, as well as in 
personal collections of civil servants held in the Leiden University Library. 
Together with samples from the indigenous press and transcripts of Indone-
sian narratives such as the Acehnese Hikayat Perang Sabil, such sources offer 
unique perspectives into the experiences of those ‘being governed.’
These materials offer invaluable micro-histories that pinch through the 
narrative of high level government officials. Filled out tax forms, whether 
83 Stoler, Along the Archival Grain, 18-20; T. Day and C.J. Reynolds, “Cosmologies, Truth 
Regimes, and the State in Southeast Asia”, MdAS 34:1 (2000), 1-55: 17-19, 27-8.
84 Additionally, many ‘indigenous’ tax practices of the twentieth century were already 
marked and reshaped by colonial infl uences and practices. So, studying contemporary 
socio-political organization is always a study of colonial epistemologies of the func-
tioning of these in the past. Unavoidably, the only productive way to study colonial 
taxation is to look at it as the merged routines and rituals of indigenous and colonial 
institutions.
85 H. Djajadiningrat, “Local Traditions and the Study of Indonesian History”, in Soedjat-
moko (ed.), An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1965; Jakarta: Equinox Publishing 2007), 74-86: 74.
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from Acehnese villagers as exemplified above, or Javanese teachers or 
Chinese traders (see Chapter 3) found in private collections in Yogyakarta or 
the National Library of Singapore, exemplify how codified ordinances trans-
lated into hybrid assessment practices. Assessment reports of local wedana 
(Javanese district official) located in the archives of Pakualam, a princedom 
on Central Java, shine a light on the crucial role of indigenous officials in 
manipulating the government’s expectations. Together, such sources truly 
bring to life the everyday experience of colonial taxation on the ground.
Moreover, the voices of subjected taxpayers are also omnipresent in 
the colonial state’s archives. Considering these more seriously shows that, 
instead of being simply out of tune with the narrative of governing elites, 
these voices contributed to the formulation of tax policy. The number of 
petitions, complaints and protests issued by taxpayers and intermediaries 
contained in the archives, is striking. More than just passive subjects 
‘arrested’ by officials into categories of governance, taxpayers sought influ-
ence over how they were treated and inscribed by the colonial state, and 
actively engaged with the state to do so.86 Through local elites, who indeed 
represent the “channelling of influences” of people to gain influence87, the 
implementation and elaboration of tax policy was mediated.88 Considering 
its long history of indirect rule, the Dutch colonial state was no exception.
Local knowledge
Taking seriously the reality of taxpayers and how they influenced tax policy, 
requires a consideration of local indigenous institutions, social organiza-
tions and ‘practical knowledge systems’89, and an acknowledgement that 
their histories are not merely a “prologue to understanding European 
colonial rule.”90 Instead of “useless superstition” obstructive “to the state’s 
preferred methods of organization” (as European officials tended to discard 
local knowledge), this dissertation presumes that it continued influencing 
Indonesia’s social history as it had fundamental importance to the formula-
tion of colonial policy.91
Indonesian ‘practical knowledge’ was diffused through systems of 
social or socio-legal organization and customs known as adat. More than 
simply a system to organize law, adat was a complex of signifying social 
norms of relationships and behaviour, believed to have been established by 
86 F.A. Noor, “You Are under Arrest: Epistemic Arrest and the Endless Reproduction of the 
Image of the Colonised Native”, South East Asia Research 24:2 (2016), 185-203.
87 J.R. Rush, Opium to Java: Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia, 1860-
1910 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 109.
88 Campbell, “The State and Fiscal Sociology”, 172; R.H. Bates and D.H. Lien, “A Note on 
Taxation, Development, and Representative Government”, Politics & Society 14:1 (1985), 
53-70.
89 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 6-7, 195, 304-305, 311-316, 323-328, 332.
90 D.R. Sardesai, Southeast Asia: Past and Present (Boulder: Taylor and Francis, 2013), ix.
91 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 309-341, see especially pp. 332-333.
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ancestors according to specific origination myths and narratives of society. 
It is expressed in customs affecting social life, the right to rule, marriage 
regulations and principles for inheritance and (re)distribution of income and 
property, to guarantee the well-being of the community. Adat was usually 
observed by specific village authorities and narrated in rules, guidelines, 
stories or sayings and maxims. It was and still is often unwritten, highly 
local, negotiable, changeable and fluent. It cannot be ignored when trying 
to define the ‘local tax base’, for it exerted deep influence over local colonial 
governance, as both a logical starting point and a challenge to policy. In this 
dissertation, local knowledge refers to the overlapping patterns of adat, social 
organization and behaviour merging with and responding to colonialism.
To understand the various adat principles of the regional case studies, 
this dissertation relies on contemporary and modern-day literature, much 
of which uses the same archives as this dissertation to map the historical 
formation of specific forms of adat. Indeed, Dutch colonial archives certainly 
provide a voluminous repository of Dutch interpretations of indigenous 
knowledge systems. However, when reading about Indonesian adat in the 
nineteenth century, it is important to remain aware of the limitations of 
these archives and to keep in mind the aims and motivations of colonial 
officials in their writings. That said, the study of Indonesian history can 
show multiple new lines of inquiry of Indonesian social structures through 
colonial sources.92
Comparisons and selection of case studies
As I aim to understand colonial taxation and governance across Indonesia 
without having the space to be comprehensive, I will use a comparative 
approach. Earlier studies of taxation in colonial Indonesia, for instance, by 
Abdul Wahid, W.R. Hugenholtz or Ong Hok Ham, focus solely or largely 
on Java, leading to a somewhat Java-centric understanding of the politics of 
(colonial) taxation vis-à-vis other regionally specific studies of Indonesia.93 
If we want to understand Dutch colonial governance throughout Indonesia 
(rather than in one specific region), we should look for differences and simi-
larities in colonial tax policies and practices in diverse regions. What helps 
is that colonial governors were transferred with frequency. They inevitably 
made comparisons, making colonial governance in itself a “comparative 
endeavour [...] dependent on fruitfully imagining the lessons that could be 
92 See for example P. Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (New York/London: W.W 
Northon & Company, 2013), and H. Hägerdal, “The Colonial Offi cial as Ethnographer: 
VOC Documents as Resources for Social History in Eastern Indonesia”, Wacana: Journal of 
the Humanities of Indonesia 14:2 (2012), 405-428.
93 A. Wahid, From Revenue Farming to State Monopoly: The Political Economy of Taxation in 
Colonial Indonesia, Java C. 1816-1942 (PhD thesis, Utrecht University, 2013); W.R. Hugen-
holtz, Landrentebelasting op Java, 1812-1920 (PhD thesis, Leiden University, 2008); Ong 
Hok Ham, The Residency of Madiun: Priyayi and Peasant in the Nineteenth Century (PhD 
thesis, Yale University, 1975).
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learned and transferred between differently constituted colonial places.”94 
To appreciate this cross-regional exchange and the movableness of colonial 
governance, as well as the specifics and details of colonial tax policy and 
practice in various places, this dissertation selectively compares the tax poli-
cies and practices in five different regions in Indonesia. These regions are 
not selected randomly, but each represent another period of colonial expan-
sion (in chronological order), another societal organization, and another 
timing of the introduction of taxation. Each case study hence addresses a 
specific problem of taxation characteristic to that region. This allows for a 
comprehensive and detailed study of specific tax practices, as examples of 
colonial experiences. The differences between these experiences expose how 
colonial governance functioned as either an extension of systems already in 
place, the transfer of what worked in one area to another area, an on-the-
spot invention, or a mixture of all three of these. By demonstrating these 
differences within the archipelago, it also becomes clear how and why, in 
1920, fiscally unifying the colony was so difficult. Each case study exem-
plifies a specific element that, in that region, played an important role in 
the realization of tax policy. They can be grouped into two different sets, 
following the specific colonization process of Indonesia.
The first three case studies (and chapters) exemplify Ambon, Java and 
West Sumatra, all colonized before 1870. They investigate the infamous 
Dutch colonial production systems of coerced labour and cultivation, their 
roots in local principles of aristocratic, chiefly or familial entitlements, 
customs of collective labour and systems of agricultural redistribution and 
reciprocity, and their transition into monetary taxes. The chapters seek to 
elucidate why coerced labour remained in use across Indonesia and kept 
influencing colonial taxation, despite colonial ambitions to abolish it fully. 
Together, these first three case studies demonstrate how local principles of 
corvée labour and taxation were constantly manipulated, (re)negotiated and 
reinterpreted by taxpayers and the state.
This contrasts with the cases of the two final case studies, which 
illustrate the importance of tax policies to civilizational or missionary colo-
nialism. They demonstrate how the Dutch attempted to ‘export’ their use of 
such appropriated and ‘legalized’ principles, systems and customs, to the 
more recently colonized regions of Aceh and Seram, where such principles 
worked rather differently or were completely absent, and no ‘cultivation 
systems’ were ever in place. Aceh and Seram demonstrate how through the 
influence of chiefs and middlemen, not just taxation, but the colonial state 
itself was the subject of negotiation. This enhances our understanding of 
the role of local ‘agency’ and the ‘lived realities’ of everyday practices of 
taxation, in the creation of colonial tax policy.
94 D. Lambert and A. Lester, “Introduction: Geographies of Empire and Colonial Life 
Writing”, in D. Lambert and A. Lester (eds.), Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Impe-
rial Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 1-31: 10-11. See also R. Raben, “A New Dutch Imperial History?: Perambulations in 
a Prospective Field”, BMGN 128:1 (2013), 5-30.
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5 Structure and chapter organization
Before commencing on this comparative analysis of the elaboration of tax 
policy in practice, it is important to understand what specific changes and 
continuities occurred in colonial ideology during the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries, as reflected in the political and economic organization of 
the Dutch empire. The first chapter therefore analyses the transition from 
the initial schemes of coerced labour and monopolization, towards liberal 
strategies of exploitation and development in the twentieth century. It 
argues that despite these reforms and changing ambitions and aspirations, 
government policies stayed much the same. The second chapter charts the 
tax system as it developed in theory. It discusses the ‘paper reality’ and 
tax-law making of bureaucrats in Batavia and The Hague, as a reference 
point for the following chapters.
The following chapters discuss how this ‘paper reality’ related to gover-
nance practice by exemplifying the findings of my case studies.
Chapter 3, the first case study, is about Ambon. Among the earliest 
territories to come under Dutch colonial rule and the monopoly system 
of coerced plantation of spices, Ambon provides an interesting starting 
point. It exemplifies the transition of a system of coerced production and 
monopolized trade, founded in the seventeenth century, into a system of 
village-based and eventually individual head taxes, against the backdrop 
of economic collapse in the mid-nineteenth century. It focuses on the 
changing role of the formerly crucial, but decreasingly relevant, indigenous 
middlemen or raja (‘kings’) and its impact on the dynamics of local practices 
of taxation.
Chapter 4 is about the assorted coerced labour systems of Java, where 
Dutch use of coerced labour reached its zenith. It discusses the role of socio-
economic organization, land rights and precolonial systems of labour and 
taxation. Coerced labour, as an institutionalized form of taxation, originated 
in Java, a core region of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia. Because Java’s 
triangular relationship between land, labour and rule was slowly appropri-
ated by the colonial state for purposes of exploitation, colonial systems of 
coerced labour and taxation became, as on Ambon, deeply rooted in local 
Javanese schemes of reciprocity and exchange between various layers of 
society. When these became the subject of critique and change, they had to 
be made better known. This chapter explores how colonial officials accumu-
lated and produced knowledge about coerced labour systems, in order to 
transform them into monetary taxes.
Chapter 5 is about West Sumatra, which exemplifies the role of local 
families and inheritance regulations within the colonial tax system. In West 
Sumatra, property was communally held and inherited in the female line 
– a concept to which the forced cultivation system in West Sumatra was 
indifferent, but the modern colonial tax system could not accommodate. 
The chapter analyses how officials followed strong convictions of local 
social organization of family life in an attempt to employ a selective reading 
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of local socio-economic capacity, in terms of productivity and usefulness to 
the state. This provides an interesting contrast to Ambon and Java, as it led 
to rather extreme violations of local customary law and similar responses. 
The chapter specifically evaluates interrelated Dutch interpretations of 
local categories of rule, gender and property organization, and how they 
influenced tax policy in West Sumatra.
Chapter 6 is about Aceh. It exemplifies the role of violence, coercion 
and the appropriation of existing structures of rule and taxation. As the last 
remaining independent monarchy on Sumatra, it was violently conquered 
between ca. 1873 and 1910. As the first large Dutch neo-imperial project of 
military conquest, it is suitable as an example to explore the elaboration of 
taxes beyond the era of forced cultivation. Aceh never knew any agrarian-
based labour service systems like Ambon, Java or West Sumatra. Despite 
this fact and ongoing war, the Dutch attempted to implement corvée labour 
(even though this did not really exist in Aceh prior to Dutch colonization), 
and direct taxes by appropriating the rights of local rulers to levy duties 
and tariffs, aiming to include the Acehnese as just another ‘normalized’, 
tax paying, subjected population. Here, the ‘will to improve’ was a ‘will to 
pacify.’ Essential in this process was locating specific ‘oriental despots’ and 
getting these to sign contracts as ‘self-governors.’ This chapter explores how 
existing patterns of rule and taxation were used to introduce colonial taxes 
as a tool for the legitimization and exertion of colonial power and reform.
This compares very well with the final case study about Seram, in 
Chapter 7. Seram is located next to Ambon, so geographically the disser-
tation finishes where it started, but politically the differences could not 
be bigger. Unlike Ambon, Seram was not colonized in the seventeenth 
century as it was of little economic interest to the Dutch. It was inhabited 
by independent tribes that practiced headhunting and it was long consid-
ered impracticable to subject them to the rule of a modern colonial state 
and impose taxes. However, the colonial drive for improvement made no 
exceptions, and in the twentieth century Seram was finally conquered and 
subjected to taxes. This chapter scrutinizes colonial strategies of incorpora-
tion and domination versus indigenous strategies of avoidance, evasion and 
interpretation of the colonial state.
Comparing these five regions with the Dutch colonial ‘paper realities’, 
explained in Chapters 1 and 2, will help us understand how the creation 
of Dutch colonial tax policies and practices was fine-tuned to local condi-
tions, and how central colonial ambitions of reform and local systems of 
knowledge and organization related to each other in the narrative of Dutch 
colonial policy. In the conclusion, all chapters are brought together in a 
discussion on how our understanding of the elaboration of modernization 
of the tax system in theory and practice, contributes to our understanding 
of Dutch colonialism and the mechanisms of colonial governance in general.
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1 The rhetoric of progress
Dutch colonial ideas and reforms in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries
“We must use our greater knowledge and skill […] and intellectual advantage 
[…] to provide the Javanese with the benefits of civilization. […] From us and 
through us they must enjoy material advantages, their means of subsistence 
must be developed, their agriculture improved and their industry stimulated; 
and they must also reap in large measure the fruits of their labour and enjoy 
material prosperity. Elevation from a state of moral abasement and misery to one 
of thinking and independently developed beings, from the slavery of oppres-
sion of greedy lords and notables to individual freedom, the cultivation of their 
minds and purification and refinement of their social institutions: all these ben-
efits they must be able to thanks us for.”1
Thus wrote W.R. baron van Hoëvell (1812-1879), former preacher in Java 
and liberal parliamentarian in 1849, during the heyday of the Cultivation 
System in Java, of which he was an early, notable critic. The article from 
which this excerpt derives is titled ‘Sketch for an Ethical Program.’ While an 
ethical program only came to be launched in the early 1900s, its underlying 
ideas of moral uplifting and social improvement were as old as the colony 
itself.
This chapter traces the emergence of such ideas by contextualizing 
them in over a century of colonial expansion and political, economic and 
administrative reform. It aims to understand how Dutch colonial gover-
nance in Indonesia came into being and took shape and what policies were 
implemented. It will analyse and characterize the development of colonial 
policies, politics and bureaucracy, and demonstrate how, contrary to what 
Van Hoëvell’s quote seems to suggest, these were not only prompted by 
visions of socio-economic and political modernization, but also by prag-
matic and financial choices. It will demonstrate how these choices led to 
the imposition of coerced labour and monopolized export of cash crops in 
the early nineteenth century, and the transition towards free entrepreneur-
ship and monetary taxes in the later nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
as discussed in the next chapter. Rhetoric of improvement and progress 
followed these changes (and seemingly changed), but its underlying 
dogma’s and key concepts about colonized people and societies remained 
relatively stable.
The first section of this chapter describes the economic and social 
transformations of the nineteenth century, involving continuities in political 
accounts on the moral education of indigenous peoples, through economic 
1 G.W.W.C. baron van Hoëvell, “Schets van een Ethisch Program”, TvNI 1 (1849), 59; trans-
lated and quoted by E.J.M. Schmutzer, Dutch Colonial Policy and the Search for Identity in 
Indonesia, 1920-1931 (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 17.
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policies of coerced cultivation. The second section analyses how these 
accounts were updated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
to reform and support free entrepreneurship and more modern forms of 
administration. This provides a long-term analysis of Dutch colonialism, 
showing a protracted process of colonial state-formation, characterized by 
internal conflicts, paradoxical expectations and resulting in fragmented, 
incoherent and fluctuations in policy making.
1.1 Government monopolies and coerced production
Around 1800, Indonesia was a disunified collection of sovereign empires, 
sultanates, princedoms, semi-independent chiefdoms and various stateless 
spaces. Some of these had been absorbed into the colonial network of the 
VOC (the Dutch East India Company), providing the roots of the Dutch 
colonial state, as it would emerge in the nineteenth century. The VOC used 
shifting power-alliances and intermingled in regional wars, to extend its 
militarized political and commercial influence. In Eastern Indonesia this 
led to the collapse of the Sultanate of Makassar and the rise of the Bugis 
kingdom, securing Dutch power in South Sulawesi and the Moluccas.2 In 
Java, the VOC intervened in the Javanese Wars of Succession to advance 
its own candidates and gain more influence over Central and East Java.3 
In West Sumatra, the trading outpost in Padang was used as a base for 
diplomatic and commercial expeditions to the Minangkabau Kingdom 
of Pagaruyung.4 The majority of Indonesia, however, including Aceh and 
Seram, remained largely independent until the twentieth century. Only in 
North Sulawesi, the Molucca’s and in particular Java, had the VOC gained 
administrative influence, though as “paramount chief rather than absolute 
ruler.”5
Principle precepts
In line with the increasing Dutch focus on rule during the eighteenth 
century, the Dutch continued developing strands of colonial thought, 
culture, strategies and practices of governance, during the transition from 
2 L.Y. Andaya, The Heritage of Arung Palakka: A History of South Sulawesi (Celebes) in the 
Seventeenth Century (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).
3 M.C. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi, 1749-1792: A History of the Division of 
Java (London/New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).
4 J.E. Drakard, A Kingdom of Words: Language and Power in Sumatra (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1999).
5 R. Dubsky, “Ideology in Indonesia’s Colonial Administration”, Asian Studies 14 (1976), 
37-64: 39. See also N. Tarling, “The Establishment of the Colonial Régimes”, in N. Tarling 
(ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. Volume II: The Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1993), 5-78: 9-14.
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commercial empire to colonial state, which increasingly focused on Java.6 
Following the resonating transformation of political ideologies, governance 
and politics after the Atlantic Revolutions around 1800, the influence of 
European political thought became more articulate overseas. This was 
certainly the case under the governance of the colonial state’s principle 
architects, H.W. Daendels (Governor-General in 1808-1811) and British 
commander T.S. Raffles (Governor-General in 1811-1815). Both Raffles 
and Daendels, though of different ideological backgrounds, were fervent, 
enlightened reformers. They considered the VOC to have kept the Javanese 
in a state of ‘feudal darkness’, by using and supporting systems of ‘indige-
nous despotism and exploitation’, as rooted in political-economic and fiscal 
structures of labour duties, tributes and contingencies.7 They envisioned a 
European-like, centrally coordinated and bureaucratic state to replace these 
alleged forms of indigenous ‘feudalism.’8 Hitherto, the colonized popula-
tion had to be ‘reconditioned’ for doctrines of free entrepreneurship and 
unrestrained access to capital and labour markets – precisely the elements, 
as explained below, that had been destroyed under militarized company 
rule prior to 1800 – under a supportive, responsible state in order to protect 
indigenous industry from ‘predatory’ indigenous aristocracies. Both Raffles 
and Daendels aimed to improve the colony’s political and economic foun-
dations and establish what was supposed to become a colonial bureaucracy, 
but had limited success.9 Daendels, for instance, greatly curtailed the power 
of Java’s indigenous aristocracy in an aggressive manner and undertook the 
construction of the Grote Postweg, a new, main trunk road connecting East 
and West Java, for which he used numerous unpaid coerced labour services. 
Raffles, taking over after the British invasion of Java in 1811, considered 
the forced deliveries and contingents, as maintained by the VOC, obsolete. 
He attempted to cut out the layer of Javanese provincial lords and their 
assessment and collection of taxes by imposing a land rent, a fictional tax on 
yield, based on the area of owned arable land, levied directly on the peas-
ants through the village chiefs. This land rent was rooted in the idea that the 
government was the owner of all of Java’s land (see Chapter 4), and that as 
6 A.F. Schrikker, “Institutional Memory in the Making of Dutch Colonial Culture in Asia 
(1700–1870)”, in R. Koekkoek, A.I. Richard and A. Weststeijn (eds.), The Dutch Empire 
between Ideas and Practice, 1600-2000 (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 111-134; J. van 
Goor, Prelude to Colonialism: The Dutch in Asia (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2004), 
83-99.
7 See T.S. Raffl es, The History of Java (2 vols., London: Black, Parbury and Allen, 1817), vol. 
I: xlv, xxvii-xxx, xxxviii-xlvii; Dubsky, “Ideology”, 49; A.B. Lapian, “Indonesian Perspec-
tives of the Colonial Power”, in J.C. Heesterman et al., Comparative History of India and 
Indonesia Vol. 4: General Perspectives (Leiden/New York: E.J. Brill, 1989), 77-86: 81.
8 J. Kathirithamby-Wells, “The Age of Transition: The Mid-Eighteenth to the Early Nine-
teenth Centuries”, in N. Tarling (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. Volume I: 
From Early Times to c. 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 572-620.
9 C. Fasseur and D.H.A. Kolff, “Some Remarks on the Development of Colonial Bureaucra-
cies in India and Indonesia”, in Itinerario 18:1 (1996), 31-56: 35.
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such, the peasants were tenants who owed ‘rent’ to the government; hence it 
was not called a ‘tax’. This land rent was the first centrally administered tax 
levied directly by the colonial government, and was intended to replace the 
duties or tributes levied by various layers of, what Europeans considered 
to be, ‘feudal’ aristocracies.10 However, as was the case with similar taxes 
elsewhere in (colonial) Asia, it was increasingly flawed by a lack of proper 
land surveyance and remained dogged by collection problems, character-
ized by fear for unrest, negotiation, personal ties and patrimonial levying 
practices, until far into the twentieth century.11
Daendels and Raffles met the same challenges as precolonial rulers 
who accumulated wealth, power and people, following various local 
geographical, economic, and social constraints. And combining bureaucracy 
with ‘patrimonialism’, for lack of a better word, did not seem to obstruct 
fiscal consolidation. In fact, in the face of specific local difficulties and 
societal conditions such as societal fragmentation and resilience, it appeared 
to be a more an efficient and pragmatic way to collect taxes.12 In Java, where 
monitoring capacity, communications, transportation and record-keeping 
were difficult, the emergence of unified, centralized states was not the 
logical outcome of history and tax systems stayed decentralized and priva-
tized. This was not an indicator of state-failure, but a successful response 
to particular geographical and social challenges. Rulers across the globe 
needed to engender a certain degree of credibility among the population in 
their ability to collect sufficient revenue, something they just did in many 
different ways.13 Daendels and Raffles had little choice but to follow Java’s 
specific constraints. Hence, already in its earliest phase, the contours of 
European colonial governance in Indonesia, as drawn on paper, were not 
entirely pertinent.
Initially, Dutch policy debates vacillated between a conservativism, 
which defended ‘Dutch Javanese feudalism’, and the enlightened liberal 
principles of revolutionaries like Daendels and Raffles. Conservatives 
favoured a strong state that monopolized indigenous commerce in order 
to maximize profits and protect the Javanese – whom they considered 
unsusceptible to universal principles and laws of economic liberty – against 
the overpowering influence of private capital. Liberals believed the colonial 
government had to provide the requisite legal institutions for freely func-
10 Hugenholtz, Landrentebelasting; Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, 8. On the 
use and usability of the concept of feudalism in Indonesia and Malaysia by contemporary 
and modern day authors, see C.B. Kheng, “Feudalism in Pre-Colonial Malaya: The Past 
as a Colonial Discourse”, JSAS 25:2 (1994), 243-269.
11 A. Booth, “Land Taxation in Asia: an Overview of the 19th and 20th Centuries”, Oxford 
Development Studies 42:1 (2014), 1-18: 4-9; W.R. Hugenholtz, “The Land Rent Question 
and its Solution, 1850-1920”, in Cribb (ed.), The Late Colonial State, 139-172. See also 
chapter 4 for an elaboration of the land rent.
12 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 34.
13 Kiser and Levi, “Interpreting the Comparative History of Fiscal Regimes”, 558.
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tioning markets, but refrain from any further intervention.14 Both ideologies, 
in fact, originated from the humanitarian-liberal thought of the era prior to 
and following the French Revolution and implied an underlying “enlight-
ened rhetoric of progress.”15 They upheld the core, self-legitimizing claims of 
the colonial ‘truth regime’, which maintained that only enlightened colonial 
rule could curtail the harmful effects of ‘indigenous misrule’ and elevate 
local societies to greater standards of welfare and productivity by encour-
aging what it considered more productive behaviour through fiscal policy. 
This idea of progress drove much of the long-lasting colonial fantasies of 
governmentality and paternalistic constructivism, which was reinvented 
continuously and transposed beyond Java’s shores to the surrounding 
islands during the era of ethical-colonialism in the twentieth century. Just 
how to reach this final stage of welfare and prosperity, however, was some-
thing on which officials could not agree.
Though policy changes followed the guidelines of these ideological 
boundaries, they were not determined by them. In Java, popular discontent, 
caused by deteriorating living conditions after the Dutch restoration of 
power in 1816, provided leeway for the support of a ‘messianic ruler’ who 
would liberate Java of Dutch rule, inspiring the Javanese Prince Dipanegara 
to rise against the Dutch, culminating in the Java War of 1825-1830.16 The 
war caused a government deficit of 40 million guilders and brought the 
total colonial debt to 490 million guilders by 1830.17 Facing an unfolding 
crisis of Dutch metropolitan public finances, caused by these debts and 
made worse due to the costs imposed by the Belgian Revolution of 183018, 
the Dutch King, William I decided to prioritize colonial benefits (baten) over 
governance and welfare. This marked the beginning of a period of system-
atized authoritarian extractive Dutch colonialism, when finance rather than 
ideology determined the course of colonial politics.
Coerced cultivation
And so the Dutch adopted a strategy of state monopolization of cash 
crops, set out on paper by the ambitious and experienced army officer 
14 Dubsky, “Ideology”, 42; Schmutzer, Dutch Colonial Policy, 3; J. Bastin, Raffl es’ Ideas on 
the Land Rent System in Java and the Mackenzie Land Tenure Commission (‘s-Gravenhage: 
Nijhoff, 1954), 13-14; H.W. van den Doel, Het Rijk van Insulinde: Opkomst en Ondergang van 
een Nederlandse Kolonie (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1996), 12-14.
15 A.F. Schrikker, “Restoration in Java, 1815-1830: A Review”, BMGN 130:4 (2015), 132-144: 
144; Schmutzer, Dutch Colonial Policy, xi.
16 P.B.R. Carey, The Power of Prophecy: Prince Dipanagara and the End of an Old Order in Java, 
1785-1855 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), 602-603; M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indo-
nesia since c. 1200 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 142.
17 Van den Doel, Het Rijk van Insulinde, 48-50.
18 Klein, “Dutch Monetary Policy”, 195-197; V.J.H. Houben, “Java in the 19th Century: 
Consolidation of a Territorial State”, in H. Dick, V.J.H. Houben and J.Th. Lindblad (eds.), 
The Emergence of a National Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia, 1800-2000 (Leiden: 
KITLV Press, 2002), 56-81: 64.
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J. van den Bosch (Governor General in 1830-1833). Though principally 
much convinced of enlightened principles of the malleability of people 
and society, Van den Bosch came to oppose the imposition of ‘liberal 
principles’ upon what he called a “stupid and superstitious people.”19 He 
was a resolute and forceful governor, a pragmatic and essentially ‘high-
modernist’ man of science, large-scale planning and vigour, innovative 
and progressive on the one hand, but conservative and paternalistic on 
the other. Deeply devoted to his attempts to stimulate welfare both in the 
Netherlands and overseas, based on the idea that each individual had fulfil 
his or her potential on the economic market, he felt compelled to promote 
productivity and ‘civilization’ in Java, but always in service of economic 
growth at home.20 Under his governorship, Java became an ‘area of profit’, 
serving the motherland. Van den Bosch endorsed that limitations in slave 
trading in the colonies in South America and the Caribbean around 1815 
brought new opportunities for Java to establish competitive sugar planting. 
Harkening back to the VOC’s plantation schemes on Ambon and Java (most 
notably in Priangan and Banten), his ‘Cultivation System’ (Cultuurstelsel) 
fully institutionalized coerced plantation of cash crops, resulting in massive 
production of sugarcane, coffee, indigo, tea, spices and tobacco.21 These 
were sold on the European market, auctioned by the NHM (Nederlandsche 
Handel-Maatschappij or Netherlands Trading Society, founded in 1825 by the 
king), that held the exclusive rights on transporting colonial products to The 
Netherlands, which rendered huge profits into the Dutch national treasury 
but greatly disrupted Java’s economy.22
In Java, peasants were expected to use 20% of arable lands for produc-
tion of tropical cash crops in so-called cultivation services, for which they 
were paid a fixed price, then transport the crops to the nearest government 
19 J. van den Bosch, Brief, Inhoudende eenige Onpartijdige Aanmerkingen, op eene Memorie, 
onlangs in het Licht Verschenen, onder den Titel van: Staat der Nederlandsche Oostindische 
Bezittingen, onder het Bestuur van den Gouverneur Generaal Herman Willem Daendels, Ridder, 
Luitenant-Generaal, & c. in den Jaren 1808-1811 (‘s Gravenhage/Amsterdam: Johannes 
Allart, 1815), ‘voorrede’, iii-iv, 3-4, 16-17.
20 A. Sens, De Kolonieman: Johannes van den Bosch (1780-1844), Volksverheffer in Naam van de 
Koning (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Balans, 2019), 1-4, 156-161, 179-181. See also J.J. Westendorp 
Boerma, Een Geestdriftig Nederlander: Johannes van den Bosch (Amsterdam: Querido, 1950).
21 In 1850-1860, the heydays of the cultivation system, 96% of the total revenue of the 
system was made in coffee and sugar. See: C. Fasseur, “Het Cultuurstelsel Opnieuw in 
Discussie”, in C. Fasseur and R. van Niel (eds.), Geld en Geweten: Een Bundel Opstellen 
over Anderhalve Eeuw Nederlands Bestuur in de Indonesische Archipel Archipel, Vol. I: De 
Negentiende Eeuw (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), 115-130: 127. See also: U. Bosma, 
The Sugar Plantation in India and Indonesia: Industrial Production, 1770–2010 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 88-100.
22 Profi ts comprised ca. 500 million guilders in 1832-1867 and 190 million guilders in 1867-
1877, and comprised up to a third of total government revenue in 1851-1860. See D.H. 
Burger, Sociologisch-Economische Geschiedenis van Indonesia: vol. 1: Indonesia vó ó r de 20e Eeuw 
(Ed. by J.S. Wigboldus; Wageningen: Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen, 1975), 120; 
C. Fasseur, The Politics of Colonial Exploitation: Java, the Dutch, and the Cultivation System 
(Ed. by R.E. Elson; Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1992), 149-150.
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warehouse, the transportation services usually unpaid.23 In addition, they 
were required to spend 66 days of labour in corvée services (heerendiensten) 
for construction and maintenance work and in service of their various 
overlords. As mentioned in the introduction, corvée services formed a major 
‘hidden’ contribution to colonial revenues, as they helped to reduce the cost 
of construction and maintenance of infrastructure, irrigation systems and 
public buildings.24 In precolonial Java, various services were performed 
by the people “with a certain amount of goodwill”, rendered to chiefs as a 
form of taxation, or rendered as community services for mutual assistance 
among village inhabitants.25 The government adopted these traditional right 
to services for chiefs, and started using them as mandatory, forced corvée 
labour services. Thus, postal services, fire brigades, policing and many 
other public utilities, otherwise funded by taxes, were also provided using a 
complex of corvée services on village, regional and provincial level, fuelling 
the colonial economy with cheap Javanese labour for the following decades.
Peasants received crop payments (plantloon) for the performance of 
coerced cultivation services, paid either in cash or in rice, to enable them 
to pay their land rent and retain a certain level of consumption.26 However, 
the plantloon was partly subtracted from the land rent, so peasants received 
smaller payments when the value of crops was higher than the amount of 
tax due. In theory, the value of plantloon determined the land rent payment 
as it affected capacity to pay. In practice however, payments were more 
random, depending on production and the interference of village chiefs 
or officials.27 In most of Java, the introduction of a large amount of copper 
coins used for plantloon payment, generated rapid (re)monetization of Java’s 
peasant economy, enabling further development of household economies.28 
23 Ibid., 14-15. According to Van Vollenhoven, this principle ‘one-fi fth’ rate derived from 
West-Java, or more specifi cally Norther Banten, where tax on sawah in the crown regions 
traditionally was 1/5 of yield. See: C. van Vollenhoven, “Antirouffaer. Naschrift op 
het Rapport van 16 april 1904 over den Agrarischen Rechtstoestand der Inlandsche 
Bevolking op Java en Madoera”, BKI 74:3 (1918), 399-406: 404-405.
24 As demonstrated by M. van Wajienburg in the case of colonial French Africa; Waijen-
burg, “Financing the African Colonial State”, 69-70. As Cribb has recently shown, labour 
shortages in Java were also solved by recruitment of labour from China and deployment 
of prisoners as cultivators. R.B. Cribb, “Convict Exile and Penal Settlement in Colonial 
Indonesia”, Journal of Colonialism & Colonial History 18:3 (2017).
25 T. Soebekti, Some Facets of the Income Tax Administration in Indonesia with Reference to Those 
in the United States (PhD thesis, Indiana University, 1964), 4.
26 C. Fasseur, Kultuurstelsel en Koloniale Baten: De Nederlandse Exploitatie van Java 1840-1860 
(PhD thesis, Leiden University, Leiden: Universitaire Pers, 1975), 24; C. Fasseur, “Clio 
and Clifford Geertz”, Itinerario 14:2 (1990), 71-80: 75.
27 Fasseur, “Het Cultuurstelsel Opnieuw in Discussie”, 117-125; Fasseur, Kultuurstelsel, 
20-22. See also Boomgaard, P., and P.M. Kroonenberg, "Rice, Sugar, and Livestock in Java, 
1820–1940: Geertz’s Agricultural Involution 50 Years on." In D. Schäfer et al. (eds.), Rice: 
Global Networks and New Histories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 56-83: 
68.
28 R.E. Elson, Village Java under the Cultivation System, 1830-1870 (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 
1994), 261-264, 361.
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Simultaneously, the labour demand increased rapidly and peasants had to 
cede their yields to the colonial government, for a price lower than actual 
market value while carrying a heavy and increasingly unescapable burden 
of cultivation and labour services.29 Consequently, local cash crop markets 
stagnated and Java showed a decline of smallholder production.30
Officially, the Cultivation System in Java was never proclaimed or 
imposed, nor was it centrally managed as a unified system. Instead, it was 
set out in a number of publications by Van den Bosch personally, building 
on practices already in play, and intended as transitionary system to repair 
the colonial economic deficits.31 Consequently, its practical operation 
between 1830 and 1870 was diversified, subject to many regional varieties 
and modified to suit local conditions. For instance, it was only introduced 
to those lands directly governed by the colonial administration. The Sultan-
ates of Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Mangkunegaran and Pakualam, the four 
remaining principalities after the carving up of the vast Javanese Empire 
of Mataram in the 1750s, remained semi-independent as ‘self-governing’ 
principalities (Vorstenlanden).32 Together with the many ‘private estates’ 
(particuliere landerijen), they were not included in the Cultivation System.33
Indirect rule
A crucial aspect of the Cultivation System in Java was its successful use of 
indirect rule. Across the large nineteenth-century colonial empires officials 
relied on patterns of indirect rule, which “required only a minimal state 
apparatus but rested on local elites and communities”, who also “had an 
29 J. Breman, Koloniaal Profi jt van Onvrije Arbeid: Het Preanger Stelsel van Gedwongen Koffi eteelt 
op Java (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 358; J.S. Furnivall, Netherlands 
India, 133-135; C. Day, The Policy and Administration, 258, 280-251; P. Boomgaard, Children 
of the Colonial State: Population Growth and Economic Development in Java, 1795-1880 
(Amsterdam: Free University Press, Centre for Asian Studies, 1989), 33-35.
30 T.K. Wie, “Colonial Extraction in the Indonesian Archipelago: a Long Historical View”, 
in Frankema and Buelens (eds.), Colonial Exploitation and Economic Development, 41-59: 47; 
Boomgaard, Children, 36; Booth, “Trade and Growth in the Colonial and Post-Colonial 
Periods”, 21.
31 Fasseur, Kultuurstelsel, 11; Sens, De Kolonieman, 351-352.
32 C. Fasseur, “Cornerstone and Stumbling Block”, 35; Houben, “Java in the 19th Century”, 
61-63. This helps explaining the profound infl uence of the politics and adat of the (courts 
of) these principalities over West, Central and East Java. Yogyakarta and Surakarta in 
particular remain the centres of orientation for Javanese culture.
33 Such private plots of lands, once sold to entrepreneurs or under possession of (former) 
governors remained exempted from central policies of corvée and taxation. They became 
like “mini-states” in themselves; Dutch legal scholars described them as ‘semi sovereign’ 
and compared them to the many indigenous self-governing principalities. The landlords 
were responsible for taking care of the inhabitants, providing education, healthcare and 
social services. In return they demanded the maximum in terms of services and taxes. See 
Anonymous, “Toestand op Particuliere Landerijen”, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale 
Geographie 5 (1914), 36.
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interest in withholding resources and knowledge from the centre.”34 In Java, 
peasants were held in check by village chiefs and local rulers of the Javanese 
administrative elite, the priyayi, whom Van den Bosch had reinstalled. He 
considered their alienation, under Daendels’ and Raffles’ administrations, 
a direct cause of the Java War, as it had erased most of their former fiscal 
rights and benefits.35 He ensured they regained their former status and 
granted them the right to hereditary succession, salary fields, shares in agri-
cultural profits (cultuurprocenten; ‘cultivation percentages’) and enhanced 
entitlements to ‘feudal’ labour services to enhance the consolidation of a 
loyal ruling class. This helped to maintain efficiency in a bureaucratic reality 
characterized by limited time, information and influence.
The Javanese ‘bupati’ (appointed rulers of ‘Regencies’ into a number 
of which each district was sub-divided), were selected from the Javanese 
nobility and functioned as symbolic monarchs of the districts, under the 
pretension that they were still the regional power-holders of precolonial 
times.36 Prior to colonialism, many bupati had been independent political 
leaders of patronages who accumulated strength based on the numbers 
of followers and households under their rule. They supposedly embodied 
traditional leadership and power, reflected in the welfare and harmony of 
the Regency and expressed through court ceremonies, objects and ritual. 
Under colonial rule, they developed into ritual exponents of Dutch gover-
nance, comfortably secured and salaried under direct supervision of the 
Resident (as their ‘younger brothers’), to combine Javanese traditional and 
Dutch administrative authority, as linchpins between both. They redis-
tributed the wealth and influence they received from above among lower 
administrators.37 Actual administration was delegated to the patih (‘prime 
ministers’ or ‘chief deputies’), who managed a body of lower ranking volk-
shoofden (‘popular chiefs, office-holders in fact). The lower chiefs controlled 
smaller sections of the Regency or had specific executive functions within 
the bupati’s government.38 The bupati, patih and lower chiefs were all priyayi 
and held noble ranks and titles. As pillars in the Indigenous Administra-
tion, they were responsible for the socio-economic, financial and religious 
‘health’ of the Regencies under supervision of the European officials.39 This 
was done by managing the (non-priyayi) village or desa chiefs through an 
administration consisting of various specialized mantri and specific reli-
34 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 77.
35 Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, 6-8; Carey, The Power of Prophecy, 843. See 
also R. Bertrand, É tat Colonial, Noblesse et Nationalisme à Java: la Tradition Parfaite (Paris: 
Karthala, 2005).
36 Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, 10 19-20, 23-26, 31-32.
37 Ibid., 34.
38 A ‘capable’, skilled (or cunning) patih was of essential importance to the success of the 
court in delegating the expectations of the Dutch and navigating political-diplomatic 
intermediation between Dutch and indigenous political realities. See for instance 
Houben, Kraton and Kunpeni, 129-130.
39 Ibid., 9-10, 19-21.
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gious and legal officials, called peghulu and jaksa. Most administrators under 
priyayi, including the desa chiefs and all lower village officials, held offices 
for which they were eligible, usually for a number of years.
Thus, the operation of the Dutch colonial state began to be fully depen-
dent on the collaboration of Javanese rulers through patrimonial relations, 
as a system of “men rather than laws.”40 All of the Cultivation Systems, 
as devised in the Moluccas, West Sumatra and North Sulawesi (not just 
in Java as claimed by Geertz for instance, who speaks of a deepening of 
“the extreme contrast between Inner Indonesia and Outer Territories”)41 
operated via indigenous ruling classes through indirect rule.42 This was 
really the key to the success of colonial exploitation, as it allowed the state 
access to profits drawn from the labour of larger groups of people, though 
one single chief, without establishing and financing an unwieldy admin-
istrative apparatus.43 A comparable network of indigenous officials and 
Chinese kapitan (headmen) emerged in many cities in Java and some of the 
‘Outer Territories’ to administer the Chinese quarters, which until the early 
nineteenth century formed semi-independent communities with their own 
police force, taxes and regulations.44 Similar communities of other ‘Foreign 
Orientals’ (Vreemde Oosterlingen), Asian people from outside of the archi-
pelago, such as Arabs and Malays, had formed, and were also administered 
by their ‘own’ kaptian. The population of these ‘Foreign Orientals’ steadily 
increased during the colonial era.45
The formation of an intertwined colonial framework of rule, bureau-
cracy and territorial administration shared between Dutch and indigenous 
officials may be seen as the most important legacy of the era of Cultivation 
Systems. By weakening the bargaining positions of villagers in relation to 
their rulers through communalized (but less egalitarian) organization, 
curtailing access to the market and eliminating the merchant class, the 
Dutch had gained greater control than ever before, over the land and 
people of these regions. This served as a basic model for governance of the
40 R. Van Niel, Java under the Cultivation System: Collected Writings (Leiden: KITLV Press, 
1992), 66-67, 88, 93.
41 C. Geertz, Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1963), 53.
42 H.W. van den Doel, De Stille Macht: Het Europese Binnenlands Bestuur op Java en Madoera, 
1808-1942 (Amsterdam/Leiden: Bert Bakker, 1994), 446-447.
43 See: D. Henley, Nationalism and Regionalism in a Colonial Context: Minahasa in the Dutch 
East Indies (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996); D. Henley, Fertility, Food and Fever: Population, 
Economy and Environment in North and Central Sulawesi, 1600-1930 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 
2005).
44 See G.K.N. Liem, De Rechtspositie der Chinezen in Nederlands-Indië 1848-1942: Wetgevings-
beleid tussen Beginsel en Belang (PhD Thesis, Leiden University, 2009); M. Lohanda, The 
Kapitan Cina of Batavia 1837-1942: A History of Chinese Establishment in Colonial Society 
(Jakarta: Djambatan, 1996), 9-12, 51-55, 79-83; M. Lohanda, Growing Pains: The Chinese and 
the Dutch in Colonial Java, 1890-1942 (Jakarta: Yayasan Cipta Loka Caraka, 2002).
45 Sometimes the Chinese intermarried, became Muslim and integrated into the indigenous 
population. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200, 1-3, 7-8, 84, 88.
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‘Outer Territories.’ Though claimed by the Dutch and divided into large 
provinces (Gewesten; territories, see map 1.1), the majority of these remained 
largely untouched and unmapped by the Dutch, until later in the nineteenth 
century. This way, the colony was governed by no more than 165 European 
officials around 1865.46 The unabated use of indirect rule and absence of 
any unified form of taxation or labour services made the imposition of an 
adequate tax administration and specialized tax officials unnecessary, and 
taxes were collected under the authority of the Department of Interior 
Administration.47 Many lower ranking bureaucrats, such as writers and 
translators, were of indigenous or Indo-European descent.48 They were of 
considerable importance, carrying out the tasks of everyday governance and 
the assessment and collection of taxes. By 1928, around a quarter million, 
or about 90% of all colonial civil servants were ‘native’ Indonesians.49
Justifying colonial capitalism
Coerced labour, the key principle of Dutch colonialism during the Culti-
vation System, fulfilled an important role in the legitimization of Dutch 
colonial rule. Labour services were presented as ‘disciplinary techniques’, 
in order to enhance productivity. Its premise was in accordance with 
established ideas of indigenous ‘economic incapacity’ and ‘disinterest’ in 
progress, which colonialists claimed resulted in economic stagnation.50 
‘Natives’, it was argued, were ‘economically immature’ – meaning they 
were, supposedly, unable to adhere to European economic standards – and 
therefore unsuitable subjects for monetary taxes.51
The underlying concepts that drove extractive colonialism, as pungently 
argued by the Malaysian scholar S.H. Alatas, portrayed indigenous peoples 
as “lazy”, “indolent”, “uncommercial” and “not yet monetized”, for two 
reasons. Firstly, European views upon the mentality of Asian labour were 
shaped by observations that resulted from the often violent history of 
46 By 1860, there were 19 Residencies and 4 Assistant-Residencies.
47 Soebekti, Some Facets, 5.
48 Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, 15.
49 Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies, 171, quoted in: B.O’G. Anderson, Language and Power: 
Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1990), 98.
50 F.A.M. Hüsken, Een Dorp Op Java: Sociale Differentiatie in Een Boerengemeenschap, 1850-1980 
(Overveen: ACASEA, 1988), 13-14.
51 See for instance O.R.E. Brunner, De Unifi catie van het Belastingstelsel in Ned.-Indië (Welte-
vreden: Kenanga, 1928), 22-24; G. Gonggrijp, Schets eener Economische Geschiedenis van 
Nederlandsch-Indië (Haarlem: Bohn, 1928) and W. Frijling, “De Algemeene Belasting op 
de Bedrijfs- en Andere Inkomsten”, KT 4 (1915), I, 44. This idea of ‘economic immaturity’ 
emmanted from the urge to compare Asian to European economies. See for instance J.H. 
Boeke, Tropisch-Koloniale Staathuishoudkunde: Het Probleem (PhD thesis, Amsterdam: UvA, 
Debussy, 1910). In a later book, Boeke explained indigenous poverty from “backward, 
primitive methods […] of organization […] pre-capitalist conceptions of labour and 
helplessness in regards to the demands of a money-economy.” J.H. Boeke, Economie van 
Indonesië (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1953), 109.
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European intervention in the dynamic Southeast Asian trade system. After 
smothering much of the local commerce by monopolizing trade, European 
colonizers ironically accused Southeast Asians of lacking a mercantile spirit. 
Secondly, the colonial state monopolized access to global markets and profit 
from the fruits of indigenous labour, and colonizers also explained the resul-
tant unwillingness and disobedience of indigenous people to contribute 
to these systems as laziness.52 The destruction of free commerce and the 
subsequent monopolization of profits by states and elites increasingly 
blocked options for social mobility which gave little incentive to aspire to 
socio-economic progress – consequently explained by colonial officials as 
a typical indigenous characteristic.53 These self-enhancing myths of native 
“laziness” or “profligacy”, bolstered colonial capitalism by legitimizing the 
need for European tutelage across colonial empires, framed in the pseudo-
scientific, continuously repeated Orientalist principles and discourses of 
Southeast Asian society and statecraft upheld by colonial officials, scholars 
and planters.54
Not only indigenous people, but also their rulers and their methods of 
governance were constantly questioned. Through notions of ‘indigenous 
misrule’ and ‘oriental despotism’, colonial officials observed indigenous 
society in terms of incapacity and failure, according to typologies set in 
opposition to the terms of European governance. British and Dutch colonial 
officials described Southeast Asian society as innately backward and South-
east Asian rulers as inherently corrupt, ‘despotic’ and exploitative which, 
in their perception, derived from a rulership-tradition deeply infused 
with divine and charismatic authority. Southeast Asian states were seen as 
organized around personal ties and patrimonial relationships, ceremony, 
personal charisma and pomp and circumstance, which was considered to 
have prevented the sort of rational-bureaucratic or legal morality that, in 
Europe, furnished the evolution of a centralized fiscal state.55 The presumed 
raison d’état of Southeast Asian polities was not the integral administration, 
protection and wealth of society and state, but rather the enactment of 
ritual, to bolster the connection between the world of men and the world of 
gods. Herein, rulers were presumed to exercise a gravitational pull in which 
legitimization of kingship flowed from divinity expressed in sacredness and 
52 S.H. Alatas, The Myth of the Lazy Native: A Study of the Image of the Malays, Filipinos and 
Javanese from the 16th to the 20th Century and its Function in the Ideology of Colonial Capita-
lism (London: F. Cass, 1977), 6-7, 8-10, 21-22, 62, 67-68, 70-80, 83-15, 205, 229-228-230.
53 Ibid., 205, 212. See also A. Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized (Ed. by J.P. Sartre and H. 
Greenfi eld; Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 29-30, 129-134.
54 Alatas, The Myth of the Lazy Native, 5-6. On “native profl igacy”, see R. Drayton, Nature’s 
Government: Science, Imperial Britain, and the ‘Improvement’ of the World (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2000), 232, quoted in Li, The Will to Improve, 21.
55 See for instance B.J.O. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings of B. 
Schrieke (Selected Studies on Indonesia by Dutch Scholars) (2 vols. The Hague/Bandung: Van 
Hoeve, 1955-1957) Vol. I, 184 and R. Heine-Geldern, “Conceptions of State and Kingship 
in Southeast Asia”, The Far Eastern Quarterly 2:1 (1942), 15-30.
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regalia. This divine ruler was presumably uninterested in territorial and 
socio-economic development and oriented on the centre; he attracted rather 
than expanded.56
In reality, of course, Southeast Asian rulers contemplated the responsi-
bilities and duties of rulers and subjects in more sophisticated terms, guided 
by contemporary Islamic-political philosophy.57 However, measuring 
Southeast Asia by the bar of European self-interest automatically set up the 
latter for failure which helped legitimizing colonial rule. Many rulers were 
called ‘despots’ simply because they blocked European interests. Claiming 
they were despots emphasized notions of the purported superiority of, 
right to, and need for European power and modernity overseas. In addi-
tion, maintaining the image of indigenous societies as greatly in need of 
instruction by European colonizers also soothed inward concerns about 
the endurance of the European revolutions at home.58 Thus, it became the 
self-imposed duty of colonialism to repair the ‘defects’ of Southeast Asian 
statecraft and society, cure ‘native misrule’, and restore the region to its full 
potential.59
This “Orientalist political teleology” of colonial capitalism has had a 
strong influence over twentieth century scholarship.60 Famous scholarly 
56 S.J. Tambiah, Culture, Thought, and Social Action: an Anthropological Perspective (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1985), 252-265, 327-329; J. Belich, J. Darwin and C. Wickham, 
“Introduction: The Prospect of Global History”, in J. Belich et al. (eds.), The Prospect of 
Global History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 3-22: 10; Said, Orientalism, 259-260. 
See also S. Subramanyam, “State Formation and Transformation in Early Modern India 
and Southeast Asia”, in P.J. Marshall et al., Comparative History of India and Indonesia Vol. 
3: India and Indonesia during the Ancien Regime (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), 91-110. Such ideas 
of cosmic kingship involving a strongly centre-focuses have been applied in S. Moertono, 
State and Statecraft in Old Java: a Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century (MA 
thesis, Cornell University, 1968), 20, 26-27, 104; Anderson, Language and Power, 17, 22-23, 
33, 44, 54 and G. Mudjanto, The Concept of Power in Javanese Culture (Yogyakarta: Gadjah 
Mada Univeristy Press, 1986), as well as in the Malayan peninsula in J. Gullick, Indigenous 
Political Systems of Western Malaya (London: Athlone Press, 1988), 22.
57 A well-known example is the Taj-us Salatin (The Crown of Kings), written around 1603 
in Aceh by Bukhari al-Jauhari. This important work provides guidelines and norms for 
just kingship and proper governance according to Islamic tradition. It was translated into 
Dutch in 1827 by P.P. Roorda van Eijsinga. See A. Weststeijn, “Provincializing Grotius: 
International Law and Empire in a Seventeenth-Century Malay Mirror”, in M. Kosken-
niemi, W. Rech and M. Jimenez Fonseca, International Law and Empire: Historical Explora-
tions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 21-38.
58 A. Fitzmaurice, “Liberalism and Empire in Nineteenth-Century International Law”, 
The American Historical Review 117:1 (2012), 122-140: 138; M. Koskenniemi, “Empire and 
International Law: the Real Spanish Contributions”, University of Toronto Law Journal 61 
(2011), 1-36: 4, 16, 26, 32; Weststeijn, “Provincializing Grotius”, 21-23.
59 Li, The Will to Improve, 15; F. Cooper and A.L. Stoler, “Between Metropole and Colony: 
Rethinking a Research Agenda”, in F. Cooper and A.L. Stoler (eds.), Tensions of Empire: 
Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997)), 1-56.
60 G. Steinmetz, State/Culture: State-Formation After the Cultural Turn (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1999), 16; T. Day, Fluid Iron: State Formation in Southeast Asia (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 2002), 6-7.
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models of Southeast Asian polities, such as the mandala, the ‘hydraulic 
society’ and the ‘theatre state’ have kept emphasizing the role of ‘cosmic 
kingship’, traditional power, ritualism and symbolism in Asian politics 
and authority.61 Pervasive European concepts of modernity and capitalism 
generated a Eurocentric history writing in which Asian society remained 
characterized as historically underdeveloped, traditional’, ‘unmodern’, 
fragmented and unstable.62 Studying Asia using such frameworks of 
‘modernization’, that derive directly from European categories of develop-
ment (some of which described in the introduction), while ignoring “Asian 
canons of knowledge”, has preserved some of these ideas until deep into 
the postcolonial era.63 This has had a paradoxical and lasting impact on 
postcolonial self-images in former metropoles and colonies.64 Concurrent 
and more recent literature has deconstructed these ideas and identified 
various parallels and new lines of inquiry in South-east Asian state forma-
tion processes, falsifying claims of European exceptionalism and Southeast 
Asian despotism and misrule.65 Indeed, the colonial state met many of the 
same difficulties as the polities it replaced. The administrative gaps between 
the metropolitan and colonial government or between the colonial govern-
ment and local officials for instance, emphasized a similar weakness of state 
that facilitated the continuance of colonialism’s many paradoxes.66
Supported by their self-serving tropes grafted in scientific racism, 
‘othering’ and beliefs in fundamental differences between East and West, 
colonial officials deliberately constructed stereotypes that supported the 
idea that colonized people were ‘exploited’ by despots, ‘unproductive’ and 
61 O.W. Wolters, History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives (Ithaca: Southeast 
Asia Program Publications, Cornell University, 1999), 16-18, 21-25, 27-35, 65; K.A. Witt-
fogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1957), 2-5, 8, 123, 101-102, 126-127, 161-169; C. Geertz, Negara: the Theatre State in 
Nineteenth-Century Bali (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 4-10, 13-15, 27-29, 
31-34, 123-125.
62 A. Kumar, “Capitalism and the “Traditional” State and Society: the Javanese Experience 
to c. 1810”, paper presented at the 34th International Congress of Asian and North African 
Studies (University of Hong Kong: s.n., 1993), 1. See also: T. Svensson, State Bureaucracy 
and Capitalism In Rural West Java: Local Gentry versus Peasant Entrepreneurs in Priangan in 
the 19th and 20th Century (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 1991), 3.
63 A.G. Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1998), 12-26, 323-327.
64 See G. Wekker, White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race (Durham/London: Duke 
University Press, 2016).
65 See for instance V.B. Lieberman, Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, 
c. 800-1830. Vol. 1: Integration of the Mainland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003). Critical opposition to the idea of central rulership and despotism in Java has been 
provided in J. Wisseman Christie, Theatre States and Oriental Despotisms: Early Southeast 
Asia in the Eyes of the West (Hull: Centre for South-East Asian Studies, 1985), see especially 
pp. 4-11, and more recently in A. Beatty, “Kala Defanged: Managing Power in Java Away 
from the Centre”, BKI 168:2-3 (2012), 173-194.
66 R. Raben, “Epilogue. Colonial Distances: Dutch Intellectual Images of Global Trade and 
Conquest in the Colonial and Postcolonial Age”, Koekkoek, Richard and Weststeijn 
(eds.), The Dutch Empire between Ideas and Practice, 205-232: 224-225.
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‘uneconomic’ in their behaviour and therefore ‘unready’ for self-governance 
and in dire need of European governance.67 While some, like Daendels 
and Raffles, claimed that indigenous people required capitalism and free 
entrepreneurship within the boundaries imposed in the colony, others, such 
as Van den Bosch, claimed progress was only possible through ‘tutelary’ 
systems of coerced labour.
Self-critique and self-improvement
In some of the rose-tinted pictures of contemporary foreign authors, 
the Dutch colony of around 1860 was depicted as a flourishing example 
of economic success managed by skilful Dutch colonial administrators 
who succeeded not only in developing Java’s popular welfare but also in 
maintaining its endless natural beauty.68 However, they did not succeed in 
silencing concern, voiced both within and outside of the colony, about the 
principles and the heavy impact of forced cultivation since its inception.69 In 
the Netherlands, this critique became more forcefully expressed, especially 
among liberal circles in the 1860s. Liberals condemned the system for its 
extractive character70, the heavy burden coerced labour imposed on the 
67 See F.A. Noor, “You Are under Arrest: Epistemic Arrest and the Endless Reproduction 
of the Image of the Colonised Native”, South East Asia Research 24:2 (2016), 185-203. This 
is what Chakrabarty refers to as a colonial “waiting room”, used by offi cials to argue 
how some “natives” were not ready yet for participation in a capitalistic-organized state. 
See D. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 14-15 and Li, The Will to Improve, 15.
68 F. Gouda, Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the Netherlands Indies, 1900-1942 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1995), 46-47; Day, The Policy and Administra-
tion, 34; Gouda quotes from: J.W.B. Money, Java, or How to Manage a Colony (Ed. by I. Brown, 
2 vols.; London: Hurst and Blackett, 1861, reprint, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 
1985); and E.R. Scidmore, Java: The Garden of the East (New York: The Century co., 1897; 
reprint, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984). See also G.F. Davidson, Recollections 
of Twenty-One Years Passed in Java, Singapore, Australia and China (London: Madden, 1846).
69 As a matter of fact, the ‘Government Regulation’ Acts of 1804 and 1818 had stipulated 
diminishment of forced cultivation to promote indigenous welfare and raise productivity 
through free agriculture, but were ignored upon Van den Bosch’ implementation of 
monopolized cultivation. See C. Fasseur, “Rulers and Ruled: Some Remarks on Dutch 
Colonial Ideology”, in W.G.J. Remmelink (ed.), Journal of the Japan Netherlands Institute 
Vvol. II. Papers of the Dutch-Japanese Symposium on the History of Dutch and Japanese Expan-
sion: In Memory of the Late Nagazumi Akira (Tokyo/Kyoto: Japan-Netherlands Institute, 
1990), 11-30: 12-13.
70 According to Fasseur’s the contribution of the Cultivation System to the total Dutch 
national revenue was about 38 million guilders in 1840-1844, and more than 140 million 
guilders in 1855-1860, so that in these years about 20% of the Dutch national revenue 
originated in the batig slot, the colonial revenue. More recently, Van Zanden and Van 
Riel have presented an alternative calculation, taking into account hidden subsidies and 
expenditures charged to the colony. They estimated that in the 1850s the true value of the 
batig slot should be assessed as comprising over 52% of the Dutch revenue. See: Fasseur, 
Kultuurstelsel, 20; J.L. van Zanden and A. van Riel, The Strictures of Inheritance: The Dutch 
Economy in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 180.
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Javanese population, its physical impact in Java, and most importantly, its 
exclusivist and monopolist character.
The impact of the Cultivation System in Java’s rural society and 
economy can certainly not be denied. Extensive debate on the topic has 
shown a shift in the focus on exploitation, to questions of economic growth. 
C. Geertz’ famous involution thesis upholds that the increasing dependence 
of peasants on the narrow ecological base of interlocked wet-rice and sugar 
cultivation absorbed all Javanese labour power by locking all peasants into 
the social and ecological restraints of such cultivation. This, Geertz claimed, 
structurally prevented capital accumulation and drove Java’s economy into 
stagnation, poverty and dependence.71 Later studies showed that, instead of 
involuting, the colonial and indigenous economies in fact grew and differ-
entiated during the Cultivation System, as a result of commercial interac-
tion with textile industries in the Netherlands.72 On the village level, Dutch 
cultivation programs systematically facilitated and enforced change in the 
organization of Java’s rural economy, leading to improvement of material 
living conditions, population growth, and a more developed, diversified 
and commercialized economy, even though social inequality increased.73 
71 Geertz, Agricultural Involution, 35, 55-37, 145.
72 Fasseur, Kultuurstelsel, 3-8; Fasseur, “Clio and Clifford Geertz”, 57-60; Van Niel, Java 
under the Cultivation System, 40-41, 114-120; R.E. Elson, “The Cultivation System and 
“Agricultural Involution”” (Melbourne: Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian 
Studies Working papers no. 14, 1978); R.E. Elson, Javanese Peasants and the Colonial Sugar 
Industry: Impact and Change in an East Java Residency, 1830-1940 (Asian Studies Association 
of Australia, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984); R.E. Elson, Village Java Under 
the Cultivation System, 1830-1870 (Sydney: Allen and Unwin,1994), 314-315; B. White, 
““Agricultural Involution” and its Critics: Twenty Years After”, Critical Asian Studies 15:2 
(1983), 18-31; A. Booth, “Trade and Growth in the Colonial and Post-Colonial Periods”, in 
Schrikker and Touwen (eds.), Promises and Predicaments, 17-35: 18-19; P. Boomgaard and 
P.M. Kroonenberg, “Rice, Sugar, and Livestock in Java, 1820–1940: Geertz’s Agricultural 
Involution 50 years on”, in D. Schäfer, et al. (eds.), Rice: Global Networks and New Histories 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 56-83: 56-60; M.R. Fernando, Peasant 
and Plantation Economy: the Social Impact of the European Plantation Economy in Cirebon 
Residency from the Cultivation System to the End of First Decade of the Twentienth Century 
(PhD thesis, Monash University, 1982); M.R. Fernando, “Growth of Non-Agricultural 
Economic Activities in Java in the Middle Decades of the Nineteenth Century”, MdAS 
30:1 (1996), 77-119; M.R. Fernando, “The Worst of Both Worlds: Commercial Rice Produc-
tion in West Indramayu, 1885–1935”, JSAS 41:3 (2010), 421-448; U. Bosma, “The Discourse 
on Free Labor and the Forced Cultivation System: The Contradictory Consequences 
of the Abolition of the Slave Trade in Colonial Java, 1811-1870”, Studies in Global Social 
History 7 (2011), 387-418: 388.
73 Widjojo Nitisastro, Population Trends in Indonesia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1970), 26-47; Elson, Village Java, 43, 95-49, 129, 307-317; Van Niel, Java under the 
Cultivation System, 41-44, 129; J. Breman, Koloniaal Profi jt van Onvrije Arbeid: Het Preanger 
Stelsel van Gedwongen Koffi eteelt op Java (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 
323-324; P. Boomgaard and A.J. Gooszen (ed. By W.M.F. Mansvelt et al), Changing Economy 
in Indonesia: A Selection of Statistical Source Material from the Early 19th Century up to 1940. 
Vol. 11: Population Trends 1795-1942 (Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1991), 35-66.
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Concluding that the system led to direct impoverishment, ignores the fact 
that, fiscally, it was a success, despite being oppressive and exploitative. In 
Elson’s’ view, it “promoted a previously unknown level of general pros-
perity among the peasantry.”74
An even more problematic aspect of the Cultivation System is that it can 
hardly be described as a ‘system’ along bureaucratic lines, as purported by 
some contemporary officials. Though its design may be read as an example 
of ‘high-modernism’75, its practical elaboration was certainly not. First of 
all, the colonial administration was structurally understaffed. In 1840 there 
were only 89 officials directly involved in controlling agricultural produc-
tion, whereas by the late 1850s, the number of Dutch governing officials had 
risen to 170.76 Moreover, practices of paying both indigenous and Dutch 
officials ‘cultuurprocenten’, emoluments or shares in agricultural profits to 
ensure their zealous cooperation, rendered the system vulnerable to extor-
tion, as well as excessive corruption, and abuse of the peasantry.77 Many 
Dutch and indigenous officials enriched themselves illegitimately through 
patrimonial networks of profit sharing. Moral concerns and indignation 
about this corruption, related maltreatment (knevelarijen) of the peasantry, 
inefficiency and mismanagement, plus dissatisfaction with the NHM’s 
exclusive rights on transporting colonial products, subjected the Cultivation 
System to fierce opposition from the beginning. Moral concern was voiced 
most famously in 1860 by Eduard Douwes Dekker (alias Multatuli), in his 
Max Havelaar, the most prominent contemporary Dutch indictment of the 
problems of Dutch colonial exploitation.78 Already before, but certainly 
after the European revolutions of 1848 and the consequent adoption of a 
new liberal constitution in the Netherlands, the monopoly system became 
increasingly untenable. However, colonial profits had become an addictive 
asset to the Dutch treasury. They had, for instance, prevented the intro-
duction of income taxes in the Netherlands and enabled expansion of the 
railway network.79 Some Dutch politicians even worried that this depen-
dence would harm the self-attributed ‘Dutch mercantile spirit’ and lead to 
74 Elson, Village Java, 305 (quote), 324; Houben and Seibert, “(Un)freedom”, 180-181.
75 Scott, Seeing like a State, 4-6.
76 Fasseur, Kultuurstelsel, 27.
77 Ibid., 28-33, 51-52. As shown by Fasseur, higher offi cials sometimes collected exorbitant 
amounts: in Pasuruan, between 1858 and 1860, the Resident received an annual amount 
of 25.000 guilders in cultuurprocenten on top of his regular salary, which exceeded the 
annual wage of the minister of colonies three times.
78 Ibid., 77-78, 86-94, 96-77. See for instance P. Merkus, Kort Overzigt der Financië le Resultaten 
van het Stelsel van Kultures onder den Gouverneur-Generaal J. van den Bosch (Kampen: K. van 
Hulst, 1835), 1-12.
79 J. de Jong, Van Batig Slot naar Ereschuld: De Discussie over de Financiële Verhouding tussen 
Nederland en Indië en de Hervorming van de Nederlandse Koloniale Politiek, 1860-1900 
(’s-Gravenhage: SDU, 1989), 42; H.W. van den Doel, “The Dutch Empire. An Essential Part 
of World History”, BMGN - Low Countries Historical Review, 125:2-3 (2010), 179-208: 187.
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a state of ‘socio-economic immaturity’, vocabulary normally reserved to 
describe Asian economies.80
Eventually, under the influence of former sugar magnate and liberal 
Minister of Colonies I.D. Fransen van de Putte (in office 1863-1866 and 1873-
1874), the dismantling of the system was commenced. From 1864 onwards, 
some cultivation services and travel and market restrictions abolished. 
Fransen van de Putte’s ‘Cultivation Bill’ of 1865 attempted to provide the 
conversion of indigenous possession rights into European concepts of prop-
erty rights, allowing expansion of Western enterprises by allowing the Java-
nese to lease waste land to Europeans (erfpacht) for a period of 99 years.81 
The Bill did not pass and the cabinet fell, but irreversible reforms had been 
set in motion leading to the adoption of the ‘Agrarian’ and ‘Sugar Law’ in 
Java in 1870 (issued by the liberal Minister of Colonies E. de Waal [in office 
1868-1870]), and the Domain Declaration for the ‘Outer Territories’, in 1874. 
These allowed access of private entrepreneurs to colonial industries and the 
issuing of leases of uncultivated lands for exploitation. Additionally, a new 
Tariff Law, adopted in 1872, ended the differential rights that had prohib-
ited free entrepreneurship and trade in the colony.82 Gradually, from 1877 
onward, the government monopolies were deconstructed, marking the end 
of state controlled, and the beginning of private colonial capitalism. Ulti-
mately, the Cultivation System was not abolished because of moral concern 
but because of pragmatic and political defects and the problems of state 
monopolism. Once again, policy was guided by financial consideration and 
pragmatism, rather than ideology.
Dutch colonialism was certainly not devoid of ideological reasoning, 
but moral rhetoric, such as voiced by Van Hoëvell in 1849 and quoted at 
the beginning of this chapter, was always used to legitimize specific poli-
cies in hindsight, rather than informing them. Hence, it remained the self-
proclaimed, moral calling of Europeans to ensure the uplifting and social 
development of Indonesia’ indigenous populations and the improvement 
of the conditions under which they lived. Officials envisioned a benevolent 
colonial state, as put by the famous colonial economist J. van Gelderen, 
80 years after Van Hoëvell, leading “the peoples of the tropics from the 
state of a closed economy and of production limited to their immediate 
surroundings, into participation in the expanding world economy.”83 To the 
colonial mind, the Cultivation System and coerced labour, as well as the 
succeeding tax systems rooted in individual free labour, served this same 
80 De Jong, Van Batig Slot naar Ereschuld., 41-43, 89, 110-111, 115-138.
81 T. Goh, Communal Land Tenure in Nineteenth-Century Java: The Formation of Western Images 
of the Eastern Village Community (Department of Anthropology, Research School of Pacifi c 
and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, 1998), 28.
82 De Jong, Van Batig Slot naar Ereschuld, 54,66-57, 76, 183. 
83 J. van Gelderen, Voorlezingen over Tropisch-Koloniale Staathuishoudkunde (Haarlem: H.D. 
Tjeenk Willink, 1927), 121.
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developmental purpose, reminiscent of the governmental behavioural 
of metropolitan states in Europe. But more than anything, the opening 
phase of Dutch colonialism, as characterized by profit-seeking Cultiva-
tion Systems and the deliberate negligence of areas deemed unsuitable for 
such schemes, demonstrates the deep roots, symptoms and effects of the 
dichotomy between colonial exploitation and developmentalism, between 
ideology and practice. The alleged beneficial effects of coerced labour 
upon ‘lazy natives’ structurally conflicted with an operational reality of 
commercial exclusion and exploitation. At the same time, the state’s reliance 
on indirect rule awarded tremendous bargaining power to the indigenous 
Javanese aristocratic and village elites, and encouraged bribery and corrup-
tion. As a result, as argued by N.G. Pierson (father of income tax in The 
Netherlands), colonial profits had been raised because the Dutch state failed 
to fulfil its most basic duties towards the colony, by structurally plundering 
Indonesia’s natural wealth without making the necessary investments to 
build a national-colonial economy.84 An advanced insight that unforgiv-
ingly exposes the fragile colonial justifications for coerced labour. Whether 
such insight would result in any structural changes was determined in the 
following decades.
1.2 The spell of progress
In the late nineteenth century, colonial states across Southeast Asia became 
increasingly standardized, institutionalized and centralized, developing 
from collections of disparate regions overseas into distinctive political 
units and actual colonial states with laws, governments and subjects.85 
A deliberate growth of colonial bureaucracies intended to develop order 
and increase efficiency, to replace patrimonial networks of feudal rulers and 
corrupted officials with rational governance coordinated by central admin-
istrative authorities and proper legislation. In Indonesia, newly granted 
access to free entrepreneurs into the colony and the reform of the Interior 
Administration resulted, supposedly, in an industrialized, “technocratic 
complex” of ‘modern’ bureaucrats cooperating with skilful engineers and 
84 N.G. Pierson, Het Kultuurstelsel: Zes Voorlezingen (Amsterdam: P.N. van Kampen,1868), 
228; De Jong, Van Batig Slot naar Ereschuld, 46, 94-95.
85 R.E. Elson, “International Commerce, the State and Society: Economic and Social 
Change”, in N. Tarling (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. Volume II: The Nine-
teenth and Twentieth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 131-196: 
153-156. C.A. Trocki, “Political Structures in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centu-
ries”, in ibid., 79-130: 79.
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crafty investors.86 Such developments were celebrated as successful signs 
of the ongoing modernization officials fantasized about, bolstering the 
economy, greater indigenous welfare, responsible governance and a rising, 
urbanized middle class aspiring to ‘colonial citizenship.’87 This optimism 
was aligned with the reinvention of colonial ideology and redrawn in even 
more ambitious terms of development and improvement then before. But 
to realize these ambitions, the deeply institutionalized patterns of Dutch 
colonial rule and exploitation needed to be abandoned. This would pose 
numerous challenges to the Dutch colonial state.
From agricultural to industrial colonialism: development and exploitation
As the European presence in Asia surged during the wave of ‘New Impe-
rialism’ at the end of the nineteenth century, the Dutch empire, though a 
heavy-weight in Southeast Asia, became only a “dwarf among giants” in 
Europe, and the memory of previous commercial successes assuaged over-
sensitivity among Dutch politicians to retaining their colonial possessions.88 
The cessation of agricultural monopolism and its steady profits, combined 
with new economic opportunities outside Java as well as a growing Dutch 
concern about the prestige and impregnability of their empire under 
international competition, invigorated new imperial ambitions, also as a 
warranty of the political independence and neutrality of The Netherlands 
on the European continent.89 Empires overseas mattered at home. This 
marked the end of Java-focussed colonialism, abstinence from interior 
politics and the beginning of a violent military, economic and bureaucratic 
expansion, involving a series of bloody wars, which left deep imprints 
86 J.A.A. van Doorn, De Laatste Eeuw van Indië: Ontwikkeling en Ondergang van een Koloniaal 
Project (Amsterdam: Bakker, 1994), 107, 107-123, 165. In Van Doorn’s thesis, the govern-
ment bureaucrats were more concerned with preserving traditional order within colo-
nial society, while the engineers aimed at renovating the use of modern technology to 
rearrange the colony. The term ‘complex’ in this case refers to how both were mutually 
dependent. See also M. Bloembergen and R. Raben “Wegen naar Het Nieuwe Indië, 1890-
1950”, in M. Bloembergen and R. Raben (eds.), Het Koloniale Beschavingsoffensief: Wegen 
naar het Nieuwe Indië, 1890-1950 (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2009), 7-24: 9; H.G.C. Schulte 
Nordholt, “Onafhankelijkheid of Moderniteit? Een Geillustreerde Hypothese”, in ibid., 
105-120; H.J. Benda, The Pattern of Administrative Reforms in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule 
in Indonesia (New Haven: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1966), 593-594, 604-605.
87 T. Hoogervorst and H.C.G. Schulte Nordholt, “Urban Middle Classes in Colonial Java 
(1900–1942)”, BKI 173:4 (2017), 442-474; See also E. Tagliacozzo, “The Indies and the 
World: State Building, Promise, and Decay at a Transnational Moment, 1910”, BKI 166:2-3 
(2010), 270-292: 270-271, 277-282; E. Locher-Scholten, Ethiek in Fragmenten: Vijf Studies over 
Koloniaal Denken en Doen van Nederlanders in de Indonesische Archipel, 1877-1942 (Utrecht: 
Hes, 1981).
88 Gouda, Dutch Culture Overseas, 23. It should also not be underestimated that its empire 
also helped the Netherlands in strenghening its political position and policy of neutrality 
on the European continent.
89 See: K. van Dijk, The Netherlands Indies and the Great War, 1914-1918 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 
2007), 1-18.
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on Indonesia’s history, both past and present.90 Economic expansion and 
territorial conquest coincided with state formation, as local aristocracies 
were lured into contracts, borders drawn, policies drafted, social cohesions 
broken and governance, taxes and administrative power centralized, to 
establish a unified colonial state, from westernmost Aceh to easternmost 
New Guinea.
Many newly conquered regions were initially administered by military 
personnel, who fulfilled the vacancies in the understaffed local Interior 
Administration.91 Foreign direct investment increased after the reforms 
of the 1870s, ended Dutch protectionism and allowed a steady influx of 
free entrepreneurs into the colonial land and labour markets.92 As such, 
the expansion and economic development of the Dutch empire became a 
shared project of soldiers, bureaucrats, entrepreneurs and officials, who 
found themselves caught up in a framework of capitalism and violence. 
Indeed, “only unlimited accumulation of power could bring about the 
unlimited accumulation of capital”, as the interests of the colonial state 
and the upcoming entrepreneurial class of private capital merged.93 While 
similar to the development of states and the bourgeoisie classes in Europe, 
the problem in colonial spaces was that these classes were foreign, and 
aimed to keep expanding for their own personal gain.
Driven by the economic potential and opportunities Indonesia’s rich 
resources provided, they capitalized on the demand for new cash crops 
and raw materials, generated by the second industrial revolution. These 
included tobacco, rubber, palm oil and copra, as well as mining products 
such as oil, tin and coal. These became much more important than the 
‘traditional’, ‘Javanese’ cash crops, such as tea, coffee, sugar and tea.94 Many 
‘Outer Territories’, previously commercially focussed on Singapore, were 
drawn into the colonial economic network run from Batavia, while Java 
90 C. Fasseur, “Een Koloniale Paradox. De Nederlandse Expansie in de Indonesische 
Archipel in het Midden van de Negentiende Eeuw”, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 92 (1979), 
162-186; Locher-Scholten, Ethiek in Fragmenten, 243; Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia 
since c. 1200, 176.
91 H.W. van den Doel, “Military Rule in the Netherlands Indies”, in Cribb (ed.), The Late 
Colonial State, 57-78: 57-60, 63-55, 75.
92 M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de Opkomst van het Moderne Imperialisme: Koloniën 
en Buitenlandse Politiek 1870-1902 (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1985), 35-48. 
According to the calculations of Boomgaard and Gooszen, the number of Europeans 
grew from 33,642 to 133,319 in Java and from 7,740 to 31,713 in 1880-1920. See Boomgaard 
and Gooszen, Changing Economy Vol. 11: Population Trends, 133, 226.
93 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 137 
[quote] 138-139, 165.
94 J.Th. Lindblad, “The Contribution of Foreign Trade to Colonial State Formation in Indo-
nesia, 1900-1930”, in Cribb (ed.), The Late Colonial State, 93-115: 111-115. See also: C. Ross, 
Ecology and Power in the Age of Empire: Europe and the Transformation of the Tropical World 
(Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 415-420.
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started playing the more peripheral role.95 The Javanese interior economy 
stagnated, clustering around rural centres of agricultural production, while 
the rapidly developing areas in the ‘Outer Territories’ spearheaded a new, 
industrialized international export-economy.96 Economic growth increased 
significantly, from about 2 to 2.9% annually in 1880-1900 and 1900-1929. 
This allowed for larger investments in infrastructure, trade and commu-
nication, which in turn further boosted the export economy.97 Crucial was 
the development of the steam shipping network of the KPM (Koninklijke 
Pakketvaart-Maatschappij; Royal Packet Company), which served both public 
and private export and import and supported the government’s military 
conquest and administrative expansion to all corners of the archipelago.98 
The opening of the Suez canal in 1869 and a telegraph-line between 
Sumatra Singapore in 1871, also dramatically improved communication 
between The Netherlands and Indonesia.99 These developments stimulated 
a mood of progress (kemajuan) among a rising Indo-European middleclass 
in the Indies, that aspired to European lifestyles and ‘cultural citizenship’ to 
participate in modern colonial society.100 Seen from the outside, the colony 
transformed rapidly, as technology not only reached into, but became part 
of the very roots of the state. Just like in Europe, electric trams, cinemas, 
art, a free press and new ideas about politics and society seemed to change 
everyday life.101 Seen from the inside however, the benefits of technological 
95 J.Th. Lindblad, “Between Singapore and Batavia. The Outer Islands in the Southeast 
Asian Economy in the Nineteenth Century”, in C.A. Davids, W. Fritschy, and L.A. 
van der Valk (eds.), Kapitaal, Ondernemerschap en beleid: Studies over Economie en Politiek 
in Nederland, Europa en Azië van 1500 tot Heden. Afscheidsbundel voor prof. dr. P.W. Klein 
(Amsterdam: NEHA, 1996), 529-548: 530-532.
96 Booth, The Indonesian Economy, 36. J. Touwen, Extremes in the Archipelago: Trade and 
Economic Development in the Outer Islands of Indonesia, 1900-1942 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 
2001), 57-59
97 P. van der Eng, “The Real Domestic Product of Indonesia, 1880-1989”, Explorations in 
Economic History 29:3 (1992), 343-373: 352-353, 355-356.
98 J.N.F.M. à Campo, Engines of Empire: Steamshipping and State Formation in Colonial Indo-
nesia (Hilversum: Verloren, 2002), 55-70, 457-458, 478-459.
99 This allowed for the dispatch of weekly ‘Mailreports’ from the Governor-General’s offi ce 
to the Ministry in The Hague as mentioned in the introduction. E. Locher-Scholten, 
“lmperialism after the Great Wave: The Dutch Case in the Netherlands East lndies, 
1860-1914”, in M.P. Fitzpatrick (ed.), Liberal Imperialism in Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 25-46: 38.
100 H.G.C. Schulte Nordholt, “Modernity and Cultural Citizenship in the Netherlands 
Indies: An Illustrated Hypothesis”, in JSAS 42:3 (2011), 435-457; A.H.C. van der Meer, 
“Performing Colonial Modernity”, BKI 173:4 (2017), 503-538.
101 Batavia was among the fi rst cities in the world with an electric tramway, introduced 
in 1899. See H.W. Dick, "The Foundations of a National Economy, 1808-1890s", in J.Th. 
Lindblad (ed.), Historical Foundations of a National Economy in Indonesia, 1890s-1990s 
(Amsterdam/Oxford/New York/Tokyo: North-Holland, 1996), 31. See also R. Mrá zek, 
Engineers of Happy Land: Technology and Nationalism in a Colony (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002); S. Moon, Technology and Ethical Idealism: A History of Development 
in the Netherlands East Indies (Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2007).
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and socio-cultural progress reached only the happy few, most of them 
Europeans, some from the higher classes of indigenous elites and Chinese 
entrepreneurs.102 This ‘modernity’ was (and unfortunately sometimes 
still is) used to legitimize colonial presence and underline a presupposed 
Western superiority, but for the majority of Indonesians in the first half of 
twentieth century, technology, entrepreneurship, expansion and economic 
growth meant little more than an increase in their economic burden, repres-
sion and colonial paternalism.103
This repression and paternalism translated into political change which 
originated in the legitimate concerns of some Dutchmen that the govern-
ment, guided by private capitalism, failed to observe its ‘solemn imperial 
duty.’ As termed by the colonial lawyer and parliamentarian C.Th. van 
Deventer (1857-1915) and journalist Pieter Brooshooft (1845-1921), this 
included repayment of a Dutch ‘debt of honour’ to the indigenous people 
as some sort of ‘atonement’ for decades of colonial exploitation.104 Such 
concerns were used by the colonial government to design a rebranded 
version of developmental colonialism that fitted the newly privatized 
economy. Anti-liberal political parties in the Netherlands redesigned old 
principles of protectionism (against indigenous ‘labour exploitation’ and 
‘despotism’, but also Chinese moneylenders and European entrepreneurs) 
to fulfil “a moral calling” towards the indigenous population, by devel-
oping agriculture and enhancing local indigenous welfare.105 These became 
core priorities of the ‘ethical policy’, which took shape around 1900 and 
was a lot more ambitious in its scope, and thorough in its conduct, than 
former colonial policies. It was presented as a full-fledged developmental 
program, aimed at bringing the colony and its subjected populations 
into the somewhat unclearly defined standards of what it considered to 
be a modern ordered society.106 To this end, the government commenced 
to reform rural economies, expand its borders, investigate ‘diminished 
welfare’, stimulate irrigation projects and forcefully encourage migration 
of people from overpopulated Java to the ‘Outer Territories.’ The colonial 
frontier was pushed ever outward, accompanied by civilizational projects 
and missionary activities, in pursuit of the private entrepreneurs. “Gentle 
pressure” was applied to permeate village life with European principles of 
102 Bloembergen and Raben, “Wegen naar het Nieuwe Indië”, 11-13.
103 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 115, quoted in Bloembergen and Raben, “Wegen naar 
het nieuwe Indië”, 10-11. See also: B. Waaldijk and S. Legêne, “Ethische Politiek in 
Nederland: Cultureel Burgerschap tussen Overheersing, Opvoeding en Afscheid”, in 
Bloembergen and Raben (eds.), Het Koloniale Beschavingsoffensief, 187-216: 210-211.
104 Locher-Scholten, Ethiek in Fragmenten, 1-45, 337.
105 E. van Raalte (ed.) Troonredes, Openingsredes, Inhuldigingsredes 1814-1963 (’s Gravenhage 
1964), 193; E. Locher-Scholten, “Dutch Expansion in the Indonesian Archipelago Around 
1900 and the Imperialism Debate”, JSAS 25:1 (1994), 91-111: 106; Moon, Technology and 
Ethical Idealism, 25-43.
106 Bloembergen and Raben, “Wegen naar het Nieuwe Indië”, 10.
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governance and normalize bureaucracy and tax payment.107 Christianity, 
settled life and (technical) education were propagated as the heartbeat of 
colonial civilization to nurture the professional and intellectual abilities of 
indigenous populations, purportedly enabling them to work in the new 
industries of the colonial political economy and become governed citizen-
subjects functional to the colonial state.
‘Ethical colonialism’ largely served to legitimize the deeper penetra-
tion of the colonial state into unexplored peripheries and into the hearts 
and minds of its people, to keep alive colonial ‘truth regimes’ and support 
the idea of a unified, European-like state in which all participated as tax 
paying citizens.108 It was an unabashed imperialistic endeavour, swaddled 
in justifications ranging from free commerce to humanitarianism and social 
development, while self-interest and greed were still at the essence of 
colonialism, but in theory, in the minds of contemporary officials, only as 
a secondary part of the equation. Capitalism came to be understood as a 
moral force, with enterprise, free work ethic and free trade as its civilizing 
values. This way, colonialists squared violent imperial expansion and 
exploitation with developmentalism. The ethical policy corresponded with 
attempts to tighten the political grip over Indonesia by using indirect rule, 
interventionist technocracy and a regime of fear and violence, wielded to 
both intimidate and win over the political loyalty of the colonized.109 The 
“dirtiest methods” were permitted to keep the ethical face of the Dutch 
“unsullied and clean.”110
Unfulfilled promises
Hence, words rarely reflected deeds. What was presented as extraordinary 
colonial socio-economic development carried out by capable technocratic 
officials and engineers, was in fact a continuation of exploitation. Perpetual 
shortage of labour in booming regions such as North Sumatra, Palembang, 
Southeast Kalimantan and Bangka and Billiton was resolved partially by 
recruiting local people, but largely by importing hundreds of thousands 
of coolie labourers from Java, China and elsewhere, many of whom were 
lured into contracts that chained them to heavy labour under highly 
107 R. Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian elite (Leiden: Foris, 1984), 81-82; J.W. 
Meijer Ranneft, “Reglementeering van Zachten Dwang (Prentah Aloes)”, TBB 39 (1910), 
57-70.
108 See Locher-Scholten, Ethiek in Fragmenten, 106-107, 201-220; See also Cribb, “Introduction: 
the Late Colonial State in Indonesia”, 1-9: 2-3, 5-8; Schulte Nordholt, “Onafhankelijkheid 
of Moderniteit? “, 103; Locher-Scholten, Dutch Expansion, 7-8.
109 H.C.G. Schulte Nordholt, “A Genealogy of Violence”, in F. Colombijn and J.Th. Lindblad 
(eds.), Roots of Violence in Indonesia: Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective (Leiden: 
KITLV, 2002), 33-60: 33-34; Schulte Nordholt, “Modernity and Cultural Citizenship”; 
Wahid, From Revenue Farming to State Monopoly, 275.
110 As put by protagonist ‘Raden Mas Minke’ in P.A. Toer, House of Glass: A Novel (Translated 
by Max Lane; New York: William Morrow, 1996), 46.
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exploitative circumstances. They were subjected to excessive punishment 
and criminal prosecution, furnished by the ‘penal sanction’ of the ‘Coolie 
Ordinance’ of 1880, when they breached their contracts.111 Such forms of 
large-scale institutionalized bound labour took shape, in many places across 
the world, long after the abolition of slavery.112 The occasional moral outcry 
helped to voice a protest against the maltreatment of coolies but under the 
so-called Coolie Ordinances, informed by the profit-pursuits of estate and 
mine owners rather than fair considerations or labour agreements, labour 
exploitation remained a principle colonial-economic method.113 Meanwhile, 
although the majority of the cultivation systems had slowly been abolished, 
other forms of corvée labour persisted and were even exported to the ‘Outer 
Territories.’114 The ethical policy’s projects of developing new infrastruc-
ture and irrigation networks augmented labour demands, which officials 
found impossible to solve using free labour, leading to increased use of 
corvée labour services. The colonial economy, dependent on forced labour 
in what has been dubbed the “new style Cultivation System”115, unfolded 
into a Multatulian nightmare, in which the corporate imperialist-capitalist 
machine in the ‘Outer Territories’ siphoned off local labour power, while 
investments in local development lagged behind.
The doctrine of developmental colonialism served to convince larger 
international audiences of the blessings of Dutch rule for the ‘uncivilized’, 
but never translated to effective welfare policy.116 It translated into various 
problems which were symptomatic of conflicting developmental and 
exploitative colonial tendencies. Ethical education programs, for instance, 
were presented as genuine attempts to teach new vocational skills and 
increase literacy. But in practice, the government invested little in proper 
education programs, except for those serving the structures of the agricul-
tural economic systems already in place, resulting in limited social mobility. 
111 Touwen, Extremes in the Archipelago, 111-112; R. Hoefte, “Indentured Labour”, in M. van 
Rossum, K. Hofmeester, and M. van der Linden (eds.), Handbook Global History of Work 
(De Gruyter Oldenbourg: Berlin/Boston, 2017), 363-376: 369. In colonial times North 
Sumatra was known as the Residency of ‘East Coast of Sumatra.’
112 Though, as R. Hoefte argues, it would be mistaken to “regard indentured labour as an 
intermediate stage in a linear process from slavery to free labour”, as the one not always 
automatically followed the other. Nevertheless, though “hailed as free labour based on 
voluntarily signed contracts” indentured labour defi nitely bordered to different shades 
of other forms of coerced labour, including slavery, rooted in the “mental legacy” of the 
slavery system including “material remnants such as slaver barracks” and institutional-
ized racism. See: Hoefte, “Indentured Labour”, 364, 374.
113 See: J. Breman, Taming the Coolie Beast: Plantation Society and the Colonial Order in Southeast 
Asia (Delhi: Oxford University Press,1989); A. Taselaar, De Nederlandse Koloniale Lobby: 
Ondernemers en de Indische Politiek, 1914-1940 (PhD thesis, Leiden University, Leiden: 
CNWS, 1998), 261-296.
114 The last cultivation services in sugar and coffee were only abolished in 1917/1919; 
Houben and Seibert, “ (Un)freedom”, 181.
115 See: Van Doorn, De Laatste Eeuw, 169-223.
116 Booth, The Indonesian Economy, 5-8, 11-12, 136, 154, 268-174, 328-132; Locher-Scholten, 
“Imperialism after the Great Wave”, 1860-1914, 40, 41-42.
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Many peasants, in Java alone, remained trapped in an existence based on 
contract labour with little prospect of any social welfare increase.117 The 
Dutch shaped an economic climate that prioritized foreign investment over 
the improvement of local economies. Development served the state and 
industrial elites rather than local populations.118 On the island of Billiton, 
for instance, the Billiton Company (Biliton Maatschappij) had been mining 
tin ore since the 1860s, and was used as a flagship in the narrative of colo-
nial economic development for its support of socio-economic development 
by constructing roads, schools and hospitals. But this was not as beneficial 
to local circumstances as the colonial government claimed it was; smelting 
of tin took place largely outside Billiton and infrastructural projects, carried 
out in corvée services, were of limited importance to indigenous people 
as they predominantly served the tin mines and harbours. Corvée labour, 
also used for the delivery of mail and transportation of Europeans, was, 
as usual, presented as beneficial to the working spirit of the indigenous 
population, but in reality was burdensome, unpaid and a cheap way to 
develop the tin industry.119 Industrial labour was largely recruited outside 
Billiton. Chinese and Javanese coolies were preferred over local indigenous 
labourers who did not always agree to the salaries, terms and conditions set 
by Dutch corporate industry.120 The island itself was, and remained, largely 
infertile and undeveloped.121
This does not necessarily imply, as Geertz claimed in the case of Java, 
that local indigenous economies inevitably stagnated. On the contrary, 
indigenous industry and agriculture were adaptive and dynamic in their 
responses to exploitation and market fluctuations.122 The problem was that 
under the ‘colonial commercial enterprise’, industrialization and develop-
ment kept relying on the export of resources123, primarily developed for 
117 Wie, “Colonial Extraction”, 53; Breman, Koloniaal Profi jt, 315-326; Van Niel, The Emergence 
of the Modern Indonesian Elite, 66.
118 J. Th. Lindblad, "The Late Colonial State and Economic Expansion, 1900-30s", in Dick, 
Houben and Lindblad (eds.), The Emergence of a National Economy, 111-153: 144; J.Th. Lind-
blad, Between Dayak and Dutch: The Economic History of Southeast Kalimantan, 1880-1942 
(Dordrecht: Foris, 1988), 215-219.
119 See for the introduction of corvée on Belitung: ANRI AS Besl. 20-8-1878 n8, herein: Besl. 
GG, 25-6-1878 and DirBB to GG, 8-5-1878. The same problem occurred on Bangka, see: 
NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 585, Vb. 23-9-1908 n9.
120 Touwen, Extremes in the Archipelago, 137-141.
121 Ibid., 89, 135-137; J.P. van de Kerkhof, “Onmisbaar maar Onbemind. De Koninklijke 
Paketvaart Maatschappij en de Billiton Maatschappij in het Onafhankelijke Indonesië 
(1945-1958)”, Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis 2:4 (2005), 122-146: 128.
122 Touwen, Extremes in the Archipelago, 160-161, 220-223, 315-319, 321-327. See also: Wie, 
“Colonial Extraction”, 54-55.
123 J.Th. Lindblad, “Manufacturing and Foreign Investment in Colonial Indonesia”, in 
Frankema and Buelens (eds.), Colonial Exploitation and Economic Development, 211-228: 
217-218, 224-226.
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the profit of the metropolitan economy.124 High levels of diversification 
and low import levels acted as a restraint, preventing the Indies from 
establishing self-sustained economic growth. Indigenous small-scale econo-
mies survived and, as disorganized as they may have seemed to colonial 
observers, experienced relative success.125 Overall however, a national 
economy with a mature rural and industrial sector, a functioning labour 
market with decent wages, and a healthy balance between import and 
export, resistant to fluctuating commodity prices, never developed. Such 
was the economic status bequeathed to the postcolonial Indonesian state on 
gaining independence in 1945.126
Occasionally, infrastructural investments resulted in budget deficits 
and until the twentieth century, private entrepreneurs regularly siphoned 
off profits to The Netherlands as their plantations, mines and trading 
companies were owned and taxed outside Indonesia.127 It has been argued 
that this caused a structural ‘colonial drain’, a ubiquitous phenomenon in 
economic debates about colonial economic developments.128 As a result, 
across Southeast Asia, developmental colonialism led to higher expenses 
and increased the burden of taxation.129
Summarized, the Dutch colonial government started focussing 
primarily on the interests of corporate capital, and secondarily on socio-
economic development. Dutch strategies overseas, albeit previously 
considered to have deviated from general norms of modern imperialism, 
have been increasingly fitted into overarching European patterns of over-
seas expansion and governance. Despite what has been called a lack of a 
“vehemently ‘imperial’ pitch” and its virtually exclusive concern with 
Indonesia, Dutch colonialism displayed the same paradoxical commercial 
versus developmental characteristics of European imperial rule elsewhere 
124 A. Booth, “Colonial Revenue Policies and the Impact of the Transition to Independence in 
South East Asia”, BKI 169:1 (2013), 37-67: 81.
125 Lindblad, “The Contribution of Foreign Trade”; Touwen, Extremes in the Archipelago, 27.
126 Booth, The Indonesian economy, 327-35. See also Lindblad, “The late Colonial State”, 
143-152.
127 F. van Anrooij, “Crisis en Financieel Beleid in Nederlandsch-Indie (1920–1925)”, in P. 
Creutzberg and F.van Anrooij (eds.), Between People and Statistics: Essays on Modern Indo-
nesian History Presented to P. Creutzberg (The Hague/Amsterdam: Nijhoff, 1979), 119-132: 
120-121.
128 P. van der Eng, “Exploring Exploitation: the Netherlands and Colonial Indonesia 1870-
1940”, Revista de Historia Económica 16:1 (1998), 291-321. See also P. O’Brien, “Afterword: 
Refl ections on Fiscal Foundations and Contexts for the Formation of Economically Effec-
tive Eurasian States from the Rise of Venice to the Opium War”, in B. Yun-Casalilla and 
P.K. O’Brien (eds.), The Rise of Fiscal States, 442-453: 453; Wie, “Colonial Extraction”, 52; 
Booth, Colonial Legacies, 85-
129 Booth, “Towards a Modern Fiscal State in Southeast Asia”, 51-55.
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(addressed in the introduction).130 Every act of the colonial government 
was proclaimed as being ultimately for the benefit of the local populations, 
some of which were still governed only in name. The mix of exploita-
tion and the enlightenment of colonial subjects was a deeply entangled 
phenomenon common to all colonial empires, because colonial expansion 
required such legitimization to enable further exploitation.131 However, in 
colonial economies one’s social position depended on birth, skin colour, 
and ethnicity. Such determinants of social mobility encumbered most 
economic initiative, so many people stayed dependent on small-scale trade 
or the colonial export economy.132 The thin varnish of the ‘ethical policy’ 
attempted to hide such realities behind a developmental smoke screen that 
presented the interests of European industrialists, the colonial government 
and subjected societies as aligned and targeted at equality and prosperity. 
It barely concealed how virtually every aspect of it was subordinate to 
corporate exploitation.
Reforming the state: training technocrats and educating elites
To enable the various changes discussed above, the state itself needed 
to change. Its structure had supported the corrupt lifestyles of European 
and indigenous administrators. Colonial Residents, for instance, had a 
difficult and demanding job overseeing the indigenous aristocracy, a posi-
tion which required great diplomatic and political skill but also included 
various material and financial privileges.133 They lived in large, bucolic 
mansions surrounded by indigenous servants, often maintaining their 
own agricultural estates and frequently one or more local mistresses, while 
on the other hand, civil servants in Batavia and Buitenzorg, the cities that 
housed the majority of the colonial central administration and the residence 
of the Governor-General, lived metropolitan, ‘Indo-European’ lives.134 
Such lifestyles did not fit the conceptualization of a rationally ordered 
130 Raben, “A New Dutch Imperial History?”, 9-10, 19; J.Th. Lindblad, “Economic Aspects of 
the Dutch Expansion in Indonesia, 1870-1914”, MdAS 23 (1989), 1-24: 2. Kuitenbrouwer, 
Nederland en de Opkomst van het Moderne Imperialisme, 202-227. Views of Dutch imperi-
alism have traditionally emphasized its narrow focus on Indonesia, commerce and prag-
matism which led some historians to conclude the Dutch empire was not imperialistic 
(see for instance H.L. Wesseling, “British and Dutch Imperialism: a Comparison”, in J.C. 
Heesterman et al., Comparative History of India and Indonesia Vol. 4: General Perspectives 
(Leiden/New York: E.J. Brill, 1989), 61-76), a view that has been reinterpreted over the 
last decades. Schrikker, “Institutional Memory”, 112-113; R. Koekkoek, A.I. Richard and 
A. Weststeijn, “Introduction: Intellectual History in Imperial Practice”, in Koekkoek, 
Richard and Weststeijn (eds.), The Dutch Empire between Ideas and Practice, 1-15.
131 Stoler, Along the Archival Grain, 24.
132 Houben and Seibert, “ (Un)freedom”, 186; Alatas, The Myth of the Lazy Native, 30-31.
133 Originally, a Resident was a European representative residing at an indigenous court. Van 
den Doel, De Stille Macht, 15.
134 U. Bosma and R. Raben, Being “Dutch” in the Indies: a History of Creolisation and Empire, 
1500-1920 (Singapore/Athens: NUS Press/Ohio University Press, 2008), 9, 26, 45-46.
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state,135 and so every official’s position, from lowest ranking clerk to the 
Dutch King, was revamped and reformed according to the dimensions of 
modest bureaucracy.136 Both the indigenous and European pillars of the 
Interior Administration were to become more of an administrative and less 
of a ruling class, better equipped for more impersonal styles of govern-
ment.137 Accordingly, the morality and professionalism of officials had to 
be improved, while corruption, nepotism and the deep patrimonial ties to 
indigenous aristocracies had to be eradicated, to support their transforma-
tion into scientifically trained technocrats.
For this purpose, an educational program for Dutch officials was 
founded in 1842 in Delft. This was the precursor of the academic study of 
Indology, taught in Leiden from 1902 onward, and aimed to train higher 
officials in colonial affairs and the diverse languages, laws, societies and 
customs of Indonesia.138 A group of industrialists established a rival educa-
tion program in Utrecht in 1925, intended to counterweigh what they 
considered Leiden’s ethical ‘extremism’ – derided in Leiden as the ‘petro-
leum faculty.’139 Many officials were indeed of ethical convictions and many 
became ‘scholar-officials’; administrators, data-collectors and anthropolo-
gists at the same time. They specialized in the regions they governed, keen 
to supply their superiors with information, supporting state surveillance, 
but also out of personal devotion and interest, as true welfare workers, 
beneficent mentors and ‘educators’ of the Indonesian population, aiming at 
conscientious policy.140
135 H. Dick, “Policy Regimes, Statistics and Unintended Consequences: Transitions in Indo-
nesia’s Modern Economic History”, in J. Touwen and A.F. Schrikker (eds.), Promises and 
Predicaments: Trade and Entrepreneurship in Colonial and Independent Indonesia in the 19th and 
20th Centuries (Singapore: NUS Press, 2015), 279-297: 279.
136 The implementation of new government bodies, such as the Department for Agriculture, 
Industry and Commerce in 1905, the Opium and Salt Administration in 1904 (see chapter 
2), and the directing offi ces for the rail- and tramways, postal and telegraph, banking and 
public health services, required further hiring and training of civils servants.
137 H. Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite: the Colonial Transformation of the Javanese 
Priyayi (Singapore: Heinemann, 1979), 4-5, 8-9, 15, 30, 35.
138 Van den Doel, De Stille Macht, 67; C. Fasseur, De Indologen: Ambtenaren voor de Oost, 1825-
1950 (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker,1994), 23-29, 34-39, 73-74, 93-27, 328-331, 362-379, 484.
139 Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, 15; Fasseur, De Indologen, 412-426; Gouda, 
Dutch Culture Overseas, 62.
140 The same scholarly tradition has been identifi ed by Benedict Anderson as the source of 
the formation of national identity and the unifi ed Indonesian nation state. See Anderson, 
Imagined Communities, 109-111, 163-185; Bloembergen and Raben, “Wegen naar het 
Nieuwe Indië”, 14; Noor, Data-Gathering in Colonial Southeast Asia, 17-18.
 See for examples of memoirs of ‘BB-offi cials’ the work of G.L. Tichelman, S. van der Wal, 
A. Visser and W. Ph. Coolhaas. Visser and Coolhaas in particular describe the ‘unex-
pected’ versatility of their daily jobs as a ‘BB-offi cials’ especially in remoter parts of the 
archipelago. Coolhaas describes his daily job as that of a governor, an educator, judge, 
tax collector, intelligence agent and even doctor. W.P. Coolhaas, Controleur B.B.: Herin-
neringen van een Jong Bestuursambtenaar in Nederlands-Indië (Utrecht: HES, 1985), 30-32, 
57-58, 65-66, 135-138.
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This way, a position in the Interior Administration became a sort of 
lifestyle, characterized by both romantic, orientalist notions of explora-
tion, adventurism and remoteness as well as long hours of paperwork. 
The state sought maximum efficiency in maintaining law and order, and 
officials grew increasingly busy. Under these time constraints they grew 
detached from and found it more difficult to understand the societies under 
their rule. Hence, they relied more often on local assistance and co-opting 
indigenous elites.141 To prevent a return to ‘feudalism’ and ‘patrimonialism’ 
these indigenous elites were also subjected to transformative programs. 
They were to develop from a “cosmologically oriented, hereditary” to a 
“modern, welfare-state oriented, education-based elite.”142 in Java, ‘tradi-
tionalist’ aspects of rule and hierarchy were abandoned as far as possible, 
and its political terms forcefully erased (though in the eyes of the public 
Europeanization of the priyayi classes had already eroded much of their 
former prestige).143 Entitlements to ‘cultivation percentages’ and labour 
services were curtailed in all regions that knew monopolized export of 
coercively produced cash crops, and European salaries had been detached 
from agricultural profits in 1866. For many, this led to immediate financial 
problems. In Java, many bupati, who were expected to maintain costly 
lifestyles, support peasants and pay for festivities and celebrations as a 
display of wealth symbolizing harmony in their realms, were no longer 
able to freely extract what they needed. Turned into insufficiently salaried 
administrators, many of them started relying on (often Chinese) money-
lenders which harmed the reputation of some courts.144 Confidence in the 
reliability of lower civil servants at government offices also seemed to have 
remained low. In 1929, for instance, it was reported that the writing desks 
in the Customs office of Tanjung Priok (the harbour close to Batavia) had no 
drawers as to prevent staff from embezzling or hiding away paperwork.145
In many ‘Outer Territories’, indigenous rulers had barely begun 
taking part in the colonial administration. Supposedly ‘self-rulers’ of ‘self-
governing’ territories (zelfbesturende landschappen), like the principalities in 
141 R. McVey, “’Introduction: Local Voices, Central Power’”, in R. McVey (ed.), Southeast Asia 
Transitions: Approaches through Social History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 
1-31: 21.
142 Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite, 2.
143 E. Locher-Scholten, Sumatran Sultanate and Colonial State: Jambi and the Rise of Dutch 
Imperialism, 1830-1907 (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2004), 180; Van Niel, The Emergence of 
the Modern Indonesian Elite, 24. Honorary titles for instance lost their meaning of pure 
lineal descent and instead became associated with specifi c administrative ranks. See also 
Sartono Kartodirdjo, Modern Indonesia: Tradition & Transformation (Yogyakarta: UGM 
Press, 1988), 113-127, 132-149.
144 Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, 22, 133. This kind of ‘elite displacement’ 
was a common feature in former monopoly-cultivated areas (see chapter 4, 5 and 6). See 
also: H.J. Benda, “Political Elites in Colonial Southeast Asia: An Historical Analysis”, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 7:3 (1965), 233-251.
145 Anonymous, “Douane Priok”, Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië , 21-1-1929, 
p. 3.
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Java, they retained various degrees of political and fiscal autonomy under 
specific contracts overseen by Dutch officials, as long as they acknowledged 
the supremacy of the Dutch and cooperated in matters of taxation and 
administration (see Chapter 7). This was the political reality in the majority 
of colonized Indonesia and only in some areas was Dutch rule absolute, 
everywhere else it was established by contracts and continuously renego-
tiated.146 The number of self-governing territories slowly diminished, from 
340 to 273 in 1914-1930147, but the Dutch East Indies had already become 
a patchwork of autonomies, princedoms, private estates, each subject to 
its own regulations, rules and forms of governance. Therefore, few of the 
promises of the colonial state, ethically guided progress, economic develop-
ment and greater welfare, survived when filtered through the divergent 
political realities of various officials and rulers.
The use of self-governance alleviated the workload of overburdened 
European officials and spurred debates about the future of indigenous rule 
and the possibility of even greater autonomy – phrased in terms of further 
‘emancipation’ (ontvoogding) and the education of the indigenous adminis-
tration.148 Inspired by the ‘association-theories’ of the Leiden Arabist and 
Islamologist C. Snouck Hurgronje and his successor G.A.J. Hazeu, small 
groups of young members of the indigenous elites were gradually exposed 
to western education, preparing them for a modern role in a new indig-
enous intellectual bureaucracy, depending on their birth and patronages.149 
Brought into contact with European ideas, they increasingly adapted to 
a western lifestyle in colonial capitals rather than their role as traditional 
rulers in the province, which aroused concern among European officials.150
Significant tensions arose over this problem between local officials 
of the Interior Administration and office-trained bureaucrats in Batavia, 
rooted in mutual incomprehension of each other’s realities. To local offi-
cials, ‘Batavian bureaucrats’ were “formalistic, unimaginative […]” and 
“too much influenced by high-flown theories with little basis in hard facts 
[…] carping, budget-watching critics, ignorant of the native world outside 
146 Bongenaar, Zelfbesturend Landschap, 30-31, 49-60, 69, 74-76, 87-92, 113-118; G.J. Resink, 
“Inlandsche Staten in den Oosterschen Archipel. (1873-1915)”, BKI 116:3, 313-349: 
330-336.
147 Benda, The Pattern of Administrative Reforms, 596.
148 Bongenaar, Zelfbesturend Landschap, 87-92.
149 Only after 1920 were lower priyayi allowed entrance, and the majority of lower elites 
was never allowed access to education. Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic elite, 
17, 53-54. See also M.F. Laffan, “The Tangled Roots of Islamist Activism in Southeast 
Asia”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 16:3 (2003), 397-414., esp. pp. 125-208. By 
1928, there were 74,697 ‘inlanders’ who had received Western-style primary education 
and 6,468 who had received secondary education. The number of indigenous people 
attending university remained low: around 1940 637 ‘inlanders’ went to college and only 
37 had actually graduated. G.M. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1952), 31-32.
150 Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, 43. See also Chapter 7.
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their offices.”151 To ‘Batavian bureaucrats’, local officials were narrow 
minded and unduly distrustful of indigenous rule and unification policy. 
More conservative officials particularly seemed to worry that emancipation 
would affect the traditional authority and prestige (hormat; honour) of the 
indigenous rulers, which they considered essential to maintaining order 
among the population.152 To them, breaking with these ruling traditions 
brought the risk of potential political collapse. But ideally, the colonial 
administration no longer required such ‘traditional authority’, and the 
education of the indigenous elites was continued.
Decentralization and nationalism: the end of the ethicists
These developments synchronized with the emancipation of the colonial 
state itself. Royal involvement in the colony had been curtailed after the 
1848 liberal revolutions and the adoption of a Dutch constitution. A 
systematic separation of governance and justice facilitated, theoretically 
at least, an independent colonial judiciary.153 In 1854, the adoption of a 
‘colonial constitution’ (Regeeringsreglement; ‘Government Regulation’) 
formalized the legal footing of the colony and promulgated policy changes 
in administration, finance and labour policies which were formally issued 
by the Governor-General, who in theory answered only to the crown, but 
in practice consulted constantly with officials in the field, in Batavia and in 
The Hague.154 Meanwhile, the colonial economy started growing beyond 
the scope of The Netherlands, and the Accountancy Law of 1867 separated 
the annual budget plans of both. The same year, a fixed colonial contribu-
151 Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, 11, 35, 118. See also, for instance instance 
the remark of Coolhaas, who was often “irritated by the letters of Batavian offi ce-men” 
(Coolhaas, Controleur B.B., 174. Illustrative is also Couperus’ literary description of 
“Batavia […] with the arrogant atmosphere of the place […] the least fl attering to one 
in the position of Resident, […] surrounded by the highest offi cials, so that the Resident, 
who was almost supreme anywhere else, was at Batavia no more than yet another offi cial 
among so many members of council and directors […] And close to Buitenzorg, with 
its arbitrary secretariat, whose bureaucratic and red-tape methods were always clashing 
with the practical administrative methods of the Residents themselves.” L. Couperus, The 
Hidden Force (Ed. by P. Vincent and I. Buruma; London: Pushkin Press, 2012), 240.
152 Among them was the later Minister of Colonies (1933-1937) and prime minister (1925-
1926 and 1933-1939) H. Colijn (1869-1944), see H. Colijn, Koloniale Vraagstukken van Heden 
en Morgen (Amsterdam: De Standaard, 1928), 77-97. See also Schmutzer, Dutch Colonial 
Policy, 53-54. and Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, 38-40, 76-78, 81, 130-143. 
A number of hormat circulars curtailed the remaining relics of the Bupati’s traditional 
prestige, see Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite, 46-47 and Ricklefs, 
A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200, 167.
153 N.S. Efthymiou, Grondrechten in Nederlands-Indië (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2012), 
18.
154 N.S. Efthymiou, De Organisatie van Regelgeving voor Nederlands Oost-Indië: Stelsels en 
Opvattingen (1602-1942) (PhD thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2005), 266-270, 
320-325.
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tion from colony to motherland was agreed upon.155 After many more years 
of lobbying, colonial and Dutch state finances were separated in 1912, as 
the colony was transformed into an independent legal entity, enabling 
Batavia to borrow money independently.156 In 1925, a new State Regulation 
(succeeding that of 1854) determined that colonial budget plans were to be 
drafted in Batavia and approved by The Hague.
Self-governance was further enhanced by the ‘Decentralization Law’ of 
1903, which delegated greater authority to local governments to improve 
cost-efficiency and reduce the impact of colonial governance on the 
treasury. In 1905, municipality councils were established in various cities 
in Java, and though these were largely dominated by wealthy, European 
industrialists or ex-statesmen, they provided a platform for priyayi to 
engage directly with larger groups of Europeans.157 In 1918 all controleurs in 
Java were replaced with indigenous officials.158 Territorial rule in the ‘Outer 
Territories’ remained delegated to the plethora of self-governing regencies 
and local councils that enjoyed increasingly higher degrees of indepen-
dence.159 These developments stimulated political awareness among the 
indigenous ruling classes. A rising intelligentsia of educated priyayi and 
a heterogeneous mixture of Indo-Europeans and peranakan (acculturated 
Chinese) started using the upcoming Malay and Chinese language press, 
to voice more radical concerns about greater emancipation, claiming access 
to education and social mobility, partly based on European principles, 
but sometimes also on cultural rejuvenation of ancient Javanese values.160 
Among the politically aware, the Malay language (rather than Dutch) 
became of instrumental importance in shaping the idea of Indonesian 
nationalism and identity.161 And among the rising colonial middle-class, old 
racial hierarchies met with new social divisions, shaped by education and 
social memberships.162
This might seem like the colonial state had finally created its much 
desired citizenry of independently thinking, productive, participating 
155 De Jong, Van Batig Slot naar Ereschuld, 30-31, 80-83, 113-118, 268-273.
156 Van Anrooij, “Crisis en Financieel Beleid”, 119.
157 Schmutzer, Dutch Colonial Policy, 46-56; Van Dijk, The Netherlands Indies and the Great War, 
21; Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, 64; Bongenaar, Zelfbesturend Landschap, 
39.
158 Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, 81.
159 Bongenaar, Zelfbesturend Landschap, 46-48.
160 F. Fakih, “Conservative Corporatist: Nationalist Thoughts of Aristocrats: The Ideas of 
Soetatmo Soeriokoesoemo and Noto Soeroto”, BKI (2012), 420-444: 421-422. See also: A. 
Ahmat, The Vernacular Press and the Emergence of Modern Indonesian Consciousness (1855-
1913) (Ithaca: SEAP Publication, 1995).
161 J.T. Siegel, Fetish, Recognition, Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 10, 
93; Anderson, Imagined Communities, 99-100, 177-178.
162 Hoogervorst and Schulte Nordholt, “Urban Middle Classes”, 453-455, 457-458, 461, 469. 
See also Van der Meer, “Performing Colonial Modernity”; B. Luttikhuis, Negotiating 
Modernity: Europeanness in Late Colonial Indonesia, 1910-1942 (PhD thesis, European 
University Institute, 2014).
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taxpayers, a harmonious society of a governed state pursuing the ideal 
of a “synthesis between East and West.”163 As such, the founding in 1908 
of the first true nationalist movement, Budi Utomo164, was celebrated as a 
success of the ethical policy by the Dutch authorities.165 But the appeal of 
Budi Utomo was still rather conservative, as it consisted solely of educated 
members of Dutch-oriented priyayi. More radical voices argued that the 
membership of Budi Utomo was from the aristocratic elites and too deeply 
dependent on the Dutch to truly represent the populations they suppos-
edly governed and with whom indeed, they had gradually lost touch.166 
Only the small top-layer of society profited from the modernizing aspects 
of European colonial governance. For the overwhelming majority little 
had changed. Nationalist popular mass-movements, rooted in ‘modern 
Islamic’167 and communist principles, such as Sarekat [Dagang] Islam168 
and the Indische Partij, responded to the government’s half-hearted 
attempts towards enabling greater social mobility, by arguing for, albeit 
not always clearly and coherently formulated, a more inclusive, ‘modern’ 
and de-racialized colonial citizenship.169 This does however not indicate 
an ‘indigenous/nationalist alternative’ to ‘European modernity’, which, 
as argued by Cooper and, more recently, Protschky, only offer limited 
explanation for understanding what colonial modernity was.170 Instead, 
163 Van Doorn, De Laatste Eeuw, 25; Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200, 206.
164 In old Dutch spelling ‘Boedi Oetomo’; ‘Principal Philosophy’, also translated as ‘Noble 
Endeavour.’
165 Van Doorn, De Laatste Eeuw, 72; Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200, 
216-219.
166 H. Sutherland, Pangreh Pradja: Java’s Indigenous Administrative Corps and its Role in the last 
Decades of Dutch Colonial Rule (New Haven: Yale University, 1973), 512-537; Sutherland, 
The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, 118-120. See also Van den Doel, De Stille Macht, 418.,
167 Modern Islam, imported by Indonesian Muslims returning from their haj, fl ourished in 
the Minangkabau region on Sumatra and parts of East and Central Java, as a more accu-
rate social binder than the colonial state. K. van Dijk, “The Threefold Suppression of the 
Javanese. The Fight Against Capitalism, the Colonial State, and the Traditional Rulers”, 
in Cribb (ed.), The Late Colonial State, 261-279: 273; Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern 
Indonesian Elite, 84-86.
168 Founded in 1905 as an indigenous batik-trading organization and changed into a political 
movement in 1912. Sarekat Islam grew rapidly across the archipelago as it channelled 
local resistance against Chinese and Dutch colonial commercial and political power and 
indigenous elitism, all seen as instruments of western capitalism – which reminds us that 
Indonesian nationalism was never a unifi ed movement. See Van Niel, The Emergence of the 
Modern Indonesian Elite, 86-94.
169 Which is, as such, a contradictio in terminis, because citizenship in the colony was in 
fact always racially informed. U. Djalins traces colonial citizenship to the traces and 
entitlements that colonized people attempted to get validated by the state, and draws 
attention to the importance of their struggle to obtain and retain land rights. See U. 
Djalins, “Becoming Indonesian Citizens: Subjects, Citizens, and Land Ownership in the 
Netherlands Indies, 1930–37”, in JSAS 46:2, 227-245. See also R.E. Elson, “Constructing 
the Nation: Ethnicity, Race, Modernity and Citizenship in Early Indonesian Thought”, in 
Asian Ethnicity 6:3 (2005), 145-160 and B. Luttikhuis, Negotiating Modernity, 9-12, 100-102.
170 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 37, 114, 149; Protschky, “Modern Times”, 2-3.
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even though higher classes organized in nationalist movements oriented 
around principles of European ‘modernity’, aspects of what supposedly 
was considered ‘modern’ were also consumed on a wider scale by a larger, 
indigenous (lower) ‘middle-class’ from Asian repositories, which rekindled 
new interpretations of change and progress in Indonesian society, both 
before and after Indonesian independence.171 Fact was that the Dutch 
were intolerant to large-scale social development outside of their control, 
and responded strongly to indigenous calls to award all full ‘colonial 
citizenship’, which the lack of sincerity which imbued education and 
emancipation politics from its beginning. Even though some officials were 
sympathetic to its plea, the Indische Partij was prohibited and its founders 
exiled.172 The Dutch became particularly distrustful of communist rhetoric, 
especially after the Russian revolutions in 1917. A shadow parliament under 
the name of Volksraad (People’s Council) was established in 1918. Intended 
to offer people greater access to national colonial politics, in effect it had 
advisory rather than legislative power, and only 24 out of 49 members were 
elected by the local councils, of which only eight were indigenous and all of 
these from the aristocracy.173 Large, communist-inspired revolts in Java and 
West-Sumatra eventually provided the government with the opportunity 
to suppress radical, anticolonial resistance and return to stern policies of 
repression; some authors therefore demarcate 1926/1927 as the end of the 
ethical policy.174
In this way, the weak slogans of developmental colonialism that had 
already barely succeeded in convincing audiences at home, crumbled below 
the weight of governance reality. Despite its promises, despite comfortably 
fancying itself a benevolent tutor and developer, the government remained 
exploitative, an autocratic ‘beambtenstaat’, unwilling and incapable of 
truly investing in local society and unwilling to accept alternative voices 
arguing for change and representation. This was not only the result of 
path-dependent decisions of officials, but also of political choice. The Dutch 
colonial state refused to hand over any influence to parties other than the 
established Indonesian aristocracies on which it already relied. However, 
unifying technocratic, transparent, representative, just and responsible rule 
171 Schulte Nordholt, “Modernity and Cultural Citizenship.” See also M. Bloembergen, 
“New Spiritual Movements, Scholars, and “Greater India” in Indonesia”, in Protschky 
and Van den Berge (eds.), Modern Times in Southeast Asia, 57-86: 76-77; R. Raben, “Hoe 
Wordt Men Vrij? De Lange Dekolonisatie van Indonesië”, in E. Bogaerts and R. Raben 
(eds.), Van Indië tot Indonesië (Amsterdam: Boom, 2007), 13-30: 17-18, 23.
172 J.M. Nomes, “De Indische Partij. Indo-Europeanen en Nationalistische Ideeën in Neder-
lands-Indië”, in W. Willems (ed.), Sporen van een Indisch Verleden, 1600-1942 (Leiden: 
Centrum voor Onderzoek van Maatschappelijke Tegenstellingen, 1992), 55-70; Raben, 
“Hoe Wordt Men Vrij?”, 23-24.
173 12 of these had to be of indigenous descent, the other 12 were European and ‘Foreign 
Orientals’. Efthymiou, De Organisatie van Regelgeving, 379-395; Bongenaar, Zelfbesturend 
Landschap, 110; Dijk, The Netherlands Indies and the Great War, 20.
174 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200, 225-226.
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with the established deeply personal, paternalistic, ‘feudalistic’ attributes 
of the relations between European officials and indigenous rulers, was an 
unachievable ideal. Officials high up in the colonial administration were 
aware of this paradoxical and contrasting reality, but rather than fixing the 
problems at hand, concealed them behind policies of development, educa-
tion and decentralization. It presented these policies as the sole route to a 
‘modern society’, and convinced as it was of its superiority, fundamentally 
gave the go ahead to a state that remained authoritarian, undemocratic, 
exclusivist and racially segregated, rooted in the paternalistic world view on 
which it was grafted in 1815.175 Consequently, the indigenous bureaucracy 
continued to be vulnerable to increasing distrust, while actual reform never 
really materialized and the state got only further alienated from the people 
it governed.176 The colonial government never became the solid, monolithic 
bureaucratic machine it pretended it was. Rather, it was a collection of 
educated, usually elitist, European and Indonesian men who had to make 
sense of the demanding expectations of Batavia and the confusing realities 
they governed. Encumbered by long distances and difficult communication, 
this translated into a patchwork of local administrations which gave leeway 
to locally-minded policies that “militated against the collection of uniform 
statistics” of Batavia.177 For the indigenous population, this had profound 
consequences.
Legal pluralism, using adat
One of these consequences was that, despite various attempts at unification, 
the colony remained characterized by various divisions. The colony was in 
essence a class society, in which class was largely informed by race. The 
legal and tax systems contributed much to this division, grafted in a legal-
racial separation embedded in legislation, judicial practice and executive 
policy.178 Europeans and ‘those classified as, or equalized with Europeans’, 
and ‘inlanders’ or ‘indigenous peoples’ (and those classified as such) 
answered to separate, ambivalent legal bureaucracies, court hierarchies, 
procedural codes and tax systems. For Europeans these were based on 
175 W.F. Wertheim, “Netherlands-Indian Colonial Racism and Dutch Home Racism”, in J. 
Breman, et al. (eds.), Imperial Monkey Business: Racial Supremacy in Social Darwinist Theory 
and Colonial Practice (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1990), 71-88: 74.
176 A.J.S. Reid, To Nation by Revolution: Indonesia in the 20th Century (Singapore: NUS Press, 
2011), 8, 15-22, 42.
177 H. Dick, “Formation of the Nation-State, 1930s-1966”, in Dick, Houben, and Lindblad 
(eds.), The Emergence of a National Economy, 153-193: 183. See also Van Niel, The Emergence 
of the Modern Indonesian Elite, 88, 90-91; Day, The Policy and Administration, 225.
178 C. Fasseur, “Cornerstone and Stumbling Block: Racial Classifi cation and the Late Colo-
nial State in Indonesia”, in R. Cribb (ed.), The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and 
Economic Foundations of the Netherlands Indies, 1880-1942 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994), 
31-56: 31.
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European law (a Dutch colonial legal code was introduced in 1848)179, while 
the justice administration of indigenous people was decreed to use the prin-
ciple legal guidelines of their own local adat (law).180 Ethnic Chinese, Japa-
nese, Indians, Arabs and other Asians occupied a more ambivalent position; 
they were considered to be economically above the indigenous people but 
inferior to Europeans, and from 1818 onward were inelegantly termed 
‘Foreign Orientals’ (‘Vreemde Oosterlingen’), as a separate legal class.181 
They answered to indigenous criminal law but to European commercial 
law. Such legal categorizations, formalized in the Government Regulation 
of 1854 (article 109), were not absolute but dynamic; people could apply 
for ‘higher’ legal status. Of course, none of these socio-legal classes formed 
homogenous groups.182 In reality, there were large and virtually unbridge-
able disproportionate differences within, and among the legal classes, such 
as financial capacity, life standards, education and social mobility.183 It is 
also important to differentiate between what officials called ‘indigenous’ (or 
autochthonous) and ‘non-indigenous inlanders’ (‘inheemse’ and ‘niet-inheemse 
inlanders’) depending on their origins. For instance, a Javanese person living 
in Aceh was a ‘non-indigenous inlander’, but an ‘inlander’ nevertheless. 
An Acehnese in Aceh was considered to be an ‘indigenous inlander.’ This 
is important, because ‘indigenous inlanders’ were supposed to adhere to 
local adat, including various social obligations relating to labour, marriage 
and inheritance, while it made little sense for ‘non-indigenous inlanders’ to 
observe a system of customary law that was not their own.184 Instead, ‘non-
indigenous inlanders’ were supposed to adhere to the tax laws designed for 
‘Foreign Orientals.’ Ultimately, the liberal-enlightened principles of justice 
administration were diffused in the “unequal and authoritarian colonial 
179 Stbl. 1847 n23; Ch. F. van Fraassen, Ambon in het 19e-eeuwse Indië : Van Wingewest tot Werf-
depot (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 2018), 221.
180 Ibid., 33; S. Ravensbergen, Courtrooms of Conflict: Criminal Law, Local Elites and Legal 
Pluralities in Colonial Java (PhD thesis, Leiden University, 2018), 18-39; D.S. Lev, "Colonial 
Law and the Genesis of the Indonesian State", Indonesia 40 (1985), 57-74: 59-60.
181 Lev, “Colonial Law”, 62; Lohanda, Growing Pains, 9-11, 41-43.
182 About 75% of the ‘European class’ comprised Indo-Europeans who had an ambiguous 
position drifting between indigenous and European society. Indigenous society was 
divided between high-class priyayi, middle class townsmen and an overwhelming 
majority of lower-class village people and agriculturalists. ‘Foreign Orientals’ formed 
an array of ethnicities striving for further recognition and legal equalization with Euro-
peans. (see Liem, De Rechtspositie der Chinezen, 623-627). Under infl uence of growing 
Japanese power and pressure from Tokyo, the Japanese were collectively equalized with 
European legal status in 1899.
183 Gouda, Dutch Culture Overseas, 4-6, 14-16, 20-15, 240-242; Luttikhuis, “Beyond Race: 
Constructions of ‘Europeanness’ in Late-Colonial Legal Practice in the Dutch East 
Indies”, European Review of History 20:4 (2013), 539-558.
184 For this reason, I prefer to leave the Dutch colonial-legal term ‘inlander’ untranslated. The 
commonly used English term ‘indigenous [people]’ can also be translated to Dutch as 
‘inheems’, which technically refers to ethnical people originally inhabiting indigenous to a 
specifi c region, while ‘inlander’ was the socio-legal category of all of these people (‘native 
Indonesians’) together.
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reality” of colonial law courts, which “were an arena where the essentially 
unenlightened character of the colonial state was revealed”, and which were 
largely reliant on the cooperation with indigenous elites and functionaries, 
deeply pragmatic in its conduct and establishing a “rule of lawyers” rather 
than a ‘rule of law.’185
Especially problematic was administration of adat law. Initially, the 
Dutch relied on local adat authorities to administer indigenous justice. 
Attempts to restructure adat only shaped a fragile, abstracted model of 
social organization which never successfully reflected practices of rule; 
the moment officials attempted to codify and alter adat, it changed right 
under their noses. Whereas local chiefs and residents had few difficulties 
in grasping and using the subtleties and flexible provisions adat provided 
for their own benefits, to outsiders such as colonial officials, adat was “a 
cacophony” of highly local, highly fluid regulations.
From the early twentieth century onward, the adat of nineteen different 
regions were described in the Adatrechtbundels (Adat Law Tomes) in a 
project led by Leiden law professor C. van Vollenhoven (1874-1933) who 
was an ardent proponent of analysing, codifying and preserving adat. 
Van Vollenhoven was aware that the plural meaning and operation of 
adat inspired a difference between its codification and actual operation, 
leading to many misinterpretations by colonial administrators (and later 
historians), and argued for the reinterpretation of indigenous law in its 
own local terms.186 This conflicted of course with the concept of a uniform 
legal regime manipulatable from the centre. Moreover, accommodating the 
enormous variety and fluidity of adat required an unaffordable and incon-
ceivable expansion of the colonial state. Its high level of changeability and 
flexibility made permanent codification impossible. Van Vollenhoven and 
his students also recognized that adat had to be seen in its social context and 
on its own terms, and refrained from perceiving adat law though dogmatic, 
static Western frames such as customary law.187 Nevertheless, much adat 
law would change, as the world in which colonized subjects lived changed, 
under the influence of colonialism.188 Still, some of Van Vollenhoven’s ideas 
185 S. Ravensbergen, “Rule of Lawyers: Liberalism and Colonial Judges in Nineteenth-
Century Java”, in Koekkoek, Richard and Weststeijn (eds.), The Dutch Empire between Ideas 
and Practice, 159-182: 163 (quote), 164-169.
186 F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann, “Myths and Stereotypes about Adat Law: A Reassess-
ment of Van Vollenhoven in the Light of Current Struggles over Adat Law in Indonesia”, 
BKI 167:2-3 (2011), 167-195: 175, 187. See also Burns, The Leiden Legacy.
187 Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann, “Myths and Stereotypes”, 172-173, 
187.
188 Lev, “Colonial Law”, 66; Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann, “Myths and 
Stereotypes”, 174; C. van Vollenhoven, Het Adatrecht van Nederlandsch-Indië (Leiden: Brill, 
1918), 29; See also: E. Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions”, in E. Hobsbawm 
and T. Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 1-14; and T. Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa”, in ibid., 
211-262: 211-212.
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resonated in the political agendas of more conservative local officials and 
his adat policy, though perhaps not intended as such, helped officials to 
define Indonesian communities in ways that were considered legitimate. 
Codifying adat also became an axiomatic framework for keeping people in 
their place, subjected to, and serving the authorities upon whom the admin-
istration relied.189 Like Javanese ceremonialism, village life and hybrid 
colonial bureaucracy, the imposition of a diversified codified law system 
“remained a principal justification of the administrative state in a plural 
society […] much (or more) grounded in conservative political and social 
interests than in ethical principles.”190
Ultimately, when the attempt was made to impose a legal unifica-
tion of criminal law in 1918 and the tax system in 1920, civil servants (as 
exemplified by Korn in the introduction) found themselves facing impos-
sible challenges. The ambition was to unify, to shape a consolidated class 
of citizen-subjects adhering to the same legal system. Unification became 
popular colonial jargon relating not only to the merger of specific ordi-
nances or laws from various parts of the colony into one category, but 
hinting at the full integration of many aspects of society – law and legisla-
tion, the civil service, education and taxation.191 Yet, fragmented and prag-
matic as the colonial administration still was, legal protocols and justice 
administration kept being delegated to local rulers and middlemen. More-
over, legal separation was connected to core aspects of colonial governance, 
such as indirect rule and the pretence of European superiority, all integral to 
the functioning of the colonial state and in opposition to ideas of universal 
justice. Legal separation shaped ethically bound identities to maintain the 
political dimensions of different communities. Throughout the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, this simplified the justice administration and the 
levying of taxes, as it helped keeping people in their place under differenti-
ated economic roles to serve efficient exploitation. Therefore, colonial law 
could never represent universal values.192 In all colonial empires, rule devel-
oped in accordance with various legal traditions and decentralized forms 
of power, necessitating adaption to local situations which created fluid law 
systems that could be transformed on the spot.193
189 Lev, “Colonial Law”, 64.
190 Lev, “Colonial Law”, 65.
191 Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite, 36.
192 As put by Lev: “Access to Dutch law implied equal opportunity to engage in commerce 
of any kind, which made no sense at all in the Cultivation System and not much more 
in the liberal era.” Lev, “Colonial law”, 60-61. See also R.B. Cribb, “Legal Pluralism and 
Criminal Law in the Dutch Colonial Order”, Indonesia 90 (2010), 47-66: 58, 60-61.
193 L. Benton, “Colonial Law and Cultural Difference: Jurisdictional Politics and the Forma-
tion of the Colonial State”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 41:3 (1999), 563-588: 
563. See also: L. Benton and R.J. Ross, “Empires and Legal Pluralism: Jurisdiction, Sover-
eignty, and Political Imagination in the Early Modern World”, in R.J. Ross and L. Benton 
(eds.), Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850 (New York: NYU Press, 2013), 1-20: 5-7. P.J. 
Burns, The Leiden Legacy: Concepts of Law in Indonesia (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004), 68, 234.
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This aptly summarizes the problems that beset the colonial state; its 
perpetual ambition to reform and improve society, always towards a Euro-
pean-style of governance, ignored the fact that in order to bring true change, 
it had to alter the very foundation on which colonialism was grafted. The 
Dutch colonial state kept presenting itself as the omniscient and benevolent 
modernizing force, without ever making any actual progress or develop-
ment. It attempted to ignore or replace indigenous thought, knowledge 
and practices, but never moved beyond use of indirect rule, exploitation 
and oppression, and thereby never truly aligned its interests to those of the 
people it aimed to govern.
Conclusion
Concepts of progress and enlightenment imbued Dutch colonial govern-
ment since its inception, formulated through labour and tax policies, admin-
istration and law, and inspired by theories of the superiority of European 
state evolution. In the early nineteenth century, Dutch colonialism relied 
on ancient, interlinked orders of indirect rule through indigenous aristoc-
racies, coerced labour and customary law, all of which enabled economic 
exploitation. However, from 1870, colonial liberalism, economic expansion 
and socio-economic transformation made for more ambitious development, 
although the intellectual undercurrent remained largely the same. Basically, 
the Dutch rehashed the old rhetoric of progress and enlightenment to justify 
the reinvention of forced labour, indirect rule, exclusive education, and 
separate legal systems, precisely the tools that had enabled them to exert 
some level of control over indigenous populations. The twentieth century 
echoed the nineteenth, a continuation of existent governance strategies, 
with nothing changing except for the terms being used. Nevertheless, 
twentieth century reformation policies set in motion a number of political 
changes that could not be reverted. The concept of a unified, more govern-
able and self-sufficient colonial population had taken root in law-making, 
administration, economic reform and, as will be shown in the next chapter, 
in taxation.
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2 The system on paper
Dutch colonial tax reforms, ca. 1870-1930
The previous chapter discussed changes in colony ideology and policy as 
rooted in altering socio-economic circumstances. This chapter will look 
at how these related to tax policies. It will show that tax policy not only 
reflected the socio-economic transformation of colonial state and society, but 
also influenced these. Hence, the development of the colonial tax system, 
political economy and society all became deeply intertwined.1 Former 
revenue systems of monopolized trade, corvée labour and revenue farming, 
kept alive by the early colonial state, were gradually replaced with direct 
taxes on trade, sales and incomes. This supported the transition from taxing 
agriculture and exports, to taxing incomes, trade and property.2
This chapter charts and analyses the development of the income tax 
system as a reference framework for the following chapters, but also as 
an aid to understanding the interrelated and integrating development 
of the differentiated tax systems for Europeans, ‘Foreign Orientals’ and 
‘inlanders’ across different places in the archipelago. Even though a lot of 
the changes most important to this dissertation’s argument took place, in 
the case studies, between the 1890s and 1920s, the period after 1920 is also 
elaborated on, for the sake of completeness.
The reform of the tax system, from about 1870 onward, was moti-
vated by two things: the quest for new funds, related to the dismantling 
of the Cultivation System and the cessation of its profits, and the urge to 
modernize and unify. This followed on from the accordant political reforms 
and the rising costs of administrative and territorial expansion of the 
colonial state (see graph 2.1). Coerced cash crop production did not accord 
with the new liberal doctrines of the later nineteenth century, promising 
progress, wealth, freedom and justice. Moreover, it had admittedly failed to 
benefit and uplift the Javanese from their alleged state of ‘feudal darkness.’ 
The Javanese had generated the majority of state revenue, but had barely 
participated in its profits. This concern for the welfare and tax burden of the 
Javanese peasant vis-à-vis that of other people in the archipelago, whether 
Europeans of ‘Foreign Orientals’ in Java or indigenous populations of other 
islands, was a recurring theme in colonial tax policy.
With the adoption of the 1872 Tariff Law, which abolished the differ-
ential rights that had protected Dutch exports to Indonesia from foreign 
competition, the monopoly exchange scheme with Dutch textiles was 
deconstructed, and new sources of colonial revenue (beyond monopolized 
1 A. Booth, Economic Change in Modern Indonesia, 135-161.
2 Booth, “Towards a Modern Fiscal State in Southeast Asia”, 36-76: 36-40, 46-49.
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exploitation of coerced labour) had to be found.3 However, the colonial tax 
system was rather undeveloped at the time and state revenue relied largely 
on the monopoly systems of cash crops, mining products and import- 
export duties. There were some consumption, wealth and inheritance taxes 
and to a degree, Europeans and ‘Foreign Orientals’ paid ‘company’ or 
income tax. Apart from the Javanese, who paid land rent, the indigenous 
population paid very little and highly differentiated taxes, following 
regional varieties in wealth standards and alleged levels of ‘political 
and socio-economic development.’ The reform of the income tax system 
occurred in three phases: the imposition of the first direct taxes for all 
groups in 1878-1900, discussed in the first section, the reform and consolida-
tion of these in 1900-1914, discussed in the second, and the full unification 
and complexification of these in 1920-1935, described in the third section. 
Graph 2.1. Government spending in the Dutch East Indies in fl. 1000, 1848-1938.
Source: J.L. van Zanden (et al.) “Government Expenditure in the Netherlands East Indies 1848-1940” 
(Dataset, Amsterdam: IISH, 2003).
3 The Tariff Law had combined various tariffs into an overarching, central tariff system of 
a standard 6% rate declared valid for the entire the archipelago, see L.J. van der Waals, 
De Indische Invoerrechten (Helder: De Boer, 1926), 1-2, and Resink, “Inlandsche Staten”, 
313-314, 334.
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During every phase, the colonial government attempted to merge and 
reshape taxes to enhance equality and minimize differences. As we will see, 
each series of reforms correlated to both the desire to enlarge the portion 
of state revenue drawn from direct taxes, the will to unify and centralize 
revenue collection, and attempts to produce social change. At the time, 
income taxes were certainly not yet the intricate fiscal instruments they 
are today4, yet they became central to colonial fiscal-administrative policy, 
leading to an avalanche of tax ordinances for all different population 
groups, between 1878 and 1935. This chapter shows why and how.
2.1 Bickering over burden: the first income taxes, 1878-1900
As states and economies changed and accelerated throughout the early-
modern and modern era, so did questions of the role, social responsibility 
and function of states in relation to taxation and justice administration. 
Taxes developed from ‘princely claims’ to the ‘price of government services’ 
into complex instruments to coordinate numerous aspects of public life, 
production, and socio-economic justice and behaviour. Under the influence 
of eighteenth and nineteenth century political philosophy, taxation ceased 
to be about merely covering public expenses to carry out basic state activi-
ties, and started addressing questions of economic equality and distributive 
justice, the protection of collective rights, modern citizenship, political 
power, self-preservation and state responsibility. Adam Smith’s ‘maxims’ 
of taxation, for instance, induced greater awareness of the importance of 
keeping taxation in line with the abilities, capacities and expectations of 
citizens.5 Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill were among the first to take 
into account the influences of taxation on public experiences and enjoyment 
4 In 1888, Pierson still described income taxes as “unsuitable to play more than a supple-
mentary role in the tax system.” N.G. Pierson, “De Progressieve Inkomstenbelasting”, 
De Economist 37 (1888), 745. See also: W. Fritschy, “A History of the Income Tax in the 
Netherlands”, Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire 75:4 (1997), 1045-1061: 1046-1047, 
1051-1052, 1061; H. Vording and O.I.M. Ydema, “The Rise and Fall of Progressive Income 
Taxation in The Netherlands”, The British Tax Review 3 (2007), 255-279: 255-259.
5 These four essential ‘maxims’ of taxation comprised equality, certainty, convenience and 
economy. Equality ensured the spread of the tax burden over citizens according their 
‘ability to pay’, tax payment respective of their incomes, wealth, and abilities, “in propor-
tion to the revenue which they respectively would enjoy under the protection of the 
state.” Certainty meant that taxpayers had to be ensured how much, when and how they 
were to pay taxes, to make tax payment predictable, protect against arbitrariness and 
outbalance “the power of the tax-gatherer.” Convenience ordered that the tax payment 
procedure was as convenient as possible for the tax payer. Effi ciency had to ensure taxes 
to be levied as economic as possible, to keep the levying costs and tax assessments as low 
as possible. A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Ed. By 
R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner and W.B. Todd; Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981), v, 45, 
825-828. See also J.L.M. Gribnau, “Tweehonderd jaar Belastingwetenschap”, in H. Vording 
(ed.), Tweehonderd jaar Rijksbelastingen (Den Haag: SDU Uitgevers, 2015), 187-254: 192-193; 
H.J. Hofstra, Inleiding tot het Nederlands Belastingrecht (Deventer: Kluwer, 2002), 76.
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rather than material matters, such as prices and economic growth.6 As a 
consequence of these ideas, the role of the state in organizing social relations 
and protecting citizens expanded, as the tax system became the most crucial 
economic and political instrument, within which the promotion of fairness 
became increasingly prioritized.7 Of what this ‘fairness’ comprised, and 
according to which principles redistributive justice was properly carried 
out and administrated, has been hotly disputed. The answer depends 
on changing ideas about societal justice and ‘good governance’, and can 
impossibly be provided within the space of this chapter.8
Important to realize however, that even though as a colonized space the 
Indies were not a very fair or equal society, nonetheless, ideas of redistribu-
tive justice started infiltrating colonial ideology upon the release of coerced 
cultivation and increased colonial expansion and governance, producing the 
political issues of taxation and governance, already well-known in Europe, 
but new to the colony. The widening differences between various places and 
islands and between the three defined socio-legal groups, the persistence 
of coerced labour and the desultory constitution of the colonial tax system, 
engendered a concern to improve the tax system. The Government Regula-
tion of 1854 promulgated all taxes to be levied by general ordinances to 
6 For Bentham the prime objective of taxation was acquiring revenue to ensure that goods 
and services were accessible to all to guarantee a decent life standard for all, “while mini-
mizing the pain and evils associated with taxation.” Therefore, he claimed that in order 
to obtain economic growth and personal (human capital) growth in society, incentive 
structures that encouraged initiative and productivity had to be put in place in the tax 
structure. J. Bentham, Supply without Burthen (London: Printed for J. Debrett, 1795), 93-94; 
J. Bentham, A Protest Against Law Taxes (London: Charing-Cross, 1793).
 To Mill, taxation was a problem of “equality of sacrifi ce”, which boiled down to “appor-
tioning the contribution of each person towards the expense of government so that he 
shall feel neither more nor less inconvenience from his share of the payment than every 
other person experiences from his.” Though earlier in his life, Mill saw direct taxes on 
income as a necessary evil for covering government expenditures, he later argued for the 
equality of sacrifi ce, claiming “equal taxation consists not in taking equal proportions 
from the incomes of individuals, but in taking equal proportions from their enjoyments.” 
Mill and Bentham were the fi rst to take into account the infl uences of taxation on public 
feeling and enjoyment rather than material matters such as prices and economic growth, 
and proposed a concrete program of tax reform. J.S. Mill, “On the General Principles of 
Taxation (1871)”, in P. O’Brien (ed.), The History of Taxation (London: Pickering & Chatto, 
1999), 274-301: 279. See also T. Dome, “Bentham and J. S. Mill on Tax Reform”, Utilitas 
11:3 (1999), 320-339: 321-322, 337, and R.B.J. Ekelund and D.M. Walker, “J. S. Mill on the 
Income Tax Exemption and Inheritance Taxes: the Evidence Reconsidered”, History of 
Political Economy 28:4 (1996), 559-581: 562, 573, 576-577.
7 S. Leviner, “From Deontology to Practical Application: the Vision of a Good Society and 
the Tax System”, Virginia Tax Review 26:2 (2006), 405-446: 407, 410-411; Q. Skinner, “The 
State”, in R.E. Goodin and P. Pettit (eds.), Contemporary Political Philospohy: an Antholohy 
(Canberra: Blackwell, 1997), 3-26: 9; C. Offe and V. Ronge, “Theses on the Theory of the 
State”, in ibid., 60-65: 61-62; J. Rawls, “Justice as Fairness”, in ibid., 187-202: 192-195; 
R. Nozick, “Distributive Justice”, in ibid., 203-246: 211-212.
8 See for a concise overview L.B. Murphy and T. Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and 
Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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enhance the system’s legal footing.9 The imposition of income taxes was 
considered particularly essential to reconstituting the political-economy and 
social relationships between colonial state and colonized people throughout 
Indonesia.
Taxing Europeans and ‘Foreign Orientals’
Until 1878, the European population in Indonesia paid few taxes, which, 
especially when viewed beside the escalating burden on the shoulders 
of the Javanese, was increasingly seen as unfair. Except for verponding (a 
tax on land or immovable property not used for agricultural purposes; 
introduced in Batavia in 1800 and in the rest of Java in 1823)10, they paid 
a horse tax and transfer rights (levied since 1834; reshaped into an Inheri-
tance and Transfer tax in 1836).11 In 1874, two liberal officials, O. van Rees 
(who became Minister of Colonies in 1879 and Governor-General in 1884) 
and J.P. Sprenger van Eijk, at the time ‘Head Inspector of Finances’ (and 
Minister of Colonies in 1884-1888), wrote a report in which they proposed to 
increase taxes for all ‘non-indigenous’ people by introducing a Personal Tax 
and ‘Patent Law’ (patentrecht) for Europeans and Foreign Orientals.12 Both 
were modelled on taxes existing in the Netherlands, as introduced by I.J.A. 
Gogel (1765-1821), during the French occupation.13 Patent Law (or patent 
tax), originally a contribution to gain a license was awarded by guilds to 
trade or exercise a specific profession, was centralized under Gogel in the 
Netherlands in 1806.14 In the colony, it was introduced in 1878, and trans-
lated as a 2% income tax (but still termed ‘Patent Law’ to continue familiar 
nomenclature) paid by all “but those belonging or assimilated to the indig-
enous population.”15 This was the first form of direct tax on individual and 
9 Soebekti, Some Facets, 7.
10 In 1886, the verponding was unifi ed over the entire archipelago. From 1912 onward prop-
erty values were determined to be ten times the annual rental value or land revenue, 
taxed at 0.75%. In 1917, verponding was introduced for indigenous people all over the 
archipelago, with rates of 10% of the annual rental value for buildings, and 1% of the 
sales value for other lands. In 1924, these rates were lowered to 7.5% and 0.75% to keep 
them in line with the rates of European verponding. See Departement van Binnenlandsch 
Bestuur, Handleiding ten Dienste van de Indische bestuursambtenaren op Java en Madoera, no. 
46/F: Verponding (Batavia: Kolff & Co, 1922), 30.
11 L. Lancée, Beknopt Overzicht van het Nederlandsch-Indisch Belastingrecht (Batavia: Noord-
hoff-Kolff, 1935), 5.
12 Van Rees was preceded by inspector P.H.B. Motké who died within a year after his arrival 
in Java in 1871.
13 Vording and Ydema, “The Rise and Fall”, 255-259; J.K.T. Postma, Alexander Gogel (1765-
1821): Grondlegger van de Nederlandse Staat (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2017); De 
Jong, Van Batig Slot naar Ereschuld, 143-145; Lancée, Beknopt Overzicht, 5; J. Visser, Over-
zicht van het Belastingwezen van Nederlandsch-Indië, in het Bijzonder van Java en Madoera: voor 
Onderwijs en Praktijk (Semarang: Van Dorp, 1927), 14.
14 Postma, Alexander Gogel, 212-223.
15 Stbl. 1878 n350; Soebekti, Some Facets, 20; 28A. J.N. Graafl and, lets over de Fiscale Wetgeving 
in Nederlandsch Oost-Indië (‘s Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1905), 17.
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corporate incomes of European and ‘Foreign Orientals.’ In practice, only the 
‘Foreign Orientals’ in Java were assessed in the Patent Law.
The Personal Tax, also introduced in the colony in 1878, was basically a 
wealth tax. Its assessment was based on ‘observable indicators of welfare’, 
such as property value, indicated, for instance, by the number of doors and 
windows of houses, or the quality of furniture, carriages and number of 
horses in a household.16 As such, tax officials, armed with detailed assess-
ment rules, visited European and ‘Foreign Oriental’ households to assess 
the value (or rental price) of their houses, taxed at 5%, and inventory, taxed 
at 2%, sometimes by measuring the thickness of curtains and heaviness of 
chairs to come to a completed tax assessment bill. Moderation in assessment 
was advised to prevent friction17, especially in the case of ‘Foreign Orien-
tals’, many of whom had an important role in local colonial economies. 
The advice of Minister P.P. van Bosse (in office 1877-1879) was to “keep tax 
revenues below expectations for the first few years, and let the principles 
of the new taxes sink in” rather than “causing serious difficulties and resis-
tance because of narrow-mindedness.”18 Such doctrines of moderation were 
commonly applied, to ensure stable, gradual adaptation and compliance. 
For this reason, the tax threshold for rental value was determined in consul-
tation with provincial Governors and Residents.19 Many Residents took 
this opportunity to attempt to negotiate rates with the Director of Finances 
for their provinces, which he did not appreciate.20 The Director eventually 
had no choice but to acknowledge that welfare and income levels varied 
profoundly throughout the archipelago. He set the standard at ƒ 240 for 
‘rich’, ƒ 180 for ‘middle-ranking’ and ƒ120 for ‘poorer’ Residencies (ƒ 90, ƒ 70 
and ƒ 50 respectively for Foreign Orientals).21 Administration and collection 
of the Personal Tax and Patent Tax was delegated to provincial authorities, 
for which model tax registers were drafted.22 Firms within the Netherlands 
16 Stbl. 1878 n349. In the Netherlands, these personal (wealth) taxes largely derived the 
taxes as levied in the cities of Holland, and were centralized by Gogel. See W. Fritschy, 
De Patriotten en de Financië n van de Bataafse Republiek: Hollands Krediet en de Smalle Marges 
voor een Nieuw Beleid (1795-1801) (‘s-Gravenhage: Stichting Hollandse Historische Reeks, 
1988), 152; T. Pfeil, Op Gelijke Voet: De Geschiedenis van de Belastingdienst (Deventer: 
Kluwer, 2009), 41-50; Postma, Alexander Gogel, 215-217.
17 ANRI AS Besl. 30-12-1878 n1, herein: Besl. Invoering van de personele belasting en het 
patentrecht.’
18 MinKol 1850-1900 3162 Vb. 12-30-1878 n1, herein: MinKol to GG, 8-11-1878.
19 ANRI AS Besl. 30-12-1878 n1, herein: RvI 30-9-1878, DirFin, 5-10-1878, DirFin to GG 
28-11-1878.
20 The Governor of West Borneo even proclaimed that he “refused to be held responsible for 
a political slip-up.” See: ANRI AS Besl. 30-12-1878 n1, herein: DirFin to GG 28-11-1878: 
Bijlagen: ‘correspondentie Gewestelijk bestuurshoofden’: Res. West Borneo [“Wester-
afdeling van Borneo”] to DirFin, 23-9-1878. See also Centraal kantoor voor de statistiek, 
Korte Mededelingen no. 15: Enkele Opmerkingen over de Uitkomsten van de Statistiek der 
Personeele Belasting Gedurende 1929/1936 (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1938), 4-8.
21 ANRI AS Besl. 30-12-1878 n1, herein: DirFin to GG, 5-12-1878, DirFin, 5-10-1878; Stbl. 
1878 n352.
22 ANRI AS Besl. 17-4-1879 n27, herein: DirFin to GG, 12-4-1879.
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were initially exempted from paying Patent Tax as they were expected to 
pay taxes in the Netherlands. This caused an increasingly heated debate 
between the Dutch national and colonial governments, signalling increasing 
friction over distribution of colonial profits and burdens.23
The existing horse tax was incorporated into the new Personal Tax at a 
fee of 6 guilders annually per horse. However, since civil servants needed 
horses and carriages for their daily jobs, they were exempted, as were 
government salaries, wages and pensions because, according to contem-
porary logic, it was considered redundant to tax government salaries 
deriving from tax revenue.24 Consequently, an overwhelming majority of 
the European population paid little Personal Tax, and no Patent Tax at all.25 
Major limited liability companies, such as the NHM, KPM and Deli Tabak 
Maatschappijen were also exempted, as they were often owned by persons 
living outside Indonesia (usually in the Netherlands) where its profits were 
supposedly taxed.26 Nonetheless, both the Personal Tax and Patent Law 
were ill received among the contemporary European colonial elite. Lively 
protest against the new taxes, symptomatic of the rising political tensions 
between metropole and colony, emerged. It was voiced most prominently 
by N.P. van den Berg (1831-1917), Director of the Javaasche Bank (1873-
1889).27 He argued that the colony could no longer be treated as a profitable 
dependency but had become a state in its own right, and considered the 
proposed taxes a continuation of exploitative extraction of a colony by a 
metropole.28 Surely, he argued, the European civil servants, who had carried 
the administrative burden of the Cultivation System for so long, deserved 
better than to be overtaxed by a Dutch state that still refused to tax its own 
subjects properly. Van den Berg even suggested the colony would be better 
off under British imperial rule than under the exploitative Dutch regime.29 
In the Netherlands, these arguments were interpreted as the quintessential 
grumbles of what was seen as a self-interested, corrupted and greedy colo-
nial elite. The Ministry in The Hague presented the taxes as a true piece 
of fiscal governance, to guide the new liberal economy and improve colo-
nial socioeconomic and financial health. No longer were Europeans to be 
favoured. If the colony had indeed became a state in its own right, all had to 
23 ANRI AS Besl. 8-4-1878 n43, herein: MinKol to GG, 6-10-1877.
24 Stbl. 1878 n350; ANRI AS Besl. 30-12-1878 n1, herein: DirFin to GG, 27-12-1878, DirFin 
17-12-1878; NA MinKol 1850-1900 2961, Vb. 15-2-1877 n22: Concept-ordonnantie.
25 ANRI AS Besl. 30-12-1878 n1, herein: ‘Consideratie en Advies’, DirFin., 17-12-1878. 
The lengthy list of exempted persons includes the Director of the Botanical Garden in 
Buitenzorg, the engineers and supervisors of the Mining Department, bailiffs, sheriffs 
and judges in the provinces, telegraphists, and many others working in service of the 
government.
26 Soebekti, Some Facets, 21-22; Graafl and, lets over de Fiscale Wetgeving, 18-19.
27 De Jong, Van Batig Slot naar Ereschuld, 145-149, 234-240.
28 Ibid., 145-148, 166-167, 235-238; N.P. van den Berg, Mist het Protest Tegen “de Bijdrage” 
een op Recht en Billijkheid Steunenden Grondslag?: Brief aan den heer F. Alting Mees (Batavia: 
G. Kolff,1878), 7, 13-14, 19-25, 29.
29 Van den Berg, Mist het Protest, 14, 20-22.
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contribute to it to capacity.30 The colonial opposition managed to delay the 
introduction of the taxes for some years, but upon the cessation of the batig 
slot (colonial profits) in 1878, both taxes were promptly implemented.31
Taxing ‘natives’
Simultaneously, the government pursued the updating of the tax system for 
the indigenous population. The practice as inherited from the VOC, as put 
by J.S. Furnivall, was one where, “Europeans paid taxes, and the Natives 
tribute.”32 In order to align the burdens carried by the three population 
groups, all had to pay comparable forms of taxes. By 1870, apart from the 
land rent levied in Javanese peasants, the indigenous population in Indo-
nesia under Dutch rule paid little or no taxes at all to the Dutch govern-
ment, except for some consumption taxes and import and export duties.33 
Instead, they ‘paid’ by performing labour. ‘Foreign Orientals’ living outside 
of Java did not pay in the Patent Law. Instead, they paid specific ‘head’ or 
‘poll’ taxes to their own quarter heads, the Kapitan Cina.34 So to summarize: 
Javanese peasants paid land rent and performed compulsory labour duties, 
non-agricultural Javanese paid various smaller taxes, ‘Foreign Orientals’ in 
Java paid a ‘Patent Law’ and some head taxes, while ‘Foreign Orientals’ on 
the ‘Outer Territories’ only paid head taxes and indigenous peoples in the 
‘Outer Territories’ paid virtually no income taxes at all.
Hence, to transpose some of the heavy burden imposed in Javanese 
peasants to the indigenous peoples and ‘Foreign Orientals’ outside of Java, 
between 1872 and 1924, the government attempted to reform the land 
rent in various stages, and started looking at the possibility of imposing 
new income taxes. In theory, yields in Java were taxed based on the size 
of land to which peasants held the rights, at 20%, differentiating between 
dry and wet fields, sub-divided into three classes following the average 
30 NA MinKol 1850-1900 3162, Vb. 30-12-1878 n1, herein: MinKol to GG 30-9-1878.
31 NA MinKol 1850-1900, 3006, Vb. 11-7-1877 n3, herein: ‘Voordracht aan Koning’; De Jong, 
Van Batig Slot naar Ereschuld, 160, 160-180.
32 Furnivall, Netherlands India, 38. Taxation had a different background and meaning in 
Indonesia. Terminology in use, such as pajak / pajeg or upeti are not the exact same thing 
as taxation. Pajak (from the Javanese pajeg), which today in the Indonesian language 
translates as taxation, was originally only a regular levy in Java on agricultural produce 
in return for land-lease or ownership to which village elites and ultimately the Javanese 
emperor’s administration and the emperor himself were entitled. Upeti, today translated 
as ‘tribute’, was a specifi c practice in which lesser lords paid homage in trade, money 
or gifts to the Javanese emperor at special occasion such as religious celebrations and 
festivities. (On Bali, these taxes were used slightly differently. See: Geertz, Negara, 
67-68, 185-18.) S. Moertono, "Dulu, Kedudukan Wajib Pajak itu Terhormat", Prisma 14:4 
(1985), 59-62: 60. See also P.B.R. Carey, “Civilization on Loan: The Makinig of an Upstart 
Polity: Mataram and its Successors, 1600–1830”, MdAS 31:3 (1997), 711-734; Boomgaard, 
Children, 23-26; Drakard, A Kingdom of Words, 1.
33 See Furnivall, Netherlands India, 37-41.
34 Lohanda, The Kapitan Cina, 10, 152, 175-177; Lohanda, Growing Pains, 42.
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yearly production. However, in practice, many officials lacked the tools and 
were unable to administer assessments, ignored actual yield, and ended 
up blindly following the presumed size of land entitlements of peasants, 
skipping the burdensome process of measuring yields.35 But the wealth of 
peasants depended on more factors than merely the size of their land, and 
poorer peasants frequently found themselves facing tax assessments they 
could not afford, especially in times of privation. Lack of central coordina-
tion, trained civil servants, a proper cadastral system to enable land surveys 
and reliable data, further problematized the levying of land rent. Tax rates 
turned out to be much higher in practice, than the 20% originally intended. 
As shown by W.R. Hugenholtz, the land rent revisions imposed in 1872 and 
1907 brought little improvement. Only in the 1920s did the government 
undertake a programmed land survey to enable fairer, more systematic 
assessments. Up until then, bridging the interests of Javanese peasants 
and European planters while professionalizing the tax administration at 
the same time, was virtually impossible. Land rent levying was delegated 
to specially appointed local committees of local indigenous officials and 
village chiefs who had to assess yields and negotiate assessments with land-
holding peasants.36 Village chiefs remained responsible for payment, and 
negotiated assessments (through a bargaining system called admodiatie) with 
peasants, in ways rather unrelated to the imposed principles and regula-
tions, leading to many injustices in the distribution of taxes among villages 
and their individual members. It remained an unjust but highly practicable 
system, which indeed was “complimentary to the administration in that it 
met the qualification of Adam Smith’s fourth principle in taxation, namely, 
to collect taxes with the least cost, but at the same time it violated his second 
principle which is that taxes must be fixed and non-arbitrary.”37 The burden 
of the land rent remained relatively high, but would perhaps have been 
higher still, if regulations had been applied properly.38
To include the non-agricultural population in Java in the tax regime, 
a ‘Company Tax’ had been introduced, which tax originated in Raffles’ 
‘house(hold) tax’ (1815) that probably built on the Javanese pacumpleng or 
35 ANRI AS Besl. 23-10-1879 no3; Hugenholtz Landrentebelasting, 34-37, 283-284; Soebekti, 
“Some Facets”, 12.
36 Hugenholtz, Landrentebelasting, 39-40; Fasseur, Kultuurstelsel.
37 Soebekti, Some Facets, 6.
38 Visser, Overzicht van het Belastingwezen, 70-72. Land rent or similar taxes on yield or land 
came in use on Bali and Lombok (padjeg [pajak], upeti and tigasana, all land-based yield 
taxes. See appendix 4; Stbl. 1904 n275-277 and 1914 n130-132; see also ANRI DepFin 
357, herein: DepFin, 5-1-1915: Res. Bali en Lombok to DirFin, 24-8-1914), South and East 
Borneo (‘vertieningsbelasting’ or ‘puluhan’, a tax of 10% on rice yields; See Stbl. 1878 n300-
301) and Sulawesi, some of which had known similar cultivation systems as in Java. See 
also: ANRI AS GB TGA 7889, G. Robinson, The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in 
Bali (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 56-58 and Touwen, Extremes in the Archipe-
lago, 69.
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‘door tax.’39 The house tax had been collected largely from urban house-
holds (mostly in Batavia) that did not pay land rent, based on their size 
and wealth.40 Through a number of revisions under Dutch colonialism, the 
house tax was transformed into a tax on non-agricultural livelihood and 
employment, and was named a “business” or company tax” (bedrijfsbelas-
ting)in 1837 and reformed in 1851.41 It was split into a tax similar to the 
European verponding and a basic tax on the incomes of the inhabitants of 
these houses.42 It delivered up to 1 million guilders annually in 1870, and 
1.36 million guilders by 1875.43 As with the land rent, house taxes were 
levied arbitrarily and disconnected from central regulative standards. In 
1875, officials noticed that 38% of the taxable population was assessed at 
the lowest amount of ƒ1 per year, while average tax assessments in other 
Residencies varied between ƒ2.76 to 6.60 – too divergent to be explained by 
economic differences. To solve these discrepancies, in 1878 it was reformed 
into a slightly more complex ‘Company Tax’, which taxed all ‘non-agricul-
tural’ incomes of Javanese and ‘Foreign Orientals’ in “sufficiently devel-
oped” ‘Outer Territories.’44 Its rate was set at 2% – a rather low rate when 
compared to the land rent that taxed at 20% – at a minimum of 3 guilders 
per year from the incomes of adult men, who supposedly represented their 
families.
Tax registers (kohieren) were drafted in which all taxpayers were to be 
registered including their age, place of residence and the local chief they 
adhered to. These registers were supposedly maintained according to 
detailed standards as ordered in the Compatibility Laws, issued from 1864 
onward, of which all controleurs were supposed to have a copy including 
instructions and prescriptions of how to levy taxes, order the treasury 
39 Pacumpleng was levied reportedly either at a fi xed amount of money per ‘door’ (cump-
leng, ‘an opening’ in Javanese), or (according to Boomgaard after 1800) rendered as 
‘yarn-money’, tax levied as a skein of cotton per household. Boomgaard, Children, 24; 
Carey, The Power of Prophecy, 452. See also KITLV Collectie Kern H 797-[373], ‘Stukken 
betreffende de belastingen in Java over de jaren 1830 to 1914’ (1922), pp. 12-13.
40 ANRI AS Besl. 7-1-1878 n14. The rate for Javanese was between ƒ1 to 5, and for ‘Foreign 
Orientals’ up to ƒ20.
41 Stbl. 1837 n26 and 1851 n97; B. ten Bruggen Cate, De Belasting op het Bedrijf in Nederlandsch-
Indië (Batavia: Kolff & Co, 1898).
42 See: Stbl. 1818 n14, 1819 n5 and 29, 1824 n47, 1836 n26 (here the term ’house tax’ was 
replaced with ’Company Tax’), and 1851 n97; Lancée, Beknopt Overzicht, 125-128; 
Departement van Binnenlandsch Bestuur, Handleiding 46/F: Verponding (Batavia: Kolff & 
Co, 1922), 30; CtHBNI, Vierde Verslag van de Commissie tot Herziening van het Belastingstelsel 
in Nederlandsch-Indië (Weltevreden: ‘s Landsdrukkerij, 1925), 51.
43 NA MinKol 1850-1900 3006, Vb. 11-7-1877 n3, herein: ‘Voordracht aan koning.’
44 Stbl. 1878 n86 and 87. The population of Batavia was exempted from the 1851 regulation 
until 1860 as the indigenous non-agricultural population paid a retail trade tax, while the 
Chinese of Batavia were expected to pay in the Chinese head tax (Lohanda, The Kapitan 
Cina, 177). The 1878 regulation covered the Residencies of 1. ‘Sumatra’s West Coast’ 2. 
‘Sumatra’s East Coast’, 3. Sulawesi, 4. Bengkulu, 5. Lampung, 6. Palembang, 7. South and 
East Borneo, 8. West Borneo, 9. Ambon, 10. Aceh, and 11. Bangka and Biliton.
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and maintain proper accountancy.45 Every act was guided and legalized 
by regulations, every penny had to be formally accounted for, and precise 
forms of registration in tables, graphs, summaries and maps were at the 
heart of the colonial power exercise.46 They supposedly enabled colonial 
officials to shape and alter facts to create governable and taxable subjects 
and “improve their human condition.”47 The notion of a quantifiable and 
agreeable colonial population in itself (rather than diversified heteroge-
neous groups), for instance, was impossible without statistical recreation.48 
But filling tables with reliable data often depended on slightly less conven-
tional techniques. The taxable age, for instance, was determined by the 
registered date of birth, which in practice was not always known. Therefore, 
a ‘Civil Governor’ on Timor used the following method:
“A small rope is stretched from nipple to nipple around the back, and when the 
boy’s head fits through the circle of this rope, he is considered of taxable age. 
If not, he is given another year so his chest can grow wider and stronger. Of all 
methods, this one never failed.”49
Such creativity, as will be demonstrated more extensively in the following 
chapters, was a determinant in the successful assessing and levying of taxes.
Initially, Director of Binnenlands Bestuur C. Bosscher (in office 1875-1876) 
contemplated making the rate progressive, to tax higher incomes more 
heavily, but both the Governor General J.W. van Lansberge (1875-1881) 
and Director of Finances L.J.J. Michielsen (in office 1877-1883) claimed that 
the “Eastern societies” were too “underdeveloped” for such complexity.50 
These sorts of arguments, upholding the ‘ungreediness’ of the indigenous 
civilization for fairer principles of taxation, were often deployed to mask 
the incapacity of the government to maintain the administrative complexi-
ties this involved. In addition, the incomes of clergymen, teachers and the 
45 See for instance Anonymous, Voorschriften Betreffende de Comptabiliteit in Nederlandsch-
Indië (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1887) and D. Brakel, Het Administratief, het Geldelijk en het 
Materieel Beheer in Nederlandsch-Indië (3 vols.; Bandoeng, 1912-1913).
46 T. Rowse, “The Statistical Table as Colonial Knowledge”, Itinerario 41:1 (2017), 51-73: 52, 68.
47 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 88.
48 Rowse, “The Statistical Table as Colonial Knowledge”, 51-52.
49 C.L., “Bepaling van Belastingplichtigheid”, TBB 44 (1913), 146-147: 146-147. This story 
is also found in Reys, De Inkomstenbelasting der Inlanders, 76-77. Reys’ own observations 
relate deeply to experiences of what he signifi cantly calls “powerlessness” against the 
“unwillingness of joint people and their chiefs” and the “impossibility of acquiring 
reliable data for the assessment.” This is symbolic of the frustrations of offi cials over 
various methods of evasion, which indeed included the categorizing of young men as 
yet untaxable, underage boys by local family chiefs in reply to the connection between 
enumeration and compulsory labour and tax liability. See Nitisastro, Population Trends, 52.
50 ANRI AS Besl. 1-7-1878 n14, herein: DirFin to GG, 27-12-1878. See also (in ibid.), MinKol 
to GG, 8-11-1878 and RvI 5-12-1878.
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indigenous aristocracy were exempted, presumably for political reasons, as 
these were the people who held some sway over the mentality and behav-
iour of local populations. Furthermore, to ensure the zealous cooperation of 
indigenous chiefs in the maximal assessment and payment of this tax, they 
were awarded an 8% ‘collectors wage.’ Until 1905, ‘collectors wages’ were 
also awarded to (Indo-)European officials on the Outer Islands, attributing 
a handsome extra to their incomes.51 Such wages were in fact a continuation 
of the ‘cultivation percentages’ of before, keeping alive older practices of 
patrimonialism and corruption.
Deployed at the same time as the Patent and Personal Tax, the Company 
Tax was supposed to close the fiscal gap between ethnicities. But adminis-
trative incapacity “to fully apprehend the income of every taxpayer”52, as 
argued by Van Lansberge, set the conditions for the following decades and 
provided little of a substantial basis to redistribute the tax burden. With the 
first act finished, all Europeans, the indigenous populations of Java, and 
part of the ‘Foreign Orientals’ in the Outer Islands were now subjected to 
income taxes of some sort. But the design of all of these taxes seemed to 
have been driven largely by pragmatic choices, while important questions 
of justice and equality had remained unanswered. The tax system remained 
deeply unfair towards Java’s agricultural population.
The 1878 tax reforms had included a great new number of subjects in the 
archipelago making direct contributions to the state, but in absolute terms, 
these contributions constituted only a marginal share of the governments’ 
balance in the years following their introduction (see table 2.1). Coerced, 
unpaid labour kept carrying the brunt of the fiscal burden. In the 1860s, 
a head start had been made, with the abolishment of forced cultivation but 
the final cultivation services were only terminated in 1919. Corvée services 
remained in use until the end of the colony, even though the Government 
Regulation of 1854 had already stipulated their “gradual abolishment.” This 
was caused by various factors to be discussed in the next three chapters, but 
what is important to realize here, is that the levying of coerced labour into 
monetary taxes was among the government’s main ambitions. As summa-
rized in 1905 by Director of Finance N.J. Struick du Moulin (in office 1905-
1906), the government “no longer required labour, but money.”53 Rapid 
policy change however, encumbered stable reduction policy. For example, 
after Governor-General J.P. van Limburg Stirum (in office 1916-1921) had 
prohibited use of corvée services for the construction of paved traffic roads 
in 1919, a few years later they were reinstated by the more conservative Dirk 
51 Stbl. 1905 n277.
52 ANRI AS Besl. 1-7-1878 n14, herein: ‘Besl. bepaling dat bedrijfsbelasting wordt gebracht 
tot werking (nieuwe regeling betr. bedrijfsbelasting)’, Kabinet besl. n14: GG to HGB.
53 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 441, Vb. 6-3-1907 n27, herein: DirFin to GG, 14-12-1905’.
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Fock (in office 1921-1926).54 Van Limburg Stirum believed corvée services 
hampered economic development while Fock thought they were essential 
to maximize the utility of labour and production. Both argued their policies 
would help to improve society to the benefit of colonizer and colonized, 
but through opposite means. So, the delay in fully replacing corvée with 
monetary tax was also caused by continuous disputes over policy within 
both the Dutch national and colonial governments and continuous policy 
changes, depending on who was in charge.














1879 683 702 1,428 2,400 60,347 144,127
1880 760 592 1,525 2,591 55,973 148,260
1881 716 640 1,616 2,652 57,829 139,418
1882 743 682 1,617 2,652 47,050 132,591
1883 725 792 1,540 2,645 36,596 143,587
In order to reduce the use of corvée, regulations were adopted that allowed 
those who performed corvée labour to ‘buy off’ (afkopen) their services. This 
meant that a small monetary payment was made instead of performing a 
day of service (usually at one guilder per day). In many regions, this was 
the first step in transforming coerced labour into monetary taxes. Yet, even 
though in many places corvée was considered a “humiliating practice”56, 
buying off remained unpopular among people who had more time than 
money, and chiefs were not keen on giving up the prestige attached to their 
entitlement to labour. Meanwhile, there was an increase in the amount 
of labour services levied, in the newly conquered ‘Outer Territories’. As 
we shall see in the following chapters, these territories were structurally 
subjected to labour service regulations copied from the earliest colonized 
regions, such as Java and West Sumatra.57 Therefore, the government 
actively started replacing corvée services with ‘head’ or ‘capitation taxes’ 
(hoofdengelden), as already paid by the Chinese population in various cities, 
54 W. Middendorp, Twee Achterlijke Arbeidssystemen voor Inboorlingen in Nederlandsch Oost-
Indië : (Heerendienst en Poenale Sanctie) (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1929), 29-30.
55 J.L. van Zanden (et al.) “Government revenue in the Netherlands East Indies 1848-1940” 
(Dataset, Amsterdam: IISH, 2003).
56 Coolhaas, Controleur B.B., 228.
57 Brunner, De Unifi catie, 10-12.
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usually a fixed rate of one guilder per person per year.58 The first central 
head tax for ‘inlanders’ was imposed in Java in 1882. Intended to curtail the 
use of labour services and promote payment of monetary taxes, head taxes 
were slowly normalized as the standard form of annually fixed direct tax 
for “inlanders liable for corvée” across the archipelago (see appendix 4).59 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 will examine to what extent this transformation was 
successful, and what specific problems occurred in the process.
Head and company taxes were levied by indigenous chiefs in the 
service of the government. Its rates varied widely, ranging from 1 guilder 
per annum in Billiton in 191860, to 6.50 guilders in North Sulawesi in 189761, 
inevitably following the huge diversification of socio-economic conditions 
and developments crossing the archipelago. While rates were fixed in the 
most of the archipelago, in Palembang, Lampung, Billiton and West and 
Southeast Borneo (in 1877-1879), the head tax was levied as a percentage 
of income, like the Company Tax in Java.62 In some regions, such as Bali 
and the majority of Borneo, instead of head or company taxes, land taxes 
(generally set at 10% tax of the yield) were imposed. This generated a highly 
diversified tax regime of numerous distinct head, company and land taxes, 
paid at different rates, in different ways and according to different prin-
ciples.
2.2 Expansion and reform, 1900-1914
As an increasing number of people in the archipelago became subject to 
direct monetary taxes, following the expansion of the state, new questions 
arose about managing larger groups of taxpayers and redistributing the 
burden. Between 1895 and 1914, a series of tax reforms were passed and 
resulted, at least on paper, in a consolidated tax regime encompassing the 
whole of Indonesia.
58 Across colonial world, such fi xed head taxes were in use. In Portuguese Africa, as exem-
plifi ed by Havik, the principle form of direct taxation, the ‘hut or poll tax’, was uniformly 
applied to indigenous adult males at fi xed rates, regardless of their income. P.J. Havik, 
“Colonial Administration, Public Accounts and Fiscal Extraction: Policies and Revenues 
in Portuguese Africa (1900-1960)”, African Economic History 41 (2013), 159-221: 185.
59 See Stbl. 1914 n313-316. Regulations for buying off corvée were expanded in 1919 for Bali, 
Lombok, Lampung, East Sumatra, Aceh, the whole of Borneo and Sulawesi, Ambon and 
Timor. See ANRI AS GB TGA 7853, herein: Besl. 7-7-1919; Stbl 1918 n772.
60 ANRI AS GB TGA 7853, herein: BGS 11-10-1918, advies AS no 43A, ‘Invoering van een 
hoofdgeld op het eiland Biliton’, and BGS 9-8-1918: RvI 9-7-1918, DirBB to GG, 22-7-1918, 
‘Voorstel Ass-Res Biliton om de HD in zijn gewest af te schaffen en daarvoor in de plaats 
te stellen eene belasting onder den naam “afkoopgeld van heerendiensten”’, Ass-Res 
Biliton to GG, 1-12-1917 and DirBB to GG, 13-6-1918.
61 Stbl. 1897 n13;
62 Stbl. 1877 n197, 1878 n301, 1879 n167 and 377 and 1895 n295.
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Establishing equity or favouring finance?
Financially, the head taxes for the indigenous population were of little 
value. Of much greater importance were the income taxes for Europeans. 
But the extravagant profits in the tobacco, mining and sugar industries 
rapidly rose out of the scope of the low rates of the Patent Tax, which taxed 
both the corporate profits of large sugar corporations and the much smaller 
personal incomes of European individuals. The European community was 
far from homogenous and comprised rich sugar planters, shareholders and 
industrialists, but also poorer civil servants, day labourers and soldiers, 
whose incomes differed profoundly according to the region, so taxing these 
incomes in the same way as corporate profits made little sense.63 Except for 
in the Patent Tax, the profits of European industry were taxed indirectly 
through the import and export duty regime. Therefore, a series of special 
excise duties and ‘product taxes’ on oil, sugar and other valuable commodi-
ties were launched on an ad-hoc base to tax corporate profits to a larger 
extent, between the mid-1890s and 1905.64 But these taxes were considered 
insufficiently sophisticated to justify reshuffling the burden, as they also 
effected consumer prices. To justly tax industrial profits, a structural reform 
of the income tax system for Europeans became inevitable.
63 The Resident of Surabaya, for instance, reported in 1878 that every guilder taxed from 
poorer Europeans in his province would needed to be taken from their daily needs, as a 
daily meal of some rice, sambal and a small piece of meat [...] and the bare minimum of 
clothing” was all they had. ANRI AS Besl. 30-12-1878 n1, herein: Res. Surabaya to DirFin, 
25-10-1878.
64 Stbl. 1906 n250-251; Visser, Overzicht van het Belastingwezen, 48; Brunner, De Unifi catie, 8-9.
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Table 2.2. Tax rates in the income tax of 1908 
for Europeans.65
Table 2.3. Tax rates in the ‘Company Tax’ of 
1907 for the indigenous people and ‘Foreign 
Orientals’.66
Level of annual income 
in guilders guild
Amount of tax
to be paid annually 
in guilders
Level of annual income 
in guilders guild
Amount of tax 
to be paid annually 
in guilders
From To From To
0 900 0 0 50 0
900 960 1.50 50 60 0.72
960 1,020 3 60 70 0.96
1,020 1,080 4.50 70 80 1.20
1,080 1,140 6 80 90 1.44
1,140 1,200 7.50 90 100 1.68
1,200 1,260 9.15 100 110 1.98
1,260 1,320 10.80 110 120 2.28
1,320 1,380 12.45 120 130 2.58
1,380 1,440 14.10 130 140 2.88
1,440 1,500 15.90 140 150 3.18
1,500 1,560 17.70 150 160 3.48
1,560 1,620 19.50 160 170 4.08
1,620 1,680 21.30 170 180 4.38
1,680 1,750 23.10 180 190 4.68
1,750 1,800 25.05 190 200 5.04
1,800 1,860 27 200 210 5.40
1,860 1,920 28.95 210 220 5.76
1,920 1,980 30.90 220 230 6.12
1,980 2,040 32.85 230 240 6.48
2,040 2,100 34.80 240 250 7.20
2,100 3,600 36.75 250 260 6.84
3,600 5,400 89.25 260 270  7.20
5,400 7,200 156.75 […]
7,200 12,000 228.75 620 630 27.72
12,000 + +5 per 100 guilders 
of income
630 + 4.5%
Note that at an income of 900 guilders, Europeans 
paid 1.50 guilders tax, while indigenous peoples and 
‘Foreign Orientals’ paid (4.5% x 900=) 40.50 guilders.
65 Stbl. 1908 n298, p.9. The progressivity hence rose from 0,17% tax at a rate of 900 guilders, 
to about 3,71% at the top rate of 12,000 guilders income.
66 Stbl. 1907 n182.
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In 1905, the Ministry of Colonies requested N.G. Pierson, former Dutch 
Minister of Finance (1891-1894 and 1897-1901), economics professor and 
banker, to design a new income tax. Pierson had had a leading role in the 
design of incomes taxes in the Netherlands in 1893, and as a liberal he had 
vividly supported the conversion of the Cultivation System to system of 
free trade.67 Together with the Groningen Law professor C.D. Segers, 
he drafted an ‘income tax for Europeans’, which was introduced in 1908 
to replace the Patent Tax.68 This was an annual tax on incomes above 900 
guilders, the rate set at 1.50 guilders, climbing with mild progressivity (see 
table 2.2).69 Civil servants were no longer exempted.70 Additionally, a 4% 
‘excess profit tax’ was introduced to supplement the taxation of the profits 
of joint stock companies and prevent them from withholding or deducing 
profits to avoid tax payment. ‘Excess profit’ was calculated based on the 
relationship between distributed profit and the amount of paid-up capital; 
an 8% tax was levied over the amount of net profits that exceeded 5% of this 
amount.71 But determining the amount of paid-up capital was a difficult 
and bothersome process which often resulted in rigid, time-consuming 
negotiations between officials and corporations.72 In 1913, the 8% tax over 
excess profit was complemented with a 4% tax over the full amount of net 
profits (in 1920 these rates were raised to respectively 10 and 6% under the 
unified income tax). Additionally, a proportional ‘extra profit tax’ (extrawin-
stbelasting) was introduced. This taxed net profits, exceeding 10% of paid up 
67 See M. Kuitenbrouwer, “N.G. Pierson en de Koloniale Politiek, 1860-1909”, Tijdschrift voor 
Geschiedenis 94:1 (1981), 1-28: 3-3-17.
68 See: NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 470, Vb. 22-6-1907 n41, herein: Part 1: ‘Algemeen 
Progressieve Inkomstenbelasting: de Minister van Koloniën vraagt advies aan Prof. mr. 
C.D. Segers te Groningen (tevens MinFin), bijgestaan door DirFin H.J.M. Bouwmann’, 
various attachments, and Part 2b: ‘Korte aantekeningen Pierson op Segers antwoord op 
zijn eerste nota/advies Pierson 2’. See for the introduction of income taxes in the Nether-
lands by Pierson: Vording and Ydema, “The Rise and Fall”, 252-264; Fritschy, A History 
of the Income Tax, 1052-1058; C. Smit, Omwille der Billijkheid: de Strijd over de Invoering van 
de Inkomstenbelasting in Nederland (Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek, 2002); G. Meijer, “The 
Contribution of the “Dutch School” in Public Finance to the Theory of Personal Income 
Taxation (1870-1920)”, European Journal of Law and Economics 10:2 (2000), 161.
69 Stbl. 1908n298; Reys, De Inkomstenbelasting der Inlanders, 12-45.
70 Ibid., 50-51.
71 Taselaar, De Nederlandse Koloniale Lobby, 223.
72 M.W.F. Treub, Nota van Mr. M. W. F. Treub, Voorzitter van den Ondernemersraad voor 
Nederlandsch-Indië , over de Inkomstenbelasting, de Extrawinstbelasting en de Overwinst-
belasting van Naamloze Vennootschappen, de Productenbelastingen en de Uitvoerrechten op 
Producten (‘s-Gravenhage: Mouton & Co, 1922), 1. Taselaar, De Nederlandse Koloniale 
Lobby, 223-224. For larger companies, capital demonstration (kapitaalsaantoning), was 
usually dealt with by specially appointed committees that specifi cally were designated 
for this job, but the numerous smaller companies fell directly under the responsibility of 
the ordinary income tax committees.
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capital, progressively up to 12%.73 These profit taxes replaced the product 
taxes. Assessments of expected profits were drafted at the beginning of 
the year based on preceding profits.74 World War I caused a sharp increase 
in the demand for many colonial export products, such as oil and rubber, 
but also depressed government spending. Critical progressive-liberal 
Dutch parliamentarians such as H.P. Marchant (1869-1956) argued that 
larger companies, especially those producing rubber, oil and other highly-
demanded products still profited massively from the relatively low colonial 
tax rates and free access to colonial resources while the metropolitan and 
colonial states paid for defending their interests.75 Supported by Leiden 
professor and publicist D. van Blom (1877-1938), he proposed to further 
increase profit taxes to spare smaller businesses and increase taxes and 
duties for large corporations.76 Finding parliament in agreement, their plea 
induced the slow replacement of duties with more specific product taxes.77 
Additionally, ‘War Profit Taxes’ were introduced in both the Netherlands 
(1916) and the Indies (in 1917).78 The latter was levied retroactively from 
1914. Because of the economic hardship of the post-World War I recession, 
only a small proportion of its assessments was actually collected.
The incipient taxation of both individual and corporate European 
incomes seemed to provide for a more equitable tax regime, but the indig-
enous population of Java still carried the brunt of the colonial burden, 
largely by performing services. Tax reforms always brought the risk of 
revenue drops, and by and large in the colonial state the quest for financial 
benefit seemed to outweigh the call for fiscal justice.79 Given the severe 
limitations of the tax administration at the time, Governor-General Van 
Heutsz believed that imposing taxes similar to the progressive income tax 
for Europeans required “little effort on paper”, but in practice would be 
impossible, considering how the assessment was determined under the 
circumstances at the time. Whoever thought it was possible, he asserted, 
73 8% extra profi t tax had to be paid over the share of profi t that exceeded 25% of paid-up 
capital, 10% over the share that exceeded 50% and 12% over the share that exceeded 
100%. See: H.J. van Brink, “Overzicht van de Onlangs tot Stand Gekomen Herziening 
en Uitbreiding van de Belastingen in Nederlandsch Indië”, De Economist 70 (1921), 535: 
14-15.
74 Lancée, Beknopt Overzicht, 10; CtHBNI, Eerste Verslag van de Commissie tot Herziening van 
het Belastingstelsel in Nederlandsch-Indië , (Weltevreden: ‘s Landsdrukkerij, 1923), 16-17.
75 Handelingen Tweede Kamer, [vergaderjaar] 1916-1917, 82e vergadering, 14-3-1917, 
herein: H.P. Marchant, p. 2033. See also H.P. Marchant, Arm of Rijk? (Offprint from: Vragen 
des Tijds; S.l.: s.n, 1914); D. Blom, “Uitvoerrechten voor Indie?”, Quarterly Review of The 
Royal Netherlands Economic Association 66:1 (1917), 529-537: 532-533.
76 Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1916-1917, 82e vergadering, 14-3-1917, herein: H.P. 
Marchant p. 2033; Blom, Uitvoerrechten voor Indie?, 534.
77 T. Ligthart, “Uitvoerrechten voor Ned.-Indië”, Economisch-Statistische Berichten 4:202 
(1919), 1032.
78 H.J. Nieboer, De Wet op de Oorlogswinstbelasting 1916 (‘s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1916), 1-4.
79 De Leeuw, Hoofdlijnen van het Belastingstelsel in Ned.-Indië, 8-9, 12-13.
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“grossly misunderstands the capacity of our government in those areas.”80 
Still, the accelerating ideas about colonial responsibility and benevolence 
provided by ethical Dutch colonialism that were launched around 1900, 
enhanced the call to replace the rather blunt, unfair head taxes and its fixed 
rates with progressive Company Taxes.81 These were to be levied in similar 
fashion for ‘inlanders’ and ‘Foreign Orientals.’ In 1907, the disparate systems 
of company and head taxes imposed on these groups were integrated into a 
unified, somewhat inelegantly termed, ‘tax on company and other incomes’ 
(belasting op de bedrijfs- en andere inkomsten) both in Java and a selection of the 
‘Outer Territories.’82 This tax announced the first step towards fiscal unifica-
tion. As before, only men were held to be taxable and were responsible for 
the payment of the tax on their family members, unmarried women were 
exempted while ‘non-indigenous’ and ‘non-agricultural’ inlanders’ were 
treated as ‘Foreign Orientals.’83 Moreover, like the European income tax of 
1908, the 1907-Company Tax assessed incomes from any form of profession, 
trade and capital, at gradually progressively climbing rates (see table 2.3).
The tax ritual
This new Company Tax enabled more routinized taxation, requiring more 
uniform and systematized levying practices. Assessments took place at the 
beginning of the first quarter of the year, carried out by local tax committees 
consisting of a number of local, indigenous officials under the supervision 
of a district chief and a European administrator, usually a controleur, who 
functioned as tax collector and manager of the local treasury. Controleurs 
maintained an extensive ‘compatibility’ according to model registers as 
ordered by the Compatibility Law of 1864 (revised in 1880, 1903, 1917 and 
1925).84 They were the districts’ chief accountants, tax administrators and 
collectors and judges. The tax committees had to investigate all individual 
incomes, usually based on the incomes of the preceding years, to determine 
and communicate assessments to the taxpayers, after which taxpayers were 
allowed to appeal in specially organized tax gatherings. An enlightening 
excerpt from an article by controleur G.L. Tichelman offers a peek into how 
these gatherings worked. In the article, he describes his experiences of orga-
80 ANRI DepFin 347, herein: Extract besl. GG, 9-3-1906.
81 ANRI DepFin 347, herein: Extract besl. GG, 9-3-1906.
82 Stbl. 1907 n182 and 183.
83 The ordinance (Stbl. 1907 n183) sums up a number of specifi cities and exemptions, but 
basically all those ‘inlanders’ that were directly subjects to the government (so not to an 
indirectly ruling chief in a self-governing authority) were considered to be taxable in the 
Company Tax. It was levied on Aceh, South New Guinee, East Sumatra, Menado, Riau, 
West and South and East Borneo, and some districts of Bali and Lombok (see table 3.6).
84 The Compatibility Law of 1864 also awarded the Dutch parliament direct control over 
colonial profi ts. See De Jong, Van Batig Slot naar Ereschuld, 31, 80-83, 116-117, 267-275; Stbl. 
1864 n106, 1880 n116, 1903 n315, 1917 n275 and 521 and 1925 n328 and 448.
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nizing ‘tax gatherings’ in Northern Sumatra in the 1930s. Boating around 
lake Toba (see figure 2.1), he visits villages together with the local raja 
(ruler) and his mantri (ministers) (see figure 2.2), to levy and collect taxes in 
gatherings at which the taxpaying population is given the opportunity to 
object. He emphasizes how in the absence of reliable data on the taxpayers’ 
incomes, in order “to apply a sense of justice, credulity and benevolence”, 
the colonial tax payers pay “in accordance to their levels of welfare, to be 
gauged by observable clues.”85 “All behave in accordance to this knowl-
edge”, Tichelman continues,
“anon, they will come forward and sketch in detail their scantiness of incomes 
and weakness of limbs, tell of diseases, calamities and hardships that have made 
it difficult, if not impossible, to scrape together the necessary essential daily 
needs, discoursing to the commission in order to be exempted from paying tax. 
[…] The gathered crowd, squatting in front of the table in the sunlit field, creates 
the impression of abject poverty. Nowhere has one seen as many togs as botched 
and torn as here. ‘Tax attire’, the mantri calls it. […]
 Then, a little man appears at the table, opening a ragged jacket to show an 
impressive cobbler’s chest. This chest will be the topic of his prolonged plea, 
dwelling upon the drawbacks of cobbler’s chests at large and of his, in particu-
lar, in the performance of labour. The ‘bigwigs’ listen with increasing attention, 
and, as it appears, vivid agreement. Barely has the last word on the cobbler’s 
chest been spoken, when the Authority taps his pencil on the table, permitting 
the commission to reduce the assessment by 25 cents. “Wah”, sighs the squatting 
crowd, their belief in the drawback of a cobbler’s chest suddenly turned into a 
conviction of its advantages. But the little man does not leave, and with a smile 
frolicking around his mouth he turns around to the bigwigs of the commission, 
showing an immense hunchback. Before the man can start pleading about the 
drawbacks of hunchbacks at large and his in particular, the Raja gives his judge-
ment. And satisfied, having received a total reduction of 50 cents, the man disap-
pears.”
 Next, a young man limps forward, exhibiting the most broken impression. 
Groaning and squirming, he laments his excruciating rheumatism, that mutated 
his once so vigorous body to the repugnant corpse that has dragged itself in front 
of the commission, and never ever again being able to taste the joy of labour, 
he asks for complete remission […] But the Raja knows the lad, and knows he 
has a sharp mind but a vile heart. Just a few days before, he strolled the streets, 
straight-up, strumming sweet songs on his string instrument. […] The Raja, with 
a disapproving look on his face, winks to the ‘mantri blaasting’, exclaiming:
--- “Double the assessment of this person!”
--- “Mercy”, the hapless youngster screams, writhing and convulsing, but the 
commission remains untouched.
--- “Triple the assessment of this barnstormer!”, the Raja says laconically.
85 G.L. Tichelman, “Bataksche Belastingbelevenissen”, IG 60:1 (1938), 135-141: 136.
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--- “Stop it, enough, your honour, I confess! I confess to misleading this commis-
sion that excels in its exquisite wisdom! I am but mere dust under your magnifi-
cent feet.”
And escorted by the cheerful jeers of his fellow villagers, and a hail of sugges-
tions and comments about the flaws in his performance, the lad quickly retreats. 
[…]
 A seemingly aged person squats in front of the commission. […] His wretch-
edness is shown by a filthy rag covering his body. Truly, every sign of visible 
welfare is absent […] yet, the complainer is the area’s wealthiest person, owning 
a large acreage of land and an impressive livestock, and he has eight women. 
Still, it is this double quartet of women that makes the core of his complaint […] 
as they “drain his larder, while providing poor compensation.” The embittered 
man dwells on age and absence of all forms of charm in his life companions. […] 
The audience listens attentively and amused, but The Raja […] knows the man 
is seriously deceiving the commission […] and the first minister loses his temper 
and enlightens the commission of how this ‘lamentable’ person has at least two 
youthful and apparently ‘highly attractive creatures’ among the eight consorts. 
Not a penny is reduced from the assessment. (Murmuring of pleased assent from 
the crowd). […]”86
Figure 2.1. Tax-collection tour with controleur G.L. Tichelman (in the centre) and Indonesian 
civil servants across Lake Toba, 1930s.
Source: UBL KITLV A190, 83822.
86 Tichelman, “Bataksche Belastingbelevenissen”, 135-141. Translated, summarized and 
editted by the author.
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Figure 2.2. Tax-collection gathering with G.L. Tichelman (third from the left), an indigenous 
raja (presumably fifth from the left) and various mantri, Indonesian civil servants and the 
taxpaying crowd in the background, around Lake Toba, 1930s.
Source: UBL KITLV A190, 83824.
Tichelman portrays the business of taxpayment in a rather frivolous tone
and the taxpayers as a bit clownish; what to him must have been an 
entertaining afternoon of tax evasion might have been serious business 
to the taxpayers. More importantly, he illustrates how tax practices were 
governed, not by laws and kohieren (tax registers) “weighty paperwork”, 
as he calls it87, but by the negotiating skills of taxpayers and their chiefs. 
Of crucial importance for the taxpayers was Tichelman’s presence. He 
represented the supreme authority of the colonial state. Negotiating with 
their chiefs in front of him must have provided taxpayers an opportunity to 
secure lower assessments and protection against their chiefs’ fiscal appetite. 
Consolidating their agreements on signed and stamped tax forms or bills, 
provided evidence. As mentioned in the prologue, tax forms demonstrate 
how office realities and field rituals conjoined into a hybrid tax practice in 
which the rich instruments of state and society were joined together and 
were used both ways.
These assessment bills were maintained throughout the year in terms 
(see figures 2.3 and 2.4), and once the assessment was final after the tax 
gathering, copies (receipts) of these were awarded to the taxpayers. A 
significant proportion of the assessment seems to have consisted of opcenten 
or surtaxes (as in the Netherlands, municipalities were allowed to levy 
87 Tichelman, “Bataksche Belastingbelevenissen”, 136.
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surtaxes, an extra percentage of tax to the benefit of local treasuries).88 The 
tax ordinance is explained on the back of each form and is bilingual. In 
many regions, they were also used as travel passes and proof of identifica-
tion to impede avoidance of payment.89 Assessed taxpayers located outside 
their registered place of residence and unable to show an assessment bill, 
were punishable with a fine of 15 guilders (in 1914).90 Keeping track of all 
taxpayers was impossible; many people were reported to ‘wander’ the 
forests, evading tax assessments by moving between places of residence. 
Some local administrators became so eager to catch these ‘wanderers’, 
that in one case in West Sumatra, a person was convicted of not being able 
to show his tax receipt, while in fact he had not yet been assessed.91 The 
conviction was revoked by the Council for Justice in Padang, necessitating 
yet another change in the ordinance.92
Many people in the colony were illiterate, and creative ways of commu-
nicating tax assessments came into use. A governor of Flores designed a 
system of corresponding receipts with practical symbols to clarify the 
assessments. As can be seen on figure 2.5, the receipts represented the 
amount of tax to be paid, to be cut into the bill with a special machine, so 
that each and every one could verify his assessment. An assessment of 2.95 
or 3.05 guilders was rounded off to 3 guilders, for simplicity’s sake.93 The 
Resident of Ternate used a different mechanism, awarding assessment bills 
and receipts printed on the same piece of paper, with the amount of tax to 
be paid represented by circles. By ingenuously drawing lines on this paper 
and then separating the bill from the receipts, both the bill and receipt corre-
sponded to each other, so that the taxpayers always had proof of payment 
to prevent double assessments or ‘jobbery’ by indigenous chiefs (see figure 
2.7).94
Tools to tax
Assessments were based on reported income, but assessing these incomes 
remained problematic, and not only in the case of indigenous people. As 
acknowledged by Resident J. Hofland of Batavia (in office 1906-1907), 
“correctly assessing the incomes of ‘inlanders’ and ‘Foreign Orientals’ […] 
was a difficult task […] but indisputably assessing the incomes of Euro-
88 Pierson, De Progressieve Inkomstenbelasting, 745.
89 Paradoxically, non- or late payment was sometimes punished by imposing coerced 
labour, which was among the many reasons why use of corvée prevailed.
90 Stbl. 1914 n130, art. 11-13.
91 In Burma, head tax receipts were also used as a form of personal identifi cation for the 
same purpose by the French. See Scott, The Moral Economy, 108-109.
92 ANRI AS Besl. 23-8-1916 n35, herein: DirFin to GG, 26-4-1916.
93 B. van Suchtelen, “Een Controlesysteem op Belastinggebied voor Anaplhabeten (Voor 
Streken Waar Individueele Belastingaanslag Wordt Toegepast)”, TBB 44 (1913), 117-129: 
117, 123.
94 W. Frijling, “Een Controle Middel op Belastinginning”, TBB 48 (1915), 67-70.
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peans was equally utopic.”95 Around the same time, a civil servant wrote to 
a Dutch newspaper that even “an approximate assessment of the incomes 
of taxpayers was impossible” and that “assessments in the Company Tax in 
Java and Madura were carried out blindly.” 
Figure 2.3. Example of an income tax assessment bill (soerat [surat] aanslag; ‘assessment 
letter’), of an assistant teacher from Yogyakarta, 1933.
The teacher earned more than 1,200 guilders indicating his particular category (see above), in 
the (temporary) ‘crisis income tax’ of 1932 (see below) which was a revision of the 1920 unified 
income tax. These bills were awarded to taxpayers as proof of payment. As had been allowed 
since the introduction of ‘Company Taxes’ in 1878, this particular taxpayer paid in 5 terms, 
each checked off on the form. The total amount comprised 9.80 guiders, plus 7.20 guilders of 
‘surtaxes’ (opcenten) which were levied at the benefit of the municipal administration.
Source: Belasting & Douane Museum, BDM 33210.
95 ANRI DepFin 355, herein: DirFin 11-6-1906: Res. Batavia to DirFin, 28-4-1906. This was 
not much different in The Netherlands, where the administrative basis for the income tax 
of 1893 was also weak, see: Vording and Ydema, “The Rise and Fall”; Smit, Omwille der 
Billijkheid, 253-256, 260, 261-254.
Promise Pretence and Pragmatism.indb   96 22-04-21   17:34
The system on paper: Dutch colonial tax reforms, ca. 1870-1930 97
The Director of Finance dispatched a circular to all officials in Java to inquire 
about the sentiment behind this article and elicited a storm of complaints 
about the limited instructions for gathering information on income and the 
practical implementation of the tax system.96
Figure 2.4. Tax assessment bill (soerat aanslag), of a Chinese or ‘Foreign Oriental’ taxpayer 
from Bengkalis in Riau, 1939.
The tax form is approved and signed by the ‘Lieutenant of the Chinese’ of Bengkalis and  paid 
in a single term. The total amount of tax due comprised 7 guilders, following the rates of the 
unified income tax of 1920 in the income group of 300-400 guilders (see table 2.5): 1.20 guilders 
as base rate, plus 0.20 guilders per 10 guilders income above 120 guilders per year, hence 
1.20 + (29 x 0.20) = 7 guilders tax, plus 0.50% opcenten makes 10.50 guilders.
Source: National Library Board Singapore, “Padjak penghasilan negeri / Soerat Aanslag”, B20113968H.
96 ANRI DepFin 355, herein: DirFin 11-6-1906: ‘Extract uit besluiten’, 17-6-1906. I was not 
able to trace the original article, which allegedly was published in an unspecifi ed colonial 
newspaper and copied by a lawyer named P. Maclaine Pont in the ‘Utrechts Provinciaal en 
Stedelijk Dagblad’, somewhere in May or June 1906.
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Figure 2.5. Drawing of a cutting machine in use on Flores.
This machine was used to ‘cut’ specific symbols in assessment bills to enable illiterate people to 
understand their assessment. These would correspond to their receipts (‘kwitantie’).
Source: Van Suchtelen, “Een Controlesysteem op Belastinggebied voor Anaplhabeten (voor Streken waar Indi-
vidueele Belastingaanslag wordt Toegepast).” Tijdschrift voor het Binnenlandsch bestuur 44 (1913), 117-129.
Figure 2.6. Sample assessment bill land accordant receipt in use on Flores.
On the back of the form (displayed bottom left), a taxable person’s specific socio-economic 
conditions, possessions and income, such as wife and children, cattle, job and land can be 
ticked off or filled out.
Source: ibid.
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Figure 2.7. Sample of an assessment bill as designed by Resident Palmer van den Broek of 
Ternate (in office: 1912-1915).
The small circles represented guilders (the top row) dimes (of 10 cents, the middle row) and 
cents (the bottom row), and crossing those that were not to be paid rendered the tax amount, 
in this case 5.35 guilders. The paper would be ripped along the corrugated line. The part in
black ink was the assessment bill, the red-inked part the receipt, which was awarded to the 
taxpayer as proof of payment and doubled as proof of identity and a travel pass. The diagonal
lines ensured that each and every bill would correspond to a unique receipt, so that no tax-
payer could be taxed twice (on purpose or by accident).
Source: W. Frijling, “Een Controle Middel op Belastinginning”, TBB 48 (1915), 67-70: 70.
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Taxation seemed to have put an increasing burden on the Interior Adminis-
tration. Many Residents complained how much time assessments cost them 
every year, both in case of companies as well as the income taxes for, respec-
tively, the indigenous populations, ‘Foreign Orientals’ and the European 
population.97 Officials constantly had to initiate new, cunning methods of 
acquiring information about incomes and encourage compliance. In Buiten-
zorg and Karawang (part of the Residency of Batavia), virtually all informa-
tion on incomes was acquired by intermediaries, such as village heads and 
the Kapitan Cina in the case of ‘Foreign Orientals.’ The understaffed Interior 
Administration was unable to supervise every individual assessment and 
instead compared compiled sets of data with that of preceding years. To 
verify, controleurs took samples of incomes and compared these to other 
regions, or assessed local minimum costs of sustenance.98 As emphasized 
by the Resident of Semarang, drafting tax assessments was not ‘desk-
work but required “going into the field.” Hence, every year, he examined 
factories, pasar and plantations to take stock of prices and profits, which 
he then used to map average incomes and determine tax assessments for 
coolies on sugar-fields, tile factory workers, market vendors and the like.99 
A recurring problem was that many indigenous people did not adhere to 
the idea of private, individual incomes. Instead, they participated in larger 
taxable households under schemes of shared yield, land and labour. While 
levying coerced labour services from such societies had been relatively 
simple, extracting monetary taxes on an individual level appeared to be 
much more complex.100 Many villagers on Bali, as explained by Resident 
Korn (whom we met in the introduction), “knew how much they earn per 
day or per week, but not per year.”101 Hence, even though all the ordinances 
neatly defined what was income and what was not, in practice tax levels 
remained conditioned by ‘observable indicators of welfare’, and frequently, 
people who earned below 1,200 guilders per year did not even fill in their 
tax forms.102
97 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 470, Vb. 22-6-1907 n41, herein: ‘part 2’, MinFin to MinKol, part 
III attachment 16, ‘Mailrapporten en Circulaires over Patentrecht’: Res. Batavia to DirFin, 
5-6-1906, DirFin to GG, 23-6-1906, Res. Surabaya to GG, 15-6-1906, Gov. Aceh to DirFin, 
14-11-1906, DirFin to GG, 29-09-1906.
98 ANRI DepFin 355, herein: DirFin 11-6-1906: Ass-Res Buitenzorg to Res. Batavia, 6-4-1906, 
Controleur Buitenzorg to Ass-Res Buitenzorg, Res. Karawang to Res. Batavia, 3-4-1906.
99 ANRI DepFin 355, herein: Res. Semarang to DirFin, 26-4-1906.
100 In forced cultivation schemes, peasants were expected to deliver predetermined amounts 
of cash crops to government warehouses to get paid a fi xed price. If they failed to deliver 
enough, or refused to perform labour, this became clear immediately, resulting in conse-
quences for the responsible chief who would transfer his punishment to his population.
101 ANRI AS Besl. 17-3-1920, n742-743, herein: Res. Bali and Lombok to DirFin, 21-12-1919, 
Controleur Badung to Ass-Res South Bali, 17-12-1919.
102 Departement van Landbouw, Nijverheid en Handel, Mededelingen van het Centraal Kantoor 
No. 69 Eenige Bijzonderheden, 1.
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Incomes of ‘Foreign Orientals’ were notoriously hard to tax; they 
usually enjoyed larger incomes than ‘inlanders’ but either refused or failed 
to maintain proper financial administration and ignored calls to appear 
at the tax committee. Though an accountancy obligation was already in 
place, many Chinese merchants were unable or pretended to be unable to 
maintain their records in Malay or Dutch, the only languages which the 
colonial Chamber of Commerce allowed.103 A variety of ruses were devel-
oped to disclose their incomes. Some Residents, for instance, used data on 
the importation and value of their merchandize, as registered at the customs 
office. Others provoked merchants to disclose the incomes of their competi-
tors in return for a tax reduction.104 And sometimes, they deliberately over-
taxed in order to force taxpayers to respond and come forward with their 
true incomes. This is what happened, for example, to a Chinese goldsmith 
living in Batavia named ‘Khoe A Njie’, who had refused to provide the 
government with proper income data and bookkeeping for his assessment 
of income tax. After failing to reply to calls from the tax administration, he 
was assessed at an income of 30,000105 guilders – much more than he could 
have possibly earned throughout the year. Together with the even richer 
Arabic merchant and ‘Lieutenant of the Arab quarters’ named ‘Syech Salim 
bin Awab Baloewel’ who was assessed at an astonishing income of 250,000 
guilders.106 They successfully filed a protest at the municipal tax administra-
tion, but in order to do so, both of them had to disclose their true incomes.107 
Whether Khoe A Njie and Syech Salim were truly unable to maintain the 
proper administration of their incomes is questionable. It is more likely that 
they chose to pretend they could not do so. Both persons seemed perfectly 
capable of navigating the colonial litigation system and won their cases, so 
103 In 1925, Director of Finance C.W. Bodenhausen (in offi ce 1921-1926) suggested to impose 
an ‘accountancy obligation’ in other languages as well, after learning the same problem 
had existed in the Philippines as well where many Chinese struggled keeping their 
records in English or Spanish. He proposed to allow record-keeping in Mandarin and 
hire Chinese persons at the tax offi ce but, rather absurdly, met with severe resistance of 
the Chamber of Commerce that considered this a needless and impractical interference 
in its accountancy regulations. NA MInKol 1901-1953 OV 2755, Vb. 19-6-1925 n8, herein: 
Consul Manilla to MinKol, 16-2-1925, Consul Manilla to DirFin, 9-4-1923, DirFin to GG, 
11-11-1921, ‘Voorzitter Kamer van Koophandel’ [chair of the chamber of commerce] Batavia 
to DirFin, 24-9-1921.
104 ANRI DepFin 355, herein: DirFin 11-6-1906: Res. Karawang to Res. Batavia, 3-4-1906.
105 Which would translate to the equivalent of roughly 240,000 euros in purchasing power 
today.
106 Ca. 2 million euros today.
107 ANRI AS GB TGA 8299, herein: BGS 16-4-1929 n758: Gov. West-Java to GG, 8-2-1929, 
‘Burgemeester’ [mayor] Batavia to GG, 13-8-1928. From 1903 onward, starting with 
Batavia, larger cities were administratively reclassifi ed as municipalities under a mayor 
and a municipality council.
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the assessments were corrected to their benefit.108 Because these were hardly 
the fiscal-administrative methods characteristic of a rational, bureaucratic 
state, the case of these merchants was severely disapproved of by superior 
officials like the Governor of West Java, the mayor of Batavia, and even the 
Governor-General, A.C.D. de Graeff (in office 1926-1931), himself.109 Yet, 
deliberate over-taxation had become one out of many routine strategies 
stored in the colonial toolbox, used to elicit protest and gain correct income 
data from the unwilling and uncompliant, even if it alienated and embit-
tered taxpayers.110
Payment of income taxes largely occurred in cash. Officials hoped that 
stimulating cash payment would encourage the local populations to become 
accustomed to using money. Government official and advisor C. Lulofs 
(1873-1922), for instance, emphasized that changes towards monetization 
were already taking place, upon which the government could build. On the 
case of New-Guinea, where he later became Resident, he commented:
“One must not imagine that the official arrives back home with a cargo of klap-
pers [coconut] and pigs, no, instead on his levying journeys he will be accom-
panied by buyers who on the spot exchange the products offered as taxation 
into money, so with some goodwill one can consider the taxation to be paid in 
money.”111
People would realize at some point, Lulofs argued, that it was more profit-
able to sell their products at the market instead of on the spot at the moment 
of taxation, and therefore taxpayers would acquire more money, because of 
taxation.112 Indonesia – like other colonies in Southeast Asia -became a net 
capital exporter, and likely had demonetized as a result of colonial capi-
108 ANRI AS GB TGA 8299, herein: BGS 9-8-1929 1838: Bezwaarschrift: Syech Salim bin 
Awab Baloewel, and Khoe A. Njie in idem: TGA 216/30: DirBB to GG, 10-1-1930, ‘College 
B&W’ / Burgemeester Batavia’ to GG, 20-12-1929, ‘Gemeente Batavia’ to GG, 20-12-1929: 
Bijlagen: ‘Beschikking uit het register der Beschikkingen van den Inspecteur van Fin. 
1e klasse, Hoofd Inspectie Weltevreden’ to GG, 13-8-1928.
109 ANRI AS GB TGA 8299, herein: BGS 16-4-1929: Gov. West-Java to GG, 8-2-1929.
110 As testifi ed by, amongst others, controleur Willem Coolhaas (1899-1981), and the Resi-
dents of Batavia and Semarang. On the island of Flores, where Coolhaas was controleur of 
the district of Manggarai in 1925-1927, people often reported suspiciously low estimates 
of their possessions. Coolhaas decided to keep doubling tax assessments of those who 
he thought lied to him, while exempting those he thought behaved honestly. Coolhaas, 
Controleur B.B., 135-138. For the descriptions of the Residents of Batavia and Semarang, 
see: ANRI DepFin 355, herein: DirFin 11-6-1906: Ass-Res Batavia to Res. Batavia, 23-3-
1906 and Res. Semarang to DirFin, 26-4-1906.
111 ANRI DepFin 357, herein: DepFin 4-1-1915: AdvBzBG to DirBB, 12-9-1914. By compar-
ison, in some cases in Portuguese Africa, taxation was used as a monetizing tool in 
similar ways, though as in the Indies forced labour remained an appealing alternative, 
see Havik, Keese, and Santos, Administration and Taxation in Former Portuguese Africa 
(Introduction), xi.
112 ANRI DepFin 357, herein: DepFin 4-1-1915: Ass-Res South New Guinea to Res. Ambon, 
16-5-1914; DepFin 22-2-1915, DepFin 23-12-1914: Extract besl. GG 16-3-1915.
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talism, hence little capital accumulation or financial development occurred 
from the bottom up.113 In rural areas on the ‘Outer Territories’, levels of 
monetization were (contrary to Java) usually low. Only regions where a lot 
of foreign capital and investment had accumulated, such as East Sumatra, 
did an increase in buying off labour services after World War I support some 
growth in the use of money.114 In other regions however, economic growth 
did not lead to higher levels of monetization. On Billiton, for instance, 
money was abundantly earned in the tin industry, but among the indig-
enous population such an alarmingly low level of monetization and capital 
formation was signalled in 1928, that the Director of Finance considered 
revoking the head tax and reimplementing labour services.115 Therefore, 
the government adopted an active policy of infusing regional economies 
with cash. Various currencies were in use in the nineteenth century, up 
until 1854 when the Dutch East Indian Guilder was made legal tender.116 
By that time, Java had, as before colonization, again a rather monetized and 
credit-informed economy based on locally produced copper coins or ‘duits’ 
(duiten).117 These duits became so abundantly used for tax payment during 
the Cultivation System, that their collection became a logistical challenge. 
They were actively withdrawn from 1855 onward but remained in circula-
tion, even in the twentieth century.118
Credit was extended, largely by Chinese moneylenders, through 
pawn shops, to which they leased the rights. The role of the Chinese in 
the early-modern tax system deserves emphasis here. As ‘tax farmers’, 
Chinese businessmen had had an important role in the development of 
113 W. Huff, “Monetization and Financial Development in Southeast Asia Before the Second 
World War”, Economic History Review 56:2 (2003), 300-345: 301; P.W. Klein, “Dutch 
Monetary Policy in the East Indies, 1602-1942: A Case of Changing Continuity”, in E.H.G. 
van Cauwenberghe (ed.), Money, Coins and Commerce: Essays in the Monetary History of 
Asia and Europe (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1991), 419-453.
114 Potting, De Ontwikkeling van het Geldverkeer, 84-118, 138-140.
115 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 3025, Vb. 6-9-1928 n12, herein: DirFin to GG, 14-5-1927, 
Ass-Res Biliton to DirFin (via DirBB), 19-1-1927, Besl. GG 26-6-1928.
116 Potting, De Ontwikkeling van het Geldverkeer, 24, 29.
117 P. Boomgaard, “Geld, Krediet, Rente en Europeanen in Zuid- en Zuidoost-Azië in 
de Zeventiende Eeuw”, in Davids, Fritschy, and Van der Valk (eds.), Kapitaal, Onder-
nemer schap en Beleid, 483-510: 489-490, 495-497; see also A. Weber, “Renegotiating Debt: 
Chemical Governance and Money in the Early Nineteenth-Century Dutch Empire”, in 
L. Roberts and S. Werrett (eds.), Compound Histories Materials, Governance and Production, 
1760-1840, Cultural Dynamics of Science (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 205-225 and L. Blussé , “Trojan 
Horse of Lead: The Picis in Early 17th Century Java”, in Creutzberg and Van Anrooij 
(eds.), Between People and Statistics (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 33-47; L. Blussé , 
Strange Company. Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia (Dordrecht: 
Foris Publications, 1986), 35-48.
118 N.P. van den Berg, Munt-, Crediet- en Bankwezen, Handel en Scheepvaart in Nederlandsch 
Indië: Historisch-Statistische BKI (‘s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1907), 1-4. See also 
Elson, Village Java, 14-15, 123, 262; A. Claver, Dutch Commerce and Chinese Merchants in 
Java. Colonial Relationships in Trade and Finance, 1800–1942 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2014), 
83-84, 88-93; Bosma, The Sugar Plantation, 100; Elson, Village Java, 261-264.
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local economies as intermediaries between the colonial government, entre-
preneurs and the indigenous population. From early VOC times until deep 
into the nineteenth century, they bought the rights to levy specific taxes 
and sell specific commodities such as salt and opium at special government 
auctions.119 The ‘revenue farming’ system (pachtenstelsel), as it was known, 
solved problems of administrative incapacity and suppressed the costs 
of colonial governance. Revenue farming was a common feature and an 
important step in the economic development of many (colonial) states and 
empires, and as such, has had a profound impact on the way in which tax 
payment has historically been experienced.120 However, tax farming always 
ran the risk of syndicate formation, and was in itself entirely ‘unmodern.’ It 
provided the ability to “generate the maximum gross revenue in a way that 
obfuscated the government’s role in setting policy.” It often resulted in over-
zealous revenue collection but not guaranteed to benefit the state.121 Indeed, 
in the late nineteenth century, the growing dominance of the Chinese kongsi, 
in which tax farmers and moneylenders were united, started posing a threat 
to the power of the colonial government. Additionally, officials linked the 
‘diminished welfare’ of the Javanese peasantry to what they considered to 
be aggressive and harmful exploitation, as well as the demoralizing influ-
ence of Chinese revenue farming – not only through pawning and lending 
practices, but also by enticing the high and the low class Javanese to get into 
debt at their warung (eating houses), brothels, opium and gambling dens.122 
119 Pawned out taxes included tax on fishponds and fishing (1817-1863), sale of liquor 
(arak, rum and ciu; since 1720 in Batavia and since 1817 in the rest of Java, and since 
1872 including European liqueurs), slaughter taxes (one of the oldest forms of taxation 
in the archipelago), small businesses (1829-1870), Chinese poll taxes (local head taxes 
for Chinese, until 1878), tax on gambling (1823-1851/1865), tax on organizing wayang 
shows (1835-1849 and incorporated into a gambling tax after 1849), pawnshop tax 
(since 1834), and tax on tobacco farms (1817-1896). Many of these taxes were levied 
as a form of consumption tax in return for the service provided by the government to 
host specifi c activities, to tax the use of public space or to control or discourage specifi c 
forms of behaviour. Wahid, From Revenue Farming to State Monopoly, 82-88. See also 
A. Wahid, Turning Java into a Modern Fiscal State: the Abolition of Chinese Revenue Farming 
and the Creation of a Modern Taxation System in Colonial Java, 1870s-1920s (MA Thesis, 
Leiden University, 2009), 122; C.A. Trocki, “Revenue Farming and the Chinese Economy 
of Colonial Southeast Asia”, in G. Wade and J.K. Chin (eds.), China and Southeast Asia: 
Historical Interactions (New York: Routledge, 2019), 303-313: 304, 309-310 and C.A. Trocki, 
Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800-1910 (Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 2019).
120 On Indonesia, except for Wahid, see Rush, Opium to Java and the essays in J. Butcher and 
H. Dick (eds.), The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming: Business Elites and the Emergence of the 
Modern State in Southeast Asia (Basingstoke/London: Macmillan Press, 1993).
121 C. Webber and A. Wildavsky, A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), A History of Taxation, 21, 234; See also P. Stella, 
“Tax Farming: A Radical Solution for Developing Country Tax Problems?”, Staff Papers 
(International Monetary Fund) 40:1 (1993), 217-225: 219, 221, 224.
122 P. Boomgaard, “Buitenzorg in 1805: The Role of Money and Credit in a Colonial Frontier 
Society”, MdAS 20:1 (1986), 33-58: 35-36, 41-46; Lohanda, The Kapitan Cina, 178-199; Rush, 
Opium to Java.
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This fed a popular stereotypical image of exploitative, predatory Chinese 
loan sharks, eagerly selling opium to and leeching on naïve Javanese peas-
ants, pauperising them through a system provided by the government.123 
In a modern, responsible state fiscal taxes were preferably levied by reliable 
and impersonal bureaucracies, rather than tax farmers. Hence, between 
1895 and 1915, the colonial government monopolized taxation on various 
products including slaughter taxes124, the sale of opium and salt and the 
pawnshop system, hoping to dismantle the revenue farming system.125 
Half-hearted ethical attempts to reduce mass consumption of opium and 
ratify international production agreements could not mask the fact that 
opium production continued to contribute substantially to government 
revenue.126
From the twentieth century onward, all taxes were to be collected by 
local indigenous officials (in exchange for an 8% collection wage), and 
made over to a ‘local treasury’ (landschapskas). These were supervised by 
the Residents of Governors, cashiered by the Javaasche Bank and served as 
a base for the payment of wages and other administrative expenses within 
the Residency.127 Under the 58th article of the Government Regulation of 
123 Wahid, From Revenue Farming to State Monopoly, 25-35, 60-25, 75-80, 122-129, 138-129, 
143-151, 180-122, 294-303; G.R. Knight, Commodities and Colonialism: The Story of Big Sugar 
in Indonesia, 1880-1942 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 19-21, 151; Lohanda, The Kapitan Cina, 180; 
Anonymous, “Sedert Wanneer is het Gouvernement zoo Anti-Chineesch Geworden?”, 
TvNI 1 (1857), 169-171.
124 Slaughter taxes were a pragmatic form of taxation usually levied at a fixed rate 
depending on the specifi c local value of cattle, in a separate regime for every species 
(pigs, bovine/buffalo and horses). Therefore every province required its own local 
slaughter-tax ordinances which were frequently revised following market prices. See: 
H. Fievez de Malines van Ginkel, Verslag van den Economischen Toestand der Inlandsche 
Bevolking, 1924 (Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1924), 4: 36-43.
125 Wahid, From Revenue Farming to State Monopoly, 151-157, 161-171, 183-237. Sale of opium 
and salt was organized under the ‘Opium and Salt Administration’ (Opium- en Zoutregie), 
introduced in 1903.
126 Wahid, From Revenue Farming to State Monopoly, 4, 75, 126-129. Dutch anti-opium 
campaigns in the colony may suggest that the colonial state attempted to achieve limi-
tation of opium consumption in the twentieth century, but this has been typed a ‘legal 
hypocrisy.’ In reality, opium profi ts reached numbers into millions, often a thousand 
times more than offi cial Dutch anti-opium campaign budgets. Anti-opium campaigns 
and the problems surrounding opium-consumption were handled by philanthropical 
organizations rather than the state. See H. Derks, History of the Opium Problem: The Assault 
on the East, ca. 1600-1950 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 348; A. Wahid, “‘Madat Makan Orang’; 
Opium Eats People: Opiumaddiction as a Public Health Issue in Late Colonial Java, 
1900–1940”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 51:1/2 (2020), 25-48.
127 C.J.M. Potting, De Ontwikkeling van het Geldverkeer in een Koloniale Samenleving: Oostkust 
van Sumatra, 1875-1938 (PhD thesis, Leiden, 1997), 137. Nb.: Europeans, ‘Foreign Orien-
tals’, and ‘non-indigenous inlanders paid their taxes to the ‘landskas’, the ‘national’ colo-
nial treasury managed in Batavia. See Chapter 7 on Aceh for a more detailed explanation. 
In Northern Rhodesia, as mentioned by Gardner, similar types of local treasuries were 
imposed from 1929 onward to decentralize tax collection and administrative expendi-
ture. Gardner, Taxing Colonial Africa, 229.
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1854, only taxes levied under a ‘Batavian’ ordinance could be deposited in 
a central government’s treasury.128 For many locally levied taxes this was 
not necessary. The promotion of local treasuries fitted government policy of 
fiscal-financial decentralization, in which each region was expected to fund 
its own expenses.
Provision of credit was also monopolized by the state though a network 
of local, government sponsored popular banks (Volksbanken) organized in 
an overarching ‘People’s Credit System’ (Volkscredietwezen).129 Borrowing 
money seemed to decrease in popularity, perhaps aligned to the general 
welfare decline in Java in the later nineteenth century. In 1874, 11 million 
guilders was lent out, but in 1905 only 2 million. Peasants who were in debt 
with various moneylenders risked poverty, servitude or even slavery.130
Accordingly, the tax administration was modernized and professional-
ized. In 1915, a tax agency was introduced at the Department of Finance, 
to coordinate all taxes in cooperation with the Department’s ‘Service of 
National Income’ and ‘Import and Export Duties’. Managed by a ‘Head 
Inspector of Finances’, the tax agency consisted of locally dispatched 
‘Inspectors’ and ‘Adjunct Inspectors of Finance’, who, in cooperation with 
the local Interior Administration travelled their ‘financial’ or ‘tax districts’ to 
inspect the assessments and payments of primarily wealthier taxpayers.131 It 
also processed objections of taxpayers against their assessments.132 In 1925, 
the inspectorate was centralized and the agency was reformed into Tax and 
Accountancy Bureau (Belasting- en Accountants Dienst), which had more 
of a supervisory role133; it advised on matters of taxation and investigated 
128 Soebekti, Some Facets, 7.
129 D. Henley, “Credit and Debt in Indonesian History: An Introduction”, in D. Henley and 
P. Boomgaard (eds.), Credit and Debt in Indonesia, 860-1930. From Peonage to Pawnshop, 
from Kongsi to Cooperative (Leiden/Singapore: KITLV Press/ISEAS, 2009), 1-40: 18; 
Boomgaard, “Buitenzorg in 1805”, 33-58. Every desa also had a communal grain shed in 
which stocked rice was stored which could be borrowed by villagers against low interest 
rates to stabilize the price of rice year around. See Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern 
Indonesian Elite, 73-76.
130 J.L. van Zanden, “Credit and the Colonial State: The Reform of Capital Markets in Java, 
1900-30”, in Henley and Boomgaard (eds.), Credit and Debt in Indonesia, 160-177: 168. 
See also: J. Wisseman Christie, “Preliminary Notes on Debt and Credit in Early island 
Southeast Asia”, in ibid., 41-60 and P. Boomgaard, “Following the Debt”: Credit and Debt 
in Southast Asian Legal Theory and Practice, 1400-1800”, in ibid., 61-79.
131 These inspectors were usually based in larger cities, their domains stretching either a 
number of districts (in Java), to a number of islands (in the case of Eastern Indonesia).
132 Every tax ordinance included an article enabling objection. In general, it seems that only 
Europeans and wealthier ‘Foreign Orientals’ (such as Khoe A Njie’ and Syech Salim bin 
Awab Baloewel’) were able to successfully object, while Indo-Europeans and indigenous 
peoples usually settled for either alternative corvée services or negotiated their assess-
ments at the instance of tax collection during tax gatherings. See: ANRI DepFin 362.
133 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 2751, Vb. 7-7-1925 n48 and 8-7-1925 n30. Since that moment 
onward, inspectors would only check the incomes of 1,200 guilders and higher, and 
gained greater power in fi scal matters as they were disaffi liated from the controlling 
weight of the Interior Administration.
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tax reports and local and national accounts of tax revenue. The Council of 
Tax Appeals, installed in 1919, functioned independently to resolve tax 
disputes.134 By the 1930s, the Accountancy Bureau set out to work on taxing 
internationally operating limited companies by sending its agent across 
the globe to Europe and America, and for this purpose even established a 
branch office in Amsterdam.135
However, the majority of the colonial population rarely directly dealt 
with the European colonial administration or litigation system. They were 
taxed by their own chiefs, who collected taxes in return for collector’s 
wages. This was not only considered more efficient but also a strategy 
to enhance compliance, as people were expected to pay more willingly 
to their own chiefs, than to a foreign state.136 But with the expanded and 
more complicated tax system, the responsibilities of ‘self-governors’ and 
local officials had rapidly increased, for which reason they required more 
funding. They were therefore allowed to levy local surtaxes and services, 
although formally these had to be approved by the Governor-General.137 
Later in the twentieth century this caused conflict about what shares of tax 
revenue accrued to local, and what belonged to central colonial authori-
ties.138
The Company Tax of 1914
The Dutch seemed to have made considerable progress in imposing direct 
income taxes. By 1908, all Europeans and ‘Foreign Orientals’ throughout 
the archipelago, and the indigenous people in Java and the majority of the 
‘Outer Territories’ were theoretically subjected to such a tax. Overall, the 
share of government revenue from taxes increased – up to 40% in 1897 – 
and government revenue from taxes rose from 50 million guilders in 1910 
to 200 million in 1920, surpassing import duties (see appendices 1-3).139 
134 Lancée, Beknopt Overzicht, 14. See also: Stbl. 1908n412, 1914 n84, 1918 n2, and 1919 n461; 
Visser, Overzicht van het Belastingwezen, 45-46.
135 W.J. de Langen, “The Netherlands East Indies, and the Taxation of Limited Companies 
with International Interests”, Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International 1 (1939), 105-122: 107.
136 Also in the case of Europeans. See De Jong, Van Batig Slot naar Ereschuld, 233-234.
137 Visser, Overzicht van het Belastingwezen, 32.
138 For instance, in the case of the wage tax (see below) levied from 1930 onward. In Deli and 
Aceh various shares imposed levied from ‘directly ruled’ and ‘self-governed’ subjects 
had led to differences in the tax burden. See: ANRI DepBB 1053, herein: Gov SOK to 
DirFin, 18-8-1936 and Ass-Res Deli to GovSOK, 24-3-1936, BGS 19-12-1939: DirBB to GG, 
27-9-1939.
139 Booth, The Indonesian Economy, 141, 215-147. By 1930, income tax revenue comprised 20% 
of total government revenue, compared to 80% in Burma, but only 34% in the Straits 
settlements. See Booth, “Towards a Modern Fiscal State in Southeast Asia”, 37-38, 43.
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However, in particular the income taxation of indigenous peoples, over 
95% of the total population in 1910140, was highly diversified. The average 
assessment per capita diverged widely, from 0.42 guilders in Timor to 4.35 
guilders in East Sumatra (see table 2.4). Collection of taxes was reportedly 
very difficult, adding to the inequality of the burden between regions where 
taxes were successfully levied, and regions where that was not the case. 
As put by Lulofs in 1912, the fiscal modernization had remained merely an 
“accomplishment on paper.”141
A far-reaching solution was announced in 1914, when a general 
‘Company Tax’, was introduced to replace all separate company and head 
taxes in the Outer Islands.142 This was a much more elaborate tax instru-
ment than those imposed before. The tax was set at 40 cents for every 10 
guilders of income for the coming year, based on income assessments of the 
preceding year.143 The Company Tax was presented, and should be seen, 
as a second step in the ongoing fiscal integration of the colony. A majority 
of the ‘Foreign Orientals’ and indigenous peoples of Sumatra, Borneo and 
East Indonesia was now taxed under a unified, progressive company annex 
income tax. However, in Java, peasants still paid a land rent, supplemented 
with head taxes and Company Taxes for ‘non-agricultural inlanders’ and 
‘Foreign Orientals’, while in Sulawesi, for instance, local, semi-autonomous 
‘self-governors’ levied their own forms of taxation (see map 2.1 below and 
appendix 4). The taxation of indigenous people remained a mishmash of 
head, land and company taxes.
140 See KV 1905; Boomgaard and Gooszen, Changing Economy Vol. 11: Population Trends, 10.
141 C. Lulofs, “Belastingpolitiek in de Buitenbezittingen”, TBB 43 (1912), 74-94: 77.
142 Stbl. 1914 n130. It made an exception of West and East Sumatra, Bangka, ‘indigenous 
inlanders’ in ‘Lingga-Riau’, specifi c parts of South and East Borneo, the ‘inlandse burgers’ 
(see chapter 6) of Ambon and Menado and the indigenous peoples of South New-Guinee. 
The latter were considered “not yet susceptible to taxes.” Similar exemptions as before 
were maintained, including indigenous offi cials, migrants (again, this refers to the ‘non 
indigenous’ – usually Javanese – migrant communities that had just settled in a particu-
larareas shorter than two years), teachers, clergymen, unmarried women and senior 
(unmarried) men.
143 Except for South and East Borneo, Sulawesi and Bali and Lombok, where a land-based 
tax of usually 10% tax on yield existed. See: Stbl. 1914, n130.
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Table 2.4. Average direct tax assessments per capita in the ‘Outer Territories’ in fl.144
Province Directly Ruled Territories ‘Self-Governing’ Territories145
Timor 0.42 Aceh 0.54
Tapanuli 0.49 East Sumatra 0.72
West Borneo 0.68 Bali and Lombok 0.77
West Sumatra 0.885 Riau 0.86
Bali and Lombok 0.93 South and East Borneo 0.96
Jambi 0.97 Timor 0.99
Ternate 1.16 West Borneo 1.09
South and East Borneo 1.17 Ambon 1.14
Menado 1.185 Ternate 1.32







144 J. Roest, “Vergelijkend overzicht van de Buitenbezittingen van de Inlandsche Bevolking 
Geheven Directe Belastingen over 1913”, TBB 48 (1913), 518-529.
145 Territories that remained governed by semi-autonomous indigenous rulers who took 
care of taxation and local public fi nances themselves. Part of tax revenue was rendered 
to the colonial government, as agreed in standardized contracts between the colonial 
government and the rulers of these territories. Hence, self-governing territories did not 
follow the tax rates as established in the central colonial tax ordinances of the Colonial 
State Gazette, but rather determined these rates themselves. See also the explanation in 
chapters 1 and 6, and map 2.1 below.
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2.3 Consolidation and unification, 1914-1935
Did the tax reforms up to 1914 make any structural improvement to the 
persistent inequality among colonial taxpayers? When comparing the tax 
rates of the Income Tax for Europeans of 1908 with the Company Tax for 
indigenous people and ‘Foreign Orientals’ of 1907, we see that the rates 
of the latter resulted in excessively higher taxes in absolute terms, due to 
the lower threshold at which to start paying taxes in the Company Tax 
(see table 2.2 and 2.3). This was rooted in the colonial idea that different 
ethnicities adhered to different welfare standards – even though in 1884, 
82% of the ‘Foreign Orientals’ earned less than ƒ500 per year.146 As a result, 
sometimes ‘Foreign Orientals’ opted to gain status equal to Europeans. As 
observed by the Resident of Ambon, who frequently had to deal with such 
requests, “a Chinese with an income of ƒ800 pays ƒ36 in Company Tax, but 
at an income of ƒ1000 he pays ƒ45, though in the case he is made equal to a 
European, he would only pay ƒ3.”147
Such evasiveness was among the many consequences of the diversified 
and disunited tax regime developed in Indonesia before 1915. Following the 
numerous social, ethnic and regional differences imposed by the colonial 
government, the tax system had become deeply differentiated, which, as 
discussed before, was at odds with the idea of a unified and consolidated 
colony envisioned by statesmen in The Hague and Batavia. This was why, 
in 1920, the various systems of income taxation were unified.148 The unifica-
tion was intended to include indigenous peoples across the archipelago in 
sharing in the burden of colonial administration and at the same time to 
transform the separate and dispersed peoples of Indonesia into a unified 
class of taxpaying, obedient subject-citizens, in an equal and just manner, 
and further enable redistribution of the tax burden. The tax subjected all 
directly governed subjects, aged 15 or older and enjoying incomes of 120 
guilders and above, except those paying land rent149 to a progressive tax 
146 ANRI DepFin 347, herein: DirFin, 4-10-1888: MinKol to GG, 16-6-1888 and DirFin 25-7-
1884 and 24-1-1885: MinKol to GG, 12-11-1884 and MinKol to Koning, 1-10-1884, DirFin, 
4-10-1888: MinKol to GG, 16-6-1888.
147 NA MinKol Memories van Overgave [MvO] 311: A.J. Quarles de Quarles, Amboina, 1908, 
in Ch. F. van Fraassen, Bronnen Betreffende de Midden-Molukken 1900-1942 (Den Haag: 
Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis,1997), I: 64 (pp. 132-144: 143).
148 Brunner, De Unifi catie, 20-22.
149 These existing taxes comprised the ‘10% rice tax’ on Sulawesi, ‘vertieningsbelasting’ (10% 
land tax) in South and East Borneo, and the ‘padjeg [pajak], upeti and tigasana’ land or 
yield taxes on Bali and Lombok (see chapter 3). The introduction of a unifi ed income 
tax was postponed for the indigenous people of Mentawai, Sipora and Siberut (West 
Sumatra), Bali and Lombok, Aceh, Timor, Bangka and of Ambon and New South Guinee, 
the ‘indigenous inlanders’ of Lingga-Riau and Upper-Mahakam (in South Borneo), 
the ‘inlandse burgers’ of Ambon, Haruku, Saparua and Nusa Laut, and for the directly 
governed ‘inlanders’ of Ambon and Yogyakarta. Most of these groups would be subjected 
at a later point through revisions implemented throughout the 1920s and 30s. See: ANRI 
AS Besl. 17-3-1920 n742-743, herein: Besl. 13-4-1920 n21: DirFin to HGB, 23-8-1919 and 
Besl. 13-10-1920 n9.
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scheme, as displayed in table 2.5.150 Taxes were paid ‘fictively’ in advance 
of the tax year over expected incomes based on the assessment of the 
preceding year.151 Indigenous civil servants were no longer exempted. The 
collection protocol remained, as before, locally executed by ‘tax commis-
sions’, headed by teams supervised by local Dutch officials. Tax bills were 
to be distributed among all tax payers by village chiefs, who received the 
usual collectors wage of 8% of the tax assessment, filled in and delivered 
back to the Resident’s office. In this way, the Dutch seemed to have arrived 
at a unified, colonial fiscal state. All people across the archipelago paid some 
form of income tax and thereby theoretically contributed to the capacity of 
the central colonial state.
Table 2.5. Tax rates in the unified income tax of 1920.152
Level of annual income in guilders Amount of tax to be paid annually in guilders
From To
0 120 + 0.20 for every ƒ10 above ƒ120 income 
120 1,800 1.20 + 0.20 for every ƒ10 above ƒ120 income 
1,800 3,600 34.80 + 3 for every ƒ100 above ƒ1,800 income
3,600 5,400 88.80 + 4 for every ƒ100 above ƒ3,600 income
5,600 8,400 160.80 + 5 for every ƒ100 above ƒ3,600 income
8,400 12,000 310.80 + 6 for every ƒ100 above ƒ5,400 income
12,000 18,000 326.80 + 7 for every ƒ100 above ƒ 8,400income
18,000 24,000 946.80 + 8 for every ƒ100 above ƒ12,000 income
24,000 30,000 1426.80 + 9 for every ƒ100 above ƒ18,000 income
30,000 36,000 1966.80 + 10 for every ƒ100 above ƒ24,000 income
36,000 + 2566.80 + 11 for every ƒ100 above ƒ36,000 income
Although meticulously detailed in its design, in reality the unified income 
tax ordinance, with its 99 articles, was an impractical beast and subject to 
acerbic criticism from its inception, not only by local officials such as Resi-
dent Korn, quoted in the introduction, but also by civil servants in Batavia. 
According to an inspector at the Department of Finances, for instance, 
the unification was politically motivated, in the spirit of uplifting and 
integrating the indigenous populations into a unified colonial society that 
existed only in the minds of colonial theorists in The Hague.153 “Decreeing a 
unification does not make it exist”, he concluded.154
150 Stbl. 1920 n678.
151 Stbl. 1920 n678, art. 1; Soebekti, Some Facets, 26.
152 Stbl. 1920 n678.
153 Brunner, De Unifi catie, 7-8, 20-22.
154 Ibid., 35.
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Indeed, the imposition of the unified tax regime did not resolve the 
huge income and welfare differences that still existed among the various 
ethnically separated socio-legal groups. On average, Europeans carried a 
tax burden, per-capita, 45 times higher than ‘inlanders’, while their incomes 
were 53 times higher in the 1920s.155 The wages and incomes of many 
coolies, craftsmen or day labourers were in fact so low156 that the majority 
of the indigenous population was virtually untaxable.157 Around 1925, only 
25% of the indigenous population in the archipelago was reported to earn 
above the minimal taxable income of 120 guilder per year.158 And in fact, 
80% of income tax was collected in Java and Madura alone.159
The Residents in Java, upon request for feedback by the Director of 
Finance, showed much scepticism about its effective practicability.160 
Incomes below 120 guilders per year usually had to be estimated, and 
income tax-levying became a dreaded and time-consuming endeavour.161 
Nonetheless, the Residents also applauded the unified income tax for its 
redistributive intentions. The Resident of Rembang subscribed to the idea 
that the payment of equal, unified taxes possessed “educative cogency” 
so that “…all would consider themselves ‘citizens of the state’”; whereas 
155 A.D.A. de Kat Angelino, Staatkundig Beleid en Bestuurzorg in Nederlandsch-Indië 
(‘s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1931), vol. II, 692; Burger, Sociologisch-Economische Geschiedenis 
van Indonesia, vol. I, 116; W.M.F. Mansvelt, P. Creutzberg, and P.J. van Dooren, Changing 
Economy in Indonesia: A Selection of Statistical Source Material from the Early 19th Century up 
to 1940. Vol. 5: National Income (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1979), 70; J. Alexander and P. Alex-
ander, “Protecting Peasants from Capitalism: The Subordination of Javanese Traders by 
the Colonial State”, Comparative Studies in Social History 33:2 (1991), 370-394: 381.
156 In 1906, the Director of Finance reported that 93% of the indigenous population 
earned less than 150 guilders annually, which was assessed as insuffi cient income for 
daily survival or productive economic participation. ANRI DepFin 355, herein: DirFin 
1-5-1906: nota.
157 Day wages for coolies, craftsmen or day labourers working on sugar plantations were 
around ƒ0.30 - 0.50 per day in 1870-1890 to about ƒ2 for skilled craftsmen in 1920. By 
comparison: coolies working in the tin mines on Bangka earned around ƒ0,44 daily in 
1932. Until around 1930, this barely covered the costs of living. The average income 
of a Javanese labourer was calculated at ƒ161 annually in 1921. See N. Dros, Changing 
Economy in Indonesia: A Selection of Statistical Source Material from the Early 19th Century 
up to 1940. Vol. 13: Wages 1820-1940 (Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1992), 11-12, 
20-32, 42-44, 550-560, 569-571, 121-134-135, 138-141, 150; Reys, De Inkomstenbelasting der 
Inlanders, 103.
158 Those who were taxable on average earned 250 guilders in Java, and 284 guilders in the 
‘Outer Territories.’ Departement van Landbouw, Nijverheid en Handel, Mededelingen van 
het Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek. No. 69 Eenige Bijzonderheden Betreffende het Aantal 
Aangeslagenen in de Inkomstenbelasting, 1925 (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1925), 3-4.
159 Ibid., 4.
160 See: ANRI DepFin 344, herein: DepFin, 28-4-1916: DirFin to HGB, 5-4-1913: Res. Surabaya 
to DirFin 20-3-1913, Res. Pekalongan to DirFin, 22-3-1913, InspFin Surabaya to DirFin, 
8-3-1913, Res. Semarang to DirFin, 14-3-1913, Res. Banten to DirFin, 10-3-1913, Res. Kediri 
to DirFin 5-3-1913, Res. Madioen to DirFin 13-3-1913, Res. Cirebon to DirFin, 18-3-1913, 
Res. Banjoemas, to DirFin. 29-3-1913, Res. Batavia to DirFin, 2-4-1913.
161 J.W. Meijer Ranneft and W. Huender, Onderzoek naar den Belastingdruk op de Inlandsche 
Bevolking (Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1926), 76-78.
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existing exemptions, he continued, had a “demoralizing influence […] 
putting taxpayers in opposition to those who enjoyed remuneration.”162 
This was a source of legitimate concern in 1918, when members of the local 
councils and the Volksraad received exemption from buying-off corvée and 
head taxes and gave a misleading impression about the benefits of holding 
public office, as ‘Advisor for Decentralization’ H.A. Kindermann (in office 
1917-1921) argued. Volksraad members were to “give the right example”, so 
their exemption was withdrawn.163 Other Residents feared that in practice, 
the unification would only cause an increase in the tax burden of indig-
enous peoples, which in light of growing political awareness, they assessed 
as a potential threat to social stability.164 Indeed, especially under influence 
of the expanding growth of state expenses during World War I, the idea 
of fiscal unification had gained accelerating popularity among the political 
elite, as it was considered to enable even greater inclusion of taxpayers 
under generally higher tax rates.165 The government had spent much energy 
on sharpening its political intentions and redesigning the fiscal system on 
paper. But the concern of Residents about the increase and redistribution 
of the tax burden was not ungrounded. The final part of this chapter will 
briefly address what were the consequences of the unification, and how the 
colonial government responded to them.
Investigating inequality
The years after the unification, concerns arose once again over the impact 
the income tax had on the fiscal burden carried by Javanese peasants. 
Already in the 1880s, Brooshooft had calculated the annual income of the 
average Javanese peasant to be around 90 guilders per year, taxed at aver-
agely 27%.166 In the 1920s, a series of investigations was launched by the 
colonial government to map the impact of unified taxation on ‘indigenous 
welfare’ and the practice of taxation. The first of these was carried out 
by controleurs J.W. Meijer Ranneft and W. Huender, commissioned by the 
Department of Interior Administration, and it returned a rather pessimistic 
report. In Java, peasants were taxed on average at up to 25% of their income, 
while people the ‘Outer Territories’ were taxed at no more than about 10% 
162 ANRI DepFin 344, herein: DepFin, 28-4-1916: Res. Rembang to DirFin, 23-3-1913. See 
also: H.J. Köhler, “Het Opvoedend Element in Belastingheffi ng Gelegen”, TBB 45 (1913), 
139-140.
163 ANRI DepBB ‘Afdelingsarchief’ 332, herein: Extract besl. GG, 18-11-1926, Extract besl. 
GG 15-3-1922, Extract Besl. GG, 25-4-1922 to DirBB: AdvDec to DirBB, 15-1-1921.
164 ANRI DepFin 344, herein: DepFin, 28-4-1916: Res. Rembang to DirFin, 23-3-1913 and Res. 
Besuki to DirFin, 25-3-1913.
165 Visser, Overzicht van het Belastingwezen, 33.
166 E. Locher-Scholten, “Mr. P. Brooshooft, een Biografi sche Schets in Koloniaal-Ethisch 
Perspektief”, BKI 132:2-3 (1976), 306-349: 323.
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on average. Five decades of reform had barely had any impact on the redis-
tribution of the burden, from Java to elsewhere. According to Meijer Ranneft 
and Huender, this was caused, in particular, by the complexity of the head 
tax system in relation to the persistence of ineradicable corvée services. 
While head taxes were theoretically introduced to replace coerced labour, in 
practice they were levied on top of them, next to the burdensome land rent 
and other taxes. This curbed potential for capital accumulation and led to 
welfare decline.167 Moreover, the ambiguous role of village chiefs as govern-
ment tax-collectors and village-representatives had prompted chiefs to navi-
gate between the government’s, the village’s and their own interests. They 
advised a reduction in the number of desa chiefs and their labour entitle-
ments, to diminish the demand for coerced labour and to reform the system 
of head taxes still in place (as an alternative to labour services), into a central 
system of simple labour taxes and land rent. Most notably, in Meijer Ranneft 
and Huender’s proposal, there was no more mention of popular tutelage: 
“the era of popular elevation”, they argued, “was over.”168 Such a remark 
may be seen as unsurprising coming from two former controleurs, generally 
sceptical of the theories of a popular uplifting as concocted in Batavia. Yet, 
a second investigation, conducted by bureaucrats and theorizers – some of 
whom had contributed to the unification’s realization – and headed by the 
Vice-President of the Raad van Indië E. Moresco (in office 1917-1923), agreed 
to the findings of Meijer Ranneft and Huender, that the existing system 
overburdened indigenous people, particularly in Java, and that ‘corrupted’ 
and ‘unreliable’ village chiefs were to blame. But whereas Meijer Ranneft 
and Huender sought to keep the tax system simple and operable, Moresco 
refused to give up the principles fundamental to fiscal governmentality. 
For instance, while the former simply suggested raising the tax threshold 
for all, to 600 guilders, to avoid inefficient levying of small amounts of tax 
from low incomes, Moresco argued that such a raise would favour people 
in many ‘Outer Territories’, who had smaller taxable incomes, at the cost of 
167 Meijer Ranneft and Huender, Onderzoek naar den Belastingdruk, 15, 25-29, 146-148, 
156-159. Other offi cials also pointed at limited knowledge of local earning capacities 
and economic circumstances, leading to divergence and arbitrariness in the assessments 
of the income tax and the relatively high burden of indirect taxes on the indigenous 
population. See: H.J. van Brink, De Belastingdruk in Nederlandsch-Indië (Overdruk uit: 
Economische en Statistische Berichten, No. 664-665, Rotterdam: s.n., 1928), 5-12; Reys, De 
Inkomstenbelasting der Inlanders, 4-6, 11-14-25; Alexander and Alexander, “Protecting Peas-
ants from Capitalism”, 381-382. See also F. Fokkens, Bijdrage tot de Kennis onzer Koloniale 
Politiek der Laatste Twintig Jaren (‘s Gravenhage: Couvé e, 1908); F. Fokkens, De Afschaffi ng 
van Heerendiensten op de Ontwerp-Indische Begrooting voor 1912 [i.e. 1913] (Den Haag, 1912), 
F. Fokkens, De Afschaffi ng der Laatste Heerendiensten op Java (Baarn: Hollandia, 1914); 
C.J. Hasselman, Eindverslag over het Onderzoek naar den Druk der Dessadiensten op Java en 
Madoera (Ingesteld Krachtens Gouvts. Besluit dd. 25 Januari 1902 No. 19) (Batavia: Lands-
drukkerij, 1905); J.H. Liefrinck, Onderzoek naar de Heffi ng van Belastingen en de Vordering 
van Heerendiensten in Eenige Deelen der Buitenbezittingen (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1917).
168 Meijer Ranneft and Huender, Onderzoek naar den Belastingdruk, 145.
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the Javanese; precisely the issue the unification had attempted to resolve.169 
Rather than simplifying the underlying principles of the tax and giving up 
its potential ‘educative cogency’, his commission advised reducing the tax 
rates, abolishing the municipal surtaxes, replacing all head taxes in Java and 
Madura with labour taxes and, last but not least, separating the tax regimes 
of Java and Madura from the ‘Outer Territories.’ This in fact meant a rever-
sion of the geographical unification of the tax system.170
The structural lack of statistical data and knowledge, in particularly 
outside of Java, remained consistently problematic. According to Head 
Inspector of Finances E.P. Wellenstein, who participated in the Moresco-
Commission, those taxable components of society which were easily 
counted or measured such as land, had become automatically overtaxed, 
vis-à-vis aspects that were more difficult to count, such as labour.171 
Meanwhile, like the land rent, the head taxes and corvée services levied 
in Java, preyed on the availability of labour, fertile land and rice prices. In 
Java and to some extent on Bali, land survey programs were increasingly 
successful, and their more reliable data gave support to a functional tax 
system, leading to increasingly high and complete assessments. However, 
in the ‘Outer Territories’, where experiments with land rent and similar 
taxes had only limited success, this was not the case.172 As a result, peasants 
in Java and Bali automatically paid more taxes than people elsewhere in the 
archipelago. Those regions where the government had greater knowledge 
of, and access to, the possessions and incomes of taxpaying people, were 
automatically taxed higher than regions where this was not the case.
169 Ibid., 75-77; CtHBNI, Vierde Verslag, 37. In reality, very few ‘inlanders’ earned above 600 
guilders annually, but that the tax burden was much lighter in the ‘Outer Territories’ was 
shown by yet another investigation. Former offi cial R.J.W. Reys, who wrote his disserta-
tion on the income taxation of indigenous peoples in the colony, agreed and claimed the 
existent threshold of 120 guilders was rather inept as no one in Java survived from that 
little money. According to Reys, taxing primarily wealthier individuals would create 
room for (modest) progressivity, and could eventually guarantee the legal principles of 
tax equality to bring about some degree of social wealth redistribution. He advised to 
increase the threshold of taxable incomes from 120 to 600 guilders, with a rate of 2% tax 
on incomes up to 1,800 guilders, the introduction of head tax on all the Outer Islands 
(“the primitive districts”) and expansion of the excise duties on the Outer Islands, and a 
wage tax. See: Reys, De Inkomstenbelasting der Inlanders, 16-25, 41, 52, 159-160. Fievez de 
Malines van Ginkel suggested a raise to 300 guilders, to reduce the tax burden on small 
incomes and the administrative burden of levying on the administration. H. Fievez de 
Malines van Ginkel, Verslag: 4.
170 CtHBNI, Vierde verslag, 7-11, 13-14, 27-33, 36-37, 45-46.
171 E.P. Wellenstein, Het Onderzoek naar den Belastingdruk op de Inheemsche Bevolking van 
Nederlandsch-Indië (Weltevreden: G. Kolff & Co., 1925), 23-33, 43-46; See also the ‘minority 
note’ of Wellenstein and F.L. Pannekoek in: CtHBNI, Tweede Verslag, 28-47.
172 Hugenholtz, Landrentebelasting, 283-284, 286-288. 2/3 of all revenue from land taxes 
outside of Java was collected on Bali (Robinson, The Dark Side of Paradise, 56).
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Corporate tax
Also, the unified income tax could not conceal the fact that incomes in the 
colony were still greatly diversified. In fact, large corporations were still 
taxed at the same level, which produced little opportunity for healthy 
progressivity and tax levelling.173 Once again, the taxation of enormous 
corporate profits started lagging behind, compared to the increasing tax 
burden upon the colonial population. Except for income and profit taxes, 
which were increased in 1920, these corporations paid a number of extra 
product taxes on sugar, coffee, tea, tobacco and oil, introduced in 1919/1923, 
in an attempt to tackle the impending financial crisis which emerged after 
World War I.174 Product taxes were levied based on the difference between 
market and (fixed) cost prices. This was an efficient but problematic method 
as it ignored profits and put the tax burden largely on particular branches 
of industry. Some critics feared that taxing these industries at a higher rate 
would harm their competitive capacity on the global commodity markets.175 
Product taxes were unpopular and seen as a mechanism for squeezing 
money from entrepreneurs in times of hardship.176 The government 
responded by making product taxes deductible in the extra profit tax.177 
However, considering the erratic market fluctuations and the crumbling 
of the relationship between industry and the government, on which the 
success of product taxes ultimately depended, a more permanent solution 
was required.178
Ultimately, the solution was the introduction of a corporate tax in 
1925. But the construction of this tax, as demonstrated by A. Taselaar, was 
heavily influenced by the most powerful of the economic-industrial elite in 
the colony. They argued for a tax regime favourable to foreign investment 
and corporatism.179 Frontman for this ‘colonial lobby’ was politician and 
economist M.W.F. Treub, former Minister of Finance (in 1914-1916 and 1917-
173 CtHBNI, Tweede Verslag, 37-47. See also: NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 2817, Vb. 18-2-1926 
n51, herein: ‘Nota 2e afdeling, voorstellen van de commissie […]’.
174 Van Brink, Overzicht: 14-15, 17-27. In addition, import and export rights and excises on 
petroleum, alcohol and matches were raised. Taselaar, De Nederlandse Koloniale Lobby, 225.
175 Treub, Nota, 1-2; A. Ritz, De Indische Inkomstenbelasting voor de Naamlooze Vennootschap 
(Amsterdam: De Bussy, 1923), 1-2; H.J. van Brink, De Indische Ordonnantiën op de Inkom-
sten- en Productenbelastingen (Amsterdam: De Bussy, 1921).
176 J. Ramaer, “Nieuwe Belastingen op Javasuiker”, Economisch-Statistische Berichten 4:202 
(1919), 1027.
177 The highest tax assessment of both had to be paid, so companies with low extra profi ts 
risked paying an excessively high product tax. Additionally, instead of paid-up capital, 
nominal capital was used as a guideline for ‘capital-demonstration’. As a consequence 
of this measure, many big corporations reinvested or split their profi ts, for which reason 
their nominal capital remained low, while their legal capital increased. As a result, 
they paid low amounts of tax in the extra and excess profi t taxes, and primarily ad-hoc 
product taxes. Van Brink, Overzicht, 14.
178 Knight, Commodities and Colonialism, 189-194; Taselaar, De Nederlandse Koloniale Lobby, 303.
179 Taselaar, De Nederlandse Koloniale Lobby, 261-296.
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1918) and chairman of the ‘Entrepreneurs Council of the Indies’ which he 
had founded.180 Treub considered the existing mixture of product and profit 
taxes unfair, illogical and arbitrary.181 While colonial government in Batavia 
was planning on introducing a progressive corporate tax as advised by the 
Committee of Moresco, Treub argued that the difference between corporate 
and personal income rendered the former unsuitable for progressive taxa-
tion, claiming that corporations itself had no fiscal carrying capacity (only 
its shareholders did).182 He proposed the introduction of a proportional 
corporate tax and a ‘dividend tax’ (modelled on the one he had designed 
for the Netherlands), with a maximum rate of 10%, to replace the ‘excess’ 
and ‘extra profit taxes’ and better tax the flow of profits from corporations 
to private shareholders. Rigidly retrenching “ethical expenditures”183, he 
urged, would bring down fiscal needs and create a favourable business 
climate attractive to foreign investment and, he claimed, would help to 
support “the noble pursuit of uplifting the indigenous economy.”184
Treub’s proposal evoked strong protests, not least because he had 
made some provocative claims about the capacities of the tax administra-
tion. The chief of the colonial Tax Administration, J.L. Vleming expressed 
his indignation by accusing Treub of using the “administrative overload”, 
demonstrated by Wellenstein, as a “vulgar argument” for lower taxes.185 
A more substantial response, by economist J. van Gelderen, expounded on 
how the emphasis on dividend tax would leave chunks of larger corporate 
profits untaxed; this is what the excess and extra profit taxes had attempted 
to prevent.186 It was quite obvious that Treub, a classic tropical capitalist, 
sought to create a mild tax regime for corporate profits, but it was quite 
hard for his opponents to prove that his plea for dividend taxes was not 
genuinely motivated on legal grounds.187
Treub’s influence reached deep into the Dutch parliament, including 
the Ministries of Finance and Colonies, as is easily recognized in both the 
consecutive debates and the eventual introduction of the corporate tax in 
180 Treub was also involved in the involved in the establishment of the ‘petroleum faculty of 
Utrecht. See Fasseur, De Indologen, 414-420.
181 Treub, Nota, 41-50.
182 Ibid., 17-18, 22. He argued that progressively taxing companies could not be legally 
subjected to the ‘ability to pay’ principle, the principle that taxpayers should pay tax 
accordant to the relative impact that tax will have on their wealth. Legal persons like joint 
stock companies, he claimed, did not gain income nor acquired wealth but were merely 
the instruments natural persons used to acquire these.
183 Treub, Nota, 10, 15-16.
184 Ibid., 27-29, 30-24, 96.
185 J.L. Vleming, Critisch Antwoord op de Belastingnota van mr. M. W. F. Treub, Voorzitter van den 
Ondernemersraad voor Nederlandsch-Indië (Batavia: Javasche Boekhandel, 1922), 1-12, 20-26, 
34-43; J.L. Vleming, De Financieele Positie van Ned.-Indië en de Belastingpolitiek van de Laatste 
Jaren (Amsterdam: Ontwikkeling, 1926); Taselaar, De Nederlandse Koloniale Lobby, 231.
186 Van Gelderen, Voorlezingen, 1., Taselaar, De Nederlandse Koloniale lobby, 231.
187 M.W.F. Treub, Nadere Beschouwingen over de Indische Vennootschapsbelasting (Weltevreden: 
NV Boekhandel Visser & Co, 1923), 45-48.
Promise Pretence and Pragmatism.indb   118 22-04-21   17:34
The system on paper: Dutch colonial tax reforms, ca. 1870-1930 119
1925.188 Moresco’s ‘Tax Revision Commission’ had argued against a divi-
dend tax and favoured a progressive profit tax189, but its advice was largely 
ignored. To the frustration of many officials in Batavia, a proportional profit 
tax was introduced, using a tax rate of 10% levied over companies with a 
settlement in Indonesia.190 The ordinance seemed largely informed by the 
advice of another commission, supervised by economist G.W.J. Bruins and 
appointed by the Minister of Colonies Simon de Graaff (in office 1919-1925), 
both closely related to the ‘colonial lobby.’191 Thus the industrial elite, that 
constituted the top of the colonial system, secured its capitalist interests 
through the tax regime at the cost of fiscal-political and social development, 
even though it was sincerely opposed by the executive branch in Batavia.
Crisis and creativity: the wage tax, a fiscal endpoint?
The corporate tax would, nonetheless, make important contributions to the 
colonial treasury over the course of the late 1920s, in the region of about 42 
to 72 million guilders in 1925-1926 (see appendix 3), and take over part of 
the revenue formerly assessed in the income tax.192 But following the global 
economic crisis unfolding after the stock market crash of 1929, it became 
clear how brittle the tax system had remained, as revenue from all taxes – 
especially corporate and European income taxes, connected more tightly 
to the global economy – plunged. In 1930, government expenses surpassed 
188 Taselaar, De Nederlandse Koloniale Lobby, 31-37, 49-51, 92-38, 229-260, 503-225.
189 It proposed to levy a progressive profi t tax that maintained a 5% rate at a 5% profi t-
capital relation, progressing with 0,7% per 1% growth of the profit. Following Van 
Gelder, the Commission argued that levying dividend tax would stimulate unequal 
spread of the tax burden and proportional taxes would put the burden decreasingly on 
big, and increasingly on small companies, and that dividend tax was too easily evaded 
and as many ‘colonial companies’ also employed activities elsewhere on the globe, 
encumbering the assessment of what share of the dividend was earned and taxable in 
the Indies. The Commission argued against a proportional profi t tax, because a rate of at 
least 16% would have been necessary to generate the same revenue as under the profi t 
and product taxes of 1917-1924, too much for small companies with modest profi ts, and 
deterrent for foreign investors. The Commission argued that company revenues should 
be taxed heavier in the colony than in the Netherlands, as natural persons (the share-
holders) behind joint stock companies often lived outside the tax domain of the NEI. 
This would make it easier to spread the tax burden and decrease the ‘colonial drain.’ 
See: CtHBNI, Tweede Verslag, 8, 10-17, 14-16, 20, 23-24, 29-35, 24-29, 43-44; Taselaar, De 
Nederlandse Koloniale Lobby, 220; W. de Cock Buning, De Herziening van het Belastingstelsel 
voor Nederlandsch-Indië (Utrecht: Bruna, 1924), 6, 10.
190 Lancée, Beknopt Overzicht, 22. The corporate tax hence favoured larger corporations over 
smaller companies. The ‘Vereniging van Nederlands-Indische Spoor-en Tramwegmaatschap-
pijen’ (Association of Dutch East Indian Railway and Tramway Companies) requested 
the implementation of a digressive scale in the application of the profi t tax. This was the 
issue that originally divided the Commission for Revision. Eventually the majority of the 
Commission advised to levy an extra profi t tax instead of using digressive rates. CtHBNI, 
Tweede Verslag, 2, 12-14, 25-17, 38, 46-17; Taselaar, De Nederlandse Koloniale Lobby, 243-248.
191 Taselaar, De Nederlandse Koloniale Lobby, 220, 249-251.
192 Ibid., 253-254; Lancée, Beknopt Overzicht, 22-23.
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revenue, causing deficits. Declining market prices and the slow response of 
the government to the need for a decrease in taxes, rapidly led to increasing 
poverty and debt.193
Consequently, arrears in the unified income tax assessment ran up to 34% 
on average in the archipelago in 1933, and many small incomes managed 
to dodge payment altogether. Even in Batavia, 42% of the taxpayers “was 
not reached.”194 This added to the revenue problem, and the government 
started facing an increasingly uncontrollable fiscal crisis. Moreover, the 
introduction of the corporate tax and a new Income Tax in the Netherlands 
in 1914, affected a number of regulations of the 1920 income tax.195 Hence, 
in 1932, the unified income tax system was revised. The revision comprised 
the introduction of an ‘extra’ income tax, originally introduced as a crisis 
measure in 1932, but made permanent in 1934. It was a duplication of the 
original unified income tax, but levied at a lower tax payment threshold of 
60 guilders of income annually, in order to reach greater amounts of taxpay-
ers.196 Additionally, the revised income tax of 1934 included a tax on wages. 
This had already been suggested in the 1920s, for instance, by Meijer Ranneft 
and Huender.197 However, it met with resistance from employers who were 
expected to carry the heavy administrative burden of taxing small wages. 
Nevertheless, in 1934 it was introduced, largely from pragmatic motivations, 
forcing companies employing four persons or more to gain a licence (that 
also served as the assessment bill for the income tax), and maintain wage 
administrations. Companies paid 4% tax over these wages by buying ‘wage-
seals’ at post offices and optionally sticking these on signed wage lists (see 
figure 2.8) to withhold the tax from their employees’ salaries.198 In this way, 
wages became the taxable objects and employers the legal taxpayers. They 
paid 4% tax over the wages of their employees, which saved the government 
the burden of chasing reliable data on the incomes of wage-earners.199
193 Booth “The Burden of Taxation”, 101-104, 108; Booth, Economic Change, 110.
194 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 3524, Vb. 6-11-1934 and 7-11-1934 n1, herein: MvT n3; NA 
MinKol 1901-1953 OV 3534, Vb. 31-12-1934 n6.
195 Soebekti, Some Facets, 43.
196 Stbl. 1934 n649. See also H.J. Hofstra, “Een Vergeten Jubileum”, Weekblad Fiscaal Recht 
1963/949 and G.C.D. Grauss, “De Loonbelasting: Een Zakelijke of Persoonlijke Heffi ng?” 
Maandblad Belasting Beschouwingen 80:4 (2012), 155-167: 155-159.
197 They suggested to deduct taxes for civil servants from their salaries immediately. Meijer 
Ranneft and Huender, Onderzoek naar den Belastingdruk, 82-83. The Tax Revision Commis-
sion of Moresco agreed but did not want to go as far as to obligate employers to do so. 
CtHBNI, Vierde Verslag, 40. Reys also mentions a wage tax as a solution to the levying 
problem. Reys, De Inkomstenbelasting der Inlanders, 150-160.
198 K.H. Dronkers, De Loonbelasting (Batavia: Noordhoff-Kolff, 1936), 3. Theoretically, 
sticking the seals was not mandatory; employers were free to determine whether they 
paid the 4% tax themselves or imposed the burden on their employees. To prevent double 
taxation, incomes below 900 guilders were exempted from the income tax over the part 
of income acquired through wage, while incomes above 900 4% reduction in income tax. 
When employing more than 100 people, paying in cash was also possible.
199 M.R. Manse, R. Arendsen, and M. Klever, “De Indische Loonbelasting in Perspectief: Fiscale 
Innovatie in Koloniale Context”, Maandblad Belasting Beschouwingen 86:1 (2018), 20-30.
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Did this solve the problem of income administration? Low wages 
remained problematic and after 60 years of fiscal evolution, assessing taxes 
from incomes below 200 guilders was still based, as asserted by Minister 
of Colonies H. Colijn, on “visible signs of welfare.”200 So it seemed the 
levying problem had merely been handed down to the corporate sector. 
Nonetheless, the wage tax successfully helped to raise income tax revenues 
steeply, from 17 million guilders in 1934 to almost 25 million guilders in 
1939, three to five times as much as the land rent revenue in the same 
period (see appendix 2).201 In abstract fiscal terms, it was a success. It also 
forced employers to keep a tighter administration through registration and 
paperwork, which enhanced certainty among wage earners. Politically, it 
had far-reaching consequences, because the responsibility of assessing 
and collecting the income tax had been transferred to employers and the 
collector’s wages enjoyed by many indigenous civil servants and ‘Foreign 
Oriental’ Kapitan, were curtailed. An emergency fund was established in 
Java to compensate these indirect rulers, but enthusiasm for taking on such 
offices was reduced enormously.202 Additionally, both the revised income 
tax and the wage tax explicitly lowered the level of equity by reducing 
progressivity for the sake of efficiency; instead of progressive rates, incomes 
were once again scaled into specific categories and taxed proportionately.203 
The government had finally taken a more pragmatic stance, but largely out 
of financial need rather than in acknowledgement of the structural impedi-
ments which tax-levying problems kept posing to fiscal equity. Hence, by 
1930, the burden of taxation had been reallocated to some extent but was 
still carried largely by indigenous, mostly Javanese peasants, who paid 
income taxes, land rent and performed services.204 Little was left of the 
colonial state’s passion to develop equity and fairness, as issues of efficiency 
became prioritized over issues of fiscal inequality.
200 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 3526, Vb. 7-11-1934 n1, herein: MvT n3, MinKol; NA MinKol 
1901-1953 OV 3534, Vb. 31-12-1934 n6; NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 3547, Vb. 19-2-1935 n4, 
herein: MinKol to GG, 20-2-1935. Employers that spent less than ƒ2.50 on wages in total 
were exempted. See NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 3526, Vb. 16-11-1934 n1 and NA MinKol 
1901-1953 OV 3533, Vb. 21-12-1934 n30, herein: DirFin to GG, 31-10-1934, Besl. GG, 29-11-
1934; NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 3568, Vb. 14-6-1935.
201 Dronkers, De Loonbelasting, 2.
202 ANRI AS GB TGA 10180, herein: Besl. 23-12-1936: DirBB to GG, 7-10-1936, BGS, 9-9-1936: 
DirBB to GG, 18-7-1936, DirFin to GG, 31-7-1936, DirBB to HGB, 16-10-1936, ‘Rapporten 
gewestelijk bestuur over deze kwestie’ (for instance: Res. Surabaya to Gov. East Java to 
DirFin, 9-12-1935 and Gov. Central Java to DirFin, 8-3-1937).
203 They were divided in three different ‘income groups’ of below ƒ200 per year, ƒ200-900 
and above ƒ900. Incomes below ƒ200 were to be assessed in accordance to ‘visible clues of 
welfare. NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 3534, MinKol Vb. 31-12-1934 n6.
204 Booth, “The Burden of Taxation”, 106. See also D.S. Paauw, “The Tax Burden and 
Economic Development in Indonesia”, in B. Djuanda et al. (eds.), Ekonomi dan Keuangan 
Indonesia (Djakarta: Badan Penerbit Pembangunan, 1954), 564-588.
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Figure 2.8. Example of a wage tax assessment form of a Chinese employee from Tegal, Java, 
for the months of April, May and June (from top to bottom), 1935.
As can be seen, the seals, purchased by the employer at the local post-office (at which instance 
he basically paid the tax), represent different amounts. The green seals were worth one guilder, 
the red seals were available in amounts of 0.10 to 0.50 guilders. Hence, in this case, in April 
4% tax over a monthly wage of 32.50 guilders, totalling 1.30 guilders of tax was to be paid, in 
May 4% over 25, guilders in wage, totals 1 guilder of tax, and in June 4% over 22.50 guilders, 
equals 90 cents.
Source: Belasting & Douane Museum, BDM 33212.
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Conclusion
The evolution of the Dutch colonial tax system was supposed to propel 
a steady, systematic and controlled march from the ‘depths of feudalistic 
patrimonialism’ to the ‘heights of European fiscal bureaucracy and moder-
nity.’ The series of tax reforms between 1878 and 1935 intended to replace 
systems of coerced labour and tax farming with progressive direct income 
taxes. These supposedly included all colonial subjects, no matter their 
ethnicity or location, to tax them in a unified, equivalent and fair manner 
and support indigenous economies by redistributing the burden. Strictly 
financially speaking, the reformation of the colonial fiscal apparatus can be 
considered successful, as there was increase in the proportion of govern-
ment revenue carried by direct taxes (see appendix 3), following the expan-
sion and inclusion of taxpayers across Indonesia under colonial rule.
However, intense debates about taxation within the colonial administra-
tion reveal that officials struggled in meeting the interests of various social 
groups in different regions, in connecting theory to practice and in matching 
the ambitions of supreme officials with the capacities of local bureaucracy 
and the expectations of taxpayers. During this struggle, the financial inter-
ests of the state and of corporate capital were prioritized almost without 
exception over those of regional governments and indigenous taxpayers. 
The premeditated paternalistic-altruistic ambitions of the colonial state 
were structurally limited by the disturbing effects of corporate interests, the 
reality of socio-economic differences, administrative incapacity and indirect 
rule. Furthermore, the tax reforms were expected to fiscally unify a state 
crossed by numerous geographical, ethnic, social and economic divisions. 
Colonial statesmen set themselves the impossible task of introducing fiscal 
equity and fairness to a state that was in itself fundamentally unequal and 
unfair.
As long as the various fundamental differences in the aims of the 
government, interests of its inhabitants and realities of governance were 
not taken into account, the grand designs of the unified fiscal state would 
not reach much further than the drawing tables in offices in Batavia and 
The Hague.205 If ideology and policy offered too few tools to solve these 
differences, than how did policy makers shape a workable tax regime? 
The following chapters will demonstrate how and why officials in 
different regions, from the early seventeenth to the mid-twentieth century, 
constructed the tax system on the spot, and how under specific circum-
stances these tensions played out.
205 Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, 181-187.
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Map 3.1. The Central Moluccas.
Map 3.2. Ambon and the Lease Islands of Haruku, Saparua and Nusa Laut, just east of Ambon
(also called ‘Ulias’ or ‘Oeliassers’ in colonial sources). Ambon is comprised of two volcanic 
peninsulas, Hitu and Leitimur, the landscape of which contributed to the emergence of 
specific geographical, natural, cultural, religious, political and social distinctions on Ambon.
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3 The rise and fall of a coerced labour 
economy
Labour services and indirect rule in Ambon, 
c. 1600-1920
In 1902, 33 Ambonese raja (kings) faced such a dramatic decrease in their 
personal finances, that they collectively wrote to the Governor General 
asking him to raise their monthly stipends.1 Their incomes had consistently 
shrunk during the preceding decades as a consequence of the gradual 
collapse of the spice-market, on which their wealth had depended since 
the establishment of VOC-controlled and monopolized spice production 
in the mid-sixteenth century. Some of these rulers reportedly even lacked 
the means to buy the appropriate regal outfits they were entitled to and 
expected to wear ceremonially, and had to borrow suits for formal occasions 
from richer colleagues or European officials.2 Their prestige as rich and 
powerful local spice-lords crumbled so badly that they started experiencing 
difficulties in enforcing their ancient, bestowed rights and entitlements to 
income, land and labour.
Ambon, located in the Central Moluccas (see map 3.1 and 3.2), was once 
among the most important islands of early-modern Dutch colonialism. Its 
suitability for the cultivation of cloves, indigenous to the Moluccas, was 
the principal attraction of Europeans to the Indonesian archipelago and a 
source of extravagant profits.3 So how and why did its indigenous rulers, 
pivotal to Dutch monopolized clove production, end up in such a deplor-
able state in the twentieth century? And how did the colonial administra-
tion and Ambonese society respond?
This chapter scrutinizes the changing role of Ambon’s indigenous rulers 
during the three centuries of Dutch presence on the island. It explores 
the various socio-political consequences of the transformation of colonial 
agricultural monopolism and coerced labour to liberalism, free labour and 
monetary taxation, by centralizing the changing role of appointed ‘kings.’ 
It is, in essence, a study of the shifting patterns of indirect rule under the 
influence of changes in taxation. Ambon provides a unique case study 
because, as the first region of Indonesia to ever come under Dutch rule, it 
is where Dutch principles of coerced agricultural labour and indirect rule 
were practically invented. Moreover, for more than 200 years, monopolized 
coerced clove production would intertwine with Ambon’s socio-political 
structures and adat. It would provide for the political establishment of the 
colonial state and define the fiscal foundations of Ambon under colonial 
rule. Therefore, the final abolition of the clove monopoly in the 1860s posed 
1 ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, herein: MGS, 22-6-1903: 33 Raja of Ambon to GG, 16-8-1902, 
‘rekestanden.’
2 ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, herein: MGS, 22-6-1903: Res. Ambon to GG, 7-7-1902.
3 Cloves are the dried fl ower buds of clove-trees (Eugenia aromatic).
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pressing questions about the reinvention and reorganization of local society 
along more modern principles of governance. In the new situation, there 
was no longer a place for adat lords sharing in the fruits of coerced labour. 
The colony was to be governed by proficient, indigenous officials who 
were self-funded by taxes disjointed from personal interests. However, the 
monopoly shaped a strong path-dependency which primed the successive 
monetary taxes until the 1920s. Additionally, the decay of the spice market 
in the nineteenth century caused economic hardship that not only impov-
erished the raja but also structurally impeded the collection of sufficient 
tax revenue. Consequently, the Dutch were unwilling to invest in new 
ruling mechanisms or new roles for the pauperized chiefs. This chapter will 
investigate how the plea of the 33 raja was not only symptomatic of the 
depressing tale of Ambon’s declining economic relevance in the nineteenth 
century, but also of the increasing deliberate, selective blindness of officials 
towards specific fiscal-political problems.
This chapter is divided in two sections. The first explores the political-
fiscal foundations of the VOC’s spice-monopoly, to demonstrate how Dutch 
monopolism impacted and transformed local economy and society into a 
consolidated, conjoined Ambonese-Dutch system geared towards large 
scale clove production, especially though elevation of Ambon’s indigenous 
rulers. The second section explores how, and why, specific elements of the 
monopoly system kept resonating in the income taxes introduced after its 
dismantling, while other aspects of the tax reforms slowly started to under-
mine the position of the local chiefs.
3.1 The foundations of the spice monopoly
When the Dutch arrived in the Central Moluccas, they entered a world rife 
with political interaction and war, infused with political, social and religious 
dimensions. The majority of the Central Moluccan islands were nominally 
autonomous, but came increasingly under the domination of external 
powers. From the sixteenth century onward, clove production on Ambon 
was largely controlled by the autonomous Ambonese nagari (village/
village state) of Hitu, the Portuguese, and the Northern Moluccan Sultanate 
of Ternate (see map 2.1). From the early seventeenth century onward, the 
power of the Portuguese and Ternate crumbled under aggressive interven-
tion by the Spanish, the Dutch and subsequently, the Sultanate of Makassar 
on South Sulawesi. Slowly, European trading companies started outcom-
peting Chinese, Malay, and (East-)Javanese merchants.4
4 G. Xu, “Junks to Mare Clausum: China-Maluku Connections in the Spice Wars, 1607–
1622”, Itinerario 44:1 (2020), 196-225: 197-198; T. Mostert, “Scramble for the Spices: Makas-
sar’s Role in European and Asian Competition in the Eastern Archipelago up to 1616” in A. 
Clulow and T. Mostert (eds.), The Dutch and English East India Companies. Diplomacy, Trade 
and Violence in Early Modern Asia (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2018), 25-54.
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Ambon as encountered by the VOC around 1600, was characterized 
by centuries of collaboration with and resistance towards various foreign 
powers. While Ternate had governed large parts of the Moluccas, levying 
services and tributes, and the rivalling Sultanate of Tidore had exercised 
political influence over East and Northern Seram, many nagari on Ambon 
and Seram (see map 3.3 and 7.1) retained a high level of semi-independence. 
They retained their respective systems of village-adat to determine matters 
of land allocation and labour, social relations and taxation, without much 
supervision from higher governing authorities.5 This would change drasti-
cally over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as, in in 
search of full control over the spice trade, the VOC started absorbing local 
principles and institutions of social organization under a unified system of 
coerced production, labour and rule. It replaced older forms of adat-oriented 
village-encompassing collaboration, with its own interpretations of these, to 
fit its capitalist-oriented schemes.
The establishment of the spice monopoly
Dutch occupation of Ambon in the seventeenth century foreshadowed 
Dutch monopolistic-capitalist colonization of the entire Indonesian 
archipelago in subsequent centuries. Essentially, the Dutch acquired 
their monopoly by violently forcing their various competitors out of the 
market, signing contracts with local rulers requiring delivery of spices for 
fixed prices, and ultimately by resorting to military violence when other 
traders succeeded in circumventing its surveillance.6 Finally, after expel-
ling the Portuguese in 1605, the Dutch consolidated their supremacy over 
the Central Moluccan seas and the spice market during the first half of the 
seventeenth century by exploiting shifting power alliances and internal 
conflicts (between Ternate and Tidore, the states in South Sulawesi and the 
Spanish, but also among the many nagari on Seram, Ambon and Banda). 
5 D. Alwi, Sejarah Maluku: Banda Naira, Ternate, Tidore dan Ambon (Jakarta: Dian Rakyat, 
2005), 402-414, 424-435.
6 The VOC initially lacked the adequate means to enforce its contracts or counter local 
resistance and competition of other merchants based in port-cities around the archi-
pelago, who offered commodities much cheaper than the Dutch could, and in return 
sold spices for lower prices than the VOC was willing to pay. Particularly brutal was the 
conquest of the nutmeg-monopoly on Banda in 1609-1621 and subsequent deportation 
and mass murdering of the indigenous population. See G.J. Knaap, Kruidnagelen en Chris-
tenen: De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie en de Bevolking van Ambon 1656-1696 (Leiden: 
KITLV Uitgeverij, 2004), 23-25; L.Y. Andaya, The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the 
Early Modern Period (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), 41-44, 151-156, 174-175; 
M.S. Widjojo, The Revolt of Prince Nuku: Cross-Cultural Alliance-Making in Maluku, c.1780-
1810 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2009), 12-15.
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This was accomplished by a violent and forceful relocation of people and 
their villages, and by annihilating clove production everywhere except on 
Ambon and the Lease islands (the smaller islands east of Ambon, see map 
3.2).7 Harbours were closed to all ships except the VOC’s to ensure exclusive 
access to and full control over clove and nutmeg production and trade. This 
was enforced by the organization of annual hongi expeditions (hongitochten), 
traditional fleets of hundreds of indigenous rowing boats (kora-kora), which 
had been organized by Ternate to emphasize its prestige and power, and 
were appropriated by the VOC to intimidate local populations, enforce 
obedience and maintain the monopoly and clove-prices by burning down 
houses and removing ‘illegally’ planted trees.8 The practice of taking down 
(and replanting) trees enabled the VOC to control availability and demand 
in order to influence prices on the European market.9 From 1652 onward, 
production of cloves was made mandatory on Ambon, and all cloves had to 
be rendered to the VOC for a fixed price.10 The VOC forbade the Ternatan 
Sultan to produce spices on his homeland for which it paid him an annual 
remuneration, starting a long but strained diplomatic relationship between 
the Dutch colonial government and Ternate.11 Once their monopoly was 
established, the Dutch, building on the structures bequeathed by the nagari, 
Ternate and the Portuguese, begun reorganizing Ambon’s society in order 
to fully gear the labour economy towards forced clove production.
Below and above the nagari: Ambon’s socio-political organization
The first island ever fully dominated by Dutch colonialism, Ambon offers a 
unique insight into how the Dutch mapped and used local social organiza-
tions to coordinate coerced cultivation and monopolized trade. Upon their 
arrival in the early seventeenth century, the Dutch encountered a dynamic 
and fragmented indigenous society. The nagari, scattered across the Ambon 
and the Lease islands, offered little footing for establishing a unified state 
structure. Relations within and between these nagari, which were either 
Islamic or Christian, were relatively weak and characterized by alliances 
7 See Andaya, The World of Maluku, 55, 83-110; Knaap, Kruidnagelen, 25-34, 37-39; A.B. 
Lapian, The Deversified Unity of Maluku-Kie-Raha: Its Historical Development (S.I.: s.n., 
1984), 184; Widjojo, The Revolt of Prince Nuku, 19-21.
8 Knaap, Kruidnagelen, 39.
9 Ibid., 299-326. In 1656, the Ambonese were made to plant 120,000 trees, and two years 
later another 60,000, but in 1667 further planting was forbidden and in 1692 and 1697 
trees were cut down. Furnivall, Netherlands India, 39.
10 Selling cloves to third parties was harshly punished. Ch. F. Van Fraassen, Ambon: Van 
Wingewest tot Werfdepot (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 2018), 59.
11 See Widjojo, The Revolt of Prince Nuku, 23-25, 39-45, 47-48, 55-60, 69-74, 77-83; Andaya, The 
World of Maluku, 210-213, 244-246; H.E. Niemeijer, “De Geveinsde Vrede: Eer, Protocol 
en Diplomatie in de Machtsverhouding tussen de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie 
en Ternate omstreeks 1750” in G.J. Knaap and G. Teitler (eds.), De Verenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie: Tussen Oorlog en Diplomatie (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2002), 309-336.
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of social support rather than political organization.12 Ambon had been a 
society of “racial mixture, multi-ethnicity, geographic dispersion, relative 
isolation of various communities, insufficient means of communication and 
transportation, fragmented social and political organization, inter-village 
conflicts, land shortage, population pressure and several strains of religious 
creeds.”13 This prevented the rise of strong, centrally organized, tax-levying 
state-like entities (contrary to the Northern Moluccas, where Sultans reigned 
over more centrally consolidated realms), required for the organization of 
large-scale, structural extraction. Hence, the nagari and their functions were 
transformed drastically under the new reality of Dutch dominance. Let us 
have a look at how the Dutch attempted to reorganize the nagari internally, 
in order to operate coerced spice production.
Nagari were territorially unbound village communities governed by a 
village council, a saniri. Each nagari was inhabited by a number of genea-
logically kinship-related clans called soa, originally a Ternaten concept.14 On 
Ambon, soa became no longer (necessarily) tied by kinship, and developed 
into interrelated migrant groups of people usually of Ternaten or Seramese 
origins, unified under and represented in the saniri by one chief, the kepala 
soa.15 Soa have been described as “quite accidental conjunctions” of a 
number of family groups of different origins, with links to similar social 
groups around the Moluccas, as far away as Timor.16 These family groups, 
the mata rumah (or rumah tau), were exogamous patrilineal clans that could 
12 Van Fraassen, Ambon, 54. Monotheistic religion in the Central Moluccas, as put by 
F. Cooley, was “like a kind of graft on the tree of culture”, coexisting with numerous 
elements of other socio-religious practices related to adat and spiritual life. The various 
ways in which institutionalized religion and more ancient social believes guided 
governance, faith, ethical norms, and ritual and ceremony shaped tensions cannot be 
explained only in terms of Christian-Islamic rivalry, even though the Dutch obviously 
had a preference for the Christian nagari. It also deserves notice that Ambonese society 
as known from early modern and modern historical sources emerged under continuance 
foreign infl uence. Ternaten, Arabic and European presence left important marks, creating 
new realities in the nagari of law and social organization. Ambon’s social geography 
should be seen as the result of these encounters. See F.L. Cooley, “Altar and Throne in 
Central Moluccan Societies”, Indonesia 2:2 (1966), 135-156: 137, 145-146, 146-154, and D. 
Bartels, Guarding the Invisible Mountain: Intervillage Alliances, Religious Syncretism and 
Ethnic Identity among Ambonese Christians and Moslems in the Moluccas (PhD thesis, Cornell 
University, 1977), 26-27.
13 Bartels, Guarding the Invisible Mountain, 28-31.
14 On Ternate, soa were quarters or neighbourhoods that originated in kinship-based units, 
to which specifi c familial clans could be traced back. As Van Fraassen demonstrates, 
tracing back these clans became increasingly complex over the course of the centuries. 
Ch. F. van Fraassen, Ternate, de Molukken en de Indonesische Archipel. Van Soa-Organisatie en 
Vierdeling: Een Studie van Traditionele Samenleving en Cultuur in Indonesië (Leiden Univer-
sity, 1987), I, 40-141, 173-264.
15 F.L. Cooley, Ambonese Adat: A General Description (New Haven: Yale University, Southeast 
Asia studies, 1962), 7; F.L. Cooley, “Village Government in the Central Moluccas”, Indo-
nesia 1:7 (1969), 139-164: 140, n143.
16 F.A.E. van Wouden, Types of Social Structure in Eastern Indonesia (The Hague: Nijhoff, 
1968), 149-152.
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be traced back to a mythical ancestor whose direct descendants held the 
hereditary privilege of ruling the soa together.17 Soa had a dualistic social 
and religious function; it’s spiritual and social wellbeing was guaranteed by 
its proper constellation and the behaviour of its members according to local 
adat. Larger bonds of soa constituted so-called uli that were formed in groups 
of five or nine villages or aman (members) that had a shared ancestor. Prior 
to Dutch colonization, these uli constituted the organizational foundations 
of inter-nagari relationships, coordinating the administration of peace, order, 
justice, labour services and tributes across the Central Moluccan Islands.18 
Uli were village-federations rather than state-like entities and were never 
strong enough to, for instance, levy taxes.19 Among specific uli federations 
continuous rivalry and warfare existed which Ternate and Tidore eagerly 
politically exploited.20
To the Dutch, these sub- and supra-village organizations seemed rather 
incomprehensible. The uli federations were even deemed subversive to 
colonial political order and actively undermined by the Dutch.21 Subse-
quently, another form of socio-economic village partnership known as 
pela, grew in popularity on Ambon.22 Pela alliances, as D. Bartels explains, 
crossed religious boundaries, based on the idea that “all members in the pela 
relationships are considered to be of one blood”, by ‘exchanging’ (mixing or 
drinking each other’s) blood to create a bond of brotherhood, “transferring 
17 There were about 15-25 mata rumah per village. Mata rumah is the Malay term for this 
group, the indigenous term is rumah tau. The Dutch derived term ‘fam’ (familie) is also 
used. Whenever this ‘mythical ancestor’ arrived, he was assigned a name commemo-
rating some special event which was associated with his arrival and transferred to a 
special, sacred stone called teun (or teong). See Bartels, Guarding the Invisible Mountain, 22; 
Cooley, Ambonese Adat, 36, 105; Cooley, “Altar and Throne”, 139. Van Hoëvell suggested 
that specifi c mata rumah delivered the raja, kepala soa, and other village offi cials, hence 
shaping a class division. G.W.W.C. baron van Hoëvell, Ambon en meer Bepaaldelijk de 
Oeliasers, Geographisch, Ethnographisch, Politisch en Historisch Geschetst (met eene Kaart der 
Oeliasers) (Dordrecht: Blussé en Van Braam, 1875), 46-47, 6.
18 As explained by Bartels, uli consisted of three, fi ve, seven and nine constituting parts, the 
fi ve (lima) and nine (siwa) being the most common. Nagari consisted of social units of two 
complementary moieties that exchanged partners for marriage. These two parts, plus the 
unity of these two parts together were imagined as a trinity that constituted the village 
unit. Two counterparts (thus four elements, or aman) and the ‘head’ of the unity formed 
an uli lima. Uli siwa had another two pairs of aman. Uli lima and uli siwa ere each other 
oppositions which started imbuing other divisions. On Ambon, for instance, most of the 
uli lima settled on Hitu and embraced Islam, while the uli siwa kept to older traditions 
and settled on Leitimor. See: D. Bartels, In de Schaduw van de Berg Nunusaku: Een Cultuur-
Historische Verhandeling over de Bevolking van de Midden-Molukken (Utrecht: Landelijk 
Steunpunt Edukatie Molukkers, 1994), 163-168. Similar geometric designs of fi ve- and 
nine-unit elements appeared across Indonesia as a form of polity related to geographical 
and cosmological infl uences. See Tambiah, Culture, Thought, and Social Action, 253-256.
19 Knaap, Kruidnagelen, 13-15; Van Fraassen, Ternate, I, 44-45 and II, 495-505.
20 Knaap, Kruidnagelen, 13.
21 Ibid., 343; Cooley, “Altar and Throne”, 139.
22 Bartels, In de Schaduw van de Berg Nunusaku, 431-432; Bartels, Guarding the Invisible Moun-
tain, 28-33. See also R. Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatists: The Ambonese Islands 
from Colonialism to Revolt, 1880-1950 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1990), 7.
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the idiom of consanguinity to strangers.”23 Within pela networks, involved 
nagari were expected to protect and support each other by coordinating 
war and peace and assisting each other in times of crisis or in undertaking 
larger community projects, such as the construction of mosques and village 
houses (baileo).24 Nagari had to shelter visitors from allied pela villages to 
whom food could not be denied. Pela networks existed prior to the arrival 
of Europeans but developed its functions of defence and aid networks only 
under colonialism.25 As such the nagari on Ambon, even though taking care 
of their own subsistence household economies, were always organized in 
larger economic and political bonds of mutualism. Such bonds served as 
viable alternatives to European political entities and institutions such as 
states and centralized taxation, to provide security against shared risks and 
local challenges and circumstances.26
Whereas soa determined one’s rights, obligations and place in society 
based on ancestral descendance, landholding and usufruct rights were 
organized through yet another form of social organization, revolving 
around landholding lineage-groups of patrilineal descent, called dati. How 
and why dati formed is not entirely clear.27 Under colonialism, dati groups 
were transformed into politically and territorially defined labour units 
for clove production, labour services and taxation. Originally, members of 
dati held usufruct rights to cooperatively exploit specific dusun, sago palm 
gardens (sago or sagu is a starch extracted from the centre of sago palm 
stems which was, and still is an important staple food in the Moluccas and 
Papua). Many colonial officials considered sago a crop easy to cultivate. A 
hungry Ambonese, they believed, would simply go to his dusun to find a 
ripe sagu tree with readily available food.28 Such food abundancy, it was 
claimed, prevented the rise of large-scale rice cultivation and the accordant 
labour ethos and state institutions, which to the colonial mind explained the 
23 Therefore, intermarriage within networks pela was not allowed. Bartels, Guarding the 
Invisible Mountain, 29, 34-37, quote p. 37.
24 Pela networks were sometimes used on the offensive; when one village would attempt an 
attack on another village it would try to fi nd allies and establish a pela. See ibid., 38-41.
25 According to Bartels, pela networks unifi ed Ambon “through the adversities and trials 
of history […] and continues to be the generating force of Muslim-Christian solidarity.” 
Ibid., 325. See also pp. 131-134, 140-145, 162-163, 324.
26 See M. van der Linden, “Mutualism”, in Van Rossum, Hofmeester, and Van der Linden 
(eds.), Handbook Global History of Work, 363-376: 498-501.
27 In the colonial readings of Van Hoëvell and adat specialist F.D. Holleman, dati were a 
typical example of Indonesian of ‘pseudo-feudalism’, in which clan chiefs or kings 
occupied lands and leased these to lesser chiefs and their families, who in return became 
tributary to the supreme chiefs or kings. See Van Hoëvell, Ambon, 177; F.D. Holleman, 
Het Adat-Grondenrecht van Ambon en de Oeliasers (Delft: Meinema, 1923), 185, 177. Knaap 
seeks the emergence of dati in specifi c methods of warfare that necessitated mobilization 
of manpower through higher levels of social organization. Knaap, Kruidnagelen, 178.
28 See for instance Van Hoëvell, Ambon, 52-55. On dati rights, see KITLV/Commissie voor 
het Adatrecht, Adatrechtbundels: Bezorgd door de Commissie voor het Adatrecht; uitg. door het 
Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië (‘s-Gravenhage: 
Nijhoff, 1910-1955), Vol. 21, 29; Cooley, “Altar and Throne”, 1.
Promise Pretence and Pragmatism.indb   131 22-04-21   17:34
132 Chapter 3
careless Ambonese attitude to life and the limited potential of local people 
to engage in more complex forms of political and commercial economic 
organizations, beyond subsistence.29 Of course, sagu cultivation was more 
complex, but as this depiction supported the idea that the Ambonese 
were ‘unready’ for self-reliant forms of commerce30, labour and monetary 
taxation, it was firmly adhered to, legitimizing coerced labour on clove 
plantations as the only possible method to discipline Ambonese people into 
productive, organized subjects.31
Land held by the dati (tanah dati) could not be sold or removed from 
the dati-holding, and in fact, the fruits of tanah dati were equally distributed 
under the supervision of the kepala dati or dati chief.32 Simply grabbing what 
one desired from the dusun would have been a violation of adat. Taking part 
in dati incurred the obligation to develop and protect it. Like soa, dati usually 
comprised various groups that dated back to kinship-related constellations, 
but dati and soa existed next to and independently from each other, so 
members of dati were not (necessarily) of the same soa, and sometimes even 
lived in different nagari.33 Taking part in dati by paying taxes and performing 
services was a fundamental and necessary determinant for social participa-
tion that directed one’s rights to sharing in the fruits of land an labour.34 
For this reason, dati structures provided ideal starting points to concentrate 
sizable groups of Ambonese into territorially defined and taxable units in 
the spice cultivation system and engrain institutionalized use of coerced 
labour in traditional Ambonese society. The VOC enforced plantation of 
clove trees on dati lands, and thereby utilized existing structures of duties, 
based on rights over land, to define liability of coerced clove plantation 
services. Allocation of dusun was increasingly used as reward or compensa-
tion for performance of services and payment of taxes.35 For instance, under 
the VOC dati were expected to deliver one man to take part in the hongi 
expedition, who in return would be awarded with land. The VOC drafted 
29 There was some small-scale, unorganized dry rice cultivation on Ambon. See for a 
description: Van Hoëvell, Ambon, 54, 60-62. Absence of large scale rice-cultivation has 
been explained as characteristic of to the absence of state formation, in especially high-
land areas of Southeast Asia, see for instance Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 5-6, 
41-42, 75-76, 84-85.
30 As for instance claimed by Van Hoëvell, Ambon, 75.
31 Knaap, Kruidnagelen, 159; F. and K von Benda-Beckmann, Where Structures Merge: State 
and ‘Off-State’ Involvement in Rural Social Security on Ambon (S.l.: s.n., 1989), 4.
32 In case of neglection of land or in the event a whole dati went extinct, the use rights 
of tanah dati would return to the village administration to be redistributed over the 
remaining dati, see Adatrechtbundel 21, 28-30, 33; Cooley, “Altar and Throne”, 57-58; 
Knaap, Kruidnagelen, 207-208; Van Hoëvell, Ambon, 178-183, 192-193, 194-197, 189-190, 
202-205, 216-218.
33 Van Wouden, Types of Social Structure, 76, 148.
34 Van Vollenhoven, Het Adatrecht, 400.
35 For this reason, Valentijn interpreted the dati landholding system as a system of taxation 
and corvée. Knaap follows Valentijn in this conception. See Knaap, Kruidnagelen, 178-185; 
Van Fraassen, Ambon, 276.
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‘dati registers’ that divided the people into ‘troops’ to create an overview of 
forced cultivation services called ‘kerja trop’ that people had to perform, and 
the number of clove trees they had to maintain.36 In 1814 and 1823, these 
dati-registers were consolidated by law to ensure no new dati were estab-
lished.37 Furthermore, the VOC prohibited villagers from leaving or living 
outside their nagari.38 Under this kind of ‘ground slavery’ people were 
allowed to leave the nagari only for performance of labour in service of the 
VOC. The kepala dati were made fully responsible for supplying all cloves 
produced in the dusun to the village chiefs, the kepala nagari, and the VOC.39
This way, for the first and not the last time, the Dutch broke down 
local societal structures, and selected, codified and enlarged the elements 
it considered useful, while ignoring others, to create a consolidated peas-
antry system on Ambon required to maximize extraction at minimal costs. 
The dati became the crucial working groups for fulfilling labour demands, 
the dati lands were the taxable objects, the kepala dati the responsible clove 
suppliers or taxable persons, the nagari the manageable territorial units, 
and the kepala nagari the crucial class of territorially bound, profit sharing 
puppet kings.40 Their changing role symbolized the Dutch invention of indi-
rect rule in Indonesia. How this came about, and what sorts of entitlements, 
profit shares and taxes they were made entitled to, deserves closer attention, 
as these would provide the foundation of the post-monopoly tax system in 
the later nineteenth century.
Village governance, taxes, services and entitlements
Generally, the core duty of Ambonese chiefs was observance and continua-
tion of local adat, as established by the ancestors to preserve and secure the 
prosperity of the village community. In the case that adat was violated, it was 
believed that the ancestors’ spirits would be offended and act accordingly, 
36 Van Fraassen, Ambon, 277.
37 Adatrechtbundel 21, Ambon, n17, 28.
38 Some people constructed sheds outside the nagari in the dusun to escape the VOC’s 
surveillance. P. Bleeker, Reis door de Minahassa en den Molukschen Archipel: Gedaan in de 
Maanden September en Oktober 1855 in het Gevolg van den Gouverneur Generaal Mr. A.J. 
Duymaer van Twist (2 vols., Batavia: Lange & Co, 1856), I: 146-147, 158-159; Knaap, 
Kruidnagelen, 218-219. On Buru, people also alternated between sheds and village houses 
which troubled the Dutch colonial administration to subjugate the population to its colo-
nization schemes. As Buru was of little economic interest, it was never subjected to the 
same relocation policies as Ambon and Seram. See: B. Dix Grimes, “Mapping Buru: The 
Politics of Territory and Settlement on an Eastern Indonesian Island”, in T. Reuter (ed.), 
Sharing the Earth, Dividing the Land: Land and Territory in the Austronesian World (Canberra: 
ANU Press, 2006), 135-156: 139-140.
39 In case of unsolvable conflict, the saniri would determine this. Cooley, “Altar and 
Throne”, 59.
40 Knaap, Kruidnagelen, 212; Cooley, “Altar and Throne”, 86.
Promise Pretence and Pragmatism.indb   133 22-04-21   17:34
134 Chapter 3
venting anger upon the community.41 Saniri were headed by kepala nagari42 
with an inheritable title of ‘orangkaya’ or the higher ‘raja’, and occasionally 
the lower ‘patih.’43 They were ultimately responsible for proper adherence 
to adat (including matters of labour and taxation) and presided over the 
village courts. Their role changed drastically under colonialism. The Dutch 
appointed them as political territorial chiefs of the nagari, responsible for 
supervising clove production and maintaining public order, and treated 
them as ‘Regents.’ Every month the kepala nagari would appoint one of the 
kepala soa to assist in the general supervision of the nagari as ‘kepala soa bulan’ 
(officer of the month).44 Together, the various kepala became the principle 
instruments of the company, in exerting influence over society and main-
taining coerced clove production.45 Kepala nagari were originally selected 
by the population from the kepala soa during special ceremonies over which 
the VOC gained increasing influence.46 By the nineteenth century, these 
ceremonies took place under supervision of controleurs. G.W.W.C. baron 
van Höevell (controleur on Ambon in 1870-1875 and Resident of Ambon in 
1891-1896) described the election ceremonies as “irksome scenes” in which 
many persons aspired and competed for the village-chief title, although 
they had little chance of obtaining it. Specific families, with allegedly direct 
links to the original founders of the village, inherited the right to provide 
candidates for the election to positions of leadership.47 Though occasionally, 
succession of village chieftainship was a cause of conflict among throne-
pretenders – especially in those villages where the VOC had removed chiefs 
or relocated clans, in general, changes in rule were not seen as disruptions 
of village life but led to further reinterpretations of adat.48
The key to successful indirect rule was to provide local leaders with 
41 Cooley, “Village Government”, 158; Cooley, “Altar and Throne”, 142.
42 In colonial terminology usually referred to as regents or raja, which, in strict sense, they 
were not.
43 According to Cooley, within the village there was no significant difference in status 
among these titles until colonialism. Cooley, “Village Government”, 144. As many other 
parts of Indonesia, the Central Moluccas experienced influence from the thirteenth 
century onward of the Hindu-Javanic empires (especially Majapahit) in the organization 
of the aristocracy, hence the Javanese-Malay character of these titles. Under colonialism, 
ranks and titles were signified by the adequate regalia annex heirlooms as concrete 
symbols of authority of which the most important were sticks with either silver (for 
orangkaya) or golden (for raja) tips engraved with the Dutch national coat of arms.
44 Van Hoëvell, Ambon, 23. In fact, there were two kinds of kepala soa: one, the kepala soa ate, 
was the one installed by the district government and wielded executive power, the other, 
kepala soa tanah, had particular functions addressing matters of land or adat, but were not 
installed or recognized by the district government. See Cooley, “Altar and Throne”, 148, 
152.
45 Van Fraassen, Ambon, 73.
46 Ibid., 76.
47 Van Hoëvell, Ambon, 19-23, quote p. 21. Kepala had to come from the appropriate clan 
as the supernatural powers (sakti) they supposedly disposed over was believed to be 
inheritable in male line.
48 Knaap, Kruidnagelen, 61; Bartels, In de Schaduw van de Berg Nunusaku, 137-138.
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entitlements to profits from the monopoly. On Ambon, this happened in 
three ways. Firstly, kepala nagari received ‘geschenk gaji’ (salary gifts), annual 
gifts in commodities (usually linen, at a value of 20 guilders) from the 
government, presented during the festivities held at the end of hongi tours.49 
Secondly, they received uang hasil (‘yield money’) a sum of fifteen guilders 
per barah cloves (of 550 Amsterdam pound, ca. 270 kg), paid annually by the 
VOC-government. 60% of uang hasil was allocated to the kepala nagari, 30% 
to the (various) kepala soa and 10% to their assistants, the marinyo.50 Thirdly, 
chiefs were entitled to levy a tax on the population, at a rate of 4% of the 
value of their harvested cloves, called uang pitis.51
Apart from these entitlements, the VOC awarded kepala nagari various 
special privileges, such as free board and lodging or the right to bear payung 
(umbrella’s) and other signs of dignity.52 Most importantly, they became 
entitled to levy labour services, which was not customary on Ambon, but 
enabled by the imposition of dati registers. Kepala nagari were entitled to 
the use of unpaid so-called ‘kwarto services’ of one to five of their subjects 
per month, levied from every dati unit.53 Additionally, kepala nagari had the 
right to shares in yields and personal services of five fishermen and hunters 
for food supplies, and to some personal services for construction and 
maintenance of their property.54 Essentially, these were the earliest forms 
of registered and legalized unpaid corvée labour in service of local chiefs in 
the Dutch colonial empire.
49 According to Cooley, these comprised of several boxes of red powder for traditional 
cakalele dance, mirrors and beds, 77 yards of white cloth, 60 yards of unbleached cotton 
stuff, seven bolts of 30 yards each of denim, and twelve yard bolts of red cloth, used in 
ceremonial costumes. See: Cooley, “Village Government”, 145.
50 Uang hasil was also known as uang barah or barot. Stbl. 1824 n19a; Van Hoëvell, Ambon, 
24-25. See also Knaap, Kruidnagelen, 327-328. Marinyo were originally the spokespersons 
of the kapitan, the commanders of war, and transformed into the elected assistant of soa 
chiefs and served as adjutant or ‘general errand-boy’ of the kepala soa during the month 
when this particular kepala soa would be kepala soa bulan.
51 The indigenous members of the landraad (called orangkaya kamera) also shared in these 
incomes to some extent, and received ‘mantelgeld’ (cloth money), to buy appropriate attire 
for council meetings. Knaap, Kruidnagelen, 51.
52 Cooley, “Village Government”, 140, 149-151; Van Fraassen, Ambon, 208-209. This happened 
across the Central Moluccas. On Buru, for instance, in 1681 the titles of sengaji and patih 
were abolished by the VOC and replaced with orangkaya to delineate overlap in religious 
and political functions and create a unifi ed system of controllable village offi ces. Knaap, 
Kruidnagelen, 47.
53 Van Hoëvell, Ambon, 27. Kwarto derives from quartier or kwartier, the Dutch word for 
billet or quarters. Knaap distinguishes ‘court services’ for the VOC, referring to annual 
hongi rowing and other monthly services, and nagari services for the village, such as 
construction and maintenance of balai, churches and mosques. Every dati had to deliver 
one person. Knaap assesses that about 12% of the villagers was liable to perform services. 
Knaap, Kruidnagelen, 181.
54 If a kepala nagari’s house was built using such services, it would become common 
property of the nagari right after he passed away. Van Hoëvell, Ambon, 26-27. The njora, 
the regents’ wives, also had rights to domestic services from a number of girls from the 
nagari. See Adatrechtbundel 21, 50-51; Van Fraassen, Ambon, 349.
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The VOC also started levying (paid) services for maintenance of its 
fortresses, warehouses and roads, delivery of wood for construction 
works and shipbuilding and assistance in docking ships and transporting 
mail.55 The burden these so-called ‘nagari services’ imposed upon villages 
depended on their location. The closer villages were located to fortresses or 
roads, the more likely its inhabitants would have to perform services.56 G. 
Knaap calculates that on Ambon about 6.6% of the labour potential of dati 
was consumed by corvée in the service of the VOC57, but this excludes the 
performance of kerja trop, kwarto services and hongi expeditions. The latter 
should also be seen as mandatory labour, as alternative corvée services were 
levied when hongi expeditions were cancelled.58
Much more successfully than former powers, the VOC built a compre-
hensive system of governance and domination on Ambon. It subjected the 
Ambonese to forms of control, taxation, military conscription, mandatory 
cultivation and corvée labour to an extent that had not been experienced 
by them before, and centuries before other parts of Indonesia underwent 
such transformations. Their chiefs were remodelled from democratically 
elected representatives into entitled ‘feudal’ lords. The Dutch had distilled 
an authoritarian, hierarchical state structure out of what used to be a rather 
egalitarian and representative form of political organization. Because 
peace, order, village life and land and labour redistribution came to be 
managed by the VOC, various functions of the local ruling elite and the 
adat institutions they represented became socio-politically obsolete and 
increasingly ceremonial in their function. The transformative power the 
VOC’s exploitative regime had caused indigenous principles of landowner-
ship, governance and labour and profit redistribution to intertwine with the 
fundaments of the local colonial state. Because adat was never codified, it 
easily absorbed and reinterpreted the new Dutch influences into its existing 
forms.59 As a result, the complex of local knowledge, political organization, 
social relations and economic production was reoriented, from serving the 
social-spiritual security of communities, towards the end of spice produc-
tion in service of the export economy. By appropriating adat institutions 
through local elites the Dutch interwove what they saw as unproductive, 
disorganized and entangled village communities into its capitalist state-
machinery, thereby rewiring the social fabric of Ambonese society. Hence, 
55 Knaap, Kruidnagelen, 250. For a full overview of services, see Van Fraassen, Ambon, 347-348.
56 Knaap, Kruidnagelen, 181-183; Bleeker, Reis door de Minahassa, I: 93-94.
57 Knaap, Kruidnagelen, 184.
58 Ibid., 192-195. Every village had to man one kora-kora. As most villages had too small of 
a population to do so, the uli fulfi lled this role causing competition among village chiefs 
who gained in prestige by commanding the boat. Hongi took about a month, and overall 
were experienced as intensive and burdensome. The phenomenon slowly disappeared 
during the seventeenth century, but the last hongi occurred only in 1821. Van Fraassen, 
Ambon, 74-75.
59 Cooley, “Altar and Throne”, 57; Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann, “Prop-
erty, Politics, and Confl ict”, 589.
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the deconstruction of the spice-monopoly from the second half of the nine-
teenth century onward, required the full reinvention of village society and 
the rethinking of the role of people and chiefs.
3.2 Reinventing rule
The monopoly was not abolished overnight, and outlived the VOC that 
founded it for almost 70 years. This section discusses how the strong 
fusion of Dutch colonial exploitation and Ambonese socio-political reality 
constantly impeded liberal attempts to reform.
Decline and reform
The VOC’s decline at the end of the eighteenth century led to the collapse 
of the Dutch spice monopoly. Ambon fell into British hands in 1796, and 
clove seeds slipped past Dutch surveillance and arrived, via French Eastern 
Africa, Mauritius and British Zanzibar, in Brazil and Cayenne. After the 
monopoly was breached, in practical terms it only served Ambon’s socio-
economic organization; economically it made little sense anymore. The 
British occupation of Ambon, between 1796-1803 and 1810-1817, evoked 
scepticism among the Ambonese population towards Dutch supremacy. 
The return of the Dutch in 1817 was met with great distrust and organized 
resistance was initiated on Saparua by an Ambonese soldier, Pattimura 
(1783-1817), who refused to accept Dutch supremacy. He was defeated 
within half a year and executed.60 In the 1820s, Governor-General Van der 
Capellen paid a visit to Ambon and Banda to see with his own eyes how 
market fluctuations impacted the spice trade.61 He proposed abolishing the 
monopoly, but the poor state of government finances at the time led to King 
Willem I withholding his approval.62 The hongi tours were abolished, and in 
the 1820s many unpopular restrictions on boat building, trading and fishing 
were lifted, but the monopoly continued.63 Attempts to start the cultivation 
of other crops failed, and colonial interest in Ambon shifted to missionary 
activities and army-recruitment.64
Meanwhile, even though as an army-officer dispatched to Ambon, 
Van Den Bosch had argued to abolish labour services on Ambon in 1803, 
the principles of his cultivation system later on fed the popular colonial 
mantra that indigenous peoples across Indonesia were not industrious, 
60 Van Fraassen, Ambon, 79-132.
61 NA MinKol 1850-1900 1389, Vb. 9-10-1863 n8, herein: Vb.; Anonymous, “De Hervorming 
der Molukken”, TvNI 2:1 (1868), 120-139, 180-199: 123.
62 Van Fraassen, Ambon, 145-152.
63 P. Bleeker, Reis door de Minahassa, I: 140-141, 146; Van Fraassen, Ambon, 146-147.
64 De Graaf, De Geschiedenis van Ambon en de Zuid-Molukken, 190-191. See also Van Fraassen, 
Ambon, 190-191 and Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatists, 22-23, 25-38, 39-70.
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not commercially minded and ‘unready’ for the laissez-faire politics of 
free trade, and colonial economic focus shifted to forced cultivation.65 Van 
Hoëvell, for instance, claimed the Ambonese would sell their cloves too 
cheaply, and would be out-witted and unable to compete with ‘devious’ 
Chinese and Arab merchants.66 Hence, the Dutch upheld that the monopoly 
would keep yielding greater profits than monetary taxes potentially could. 
Liberation of the monopoly was considered rather inopportune as the 
colony was in a state of fiscal crisis, added to by the recent wars on Ambon 
and Java; in fact, the era of colonial policies of monopolism and coerced 
labour had only just commenced.67 Abolishing the spice monopoly would 
contradict the contemporary colonial economic thinking that would imbue 
policies for the coming decades. This way, the spice monopoly survived 40 
years past its financial expiry date.
In the 1850s, growing criticism of the Cultivation System in Java incited 
the call for reform of the Moluccan spice monopoly as well. One contem-
porary author referred to it as “one of the saddest pages in the history of 
the colony.”68 in Java, as the tenability of the system waned, descriptions 
of socio-economic decline, exploitation and popular suffering were aligned 
with pleas for liberalization of the entire colonial economy. And as in Java, 
the principle impulse for the abolishing of the system was not moral outrage 
but rather economic decline. As a result of the breach of the monopoly 
during the British invasion, clove prices started fluctuating. This caused 
a declining interest in clove cultivation among the Ambonese.69 When 
prices and profits dropped below local production values, many Ambonese 
refused to participate in the Dutch production scheme any longer and left 
the nagari to ““wander off.”70 As we shall see in subsequent chapters, such 
‘unauthorized’ migration was often a first sign of non-compliance, resulting 
from the economic recession. In 1828, a prohibition forbidding villagers to 
leave the nagari was imposed, to be replaced in 1870, by the introduction 
of a pass system designed to retain some level of control over migration.71 
The system started collapsing even further, when kepala were no longer able 
to cover the costs of hiring extra hands for harvesting cloves in the short, 
intensive harvesting season.72 A rapid plunge in clove prices in the 1850s 
delivered the final deathblow to the spice monopoly which by then could 
65 Sens, De Kolonieman, 71.
66 Van Hoëvell, Ambon, 65-70.
67 Van Fraassen, Ambon, 170-171, 202; De Graaf, De Geschiedenis van Ambon en de Zuid-
Molukken, 242; Anonymous,, “De Hervorming der Molukken”, 124.
68 Anonymous, “De Hervorming der Molukken”, 120.
69 Van Hoëvell, Ambon, 59-60, 71.
70 Anonymous, “De Hervorming der Molukken”, 124-125.
71 Stbl. 1870 n91; Van Fraassen, Ambon, 295.
72 Harvesting cloves is a short, intensive process as cloves need to be picked during the 
limited timeframe of a few days when the buds are large enough but have not yet started 
to fl ower. See Anonymous, “De Hervorming der Molukken”, 136; Knaap, Kruidnagelen, 
250.
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no longer cover the costs of governance. It was finally abrogated in 1864, 
not to improve the living standards of the local population but because it 
was no longer advantageous to the colonial economy.73 In 1868, the govern-
ment stopped buying cloves for a guaranteed fixed price.74
This was an important watershed in the history of colonized Ambon. 
For centuries, the Dutch had acquired knowledge about Ambonese society 
only in the service of coerced clove production. Thus, abolishing the 
monopoly immediately crippled what had underpinned Dutch authority 
and social politics: indirect rule, collusion and royal entitlements serving 
an interwoven, monopolized coerced labour economy. For decades, this 
had caused the Dutch unwillingness to reform. Path-dependent on these 
institutions and unwilling to invest in Ambon’s collapsing economy, they 
continued what had worked for 200 years, even though it became increas-
ingly clear the monopoly was a dead end. When it was finally abolished, 
officials on the ground found themselves ill-prepared to provide new 
answers to old questions of fiscal organization and governance. Initially, 
Dutch liberals hoped that end of the spice monopoly would lead to a 
production decrease, which in theory would incite a price increase, moti-
vating the Ambonese to independently restart clove cultivation and sell 
on the free market, enabling the levying of monetary taxes.75 But coerced 
labour was not that easily eradicated. Economic decline and the abolition of 
slavery in the Indies in 1860 prompted many chiefs to significantly increase 
the use of (unpaid) services and strengthen their grip on land and labour.76 
Whatever reforms the Dutch were going to implement needed to include a 
rethink about the role of these chiefs.
Nagari tax: locating the taxpayer
Coerced plantation was manageable because it collectively ‘taxed’ people 
through designated working groups, the dati, under the supervision of the 
dati chiefs. Technically, the result was that officials only had to deal with the 
dati chiefs, to manage the system. When the monopoly was abolished, the 
monetary ‘nagari tax’ that the Dutch authorities introduced in 1865 sought 
to tax en bloc as well.77 The contemporary Governor of the Moluccas, H.M. 
Andrée Wiltens (1862-1864), suggested levying the tax on every ‘household’ 
(huisgezin), a unit he defined as a “man and wife and their children in one 
73 NA MinKol 1850-1900 1366, Vb. 11-8-1863 n22, herein: Nota GG, 30-7-1863; See also Van 
Fraassen, Ambon, 291-297; Van Hoëvell, Ambon, 390-391; quoted also in Chauvel, Nationa-
lists, Soldiers and Separatists, 22.
74 Anonymous, “De Hervorming der Molukken”, 138. The price was 24 cents.
75 NA MinKol 1850-1900, 1389, Vb. 9-10-1863 n8, herein: Vb.; NA MinKol 1850-1900 1366, 
Vb. 11-8-1863 n22, herein: Nota GG, 30-7-1863.
76 Bleeker, Reis door de Minahassa, I: 150-155.
77 Stbl. 1864 n169. The tax was designed after a similar levy introduced in North Sulawesi 
where it replaced the local coffee monopoly
Promise Pretence and Pragmatism.indb   139 22-04-21   17:34
140 Chapter 3
house.”78 In Dutch colonial vocabulary, the term huisgezin was also used to 
indicate the dati79 (which made little sense as dati were non-kinship related 
landholding groups), while in Ambonese terms it could only compare 
to the mata rumah. In Batavia, officials figured that since the dusun, from 
which villagers harvested most of their personal income, were owned by 
the dati, the kepala dati had to be appointed as taxable persons, and the dati 
lands as taxable objects. However, the kepala dati were not landholding 
chiefs, but representatives to the outside world. These officials obviously 
followed the framework provided by the spice Cultivation System to 
determine taxability. This created much confusion among both indigenous 
officials and the local population, requiring the further intermediation of 
the kepala.80 The kepala dati were made liable to pay one guilder annually 
for every person in their ‘household’, increased gradually to 5 guilders in 
1868.81 Because the ratio between size and production level of dusun and 
the number of dati members differed per dati, the tax burden fell heavier on 
dati with smaller amounts of land. It would have been fairer to classify dati 
according to land and population size, and tax accordingly, as suggested 
by Van Hoëvell.82 But this would require a full survey of all dati as well 
as a population census, for which the impoverished local government did 
not have the financial or administrative means. Batavia seemed unwilling 
to invest and preferred to rely on old indigenous elites: the kepala soa and 
kepala nagari were exempted, and held personally responsible for collecting 
the tax from the kepala dati. In practice tax collection was delegated to the 
marinyo.83 Thus, the nagari tax practically brought little change and kept 
following the principles and practices of the spice monopoly system.
Table 3.1. Assessments in the Nagari Tax, 1865-1866.84
Year Number of families assessed Tax Rate in guilders Total Revenue of the Nagari Tax
1865 8.163 2 ƒ 16.326
1866 7.969 3 ƒ 23.907
78 NA MinKol 1850-1900 1626, Vb. 8-7-1865 n17, herein: GovMol to GG, 28-5-1864: Bijlage A.
79 For instance, in a government regulation of 1824, see Stbl. 1824 no. 19a. See also: NA 
MinKol 1850-1900 1626, Vb. 8-7-1865 n17, herein: RvI 15-7-1864 and Dir. ‘s Lands 
Middelen en Domeinen to GG, 27-9-1864.
80 ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, herein: Besl. 26-8-1864 n32: GovMol to GG, 30-5-1864.
81 Stbl. 1863 n169; NA MinKol 1850-1900 1389, Vb. 9-10-1863 n8, herein: RvI 30-1-1863 and 
GG to MinKol, 18-4-1863. In the haste to impose the tax and abolish the spice monopoly, 
the tax was implemented while its “methods of collection were [to be] further regulated 
later” (Stbl 1863 n169 art.4). For elderly and disabled persons, the kepala received a guilder 
discount. Due to communication problems the tax was not introduced in 1864, but in 
1865, and thus started at f2 per year, see Anonymous, “De Hervorming der Molukken”, 
139; Van Fraassen, Ambon, 296-297.
82 Van Hoëvell, Ambon, 42-46.
83 See Stbl. 1865 n42, art. 4-10.
84 NA MinKol 1850-1900 1806, Vb. 17-9-1866 no. 65, herein: Dir. Lands Middelen en 
Domeinen to GG, 15-6-1866.
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Revenue from the nagari tax increased slowly, but only because, as the 
number of assessed families declined (see table 3.1), the tax rate was gradu-
ally increased. Even so, it still remained insufficient to cover the costs of 
governance. To make up for this, successive Governors suggested imposing 
alternative monopolies on cacao and coffee under the forced labour scheme, 
to which the liberal Governor-General L.A.J.W. Sloet van de Beele (in office 
1861-1866), could not agree.85 Instead of investing in proper administrative 
mechanisms and tax infrastructure, officials in Batavia repeatedly urged 
more administrative efficiency and stuck to a strategy of diminishing 
coerced labour to enhance free commerce and, hopefully, to increase tax 
revenue.86 This ignored the fact that the local colonial administration fully 
relied on the structures it attempted to abolish.
Rethinking entitlements, identity and equality
The root of the problem was the position of the gathered kepala. The spice-
monopoly had guaranteed them shares in their populations’ wealth, land 
and labour power through tributes, gifts and services under jurisdiction 
of the colonial state. In 1824, to guarantee their financial stability, ensure 
their loyalty and prevent political turmoil, they were promised retainment 
of these entitlements until alternative sources of income were established.87 
But the post-1864 system prioritised issues other than the wellbeing of 
chiefs. The uang hasil and uang pitis were abolished.88 Instead of these 
renumerations, chiefs were awarded compensation paid in accordance with 
newly constructed class divisions depending on the number of people they 
ruled: the lowest ranking ‘regents’ (of which there were 2) would receive 40 
guilders per year, the fourth to the second class of ‘regents’ (of which there 
were 15) between 50 and 100 guilders per year, while ‘first class regents’ (of 
which there were 27) would receive 100 guilder per year. These compensa-
tions were budgeted at a total sum of 74,760, surpassing total revenue of 
the nagari tax (see table 3.1). Contemplating the low population density 
under many of these rulers, the Raad van Indië advised categorizing most 
rulers below an annual salary of 50 guilders.89 The kepala nagari were made 
85 NA MinKol 1850-1900 1398, Vb. 30-10-1863 n31, herein: Vb., GovMol to GG, 28-4-1863 
and RvI 10-7-1863; NA MinKol 1850-1900 1389, Vb. 9-10-1863 n8, herein: Vb., GovMol 
to GG, 28-4-1863 and RvI 10-7-1863; De Graaf, De Geschiedenis van Ambon en de Zuid-
Molukken, 190-191. The number of trees was 513.000 in 1775 and 380.000 in 1780, see: 
Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatists, 22-23, 25-38, 39-70. See also Van Fraassen, 
Ambon, 264-267.
86 KV 1866, 25; NA MinKol 1850-1900 2292, Vb. 26-1-1870 n8, herein: GovMol to GG, 24-4-
1866.
87 RR 1824, art. 97 n19a, in NA MinKol 1850-1900 1389, Vb. 9-10-1863 n8, herein: Vb.
88 ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, herein: Besl. 26-8-1864 n32: GovMol to GG, 30-5-1864; Besl. 15-3-
1865 n7, GovMol to GG, 27-12-1864.
89 Stbl. 1864n169; NA MinKol 185-1900 1389 Vb. 9-10-1863n8, herein: Vb., RvI to GG, 30-1-
1863.
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entitled to eight percent of the collectors wage in the nagari tax, but contrary 
to elsewhere in Indonesia, they had to share this (with the kepala soa), as had 
been the case with uang hasil.90 Meanwhile, their informal incomes declined 
steadily, as their subjects were no longer obliged to work in the kepala’s 
dusun or support their households. Various paid and unpaid services 
were prohibited. In 1869, all nagari services, except the kwarto services and 
services for emergency aid and repairs, were abolished.91 The burdensome 
and extortive kerja trop, that in practice had survived the abolition of the 
monopoly, was finally prohibited in 1881.92 Thus, the kepala nagari had lost 
most of their direct shares in their people’s labour power.93
As a result, the kepala nagari faced a huge decrease in welfare which 
worsened when, after a temporary recovery in 1874-1890, clove prices 
plunged again in the 1890s, never to fully recover.94 Residents G.J. van 
der Tuuk (1879-1880) and J.G.F. Riedel (1880-1883), proposed boosting tax 
revenue by introducing individual head taxes in the Central Moluccas from 
both ‘indigenous’ and ‘non-indigenous inlanders.’95 This individual head 
tax was adopted in 1891, to replace the nagari tax. It divided all men, of 16 
years and older, into nine classes of welfare and paying up to 25 guilders 
per year.96 Accordingly, a new corvée regulation was adopted in 1892 that 
stipulated personal liability to corvée performance, rather than the collec-
tive liability of the dati.97 This unlocked the labour power of immigrant 
‘foreign inlanders’, who did not take part in Ambon’s traditional soa and 
dati-structure and were therefore not eligible to perform services (instead 
they performed their own kampung services).98 In order to curtail use of 
corvée and increase payment of monetary tax, the maximum amount 
of leviable services allowable was set at 30 days per year, following the 
90 ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, herein: MGS 22-6-1903: ‘Nota betr. request der regenten van 
Ambon gehouden verzoek bij wijze van tractement een geldelijke tegemoetkoming te 
verlenen, Controleur J. van Lier.’
91 Stbl. 1869n91; Van Fraassen, Ambon, 347-349.
92 Ibid., 453-454.
93 ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, herein: MGS 22-6-1903: Nota v. Toelichintg Res. Ambon, 18-1-
1881; Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatists, 11.
94 In 1928 the Indies imported ten times more cloves from Zanzibar than was produced in 
the Moluccas. See ibid., 22.
95 NA MinKol OV 4359, Vb. 12-4-1890 n29, herein: Vb., GG to MinKol, 28-1-1890. This tax 
would exempt Seram and Buru as these islands were, contrary to the many smaller Kei, 
Damar and Tanimbar islands (see map 3.1), not fully under Dutch control.
96 Stbl. 1891 n45. In reality, few were capable to paying more than 5 guilders per year.
97 The regulation was announced by Van Hoëvell in a pamphlet spread out over Ambon in 
the “typical Ambonese speaking language” urging young people to “listen to their nagari 
chiefs, and not “let their ears hang to the malicious […] and perform services […].” NA 
MinKol MvO 1222: F.J.P. Sachse; met nota naar aanleiding der “Memorie van de onder-
afdeling Amahai” door G.L. Tichelman, gezaghebber, 1920.
98 ANRI AS GB Besl. 75, herein: MGS, 19-12-1891: Res. Ambon to DirBB, 30-9-1891, Besl. 
3-3-1892: DirBB to GG, 14-1-1892.
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instructions of the Government Regulation of 1854 (see Chapter 3).99 This 
evoked protest from Resident J. van Oldenborgh (1896-1900), who claimed 
that this curtailed him in his ability to levy unexpected ‘extra services’, 
for instance, in case of disaster or unforeseen infrastructural projects.100 A 
somewhat far-fetched concern, as in 1894 only about 10% of the maximum 
allowed amount of services had been actually levied.101
The real problem was that Ambon had always been a pluralistic society 
where different people enjoyed different rights. Those within the traditional 
nagari structure had carried the brunt of the government’s burden, but other 
inhabitants, such as migrants (classified as ‘non-indigenous inlanders’), 
were relatively untaxed. That way, the kepala nagari only drew income from 
a select amount of ‘indigenous inlanders’ that participated in the dati struc-
ture, and that had continued informing the tax system to its core. For other 
subjects, different regulations applied. For instance, a special category of 
people on Ambon, the ‘inlandse burgers’ (‘indigenous citizens’, descendants 
of ‘inlanders’ who had served the Company or mestizos and mardijkers, 
descendants of formerly enslaved people), were fully exempted from all 
corvée services and taxes as they could also not partake in the dati system 
and own land, for which reason they lacked the legal criteria to be deemed 
liable to perform services. Instead, they served in the schutterij (citizen 
militia).102 They were ‘governed’ by their own ‘quarter masters’ to whom 
they paid their contributions.103 Privileged and elevated above the ‘indig-
enous inlanders’, they were considered too proud to work on plantations 
and only fulfilled their obligations to society by developing industry and 
serving their own communities.104 So making “burgers maintain roads, side 
by side with common inlanders”, as a consequence of curtailing the burgers’ 
exemptions as proposed in 1879, was considered a radical breach with the 
99 ANRI AS GB Besl. 75, herein: MGS, 19-12-1891: Res. Ambon to DirBB, 26-9-1889, DirBB to 
Res. Ambon, 14-8-1890, DirBB to GG, 3-11-1891.
100 NA MinKol 1850-1900 5183, Vb. 21-7-1897 n56, herein: Vb., DirBB to Res. Ambon, 25-7-
1896, Res. Abmon to DirBB, 29-12-1896; Van Hoëvell, Ambon, 38.
101 KV 1895 bijlage R, p4. The maximum amount of services to be levied that year was set at 
275,724; the actual amount levied 28,760. On Ambon few men performed more than two 
days in corvée per month, far less then indigenous people elsewhere in the archipelago as 
there was simply less infrastructure on Ambon to maintain.
102 ANRI AS GB Besl. 75, herein: MGS, 19-12-1891: Res. Ambon to DirBB, 18-12-1890; Van 
Fraassen, Ambon, 66-67. See also: C. Bakhuizen van den Brink, “De Inlandsche Burgers in 
de Molukken”, BKI 70:1 (1915), 595. See also Adatrechtsbundel 21, 36-37.
103 Adatrechtsbundel 21, 53.
104 Formally all individuals were personally liable to perform corvée according to the 1892 
regulation, including inlandse burgers and all other ‘inlanders.’ However, the inlandse 
burgers who lived in the capital towns on Ambon, Saparua and Hila (which was practi-
cally all of them) were exempted and through this bureaucratic trick no burgers had to 
perform corvée while on paper the burgers and ‘regular inlanders’ were one step closer to 
fi scal equality. Stbl 1892 n67, art. 3-5.
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past which problematized specific privileges across the archipelago.105 
Social differences and privileges were ubiquitous throughout the colony, 
but did not fit well with the colonial mission to unify and equalize the tax 
system, as discussed in the previous chapter. If the government was going 
to abide by its own agenda, it had little choice but to curtail such privileges 
and align various forms of taxation.
Thus, in 1892 a new ordinance stipulated registration of all burgers 
and the villages where they lived for the performance of local services. 
Burgers who no longer paid their militia contributions automatically lost 
their status as burger and would be degraded to the status of ‘negorijman’ 
(nagari inhabitant or villager; ‘indigenous inlander’).106 Taxation became 
a social denominator for how people were governed, registered and what 
status they enjoyed, but not always without objection. In 1910 for instance, 
a new law had empowered the Governor General to determine taxability 
and exemption of taxes on the nagari level in case of emergency107, which he 
used to update Ambon’s social structures. In 1911 he decided that the burgers 
of nagari Loki on Huamual (Seram) were no longer to pay contributions 
to the militia-treasury, but would be subjected to head taxes like the other 
‘inlanders’ and replace the militias with a government-funded police force. 108 
The burgers of Loki appealed to the Ministry of Colonies against the intended 
exemption from paying militia tax in their nagari, as this implied an imme-
diate charge on their status as free burgers, and a fiscal-political inclusion into 
the general population. In their letter, they wrote that “abolition of payment 
to the militia treasury and levying of head taxes would derogate their rights 
and duties as free burgers.” As “loyal and humble servants of the govern-
ment”, they experienced the abolition of militia treasuries as a “humiliating, 
unfair, unmotivated and undeserved ignominy”, and promised the Minister 
that they, and many of their fellow burgers, would certainly abandon their 
village.109 In a pragmatic consideration, the Minister understood that the 
burgers were willing to pay tax, as long as this would not influence their 
rights to citizenship and agreed to maintain the militia contributions as long 
as these would be allocated to the local treasury. For similar reasons, the 
Ambonese burgers were exempted from the 1914 ‘Company Tax’.110
Thus, the government had seemingly unified and equalized tax policy 
without compromising revenue or the entitlements of kepala and specific 
105 Also, because the transportation services had been abolished in 1869, and reintroducing 
services was not allowed under article 57. ANRI AS GB Besl. 75, herein: MGS, 19-12-1891: 
Res. Ambon to DirBB, 18-12-1890.
106 Stbl. 1892 n 82 [art. 4]; Van Fraassen, Ambon, 563-564.
107 Stbl. 1910 n15.
108 NA MinKol MvO 311 (Quarles de Quarles, 1908); NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 2712, Vb. 
9-3-1925 n2, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 28-2-1924.
109 NA MinKol OV 812, Vb. 31-3-1911 n9, herein: ‘Inlandse Burgers Arnold Ferdinandus, 
Zacharias Pesulima, Jozias Marissa and Habel Rieuwpassa’ to MinKol, 1-2-1911.
110 Stbl. 1914 n132.
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social groups. Tax liability, formerly only dependent on dati participation, 
seemed elegantly expanded by individualizing taxpayers to fund the raja. 
In reality, the tax system remained deeply primed by preceding instruments 
emanating from the monopoly system, and governed by middlemen who 
experienced increasing poverty and increasingly relied on continuing the 
practice of forced labour. By 1918, all nagari services had been abolished 
(except for those levied in the city of Ambon), but kwarto remained in use.111
Elite displacement
By the start of the twentieth century, almost all kepala nagari were in a condi-
tion of severe financial crisis. A report by controleur E.J. van Lier of Ambon 
(1901-1904), emphasized how wearing “European clothing” and “having 
achieved a relatively high level of civilization”, the ‘Raja’ had arrived at 
a state of development where they needed adequate salaries instead of 
compensation and collectors wages to save them from poverty.112 They 
frequently received Europeans in their houses, “as, in lack of pasanggrahan 
[travelers lodges] on the island, their houses functioned as a stop-over 
place”, for which they refused compensation out of pride.113 In 1894, ƒ60,000 
was collected in the head tax which guaranteed ƒ4,800 of a collectors wage, 
to be distributed among 34 nagari chiefs and their kepala soa and marinyo. 
Even combined with incomes from gifts (ƒ2,500) and an additional ƒ7,700 
guilders in other compensations, this ‘lawful income’ was insufficient.114 
Hence, many kepala resorted to acquiring ‘unlawful income’, by embezzling 
tax money and other ‘malpractices.’ The dissatisfied Raja of Pelauw on 
Haruku, for instance, forced his subjects to sell their cloves to him at prices 
considerably below the market value to his own benefit and illegitimately 
demanded formally abolished forms of services. For political reasons 
the Dutch had no choice but to keep supporting him.115 On Ambon, the 
collected kepala of the nagari Soya, Nusaniwe, Seilale, Rumah Tiga and Waai 
around the Ambon Bay (see map 3.3) were caught embezzling tax money, 
had to stand trial and were convicted by the regional Council for Justice, in 
Makassar. Many other kepala nagari were reported to have made excessive 
use of kwarto services.116 Forced to keep up the appearance of the powerful 
111 NA MinKol 1901-1953 Mailr. 126, 1919 n2105, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 30-8-1919, p. 42.
112 ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, herein: MGS 22-6-1903: ‘Nota […] Controleur J. van Lier; Van 
Hoëvell, Ambon, 28.
113 ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, herein: MGS, 22-6-1903: Res. Ambon to GG, 7-7-1902, ‘Nota […] 
Controleur J. van Lier.’
114 ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, herein: MGS 20-1-1896: Res. Ambon to GG, 1-10-1895.
115 Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatists, 89-93, 93-94; Van Fraassen, Ambon, 558-562. 
The prevailing authority crisis in Pelauw was infused with political involvement of 
nationalist movements, and only resolved in the 1920s by appointing new raja and 
promoting the old one to a higher position in the administration.
116 ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, herein: MGS 22-6-1903: ‘Nota […] Controleur J. van Lier.’
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prestigious lords they had once been under the monopoly, but without 
being offered support or suitable alternatives to previous entitlements, the 
raja were destitute and driven to criminal behaviour. In this way, colonial 
reformist policy forced the government to prosecute the indirect rulers it 
still relied on and “the serpent of change started eating its own tail.”117 
The problem was so obvious, that Van Lier did not even bother ascribing 
it to inherent patterns of corrupted, oriental misrule, as officials generally 
did, but rather to its actual cause; the overall decline in economic circum-
stances.118
In the mid-1890s, Van Hoëvell proposed a simple but far-reaching 
solution. He suggested reducing the number of kepala nagari by awarding 
the more powerful ‘Regents’ authority over multiple nagari or by awaiting 
the natural death of raja, then merging nagari together, thereby reducing 
the costs of administration.119 Van Hoëvell considered Moluccan rule to 
have become seriously diffused. The island of Saparua, for instance, had a 
population of around 9,000 people who were ruled by no less than sixteen 
kepala nagari. And on Ambon, a population of around 40,000 was governed 
by more than 30 kepala. Some kepala had less than ten ‘working men’ at their 
disposal to perform services and pay taxes.120 The raja of ‘large’ nagari like 
Allang (1528 inhabitants out of which 323 were liable for service), had access 
to a much larger tax base than those of smaller nagari like as Nusaniwe 
(153 inhabitants; 39 liable) or Rumah Tiga (only 68 inhabitants; 12 liable). 
This had consequences for the (fixed) compensations that kepala nagari 
were paid since 1864 in replacement of the abolished uang hasil and pitis, 
and resulted in variables, in the average tax payment per capita (see table 
3.2).121 In fact the Mardijker community on Ambon reported only 2 taxable 
inhabitants, resulting in, theoretically, a chiefly wage of less than a guilder 
per year. Obviously such small nagari were untenable. Such rulers were 
completely reliant on state benefits and ‘illegally levied services’, and force-
fully attempted to retain the few remaining villagers within their nagari.122 
Van Hoëvell argued that since kepala nagari competed with each other over 
influence and resources, based on land and labour, the logical consequence 
of population growth and welfare decrease was further impoverishment and 
unrest among the nagari and their chiefs. Diminishing the governing elite, 




119 ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, herein: MGS 20-1-1896: Res. Ambon v to GG, 1-10-1895.
120 Hoëvell, Ambon, 29.
121 ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, MGS 22-6-1903: ‘Nota […] Controleur J. van Lier’, ‘Nota Contro-
leur Morrees.’
122 ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, MGS 22-6-1903: ‘Nota […] Controleur J. van Lier, Nota Contro-
leur Morrees: Controleur J. van Lier, bijlage B.’
123 Hoëvell, Ambon, 30.
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Table 3.2. Comparison of Hasil- and Pitis compensations in 1903.124
Nagari Number of 
inhabitants









Allang 1528 296.20 92.12 30.68 419 0.27
Laha 330 11.80 4.20 x 16 0.05
Tulehu 1824 103.80 32.40 10.80 147 0.06
Mardika 2 0.65 0.35 x 1 0.33
However, merging nagari inevitably entailed violation of the local succes-
sion rights of specific soa, traditionally entitled to deliver kepala nagari. 
Director of the Interior Administration P.C. Arends (in office 1895-1903), 
feared that that such violation of the continuation of nagari lineages would 
cause social upheaval and potential conflict among ruling houses.125 Prob-
lematically, throughout the centuries the Dutch had themselves elevated 
many kepala nagari to higher ranks, thereby, more deeply engraining collec-
tive traditions of rule. The uncodified and much more flexible adat stipula-
tions had been transformed along the way, creating new ruling myths and 
traditions, to which twentieth-century kepala eagerly adhered. Revoking 
these entitlements, as Arends affirmed, would seriously cripple the Dutch, 
as well as the raja, in the credibility of their authority. The only solution to 
this problem was breaking with the past, and downgrading the Ambonese 
lords as ‘regents’ being on par with the bupati of Java, to village or kampung 
chiefs, which is indeed what they really were.126 And ultimately, this is what 
the supreme government decided, thereby sealing the fate of Ambon, its 
raja, and its inevitable decline in importance.
Set in this context, the 33 rajas (see the beginning of this chapter) wrote 
their petition as a final attempt to safeguard what remained of their power 
and privilege. Their diminished prestige, following on from their financial 
distress, obstructed their power to tax, levy services or induce their inhab-
itants to work on clove plantations, circularly adding to their decreasing 
124 Source: ANRI AS MGS 4263, herein: MGS, 22-6-1903: ‘Nota [...] Controleur J. van Lier.’
125 ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, herein: MGS 20-1-1896: RvI 16-12-1895: DirBB to GG, 11-12-1895; 
for relocation problems during VOC reign, see: Knaap, Kruidnagelen, 61-62.
126 Indeed, in Java the titles of raja and patih were reserved for court offi cials, while village 
rulers bore lower titles (see the next chapter). The Ambonese raja were also not be equal-
ized to the nagari heads on West Sumatra (see chapter 6) according to the Raad, as even 
though they ruled over populations of comparable size (about 1,000 subjects on average), 
they had a different role and ruling tradition with different responsibilities and duties. 
ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, herein: MGS 20-1-1896: RvI 16-12-1895: DirBB to GG, 11-12-1895.
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income.127 Controleur J.S.A. Morrees (1900-1901) interpreted this as ‘royal 
indifference’ towards economic development128, but Resident Van Assen 
endorsed the raja’s plea, and suggested awarding the Ambonese ‘regents’ 
fixed salaries to enhance their position and to transform kwarto services into 
a 2.50 guilders compensation.129 He recognized the difficulties of unifying 
nagari, although he also signalled “the happy fact” that on four occasions 
raja’s had started to rule over more than one nagari as a consequence of 
local reform policies.130 Following Van Hoëvell, Van Assen suggested 
slowly awaiting the natural decline of ruling dynasties and rather than 
replacing them, merging nagari together under fewer chiefs, each ruling 
at least 200 persons.131 He expected internal rivalry would diminish and 
eagerness and discipline to rule would increase.132 Van Lier designed a 
scheme to award compensation of 60-100 guilders (see appendix 4) to nagari 
chiefs, merging some nagari together, and cunningly only submitting the 
plan after the more conservative Director Arends was succeeded by the 
more liberal D.F.W. van Rees (in office 1903-1906), who convinced Minister 
Idenburg to award the Ambonese kepala, fixed salaries.133 Idenburg agreed 
only on condition that these salaries were funded from the local treasuries 
by local tax revenues. This deserves emphasis, not only because it shows 
how Ambon became increasingly fiscally deprioritized, but also how 
important it was to the central government to ensure local populations paid 
for their ‘own’ administrations. Using local tax revenue to pay salaries to 
local elites methodically obliged people to contribute to their local adminis-
tration and reminded them of the fact that, despite Dutch supremacy, they 
were still governed by their own adat chiefs. This became a sound tool to 
communicate the imperial agenda and combine ‘traditional governance’ 
with ‘modern public finance.’ Taxes were more easily legitimized if used to 
fund local rulers.
Unfortunately, on Ambon the method seemed to have arrived too late. 
Not only were the salaries reported too low, as many kepala nagari had to 
fund the kepala soa from their own incomes, and their diminished authority 
affected their ability to fulfil their responsibilities in terms of policing 
and levying taxes. As a result, arrears in head tax payment showed a 
127 ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, herein: MGS 22-6-1903: ‘33 regenten aan GG, 16-8-1902’, ‘reke-
standen.’
128 ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, herein: MGS 22-6-1903: ‘Nota Controleur Morrees.’
129 ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, herein: MGS 22-6-1903: Res. Ambon to GG, 7-7-1902.
130 ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, herein: MGS 22-6-1903: Res. Ambon to GG, 7-7-1902.
131 A similar suggestion was made by C.J. Hasselman to resolute the problem of overuse of 
desa services in Java (see Chapter 4, section 3.5).
132 ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, herein: MGS 22-6-1903: Res. Ambon to GG, 7-7-1902.
133 ANRI AS GB MGS 4263, herein: Besl. 26-3-1904n25: Voorstel Res. Ambon […] 16-12-1902, 
DirBB to GG, 25-11-1903, MGS 22-6-1903: RvI 9-5-1903, MGS 17-3-1905: MinKol to GG, 
27-12-1904.
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sudden increase.134 Resident A.J. baron Quarles de Quarles responded by 
imposing heavy fines on late or non-payment of taxes, especially upon the 
‘foreign inlanders’, who “lead a wandering existence” as an anti-migration 
measure.135 This had a positive effect on fighting arrears (see table 3.3) as 
Quarles de Quarles proudly noticed. Meanwhile, the problem of poverty 
among the raja of Ambon received less attention as the government 
started focusing on expansion of its authority elsewhere in the Moluccas 
(see Chapter 7).136 It briefly returned in 1918, when the brand new Regent 
Federation (Regentenbond) alarmed that persistent poverty on Ambon was 
playing havoc with the reputation of the kepala nagari, reducing the respect 
people had for the raja office and the adat institute it represented, into its 
absolute nadir. By that point, the political and material privileges no longer 
outweighed the administrative and moral burden of the office of kepala 
nagari.137 Hence, enthusiasm to fulfil the office further decreased.
In 1919, the Regent Federation filed a motion in the Volksraad to award 
the raja an extra monthly allowance of 20, 30, 40 or 50 guilders depending 
on the number of inhabitants they governed (500, 1000, 2000 or 3000).138 
This motion was adopted, but simultaneously the hasil and pitis compen-
sations were abolished and the remaining kwarto service replaced with a 
5 guilder stipend per working men (which most Ambonese were unable to 
pay).139 This way, the government seemingly eradicated the final remains of 
the spice monopoly.
134 ANRI AS Besl. 4-11-1906 n28, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 23-7-1906.
135 ANRI AS Besl. 4-11-1906 n28, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 23-7-1906. The ordinance of Stbl. 
1906 n463 specifi cally ordered that in case half of the annual assessment of the head tax 
was not paid by the fi rst of June, the entire amount would be claimable immediately.
136 NA MinKol MvO 311 (De Quarles, 1908), in Van Fraassen, Bronnen Betreffende de Midden-
Molukken, 139-140.
137 NA MinKol 1901-1953 Mailr. 126, 1919 n2105, herein: Res, Ambon to GG, 30-8-1919; NA 
MinKol 1901-1953 Mailr. 125, 1919 n1945, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 12-7-1919.
138 NA MinKol 1901-1953 Mailr. 125, 1919 n1945, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 12-7-1919. 
According to Cooley, later on the raja would also receive a 200-guilder bonus for each 
man from their villages they provided for the colonial army, while the man’s family 
received 250 guilders. Cooley, “Village Government”, 146. I was unable to trace archival 
evidence supporting this claim.
139 Ibid., 145; Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatists, 11; NA MinKol 1901-1953 Mailr. 
165, 1921 n1931, herein: ‘Regentenbond’ to GG, 2-12-1920; See also MvO 315: C.C. 
Ouwerling, Amboina, 1930, 42.
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Table 3.3. Head tax arrears on Ambon, 1902-1906, 1911-1913.140
Year Assessment in guilders Arrears in guilders In percentage
1902 61,979 1,253 2.02%
1903 58,747 1,208 2.05%
1904 58,397 1,539 2.64%
1905 61,382 4,231 6.89%
1906 (assessed) 68,598 7,295 10.63%
Year Assessment in guilders Arrears in guilders In percentage
1911 141,454 1,080 0.76%
1912 187,385 3,087 1.65%
1913 219,120 6,183 2.82%
In reality, the government had only contributed to the erosion of local 
authority and the local willingness to pay, thereby undermining the effec-
tiveness of its bureaucratic state. In 1919, a report on agriculture on Ambon 
showed that combined with the policies of forced village resettlement and 
migration, improper compensation of chiefs had structurally hollowed out 
Ambon’s adat institutions, while excessive illegal use of coerced labour 
increased distrust and dissatisfaction.141 The hasil and pitis compensations 
and kwarto services were closely linked to the dati system, which was still 
important to Ambon’s social organization. As the raja of Hitu warned, the 
final abolition of these compensations and services brought Ambon’s social 
coordination to the brink of collapse.142 The half-hearted attempts of the 
government to invent new roles for the kepala nagari, soa and dati had left 
most of them stranded somewhere between being popular rulers supported 
by traditional entitlements and salaried (but underpaid) government 
employees.143 Post-monopoly Ambon no longer required nor accommo-
dated the authoritarian raja as shaped under VOC rule. Instead, it needed 
local puppets to keep up the pretence of bureaucracy and maintain local 
order. However, as Ambon increasingly disappeared off the economic maps 
of state orientation, the economic base of the chiefs’ supremacy became so 
affected by the insufficiency of their salaries that they were no longer able 
to keep up the necessary appearance of wealthy, capable great adat lead-
ers.144 In 1923, the colonial government decided to refurbish the supposed 
140 ANRI AS Besl. 1906 4-11 n28, herein: besl. 23-7-1906; NA MinKol MvO 314: W.D. van 
Drunen Littel, Amboina, 1918, herein: Bijlage 130A.
141 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 2122, Vb. 5-5-1920 n88, herein: ‘Rapport Kopenis over zijn 
onderzoek naar de landbouw in het gewest Ambon […]’, 1-11-1919, p. 78-79.
142 Holleman, Het Adat-Grondenrecht van Ambon en de Oeliasers, 116; Chauvel, Nationalists, 
Soldiers and Separatists, 11.
143 See Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatists, 13-14.
144 Ibid., 97-98.
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‘democratic, consultative nature’ of the precolonial nagari. They hoped 
to regenerate popular support by reinstating the saniri and by awarding 
these the status of ‘gemeenteraad’ (municipal council), which were gradually 
erected all over the archipelago. But the communist uprisings of 1926-1927 
put an end to such experiments in democratization, and the municipal 
councils were abolished. Subsequently, the government tried to restore the 
raja as autocrats. But the Raja of Hitu was right: irreparable tears and cracks 
had emerged in Ambon society, between the nagari, burgers, the raja and the 
state.145 Emerging nationalist movements such as Sarekat Ambon and Insu-
linde jumped into this gap, further impairing the position of the raja who 
stood little chance against them. These movements successfully utilized 
and vocalized popular grievances against taxation and corvée to incite 
political uprising and disobedience towards both the raja and the govern-
ment that the raja unenthusiastically represented.146 The nagari were no 
longer the old adat units they once were; under the influence of wavering 
colonial ideologies, that traversed adat realities but offered no final solution 
to issues of financial drawback, the orderly world of taxes and self-funding 
raja imagined by colonial officials could not, and did not materialize. 
The government, parsimonious and deliberately blind to the problems on 
an island it no longer fiscally prioritized, refused to formulate a durable 
alternative to former schemes of monopolism, entitlements and forced 
labour, rendering its societies open to alternative forms and forces of orga-
nization.
145 A particular divide emerged between ordinary villagers and raja. Some villagers 
(primarily Christians) had found access to careers in the colonial army, expanding 
government and commercial bureaucracies through the Dutch colonial education system 
and language. This enabled them to gain higher social positions (the better opportunities 
laying outside the Moluccas), while others sought refuge in connection with other domi-
nated ethnicities against Dutch suppression. Especially soldiering (Ambon became prime 
supplied of soldiers for the imperial expansion wars) “offered the best hope for improved 
levels of material welfare and educational opportunities for children to obtain positions 
in bureaucracy”, infusing the imagination among Christian Ambonese of a political 
establishment with the Netherlands and a yearning for European education. Chauvel, 
Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatists, 49-52, 68 (quote), 86, 97. Van Fraassen emphasizes 
how Ambon’s relations with the outside world were reinvented under infl uence of army 
recruitment, see Van Fraassen, Ambon, 353.
146 Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatists, 116-119.
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Conclusion
On Ambon in the later nineteenth and early twentieth century, the behav-
iour of the colonial state was quite contradictory to the terms it set for 
itself, as discussed in the previous chapters. The intended bureaucratic, 
information-hungry tax state that developed proper fiscal instrumenta-
tion to fund a salaried European-indigenous administration, support 
indigenous welfare and stimulate productivity was never realised. Instead, 
colonial officials ignored to the problems of economic decline that impaired 
the chiefs in exerting their authority. Under the influence of the require-
ments of the VOC, Ambon’s socio-political and fiscal institutions evolved, 
transformed and started shaping Ambonese society in entirely new ways. 
The VOC had cherry-picked and enhanced specific adat underpinnings, in 
particular the role of the kepala. When the Dutch finally abolished the agri-
cultural colonial-capitalist monopolism and its coerced labour principles, 
this required a full rewriting and restructuring of Ambon’s socio-political 
fabric, including a reinvention of the role of chiefs and the functioning of 
the state itself. In theory, the replacement of uang hasil and pitis and kerja trop 
and kwarto services with taxes, taxes that funded supposedly disconnected 
‘chiefly’ salaries, demonstrated an expansion of bureaucracy directed at a 
more modern tax state. In reality, the Dutch kept relying on the same old, 
state-sponsored classes of indirect rulers, thereby continuing the political 
roots of the monopoly system. Drastically curtailing the power and prestige 
the kepala nagari had come to enjoy required an enormous administrative 
investment and might have caused political unrest, which was deemed too 
great a risk, for an island in a state of ineluctable economic decline. There 
was a refusal to invest in the island on the basis that every regional admin-
istration was supposed to be self-funded through locally levied taxes. Thus, 
the Dutch ignored the rapid impoverishment of the local ruling classes, on 
which they relied but that increasingly lost in authority, in order to keep up 
the appearance of a functional administration at minimal cost. Rather than 
seeking structural expansion of governance and knowledge accumulation 
to maximize control, justice, extraction and social improvement, officials 
pursued minimisation of political challenge, engagement and costs. The 
monopoly primed the tax system until at least the 1920s, and the encom-
passing promise of fairer taxation in a bureaucratic tax state, curtailment 
of coerced labour and proper and just administration never materialized 
for the Ambonese. By that time the majority of the Ambonese population 
had already moved on and redefined its relations with the colonial state 
independently and beyond the interference of the raja.
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Map 4.1. Java’s administrative division around ca. 1885.
Residencies:
1. Banten 4. Cirebon 7. Kedu 10. Semarang 13. Kediri 16. Pasuruan
2. Batavia 5. Pekalongan 8. Yogyakarta 11. Rembang 14. Surabaya 17. Besuki
3. Priangan 6. Banyumas 9. Surakarta 12. Madiun 15. Madura
Map 4.2. Java’s administrative division around ca. 1930.
Residencies:
1. Banten 10. Tegal 19. Rembang 28. Surabaya
2. Batavia 11. South Banyumas 20. Blora 29. Pasuruan
3. Buitenzorg 12. Pekalongan 21. Bojonegoro 30. Malang
4. Karawang 13. North Banyumas 22. Madiun 31. Probolinggo
5. West Priangan 14. Wonosobo 23. Ponorogo 32. Bondowoso
6. Central Priangan 15. North Kedu 24. Blitar 33.Jember
7. East Priangan 16. South Kedu 25. Kediri 34. West Madura
8. Indramayu 17. Semarang 26. Mojokerto 35. East Madura
9. Cirebon 18. Kudus 27. Gresik
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4 Labour and money
Socio-economic organization, coerced labour and 
monetary taxation in Java, c. 1830-1930
In 1889, Dutch controleur H.G. Heijting investigated the peasant household 
economies of his district in the Residency of Bagelen. He carefully studied 
three peasant households for a full year to gain insight into their annual 
budgets and he calculated that, as the costs of taxation exceeded their 
incomes, they made an annual loss. However, a considerable part of their 
burden consisted of unpaid labour services, to which they themselves did 
not assign any monetary value. They believed they made a profit. “How 
lucky to be of such a simple mind!” Heijting proclaimed.1
This luck was shared by the colonial government. All over Indonesia, the 
Dutch turned indigenous labour power to their advantage. On top of large-
scale forced cultivation (in some regions), almost all indigenous peoples in 
Indonesia performed public corvée labour services of some kind. This had 
become standardized policy in the nineteenth century. It originated in Java, 
where the nature in which services were performed and the conditions under 
which they were claimed, were ostensibly rooted in local adat principles, “in 
accordance to existing customs, establishments and needs”, as ordained in 
the 1854 Government Regulation.2 However, precolonial forms of labour 
services in Java consisted of numerous different types rooted in rights and 
duties that varied from region to region, district to district and even village 
to village, and that were to considerable extent the result of colonial domi-
nation and exploitation prior to and during the Cultivation System. They 
included everything from reciprocal household obligations performed to 
support landlords, the village community and the village administration3, 
1 Arminius, “Het Budget van een Javaansche Landbouwer”, IG 11 (1889), 1685- 1720, 1886-
1917, 2150-2186: 1718-1719. Quoted in: B. White, “Work and Survival in Rural Java: Java-
nese Peasant Budgets from the 1880s”, in H. de Jonge and T. van der Meijl, On the Subject 
of Labour: Essays in Memory of Frans Hüsken (Nijmegen: In de Walvis, 2010), 79-84: 82.
2 RR 1854, art. 57; See also C.F. Schoch, De Heerendiensten op Java en Madura Volgens het 
Regeerings-Reglement van 1854 (‘s-Gravenhage: Van Stockum, 1891), 1.
3 They were performed in return for access or entitlements to usufruct rights to land, 
protection and other forms of purveyance, and hence forced not because peasants 
were bound to its performance through social contracts, but rather because without 
performing them they were not entitled to these provisions. Community services existed 
both in mandatory form as desa services, and on a voluntary to support others based on 
social ethos, known throughout Indonesia as gotong royong. See A. Suwignyo, “Gotong 
Royong as Social Citizenship in Indonesia, 1940s to 1990s”, JSAS 50:3 (2019), 387-408.
 In the Netherlands, community-based conscription services known as hand- en span-
diensten were incidentally used in many municipalities to improve infrastructure. As in 
Java, these services could be ‘paid-’ or ‘bought-off’ for a fi xed amount. See K.F. Holle, 
“Herendienst in Nederland”, TBB 7 (1892), 219-230: 222-226; A.C.N. Pieren, De Diensten 
aan de Hoofden op Java en Madura (Leiden: Groen, 1884), 3; J.C. Kielstra and C. Lulofs, 
“Verplichte Diensten of Geldelijke Heffi ngen?”, TBB 46 (1914), 28-44: 28-29.
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to obligatory services performed in lieu of taxation in the absence of 
currency to pay wages for chiefs, lords and the colonial state.4 This 
complexity and variety caused much confusion in colonial times, echoing 
in current day literature.5
This chapter discusses how officials reinterpreted the organization 
of Java’s peasant society when, following the gradual dismantling of the 
Cultivation System, public support for coerced labour rapidly deteriorated. 
Coerced labour and its effect on the wellbeing of the peasantry became a 
central theme of colonial concerns about Java’s alleged lack of ‘modernity’ 
and development.6 The 1854 Government Regulation also ordered the 
“gradual abolition” and the replacement of coerced services with monetary 
‘head taxes.’ This reduction was to be achieved through central, quinquen-
nial revisions of all local corvée regulations under the supervision of the 
Governor-General, to keep its encompassing orchestration in Batavia’s 
4 L. Lucassen and L. Heerma van Voss, “Introduction: Flight as Fight”, in M. Rediker, T. 
Chakraborty, and M. van Rossum (eds.), A Global History of Runaways: Workers, Mobility, 
and Capitalism 1600-1850 (Oakland: University of California Press, 2019), 1-21: 9. See also 
Webber and Wildavsky, A History of Taxation, 149-227.
5 In literature about taxation and compulsory labour in and beyond Indonesia, corvée 
labour has been contextualized in terms of serfdom, indentured labour in substitution 
for slavery, convict labour and as a form of taxation. See Reid, To Nation by Revolution: 
Indonesia in the 20th Century, 54-59 and A.J.S. Reid, “The Decline of Slavery in Nineteenth-
Century Indonesia”, in M.A. Klein (ed.), Breaking the Chains: Slavery, Bondage, and Eman-
cipation in Modern Africa and Asia (Madison University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 64-82. 
On Jamaica (and other Caribbean islands) and in South-Africa, slaves were forced into 
low paying contracts bordering debt bondage or slavery, punishable with heavy fi nes 
and imprisonment when breaking the contract. See W. Kloosterboer, Onvrije Arbeid na 
de Afschaffi ng van de Slavernij (‘s-Gravenhage: Excelsior, 1954), 9, 25-26, 28-32, 56). See 
about the difference between corvée and convict labourers and serves and slaves: Hoefte, 
“Indentured Labour”, 364 and Van der Linden, “Mutualism”, 491-492. The Institute for 
Social History in Amsterdam has recently investigated the ties between forced labour 
and the rise of global capitalism, focussing on conscripted labour as well as defl ection, 
resilience and desertion. Van Rossum in particular has argued how forced labour (as 
punishment) comprised a “carceral connection” to the disciplinary forces fundamental 
to the colonial system and the accelerating mobilization of coerced labour in the later 
nineteenth century as trends of the modern capitalist colonial order of state-bonded 
labour. This includes mechanisms developed to secure public order and control of labour 
through local administration of justice. M. van Rossum, “The Carceral Colony: Colonial 
Exploitation, Coercion, and Control in the Dutch East Indies, 1810s–1940s”, International 
Review of Social History 63 (2018), 65-88.
6 A. Kumar argues the VOC and subsequent Dutch colonial state were in fact the opposite 
of a force for moderniation. Both built their power on elements already present, and 
hence entrenched Java’s societies in fi xed, biased terms of colonial discourses. Dutch 
administrative means might seem modern, but the consequence of colonial rule, Kumar 
argues, was regressive, and that instead Islam provided the tools for the Javanese elites to 
develop an intellectual identity. A. Kumar, Java and Modern Europe: Ambiguous Encounters 
(Richmond: Curzon, 1997), 23-30, 53-88.
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hands and safeguard unified policy.7 But despite repeatedly expressed 
ambitions to ban the use of corvée labour from the archipelago and to eradi-
cate its ‘feudal’ principles, around 1929 about 11.4 million individuals in 
Indonesia (about a quarter of the total colonial population) still performed 
services of some kind.8 Why was this the case?
The answer to this question, as this chapter argues, is to be found in 
the different ways corvée labour was defined, codified and understood in 
various layers of the government. Central to this understanding was the 
extensive colonial investigations, bent on gathering ‘factual’ information 
about the principles and practices of labour service. The most prominent of 
these investigations was carried out by civil servant, F. Fokkens (1852-1929) 
in 1889-1893. The result of his work, published in three large volumes in 
1901-1903, charted and codified the majority of those corvée labour ‘prin-
ciples’ in Java, which enabled their transformation into monetary taxes. This 
was of pivotal importance to socio-economic and fiscal policy in Java and 
the rest of the archipelago.
The first section investigates the roots of colonial coerced corvée in 
Java’s land tenure and labour redistribution schemes. The second section 
investigates how these were used during the Cultivation System and the 
third section discusses how, after around 1860, officials attempted to abolish 
services and the problems this caused. Section four discusses the investi-
gations following these problems and the transition of corvée into head 
taxes. The fifth section discusses why, after 1920, and despite developing 
international critique, corvée remained in use throughout the archipelago.
4.1 Inventing villages, distributing land: labour and taxation 
in Central Java until 1870
The Dutch colonial labour service regime of the nineteenth-century was in 
essence an appropriation, transformation and merger of various systems 
of governance, reciprocity, labour duties and taxes, primarily in West and 
Central Java, as encountered and reshaped by the VOC and the subse-
quent colonial state. Hence, as in the case of Ambon, to understand the 
principles of colonial coerced labour and taxation in Java, understanding 
how it worked prior to the nineteenth century is essential.9 In Java, labour 
7 RR 1854, art. 57, in NA MinKol 1850-1900 3196, Vb. 13-5-1879 n3, herein: Vb.; NA MinKol 
1850-1900 OV 3203, Vb. 16-6-1879 n16, herein: Vb.
8 ANRI DepBB 586, herein: DepBB, 18-1-1929: ‘Statistiekkaart’. Around 1895, the number 
was around 20 million. See Van Rossum, “The Carceral Colony”, 71.
9 See for a recent publication on the development of forced labour under the VOC M.van 
Rossum, “Running Together or Running Apart? Diversity, Desertion and Resistance in 
the Dutch East India Company Empire, 1650-1800”, in Rediker, Chakraborty, and Van 
Rossum (eds.), A Global History of Runaways, 135-155, esp. pp. 149-150. See also: Kumar, 
“Capitalism and the “Traditional” State and Society”, 5-6.
Promise Pretence and Pragmatism.indb   157 22-04-21   17:34
158 Chapter 4
and land were intrinsically connected and exchangeable, to redistribute 
collective needs, advantages and fiscal burdens. Controlling either of them 
was vital to unlock the resources of peasant society. Fiscal surplus was 
collected both from and in land and labour. Both precolonial and colonial 
rulers sought to expand their claims in Java’s rural population and lands, 
to stabilize state revenue. In the era of global trading empires in Asia, use of 
collective, coerced labour became a popular way to fulfil the ever-increasing 
labour demand of global merchant capitalism.10 This paragraph discusses 
various aspects of Java’s social hierarchy, peasant organization, systems of 
extraction and landholding and labour patterns, and how these were rooted 
in the Dutch colonial use of coerced labour.
Controlling labour
As the Dutch outcompeted indigenous trade, agricultural production 
became increasingly important to Java’s indigenous economy at the cost of 
commerce.11 Control over human resources and labour power overshad-
owed claims to territory; only by recruiting indispensable labour forces 
could rulers harness the rural resources to which they were entitled. Rulers 
devolved the power to administer the cultivation of their lands by the 
peasantry (wong cilik; ‘non-aristocracy’) to lesser priyayi. These managed a 
layer of middlemen, who in return shared in rights to produce, taxation and 
services from the peasantry.
In Dutch eyes, Javanese peasant society consisted of idyllic, homog-
enous, primitive and self-sufficient village-communities extorted by a 
class of corrupted feudal lords who had unlimited control over manpower 
and curtailed all potential for individual economic development.12 This 
relates to an important theme in theories about the behaviour or ‘moral 
economy’ of peasants around the world, which focusses on the persistence 
of smallholding peasants to prioritize survival over capital accumulation. 
According to these theories, peasants, rather than seeking profit, aimed 
to ensure the greatest possible certainty of stable yields, by employing all 
to provide minimal subsistence insurance to as many peasant families as 
possible, to minimize risk, ensure production continuation and prevent 
10 Lucassen and Heerma van Voss, “Flight as Fight”, 7.
11 Moertono, Negara, 159.
12 See for a clear expression of this argument Burger, Sociologisch-Economische Geschiedenis 
van Indonesia, 33. See also Breman, Koloniaal Profi jt, 65; Goh, Communal Land Tenure, 74-77 
and A.J.S. Reid, “The Pre-Colonial Economy of Indonesia”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies 20:2 (1984), 151-167: 151.
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harvest failure.13 This was similar in Java, which the Dutch interpreted as 
the typical failure of an indigenous society to develop a profit-oriented, 
evolving economy and related to innate indigenous ‘despotism’ and ‘lazi-
ness.’ Later authors have corrected this image, and suggested these villages 
behaved with greater independence and were governed more democrati-
cally, by large groups of council members who negotiated tax revenues with 
rulers who were not nearly as powerful as colonial officials believed.14 Even 
though Javanese peasants contributed in kind and labour to their rulers’ 
courtly households, Java never developed a European kind of feudal, 
contractual-based tenure system where prominent noble families held fiefs 
to land and its inhabitants on behalf of an ‘emperor’, at least not until colo-
nization.15 Villages were, in fact, quite commercialized, monetized, inde-
pendent and democratic (just like many feudal units in mediaeval Europe), 
but had transformed into their ‘demonetized’ and ‘despotized’ form under 
colonial exploitation. The subsequent Dutch trope of the uncommercial, 
over-exploited and stagnating village started to justify colonial entrance 
and claim to Java’s arable land.16 Central to this idea was the long-lasting 
thesis that the Central Javanese ‘emperor’, the Susuhunan or Sunan, was 
the ultimate proprietor of all lands in the (former) empire of Mataram that 
13 These theories relate to Marxist interpretations of the situation in rural Russia in the 
nineteenth century. Subsistence theory in this ‘Marxist’ sense presumes peasants are 
essentially not capitalistic in their behaviour (as they had very little capital, usually only 
in the form of labour and occasionally land-rights) until they entered the wage labour 
market as (coolie) labourers or ‘free and unattached proletarians.’ I do not have the space 
here to elaborate on such theories of the peasant household. An interesting comparison 
between Java and Russia has been drawn already in S. Aass, Chayanov and Java: A Discus-
sion Of Chayanov’s Micro- and Macro Theory of Peasant Economy (Storhove: Hedmark/
Oppland Distrikthøyskole - Samfunnspolitikk, 1975). Aass uses the subsistence-theory of 
the Russian agrarian economist A.V. Chayanov to explore how peasant economies were 
governed by non-market principles. Chayanov observed, like colonial offi cials in Java 
throughout the nineteenth century, that peasants entered the market only as consumers 
to purchase the few necessary goods they did not produce themselves, and not to accu-
mulate more wealth and hence ceased working when they achieved a level of subsistence 
(A.V. Chayanov, The Theory of Peasant Economy (Madison: Homewood, 1966). A similar 
argument has been by Scott, who coined the term ‘moral economy’ used here to argue 
how peasant society was governed by subsistence rather than capitalism. J.C. Scott, The 
Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1976), 2-3, 6.
14 Wisseman Christie, Theatre States and Oriental Despotisms, 15, 24-26, 33, 36; J. Wisseman 
Christie, “State Formation in Early Maritime Southeast Asia: a Consideration of the 
Theories and the Data”, BKI 151:2 (1995), 235-288: 235-237, 240-242; P. Anderson, Lineages 
of the Absolutist State (New York/London: W.W Northon & Company, 2013), 462-549.
15 Carey, The Power of Prophecy, 10; Breman, Koloniaal Profi jt, 65. Hence, the ‘feudalization’ 
and decommercialization of Java was also a consequence of Dutch domination and the 
curtailment of indigenous commerce, see Kumar, “Capitalism and the “Traditional” 
State”, 23-26.
16 M.C. Hoadley, Towards a Feudal Mode of Production: West Java, 1680-1800 (Copenhagen/
Singapore: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies/Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 
184-185.
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covered most of Java and Madura in the seventeenth century.17 After a series 
of wars, the Dutch declared itself successor of Mataram on the basis of their 
victory over the empire in the mid-eighteenth century, to justify its claim to 
Java’s soil. This “dogma of supreme ruler proprietorship” became the topic 
of academic debate in the early twentieth century, but until then underlying 
alleged relations between land and labour were at the heart of much of the 
colonial claims to labour power.18
Rather than having absolute power to fully impose his theoretical rights 
over people and land as a supreme ruler, the Sunan (and, later on, the VOC) 
successfully enforced supremacy over the priyayi and peasantry by using 
political, diplomatic and military means to govern elites of lesser rulers and 
nobles.19 The means of coercion at the disposal of both the Sunan and these 
ruling elite remained sharply limited. Observing the requirements of the 
peasantry was essential; rife factionalism among rulers and middlemen 
enabled peasants “to switch loyalties among the warren of the elite, in order 
to get better terms elsewhere.”20 Hence, most hierarchical-social relations 
were of a ‘patrimonial-bureaucratic’ nature.21 Like on Ambon, tax payment 
in Java was more often negotiated and paid to observe adat, than coercively 
extracted through disciplinary means.22
This would change under colonialism, as the gradual Dutch encroach-
ment upon adat society, rewired local principles of tax payment to fit the 
ends of colonial extraction. The resultant consolidation of rights to land and 
labour have been mapped for various regions by various authors. Most of 
what we know of Java’s (pre)colonial village societies is largely based on 
opinionated publications of contemporary authors (which also informed 
colonial politics). Various authors have scrutinized this literature as well 
as archival evidence, in order to reconstruct how the Dutch distinguished 
several categories of people, using Java’s various principles of communal 
17 This idea was expressed by Raffl es’ reading of Java’s land tenure system already, and 
still voiced by G.P. Rouffaer (1860-1928) a hundred years later. See Raffl es, The History 
of Java, I, 137-139, 193-194; G.P. Rouffaer, “De Agrarische Rechtstoestand der Inlandsche 
Bevolking op Java en Madoera. Rapport: uitgebracht aan Mr. C. Th. Deventer op 16 April 
1904”, BKI 74:3 (1918), 305-398: 312-313. See also P.B.R. Carey, “Waiting for the ‘Just King’: 
The Agrarian World of South-Central Java from Giyanti (1755) to the Java War (1825-30)”, 
MdAS (1986), 59-137: 57-85 and Mudjanto, The Concept of Power, 102-103.
18 T. Goh, “Review of the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Debate on the Origin 
of Communal Landownership with Special Reference to Java”, Masyarakat Indonesia: 
Majalah Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial Indonesia 3 (1986), 243-276: 250-251, 275. See also A. Kumar, Java 
and Modern Europe: Ambiguous Encounters (Richmond: Curzon, 1997), 53-88.
19 Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, 21-36; W. Remmelink, “Expansion without Design: The Snare of 
Javanese Politics”, in P.J. Marshall et al., Comparative History of India and Indonesia Vol. 3: 
India and Indonesia during the Ancien Regime (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), 111-28: 112-114.
20 Ong Hok Ham, “Social Change in Madiun (East Java) during the Nineteenth Century: 
Taxes and its Infl uence on Landholding”, in Seventh Conference of the IAHA (Bangkok: 
Chulalongkorn University Press, 1979), 632. See also Moertono, Negara, 140-151.
21 Hoadley, Towards a Feudal Mode of Production, 2.
22 Moertono, Negara, 59-50.
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and individual rights to reclamation, avail, possession, usufruct and owner-
ship of land, as well as entangled patterns of taxation and labour services. 
They explain how the Dutch read specific aspects of these principles and 
simplified, abstracted, consolidated and merged them into an overarching, 
essentialist model of social organization, into which they tied their policies 
of coerced labour and taxation.23 This model assumed a crucial role in village 
administration, with regard to managing land tenure and agricultural 
production and reaching maximum surplus extraction.24 As such, the village 
became the core institute for organization of corvée and taxation. A quick 
look at how landholding and village management was organized in Java 
helps us to better understand how this came about.
Landholding, taxpayment and social hierarchy
Across Java, the predominant form of social organization tied the holding of 
land rights (which were expected to provide income and wealth) to liability 
for taxation and service performance. Land, in other words, provided the 
‘ability to bear’ taxes. In most of Java, the village population was divided 
into classes of ‘landholding’ peasants or sikep, and non-landholding people. 
Sikep held (usually) inheritable rights of avail over specific rice fields called 
sawah pusaka or sawah ganjaran – arable lands presumably developed by the 
villages’ founders – as well as gardens, grounds and fish ponds.25 Sikep were 
also allowed to reclaim new lands, sawah yasa, to develop individually or 
lease out.26 The privilege of sikep of having such individual rights over land 
23 See for instance: Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, 64-95; Ong Hok Ham, “Social Change in Madiun”; 
M.R. Fernando, Famine in Cirebon Residency in Java, 1844-1850: A New Perspective on the 
Cultivation System (Melbourne: Department of History, Monash University,1980), 1-12; 
J. Breman, Control of Land and Labour in Colonial Java: A Case Study of Agrarian Crisis 
and Reform in the Region of Cirebon during the First Decades of the 20th Century (Leiden/
Dordrecht: Foris, 1983); J. Breman, “The Reform Question in Cirebon Around 1920” 
(Paper presented to the “Second Anglo-Dutch Conference on Comparative Colonial 
History”, Leiden, 23-25 September 1981), 3-4; Goh, Communal Land Tenure, 39-41, 46-79.
24 As argued by Breman, Control of Land and Labour. See also: J. Breman, “The Village in Java 
and the Early Colonial State”, in M.C. Hoadley and C. Gunnarsson (eds.), The Village 
Concept in the Transformation of Rural Southeast Asia (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1996), 
3-28; The volume by Hoadley and Gunnarsson shows there are many similar cases in 
Southeast Asia of misconceptions of village communities, often rooted in expectations 
form above, that have deep consequences resonating in problems of landownership and 
profi t redistribution up until today.
25 Sikep were presumed to be the descendants of the original founders of the village, as 
described by Van Vollenhoven in his reading of the Eindresume Grondrechten. See J.F. 
Holleman, Van Vollenhoven on Indonesian Adat Law: Selections from Het Adatrecht van 
Nederlandsch-Indië (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981), 156-157; Ong Hok Ham, “Social Change 
in Madiun”, 619; Ong Hok Ham, The Residency of Madiun: Priyayi and Peasant in the Nine-
teenth Century (PhD thesis, Yale University, 1975), 167-176.
26 Elson, Village Java, 19-20. Not all sawah yasa were eligible for lease. Some were hereditary 
private property of the peasant, and of those lands that were community property and 
eligible for lease, some were not redistributable.
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brought the obligation to pay taxes to and to perform services for overlords, 
who supposedly maintained order to enable the sikep to peacefully cultivate 
their lands.27
Below the sikep were the people without such ‘full’, individual land 
rights. These usually held shares in (access to) land, and hence shared in 
the tax and labour service duty. They sold their labour power to the sikep, 
and lived on their own residential plots or on the sikep’s lands as sharecrop-
pers and ‘hangers-on’, menumpang and bujang.28 They were also allowed 
to reclaim new land in hitherto uncultivated areas29, but the difficulty of 
gaining the guardianship of rulers, by generating sufficient taxes and labour 
services (difficult for a ‘beginner’ landowner) and competition with estab-
lished sikep, could be a reason to favour a ‘landless life.’30 Landless peas-
ants usually also shared in rights to cultivate the sawah desa, communally 
cultivated village lands, provided they had the means to maintain their 
designated plot and were able and willing to deliver their accordant tax and 
labour duties.31 Rights of avail to sawah desa were either held under (alien-
able) fixed shares or under specific (non-alienable) land-and crop-rotation 
or redistribution schemes. These ensured circulation of the disadvantage 
of unfertile lands among specific crops and people, and fulfilment of the 
labour demands by a large body of workers. Rotation of sawah desa also 
dissuaded otherwise disadvantaged peasants from moving elsewhere by 
27 Ong Hok Ham, “Social Change in Madiun”, 620-624; Carey, The Power of Prophecy, 33; 
Holleman, Van Vollenhoven, 179-187. See Boomgaard, Children, 29-34 for an overview of 
the taxes these sikep paid.
28 In practice, menumpang (lit. ‘stay-over’) usually did not pay shares in the land rent, but 
an alternative house or poll tax, and performed cultivation services and labour services. 
Menumpang were also not homogenous; instead they had differentiated statuses and obli-
gations concerning tax and labour duties. Among them were the ngindhung who owned 
a house and yard but had no stake in shared village rice fi elds, and unmarried strangers 
called bujang. (In strict sense, bujang were bachelors working as paid farmhands and 
day labourers, but in a wider sense all those treated alike. Children, relatives, widows, 
other elderly people (etc.) were also referred to as bujang, see Holleman, Van Vollenhoven, 
156-157.) In case ‘landless peasants’ had their own house, they were called lindung or 
wong ngindung; ‘plot holders’ (wong means ‘people’ or ‘men’ in Javanese), wong kendo 
(‘loose people’), budi or budiyan (‘sharecroppers’), or orang paroan, teloan (‘half-sharers’). 
In case they lived on the land of sikep they were called wong dempel (‘attached people’). 
Altogether, these people were also known as half-sharers, sikep cilik or sikep buri (‘little’ or 
‘rear’ sikep). Carey, “Waiting for the ‘Just King’”, 81-82; Carey, The Power of Prophecy, 31; 
Boomgaard, Children, 91-92; Goh, Communal Land Tenure, 60-61; Hoadley, Towards a Feudal 
Mode of Production, 32-59.
29 This was possible in the pre-Giyanti world (before the treaty of Giyanti of 1755 which 
ended the Javanese wars of succession and rendered Central Java to the domination of 
the VOC), but not any more in the early nineteenth century under increased demographic 
pressure and fi scal burden. Breman, Koloniaal Profi jt, 55.
30 Carey, “Waiting for the ‘Just King’”, 82-83; Boomgaard, Children, 92.
31 Ong Hok Ham, “Social Change in Madiun”, 621.
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providing them with sufficient access to land.32 Mechanisms of redistribu-
tion, reciprocity, obliged generosity and communal landholding should not 
be over-romanticised as egalitarian. Rather, they provided all with entitle-
ments to live from the villages’ resources, often attained at the cost of a loss 
of status and autonomy.33 Indeed, the majority of Java’s ‘landless’ peasants 
were entitled to shares in yield, but only if they participated in carrying the 
burden of the accordant labour services and taxation. The menumpang and 
bujang, dependent on land held by sikep, usually took over the performance 
of labour services that sikep had to perform to priyayi and contributed to the 
tax burden by developing the sikep’s lands. Thus, whereas sikep theoretically 
bore the brunt of the tax and corvée burden in exchange for the privilege of 
holding land, in practice they delegated this burden downwards by leasing 
out shares of these rights and duties, all the way to the landless, patronage-
bound dependents below.34 This ensured continuation of production, labour 
and tax payment, but prevented capital accumulation and social mobility 
among lower classes. In Dutch colonial ideology, such mechanisms were 
interpreted as part of the typical ‘stagnating’, ‘undynamic’ and ‘decommer-
cialized’ character of Java’s peasant society.35 In fact, risk averting strategies 
only became more important in Java, and deemed necessary to deal with 
the heavy burden of colonial demands.36
Sikep could be elected or appointed to administrative offices, as primes 
inter pares among fellow sikep, to represent the peasant community to higher 
authorities. That way, they could enter the higher social class of the desa 
administration, and sometimes even lower levels of the priyayi.37 Village 
32 Goh, Communal Land Tenure, 48-61; Elson, Village Java, 18-19; Boomgaard, Children, 45-46; 
Carey, “Waiting for the ‘Just King’”, 85; C.C. van den Haspel, Overwicht in Overleg: 
Hervormingen van Justitie, Grondgebruik en Bestuur in de Vorstenlanden op Java 1880-1930 
(Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1985), 14-17. Sawah had to be redistributed regularly 
(usually annually), depending on crop requirements and differences in soil quality. In 
case of fi xed shares, peasants possessing part of a sawah were not allowed to alienate 
it without consent of the village administration. Shares were not to be divided among 
heirs. Around 1870, most of Java knew systems of hereditary private property. Periodic 
redistribution was found in eastern Residencies, while fi xed shares were more common 
in the west. See Boomgaard, Children, 65.
33 Scott, The Moral Economy, 5.
34 Carey, “Waiting for the ‘Just King’”, 86; Carey, The Power of Prophecy, 34; F.A.M. Hüsken, 
Een Dorp, 21-22; Elson, Village Java, 16; Breman, Koloniaal Profi jt, 10; G.R. Knight, “Capi-
talism and Commodity Production in Java”, in H. Alavi and P.L. Burns (eds.), Capitalism 
and Colonial Production (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 119-158: 122-126; Van Niel, Java 
Under the Cultivation System, 30-31; Ong Hok Ham, “The Residency of Madiun”, 161-171.
35 Ibid., 2-6. Cynically, the greater burden colonialism put on peasant society only stimu-
lated this risk-avoiding behaviour. Hence, subsistence can also be seen as the limited 
ability of peasants to reproduce labour power for capital. See B. Eileen, “Subsistence and 
Household Labour”, in Van Rossum, Hofmeester, and Van der Linden (eds.), Handbook 
Global History of Work, 329-344: 329.
36 T.M. Li, “Involution’s Dynamic Others”, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 20:2 
(2014), 276-292: 283.
37 Boomgaard, Children, 66-67; Breman, Koloniaal Profi jt, 55.
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chieftainship was attractive because of its various privileges, ranging from 
the awarding of salary fields (tanah bengkok) to percentages in taxes and 
yield and entitlements to labour.38 These had to be carefully balanced, as 
they added to the peasants’ tax burden. Too high a burden, and peasants 
chose to run away to pledge loyalty to a different lord and bargain for better 
terms elsewhere, resulting in the possible loss of essential labour power.39 
Indeed, running away was an important strategy of everyday resistance, a 
“means of representing one’s interests or of employing bargaining power, 
by deserting in order to profit from switching employers […], done mainly 
by workers in some kind of commodified labour relations […].”40 This way, 
rulers were constrained by the mobility of their taxpayers.41
Delegated governance
The result was a pyramid-shaped social fiscal structure as displayed in 
figure 4.1. It displays a “hierarchy of rights, radiating outward from the 
centre and apex, down to the lower levels of the king’s functionaries.”42 On 
top was the Sunan, the top ruler concerned with both the upkeep of his own 
court and family and the management of his realm. He provided essential 
military protection in surrounding areas under supervision of subordinate 
rulers. He was no omnipotent despot, and frequently unable to enforce 
his asserted right to collect tax on ownership of land. He was expected to 
consult his senior family members and courtiers about major decisions, 
and a distinction was made between the revenues of the kingdom and 
the personal property and wealth of the monarch.43 To maintain military 
supremacy across Java and provide for his court, the Sunan leased out ‘his’ 
arable domains with the accordant ‘apanage rights’ (prebends) to taxation 
(pajeg) and services (lungguh), to the lower aristocracy.44 These rights were 
38 The bengkok system was in use primarily outside of the nagara agung lands (see below). 
Moertono, State and Statecraft, 117.
39 Breman, Control of Land and Labour, 18; Elson, Village Java, 17.
40 This indicates that “workers in commodifi ed settings designed repertoires through which 
they exploited opportunities of competitions between employers (and authorities), while 
actively contesting the increasing regulations put in place to control labour, markets and 
mobility.” M. van Rossum, “Desertion”, in Van Rossum, Hofmeester, and Van der Linden 
(eds.), Handbook Global History of Work, 505-520: 515-516. See also J.C. Scott, Weapons of 
the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press,1985), 
xv-xvi, 26, 34-36.
41 M.B. Efendi, Kebijakan Perpajakan di Indonesia: Dari Era Kolonial sampai Era Orde Baru, 
(Yogyakarta: Alinea Pustaka, 2006), 33-34; Ong Hok Ham, “Pajak dalam Perspektif 
Sejarah”, Prisma 14:4 (1985), 74-85: 74.
42 Tambiah, Culture, Thought, and Social Action, 1985, 272.
43 M.C. Ricklefs, “The Sweat of the King”, BKI 175:1 (2019), 5964: 60-61, 63-64; A. Kumar, 
“Javanese Court Society and Politicals in the Late Eighteenth Century. The Record of a 
Lady Soldier, Part I: the Religious, Social, and Economic life of the Court”, Indonesia 29 
(1980), 1-46: 29.
44 Ong Hok Ham, “Social Change in Madiun”, 619.
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expressed in a number of ‘cacah’, a peasant household of one sikep and his 
dependents and lands, that functioned as a unit of taxation. Again, the 
system depended on men rather than land.45 The Sunan’s realm consisted of 
core apanage lands (nagara agung), where the apanage holders or patuh were 
kinship-related, and the surrounding provinces (mancanagara), where bupati 
held apanage (see map 4.3). All patuh and bupati demanded labour services 
and taxes from Java’s agricultural population to support their own courts 
and fulfil the demands of the Sunan.46 Patuh were the Sunan’s ‘indirect’ 
vassal rulers and bureaucrats, as well as lords in their own right.47 Their 
rights to tax, landholding and levying labour services were not inheritable 
but tied to the office of apanage-holder, enabling the Sunan to use apanage-
distribution as a political instrument. As a result, sikep risked being cut off 
from their land when new priyayi entered office and reallocated land rights 
to their own followers.48 In matters of landholding from the Sunan, bupati 
were more autonomous than patuh.49
Patuh and bupati never administered their domains personally, but 
leased out their tributes through a parallel structure of local middlemen and 
power holders, such as mantri and demang.50 These officials shared in land 
tax revenue collected by village officials known as bekel (usually at district 
45 Men, for instance, had to participate in war campaigns (the apanage system had strong 
military foundations). Carey, “Waiting for the ‘Just King’”, 68-70. Cacah also became units 
of economic measurement. See for its functioning Boomgaard, Children, Appendix A. See 
for an interesting contextualization of the apanage system and the political, administra-
tive and military role of the priyayi, as compared to similar elites in Mughal India: V.J.H. 
Houben and D.H.A. Kolff, “Between Empire Building and State Formation: Offi cial Elites 
in Java and Mughal India”, in P.J. Marshall et al., Comparative History of India and Indonesia 
Vol. 3: India and Indonesia during the Ancien Regime (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), 165-194.
46 Carey, The Power of Prophecy, 9. After the Java War, the Dutch maintained the mancanagara 
versus nagara agung division, setting an exceptional position for the ‘Principalities’ while 
employing the bupati and their administrative elite as tax-collecting offi cials as shareholders 
in agricultural profi ts. The Dutch also distinguished the mancanagara and nagara agung 
from the pesisir (coastal regions) to list divisions among districts and its various systems 
of rulership, offi cialdom and village organization. Moertono, State and Statecraft, 112.
47 M.C. Hoadley, “Central v. Region Power, the Lessons of History” (Paper presented at the 
International Workshop “Governance, Identity and Confl ict”, S.I.: s.n., 2001), 35; Ricklefs, 
A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200, 167. As explained by Anderson, power of these 
rulers radiated throughout the land like a bulb of light: the further away from the centre, 
the dimmer his power. Anderson, Language and Power, 24-34. Moertono explains how 
younger priyayi resided at the Sunan’s court under duress by way of enforcing loyalty. 
The bupati were allowed to visit their children at specifi c occasions (Islamic celebrations 
or other festivities) and expected to pay specifi c homage or tribute to the Sunan. Moer-
tono, Negara, 61.
48 Ong Hok Ham, “Social Change in Madiun”, 623-625. Sikep could also be dispossessed in 
case of failure to perform duties or pay taxes. Carey, “Waiting for the ‘Just King’”, 70, 85.
49 Hoadley, “Central v. Region Power”, 2-3.
50 See Carey, The Power of Prophecy, 16, for an overview of the different structures in use in 
the mancanagara and nagara agung. The functioning of demang, sometimes referred to as 
tax collectors, differed per region. Under colonialism, they slowly became tax collectors, 
but under the Javanese apanage system, they were rather independent offi cials who 
pledged loyalty to a local ruler for as long as this was benefi cial to them.
Promise Pretence and Pragmatism.indb   165 22-04-21   17:34
166 Chapter 4
level) and kuwu and lurah (usually at village level), recruited from the sikep 
class.51 They possessed the local knowledge necessary to satisfactorily 
asses and tax land and people. The function of these officials varied per 
region and Dutch terminology used to assign them – ‘village heads’ – was 
not unambiguous.52 They all demanded shares in tax and labour services, 
as their offices were originally unpaid. They gradually started sharing in 
revenue, salary fields and services as remuneration, but maintained arbi-
trary and poor administrations. According to Carey, in Yogyakarta before 
1800, this “administrative disorder” and “the reliance on antique cadastral 
surveys” created an “insuperable barrier to the functioning of a fair taxa-
tion system at the central Javanese courts in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries.”53 Over the course of the eighteenth century, foreign 
influence over apanage lands grew, and a steady influx of Chinese and 
European entrepreneurs increasingly leased land and labour rights to tax 
villages, partly in the service of priyayi. These ‘white demang’ improved effi-
ciency and were much stricter in enforcing tax systems, locally experienced 
as an enlargement of the tax burden.54
It should be mentioned once again that this system was not bound to 
territory. The lands taxed by a specific lord were widely dispersed over 
a patchwork of regions and villages. This made land administration an 
ambitious endeavour, but also encouraged subordinate officials to obtain 
a strong landholding power base to challenge the position of the Sunan.55 
Seen through Dutch eyes, Javanese rural society of around 1800 was brittle, 
inefficient and involved a continuous struggle and competition over land, 
labour, and loyalty.56 In fact, it was a complex balance of power where rulers 
awarded and withheld office, and thereby controlled economic resources 
at minimal costs to channel resources to their courts. This way, they 
pragmatically collected taxes and accumulated wealth without upholding 
extensive bureaucracies following Java’s societal constraints. Especially in 
51 In the principalities in particular the bekel developed into powerful tax offi cials under the 
colonial administration. See B.J. Mulherin, “The ‘Bekel’ in Javanese History”, Review of 
Indonesian and Malayan Affairs 4-5 (1970/1971), 1-28, and Suhartono, Apanage dan Bê kê l: 
Perubahan Sosial di Pedesaan Surakarta (1830-1920) (PhD thesis, Universitas Gadjah Mada: 
Yogyakarta, 1989).
52 Boomgaard, Children, 14, 96-99 (esp. p. 98); Breman, Control of Land and Labour, 76-78.
53 Carey, The Power of Prophecy, 63.
54 Boomgaard, Children, 23-24; Carey, The Power of Prophecy, 11-12, 33-35, 38-39, 57-59, 71; 
W.R. Hugenholtz, “Traditional Javanese Society and the Colonial Exploitation System: 
Regional Differences in the “Appropriated Principalities” in 1830” (Paper to be presented 
to the fourth Indonesian-Dutch Historical Congress, 23-29 July 1983, Bali, Indonesia, 
1983), 19-20; Moertono, Negara, 61.
55 Carey, The Power of Prophecy, 10-11; Ong Hok Ham, “Social Change in Madiun”, 619-620. 
Rulers ruled over people, so cacah were used to calculate their holdings (the number of 
cacah they ruled over and taxed from) and its tax revenue was an expression of their 
wealth and power. See also K.H. Kian “How Strangers Became Kings: Javanese-Dutch 
Relations in Java 1600-1800”, Indonesia and the Malay world 36:105 (2008), 293-307.
56 Breman, Control of Land and Labour, 17; Hoadley, “Central v. Region Power”, 4.
Promise Pretence and Pragmatism.indb   166 22-04-21   17:34
Labour and money: Socio-economic organization, coerced labour and monetary taxation in Java, c. 1830-1930 167
regions where monitoring capacity, communications, transportation and 
record-keeping was difficult, such forms of patrimonial and privatized tax 
collection was considered more efficient.57 Rather than an indicator of state-
failure, low levels of centralization and maintaining personal ties, provided 
rulers, middlemen and taxpayers with bargaining power over land and 
labour.
Figure 4.1. The Javanese apanage system in the early nineteenth century.
From: Carey, The Power of Prophecy, 16.
57 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 34.; Kiser and Levi, “Interpreting the Comparative History of 
Fiscal Regimes”, 557-558.
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4.2 Institutionalizing villages, adding to the burden
After 1800, the impact of colonial intervention in Central Java’s socio-
economic system intensified dramatically. Between 1811 and 1815, following 
up on Daendels’ aggressive anti-aristocratic reforms, Lord Minto and 
Raffles attempted to remodel Java based on British experiences in India, by 
curtailing the power of bupati and apanage-holders, which they perceived 
as a feudalistic aristocracy. Instead, they assigned the village-functionaries 
(especially bekel) as directly responsible for the organization of corvée and 
desa services, tax assessments and payment to the government. In Central 
Java, bekel received a hereditary position, salary lands, apanages and a 
“direct charge on the peasantry”, in kind and labour.58 This way, the office 
of bekel provided a vehicle for richer peasants to gain even more wealth 
and political influence, which provided various opportunities to further 
self-enrichment, while the possibilities for social mobility of the lower 
classes of people declined.59 As such, village officials became tax assessors, 
administrators and collectors on behalf of the colonial administration, in 
direct contradiction to ancient principles that forbade village heads to be 
government official or tax collectors, as they had been elected by the people, 
to serve without salary.60
Village elites were awarded greater responsibilities during the 
Cultivation System, in order to further centralize villages as demarcated 
geographical administrative units. Villages became the “locus for direct 
and regular taxation demands”, provided with “an administrative and 
even spatial identity” which gave them “a position that was wholly new.”61 
Office holders were exempted from performing services and paying taxes, 
receiving collectors wages and salary lands (tanah bengkok). Exemption 
became interpreted as a sign of social climbing and privilege, which was 
eagerly used by Dutch officials as a political tool.62 In possession of more 
status and influence than ever before, village ‘chiefs’ started forming a new, 
wealthy rural elite, functioning as the “intermediaries between traditional 
supra-village elites and the village masses”, not unlike the Ambonese kepala 
58 Boomgaard, Children, 67 (quote); Breman, Control of Land and Labour, 6; Van den Haspel, 
Overwicht in Overleg, 8-10. According to Hugenholtz, under Raffl es, bekel transformed 
into the local equivalent of zamindari (landholding tax farmers in British India), Hugen-
holtz, Landrentebelasting, 24-25; Mulherin, “The ‘Bekel’”, 14-20.
59 Ong Hok Ham, “Pajak dalam Perspektif Sejarah”, 81.
60 Instead they claimed privileges and services. Soebekti, Some Facets, 12-13.
61 Elson, Village Java, 34, 155 (quote).
62 R.E. Elson, “The Impact of Government Sugar Cultivation in the Pasuruan Area, East 
Java, during the Cultivation System Period”, Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs 
12:1 (1978), 26-55: 28; C. Fasseur, “Organisatie en Sociaal-Economische Betekenis van de 
Gouvernementssuikerkultuur in enkele Residenties op Java omstreeks 1850”, BKI 133:2 
(1977), 261-293: 267-277; Breman, Control of Land and Labour, 16-17, 27.
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in the seventeenth century.63 Their enhanced power in disposing over land 
and labour facilitated greater enforcement of tax and corvée administra-
tion, but also self-enrichment and abuse on a previously impossible scale. 
Figure 4.2. ‘Improved’ land rent levying 
system.
These sample forms from Cirebon were used 
as an experiment, to better clarify to taxable 
persons the amount of tax (levied in various 
terms) for which they had been assessed. The 
amount assessed was displayed by stamps, 
the size of the stamp indicating a particular 
amount and corresponding to the actual size 
of coins.
The coupons on the left worked in a similar 
way; each colour represented a specific 
amount of tax to be paid. Both methods were 
adopted, but it is unclear whether they were 
exported to other Residencies.
Source: ANRI AS MGS 4210; the coupons are also 
found in J.M. Jordaan, “Een Nieuwe Landrente-
Administratie”, TBB 16 (1899), 398-405 and Bode-
meijer, “Een Nieuw Model Landrente Aanslagbiljet”,
in ibid., 532-564.
63 R. Van Niel, “The Effect of Export Cultivations in Nineteenth-Century Java”, MdAS 15:1 
(1981), 25-58: 43-44 (also quoted and elaborated on in Hüsken, Een Dorp op Java, 33). 
See also: J. Breman, The Village in Java and the Early-Colonial State (Rotterdam: Erasmus 
University, 1980), 20-21.
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The new village chiefs were essential to the Cultivation System’s early success
and socio-economic consequences.64 Appointing and delegating levying 
taxes to headmen enabled taxation of whole villages all at once, and allowed 
for minimal administrative responsibility through layers of middlemen – 
just like the precolonial apanage-system.
Levying land rent
The integrated levying of land rent, as the ‘monetary’ component to Java’s 
tax system, became central to Java’s Cultivation System. Full survey and 
classification of sawah was deemed unachievable by Van den Bosch’, and the 
land rent developed into a tax, paid mainly to the new village chiefs.65 They 
received a predetermined tax-quota based on fictional yields, depending 
on assessed land values of households, through admodiatie (negotiation) 
between sikep, village chiefs and the state.66 Instead of levying tax over 
incomes, incomes were made subordinate to the fictional amount of tax 
to be paid. Hence all attempted to delegate the tax burden downward, by 
redistributing the rights and duties pertaining to land.67 Non-payment was 
sometimes resolved by levying extra services, voluntarily or as a punish-
ment, or by taking extra shares in produce. This way, chiefs expanded their 
claim on the peasantry using the land rent.68 By deliberately relying on 
half-heartedly controlled village elites that levied shares larger than those to 
which they were entitled, fiscal justice and equivalent rights were sacrificed 
to pragmatism.
Because the land rent guaranteed an addictively steady flow of revenue, 
the government was reluctant to make changes to its principles. However, 
in the 1880s a series of investigations and reports revealed its many defi-
ciencies. The land rent had only added to inequality on rural Java. Village 
elites maximized the burden placed upon the lowest classes in society and 
landless peasants were unable to exert influence over their assessments, 
land redistribution or policy.69 The land rent was reformed over the course 
64 Elson, Village Java, 144, 159-161. See for an early contemporary critique on the impact of 
the reform of village elites for the operation of the Cultivation System: L. Vitalis, De Invoe-
ring, Werking en Gebreken van het Stelsel van Kultures op Java (Zalt-Bommel: Joh. Noman en 
Zoon, 1851).
65 The idea of renting may have given many agricultural households “stronger claims on 
the land then they actually had right to” as around 1815 a fair proportion of peasants 
leased rather than rented land. Boomgaard, Children, 66-67.
66 Hugenholtz, Landrentebelasting, 32.
67 C. van Vollenhoven, De Indonesiër en Zijn Grond (Leiden: v/h E.J. Brill, 1919), 12-13.
68 S. van Deventer, Bijdragen tot de Kennis van het Landelijk Stelsel op Java (Zalt-Bommel: Joh. 
Noman en Zoon, 1865-1866), I, 137; Hugenholtz, Landrentebelasting, 36. The collectors 
wage of village offi cials was usually based on assessments of the amount of revenue of 
former years, in comparison to the economic circumstances of the desa and suspected 
conditions of the crops.
69 NA MinKol 1850-1900 3095, Vb. 12-1-1878 n18, herein: RvS 8-1-1878; Hugenholtz, Land-
rentebelasting, 263-272; Elson, Village Java, 120-122.
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of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century70 and experiments were 
organized to enhance transparency in the assessment and levying practice, 
to stimulate its monetary payment. New, multilingual tax bills were intro-
duced in Cirebon and Surabaya, on which the amount of tax was displayed 
by stamps representing a specific amount of tax (see figure 4.2). In another 
district, the tax amount was represented by coloured coupons, to be 
awarded to taxpayers. A large land-survey project was carried out to deter-
mine the values and quantities of lands according to a classification of fields 
following agricultural conditions, fertility and location of lands, which was 
assessed using new measuring techniques and in negotiation with specially 
appointed committees.71 As land rent was occasionally transposed into 
labour services72, the size of arable land or its fictional yield determined the 
services to be performed. This showed that land surveying was important 
to control tax revenue; to control measurements was to control society.73 
To ensure maximum payment, land rent was usually collected after the 
full sum of cultivation wages was paid out.74 These wages were usually 
too low. Peasants frequently had to forego crop payments and find cash in 
some way, in order to pay for their shares in the land rent.75 Many landless 
peasants, tied to their social position by debt and the power of the sikep, 
remained disadvantaged in procedures of negotiation.76 The land rent 
was a potentially fair tax, based on statistical assessments of incomes and 
land, but incapacity to carry out structural surveys and the prioritization 
of its addictive revenue bolstered the use of independent and corrupted 
middlemen, contributing to the increasing welfare gap.
70 The investigations of head inspector of cultivation J.H.F Sollewijn Gelpke of 1881-1886, 
and H. Kuneman (later Director of Interior Administration) and F.A. Liefrinck (later 
Director of Finances) in Priangan in 1889 fi nally resulted in a new system, introduced 
from 1907 onward and completed only in 1920. The new land rent differentiated between 
sawah, for which it functioned as a yield tax, and tegal (dry agricultural lands), for which 
it was a land tax. Sollewijn Gelpke had made it his personal mission to reach equal spread 
of the land rent over Java, but his proposals were considered impracticable. Kuneman 
and Liefrinck proposed to distinguish three different sections of yield: restitution of 
costs, reward for labour and interest from capital. Taxation was to be levied only over 
the second part. A tax-free share of 10 picol was run on trial in Priangan, where land rent 
had never been implemented to spare the profi table cultivation of coffee which required 
(usually unpaid) transportation services. Hugenholtz, Landrentebelasting, 278-283. See 
also Elson, Village Java, 47; Fasseur, Kultuurstelsel, 20, 210 n253.
71 Hugenholtz, Landrentebelasting, 283-284; Soebekti, Some Facets, 16-18.
72 Calculated against the wages which a peasant should have been paid for working on 
plantations or other projects. Ong Hok Ham, “Social Change in Madiun”, 630.
73 NA MinKol 1850-1900 3242 Vb. 23-10-1879 n3, herein: Report GG and GovSec. See Scott, 
Seeing Like a State 25-31 for a comparison of the power of controlling measurements to 
infl uence labour patterns and land distribution in France.
74 Elson, Village Java, 311.
75 In Kediri in 1830 for example, people were not able to pay tax in cash due to poverty. 
Ibid., 47, 50-51; Fasseur, “ Kultuurstelsel”, 22-25.
76 Breman, Koloniaal Profi jt, 15.
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The burden of coerced cultivation
Forced cultivation of cash crops had similar effects, directly conjoining 
Dutch financial interest with the preferred organization of crop cultiva-
tion. As a fifth of the lands was supposedly used for cash crop cultivation, 
periodic rotation of fields under communal tenure was a reliable method 
to retain soil fertility, and encouraged by colonial officials.77 Meanwhile, 
under pressure of forced cultivation and land rent levying, adat distinctions 
among people were altered to redistribute land rights and their concomitant 
burden over more shoulders. Because taxes and duties were bound to shares 
in land-rights, greater ‘communal ownership’ was supposed to increase the 
number of taxable persons to fulfil the growing labour demands of the culti-
vation system.78 In some areas, it became customary to make all cultivators 
co-owners of the lands after three years, thus making them liable to perform 
corvée and cultivation services.79
In areas were land rights were not linearly connected to taxability, or 
where communal landownership did not exist, this resulted in conflict. 
According to Van Vollenhoven, the idea of communal ownership was the 
typical result of a warped understanding of European civil servants, a 
colonial adat invention that suited the colonial need for exploitation.80 The 
circular increase in labour demand and the enlargement of Java’s taxable 
labour force resulted, inevitably, in an overflow of the taxable ‘landholding 
class’ and scarcity and division of land into tiny, unprofitable plots.81 Abun-
dancy of labour also depressed wage levels.82 So while established sikep 
77 After 1850, periods of famine and backlash stimulated new economic policy under which 
private property was revived. The Dutch attempted to distribute all arable land “equi-
tably” among inhabitants under supervision of village heads in 1830-1850, but land rota-
tion was not in every region the norm. In most desa in Tegal, Pekalongan, Banyumas and 
Bagelen and Kedu and some parts of Cirebon communal land rights with fi xed shares 
were used. See Boomgaard, Children, 52-53, 67-68; Anonymous, “Varia”, TvNI 8:1 (1879), 
402-404.
78 Holleman, Van Vollenhoven, 157; Breman, Control of Land and Labour, 15; Breman, Koloniaal 
Profi jt, 43-44. Aass, Chayanov and Java, 26.
79 J.M. van Vleuten, “Belasting in Arbeid en Belasting in Geld op Java”, De Gids 36 (1872), 
210-232; J.M. van Vleuten, “Invloed van Heerediensten en Hoofden op het Grondbezit”, 
TvNI 1:1 (1872), 293-299.
80 Van Vollenhoven, De Indonesiër en zijn Grond, 23, 24-28. For a similar argument, see C. 
Sandenbergh Matthiessen, Het Koloniaal Vraagstuk van het Uur: Met eenige Stellingen nader 
Toegelicht (‘s Gravenhage: J. & H. van Langenhuysen,1866), 8; Elson, Village Java, 164, 423 
n197; Boomgaard, Children, 48; Hüsken, Een Dorp op Java, 32-34; Knight, “Capitalism and 
Commodity Production”, 124.
81 Van Vleuten, “Invloed van Heerediensten en Hoofden”, 299. This was not everywhere the 
case; often the share of land did not equitably match the actual burden. See Boomgaard, 
Children, 58.
82 Breman, Control of Land and Labour, 22.
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accumulated wealth and cash enabling them to ‘buy off’ their services83, 
landless peasants, the labour reserve of Java, were pushed into a position 
of ‘pseudo-landholding’ and taxability without acquiring the means to 
carry their burden. They experienced increasing difficulties in balancing the 
requirements of their own households’ labour and consumption require-
ments with the ever-expanding claims of their landholding masters.84
The key to large-scale coerced cultivation, as we have seen in the case 
of Ambon, was collectivization of labour through indirect rule. In Java, 
this entailed breaking into the apanage system and grouping people under 
chiefs. Though local smallholders usually used more efficient methods of 
organization and production than the large scale, state-organized labour 
schemes, they were also more difficult to tax, govern and control.85 Hence, 
loosely associated communities of interacting landholders, cultivators and 
dependents were replaced by the closely knit village order of the colonial 
administration, satisfying its desire for uniformity and control.86 Controlling 
the chiefs unlocked Java’s labour supply, and enabled further intervention 
in Java’s reciprocal household systems.
On paper, liability to corvée and cultivation services was rooted in 
landholding, but in practice, landholding peasants watered down their own 
obligations at the expense of less privileged villagers.87 This enhanced the 
inequality between village elites, landholding classes and landless peasants. 
Java was no longer the frontier society it was in the early eighteenth century, 
and the decreasing availability of uncultivated lands incited many poor 
peasants to choose an unsettled life. A ‘vagabonding peasantry’ emerged as 
fewer peasants were able to secure access to lands, much in conflict with the 
intensions of the government.88 Such ‘uncontrolled migration’ became crim-
inalized, as was typical in colonial regimes of compulsory labour, which 
aimed to control all labour mobility to serve state and business interests; 
83 According to Carey, this was not uncommon in the principalities (Carey, The Power of 
Prophecy, 66). Especially in Central Java’s monetized, copper coin-based economy (see 
Chapter 2) payment of taxes, wages and debts was amplifi ed by cash crop payments after 
1830. Villagers exchanged goods at pasars, or at the sides of the roads to evade the tolls 
and pasar taxes. Elson also emphasizes the importance of use of money in Java’s peasant 
economy. (Elson, Village Java, 14-15, 123, 262). In Priangan, cacah already paid monetized 
head-taxes before 1830 (Breman, Koloniaal Profi jt, 69). See also Van den Haspel, Overwicht 
in Overleg, 16.
84 Breman, Control of Land and Labour, 9-13, 20; Breman, Koloniaal Profi jt, 44; Boomgaard, 
Children, 74-75; Elson, Village Java, 119-120, 205-206; H. de Jonge, “Taxes and Labour 
Services during Indirect Colonial Rule on the Island of Madura”, in De Jonge and Van 
der Meijl, On the Subject of Labour, 73-78: 77; A.S. Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements in Rural 
Java: A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries (Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 1973), 28.
85 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 6-7, 304-305, 311-316.
86 Carey, The Power of Prophecy, 35.
87 Elson, Village Java, 203, 204-205.
88 Hüsken, Een Dorp op Java, 78.
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a mechanisms to restrain the free (social) mobility of workers were crucial to 
coerced labour regimes.89
The effects of these changes did not remain unnoticed among the 
colonial government’s critics, including several (ex-)officials witnessing the 
decrease in Java’s welfare in the nineteenth century.90 The archetypical poor 
Javanese peasant was deemed in need of protection, no longer only against 
Asian extortion by bupati, village elites or Chinese tax farmers, but also 
against the colonial state itself.91 Virtually all post-1870 colonial ideologists 
criticized their predecessors’ methods, for the great power that had been 
vested in the priyayi’s disposal over labour.92 Scholars like Van Vollenhoven 
distrusted ideas of the state’s supreme land-proprietorship, contesting its 
underlying dogmas, and pointing out how landholding or ownership was 
constantly disputed, depending on interpretations of adat and agreements 
between rulers and ruled, landholders and leasers.93 Subordination of 
village lands to any superior claims, whether “exercised either by a peasant 
collective or by a higher authority” was always problematic.94
As in Ambon, revising tax and labour principles required a reinvention 
of the ‘traditional’ institutions in which it was rooted. Javanese land rights 
had developed from promises in return for sharing in the burden of labour 
services into a liability bringing an increasing tax-burden, leading to over-
taxation and further exploitation of labour. Subsequent liberalization of the 
market to incite social mobility, production increase and free sale of cash 
89 Lucassen and Heerma van Voss, “Flight as Fight”, 2; J. Kamp and M. van Rossum, “Intro-
duction: Leaving Work Across the World”, in M. van Rossum and J. Kamp (eds.), Desertion 
in the Early Modern World: A Comparative History (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 3-14: 4; Van 
Rossum, The Carceral Colony, 70-71; Van Rossum, “Running Together or Running Apart?”, 
135-137; Van Rossum, “Desertion”, 508-509, 511-512; Hoefte, “Indentured Labour”, 365.
90 For instance, by Head Inspector of Cultures K.W. van Gorkom, who in 1866 wrote that 
“…through the system of cultivations, compulsory services and subjection to their chiefs, 
the Javanese as a rule are so bound and limited in their freedom that they are left scarcely 
any time and opportunity for their own development, [or] the provision of their needs. 
Because of this they have learned to be satisfi ed with little, and their needs are very few.” 
K.W. van Gorkom, “Gedwongen Arbeid en Kultures”, Tijdschrift voor Nijverheid en Land-
bouw in Nederlandsch-Indië 12 (1866), 391-414: 395.
91 J. Alexander and P. Alexander, “Protecting Peasants from Capitalism: The Subordination 
of Javanese Traders by the Colonial State”, Comparative Studies in Social History 33:2 
(1991), 370-394.
92 Elson, Village Java, 88, 118-120, 123-124; Fasseur, Kultuurstelsel, 28-31. See also R. Reinsma, 
“De Cultuurprocenten in de Praktijk en in de Ogen der Tijdgenoten”, in Fasseur and Van 
Niel (eds.), Geld en Geweten Vol. I, 59-90.
93 Van Vollenhoven, “Antirouffaer.” See also Goh, Communal Land Tenure, 21-39, 46-79, 
90-94.
94 Breman, Control of Land and Labour, 7. Simply put, the Sunan might have claimed to be 
the sole proprietor of all lands in Java, but when unable to constantly enforce his military 
authority, bupati might have very well ignored this claim, like sikep might have ignored 
the claims to land of bupati.
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crops failed to align with the expectations of Javanese peasants. They had 
experienced a state that had turned their leaders into predatory despots, 
adding to their inclination towards risk-aversion over profit maximization. 
This strengthened the informal redistribution of wealth through kinship 
and reciprocity, and exchange of goods and services in long-term relation-
ships for subsistence.95 Without a system regulating fair market prices and 
wages, the liberal economic plan of free labour was bound to keep the 
poorest at a disadvantage.
4.3 (Re)writing adat: changing corvée policies and principles
Coerced labour had become a pillar in colonial socio-economic policy. 
However, officials, village chiefs and people rarely agreed upon the terms 
according to which it was performed and levied. While some considered 
it “tax in labour”96 or an ‘everyday obligation’ to overlords, while others 
interpreted it as a cheap alternative to wage labour.97 No regulatory distinc-
tion existed between the various pancen, desa or government services, which 
were treated uniformly and overlapped with coerced cultivation, causing 
abuse and over-exploitation. Officials had handed down the regulation 
of services to indigenous chiefs, allowing them little control over it. This 
enabled many of these chiefs to make almost unlimited use of their people’s 
labour power.
After 1850, coerced labour to all appearances, was increasingly prob-
lematized as ‘feudalistic’, oppressive, and unsuitable to modern colo-
nialism. Popular dissatisfaction over coerced labour grew and the call to 
abolish coerced cultivation and corvée intensified. But to formulate proper 
alternatives to labour services, their underlying principles had to be more 
95 Eileen, “Subsistence and Household Labour”, 330-331. The American anthropolo-
gist Alice Dewey, as read by D. Henley, shows how Javanese peasants were bound to 
village communities through commerce based on reliance and thrust in their communi-
ties. Outside the village, however, this thrust was absent so commerce was limited to 
the village boundaries. ‘Normally’, the state settled contract to enhance inter-village 
commerce, but in Java instead other mechanisms helped overcoming collective action 
problems to create new and more effi cient institutions in strikingly rational ways. See D. 
Henley, “From Tribes to Transaction Costs: How Two Anthropologists of Southeast Asia 
Anticipated the New Institutional Economics”, in Schrikker and Touwen (eds.), Promises 
and Predicaments, 163-178: 177.
96 Schoch, De Heerendiensten op Java en Madura, 5-6.
97 F. Fokkens, Eindresumé van het bij Besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal van Nederlandsch-
Indië van 24 Juli 1888 n°8 Bevolen Onderzoek naar de Verplichte Diensten der Inlandsche 
Bevolking op Java en Madoera, (Gouvernementslanden) (Batavia: Smits, 1901-1903) vol. I 
(1901), part 3, 107; Local people, according to Fokkens, did not know any division in 
services except for what they considered ‘heavy’ and ‘non-heavy’ services. See Pieren, 
“De Diensten aan de Hoofden”, 5.
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properly understood.98 This section focuses specifically on corvée services, 
and explores how lack of knowledge during the first attempts to reformu-
late corvée policy in Java, led to misinformed ideas, resulting in specious 
policy choices.
A lexicon of lies
In 1864, the second general ‘quinquennial corvée-revision’ defined a 
‘corvée service’ as one day or twelve hours of forced labour and restricted 
its use to 52 days per person annually.99 A distinction was made between 
‘regular’ and ‘special’ corvée services, as inherited from the Sunan.100 
‘Regular services’ were paid, and used for construction, repair and main-
tenance of interregional infrastructure (the main ‘corvée roads’101, bridges 
and culverts) and dams, dikes, and other major irrigation works.102 As a 
result, the infrastructure all over Java dramatically improved during 
the nineteenth century, but simultaneously, the burden of the services 
increased. ‘Special’ or ‘irregular’ services were unpaid and had been used 
by the Sunan for emergency repairs (gugur gunung) after natural disasters. 
During the Cultivation System they started including various other ad-hoc 
based services, such as delivering mail, occupying guardhouses, patrolling 
villages, assisting in transportation of government officials or prisoners, 
and guarding and maintaining government property such as passangrahan 
(travellers lodges) waterworks, warehouses or even (private) sugar fields.103 
98 See for a stinging contemporary description of this dissatisfaction and critique towards 
slow response of the colonial government: Gogol, “Losse Gedachten van een Heerendi-
enstplichtige door Gogol”, in TBB 3 (1889), II: 340 and III: 42, 92, 316.
99 In addition, these services had to be performed within the place of residence, or other-
wise had to include travel time including an overnight stay (to be calculated as an extra 
day of service). Delivery of goods and material needed for the work could not be part 
of corvée duties. It was often unclear to local offi cials and peasants whether this ‘day 
of twelve hours’ was adequately complied to and whether it included travel time. See 
Stbl. 1864 n14; NA MinKol 1850-1900 3196, Vb. 13-5-1879 n3, herein: Vb. See also: Anony-
mous, Regeling der Heerendiensten op Java (Overgedrukt uit het Dagblad van Zuidholland 
en ’s Gravenhage; ‘s Gravenhage: J. A. de la Vieter, 1866), 5; F. Fokkens, De Controleur op 
Java en Madoera: Memorandum van Ambtelijke Voorschriften en Bepalingen ten Behoeve van de 
Ambtenaren bij het Binnenlandsch Bestuur. II: Belastingen (Batavia: Kolff & Co, 1885), 315.
100 Though in use in practice already, this theoretical division was already acknowledged in 
the RR 1854 art 57 decree. See NA MinKol 1850-1900 3196, Vb. 13-5-1879 n3, herein: Vb.
101 In Dutch these were called ‘heerendienstwegen’ and ‘grote post- en binnenwegen.’
102 Only on the former apanage lands. Under the Sunan, these services were also known as 
intiran services. See Van den Haspel, Overwicht in Overleg, 7, 16.
103 Stbl. 1885 n211 art. 7; E. de Waal, Aanteekeningen over Koloniale Onderwerpen (‘s Graven-
hage: M. Nijhoff, 1864), VII, 243; Van Vleuten, “Belasting in Arbeid en Belasting in Geld”, 
217; Van den Haspel, Overwicht in Overleg, 7-8. For the use corvée to maintain sugar fi elds, 
see S. Margana, “Hybridity, Colonial Capitalism and Indigenous Resistance: The Case of 
the Paku Alam in Central Java”, in U. Bosma, J.A. Giusti-Cordero, and G.R. Knight (eds.), 
Sugarlandia Revisited: Sugar and Colonialism in Asia and the Americas, 1800-1940 (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2007), 95-112: 105-106.
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Exemption from service was possible, but depended on negotiable condi-
tions, patrimonial ties and social position; village officials, religious leaders, 
teachers and civil servants were traditionally exempted from service perfor-
mance.104 All were allowed to ‘buy off’ their services, by paying a sum and 
arranging a substitute labourer.105 This practice slowly developed into an 
institutionalized, permanent exchange of services for monetary head taxes, 
so head taxes could theoretically only be levied from people liable to corvée. 
Yet in practice, many others were ‘illegally’ assessed by indigenous civil 
servants, who “attempted to seek the favour of their Dutch superiors” by 
maximizing tax revenues.106 Additionally, firmly established in inheritable 
offices and unsupervised in their daily routines, chiefs used these services 
to excess, for their own private purposes.107 To ban ‘illegal’ use of corvée, 
Residents were obliged in 1851 to draft annual corvée registers (heeren-
dienstleggers) specifying both the anticipated and actual use of services. In 
practice, they were maintained by desa officials, and the subject of constant 
fraud.108 Levying of labour services became unpredictable, adding to the 
uncertainties of peasant life.109 Furthermore, the amount, use and burden 
of labour services became disproportionately distributed, depending on 
regional differences in both population density and service requirements, 
which further increased inequalities across Java.110
Around 1870, labour services were levied arbitrarily, chaotically and 
unlawfully. To Fokkens, they were like a “tight belt, pinching the peas-
ants down in their desa, preventing them from competing against Foreign 
Orientals or moving about freely to earn money.”111 Colonial officials 
were largely ignorant of the principles on which corvée duty or liability 
(heerendienstplichtigheid) rested. They generally considered them to relate 
104 Kartodirdjo, The Peasants’ Revolt, 47. This had not always been properly observed by 
the Dutch. Daendels for instance allegedly refused to exempt haji and religious leaders 
from service performance on the Grote Postweg, claiming that all “must work on the 
road” for all would “enjoy its comforts.” See Lapian, “Indonesian Perspectives”, 80-81. 
And in Kedu, indigenous offi cials who were entitled to arable land were expected to 
contribute in corvée performance despite their elevated position, and forced to ‘buy off’ 
their services. Fokkens, Eindresumé I, part 1, 101.
105 When a peasant bought-off his services, the money he paid was (supposedly) spent ‘to 
public benefi t.’ NA MinKol OV 1850-1900 3742, Vb. 10-4-1884 n59, herein: Vb., ‘Nota 
A2’. From 1905 onward, peasants were allowed to ‘buy off’ collectively. Stbl. 1905 n520; 
Fokkens, De Afschaffi ng der Laatste Heerendiensten, 16.
106 Fokkens, Eindresumé I, part 1, 18.
107 For instance for the maintenance of their own houses or sawah, which was in fact a pancen 
service. Schoch, De Heerendiensten op Java en Madura, 3-4; Van Vleuten, “Belasting in 
Arbeid en Belasting in Geld”, 230; Elson, Village Java, 91.
108 Elson, Village Java, 257, 258-259.
109 Pieren, “De Diensten”, 4; Elson, Village Java, 9, 11-12, 145.
110 Anonymous, Regeling der Heerendiensten op Java, 5-6.
111 Fokkens, Bijdrage tot de Kennis, II, 101.
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to land tenure as stipulated in 1854112, but landholding patterns were also 
insufficiently understood. The “poor conceptual lexicon of bureau men”, as 
put by Van Vollenhoven, of ‘communal’ or ‘individual inheritable’ forms of 
‘land possession’ were no longer fulfilled.113 This ‘lexicon’ had been filled 
with overgeneralized, abstracted adat terms, selected and blown out of 
proportion to fit developing colonial economic schemes initially rooted in 
ideas of ‘communal landownership’ and ‘coerced labour’ and subsequently 
in private ownership and wage labour. Distorted by these predetermined 
concepts of indigenous society, the adat lexicon was increasingly insisted 
upon, as the more it became ingrained in colonial policy, the harder it was to 
renounce it. When the colonial state attempted to liberalize the economy, it 
found that the institutions created in the service of the Cultivation System, 
still controlled its policies and obstructed change. Most prominent among 
these was indirect rule.
Favouring rulers over reforms: the head tax of 1882
As in the case of Ambon, a major obstacle to abolishing labour services was 
that many were part of traditional chiefly entitlements and compensations. 
Cultivation services, for instance, had contributed significantly to the earn-
ings of bupati and patuh. Altering or abolishing these had incited strong 
responses.114 Particularly problematic were the ‘pancen services.’ These were 
personal services performed by peasants to noble households and village 
chiefs. Comprising various maintenance, cleaning and household activities, 
pancen were an important aristocratic right and privilege. They contributed 
to the prestige of a household and many chiefs reportedly favoured services 
over monetary income.115 Ruling and chieftainship brought burdensome 
responsibilities and difficulties, which required rewards. Bekel, for instance, 
112 Hence, corvée was legally rooted in ‘landownership’, see Stbl. 1864 n14, 1870 n1, 1885 
n211, 1890 n248 (in 1890, Kedu and Bagelen, each having received its separate ordinance 
already after the Kedu investigation of Kuneman and Holle [see below] were exempted 
from this principle). See also Van Vleuten, “Belasting in Arbeid en Belasting in Geld”, 
214; Anonymous, Regeling der Heerendiensten op Java, 5; Van Vollenhoven, De Indonesiër en 
zijn Grond, 28.
113 Van Vollenhoven, De Indonesiër en zijn Grond, 42.
114 Fokkens, De Afschaffi ng der Laatste Heerendiensten, 5. It took until 1907 before all ‘cultiva-
tion percentages’ were fully abolished (See Elson, Village Java, 147-148; Fasseur, Kultuur-
stelsel, 31). For the salaries imposed as an alternative, see Stbl. 1867 n122-123 and 125.
115 This was reported by many Residents in Java after an enquiry by the Director of Interior 
Administration F. Verploegh (in offi ce 1875-1876) into the use of pancen services. See NA 
MinKol 1850-1900 3190, Vb. 18-4-1879 n31, herein: Vb., pp. 5-7, 15-17, DirBB to GG, 28-12-
1874. See also Elson, Village Java, 91, 213-214, 385 [n429] and Pieren, “De Diensten”, 9-10.
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were personally liable for ‘their’ villages’ tax debts.116 A number of letters 
stored in the archives of the Principality of Pakualam shows how, more than 
once, bekel disappeared in response to being unable to fulfil this debt.117 In 
one case in 1903, the father of a bekel cleverly suggested to the mantri polisi 
examining the disappearance case, that he appoint his other son as bekel 
instead, in order to keep the bekelship and its privileges within the family.118 
Bekel negotiated with higher officials about the taxes and services they 
rendered and attempted to retain as much as possible for themselves.119
Following the successful restriction of blandong services (used for 
collection of wood and timber for chiefs), Minister Fransen van de Putte 
proposed to prohibit pancen services in return for a salary increase, funded 
by a ‘pancen tax.’ The Cultivation Bill, of which this proposal was a part, did 
not pass parliament, but the replacement of pancen with taxes presented the 
Dutch parliament with a quandary which became a source of deep divi-
sion. Conservatives feared that abolishing pancen would curtail the chiefs’ 
ruling capacities and alienate the Javanese aristocracy through which the 
state operated. Liberals considered pancen a remnant of Dutch-Javanese 
‘feudalism.’ The replacement of labour services with taxation was formally 
part of to the Dutch annual state-budget proposal which required Parlia-
mentarian approval. To resolve the incessant political indecisiveness, liberal 
Minister O. van Rees (Minister of Colonies in 1879), concocted a resourceful 
but rather undemocratic ruse.120 He simply separated the replacement of 
head tax from the abolition of pancen, so the latter became not a fiscal, but 
a political measure, and as such could be kept outside of the state-budget 
116 Bekel bought the offi ce by signing a contract (piagem) with the patuh, and were allowed 
to keep part of the tax revenue in exchange for this personal responsibility. Mulherin, 
“The ‘Bekel’”, 24-25; S. Margana, “Surorejo versus Kartosudiro. Bekel and Bekel System 
in Principalities in Central Java during the Colonial Period 1880-1912”, Lembaran Sejarah 
3:1 (2000), 186-209: 193-197.
117 See the weekly reports of the ‘Wedana Distrik’ of the the Bupati of Pakualam in the Arsip 
Statis Kadipaten Pakualaman Yogyakarta (the archives of the principality of Pakualam), 
inv. nrs. 224, 416, 424, 425, 430, 572, translated from Javanese by Galih Adi Utama, 26-11-
2018.
118 Arsip Statis Kadipaten Pakualaman Yogyakarta No. 572: Mantri Pulisi Ngabehi Reksadi-
wirya to Parentah Kadhistrikan di Galur, No. 1067, 14-11-1903. See also Margana “Surorejo 
versus Kartosudiro”, 199-200.
119 See for instance: Arsip Statis Kadipaten Pakualaman Yogyakarta 224, herein: No. 271/
MD and 273/MD: Parentah Hageng Kepatihan di negeri Pakualaman to Mas Riya Wang-
sadirja (wadana dhistrik di Adikarta), 25-5-1898 and 26-5-1898, about a Demang who 
refused to pay up, no 981: District chief Mas Ngabehi Sadimeja to the Bupati of Adikarta, 
27-5-1901, about a tax confl ict between a paneket (lower offi cial) and the district chief of 
Genthan.
120 NA MinKol 1850-1900 3190, Vb. 18-4-1879 n31, herein: Vb., pp. 4-6, 15-17; NA MinKol 
1850-1900 OV 3196 Vb. 13-5-1879 n3, herein: Vb.; Pieren, “De Diensten”, 13-14. Van Rees, 
as member (1864-1868 and 1870-1872) and Vice-President (1873-1878) of the Raad van 
Indië had in fact been deeply involved in the pancen debate himself, and perhaps was one 
of the main culprits of “the dossier increasing in size.” See NA MinKol 1850-1900 3190, 
Vb. 18-4-1879 n31, herein: Vb., pp. 21-22.
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proposal of 1880, preventing the need for Parliamentarian consultation.121 
The bill passed, and all pancen services for the nobility were abolished in 
return for a salary increase. Subsequently, a uniform head tax of one annual 
guilder was introduced in 1882 to fund these salary raises. It was based on 
the ability to pay connected to the status of the taxpayer and his posses-
sion of a house and land, which potentially made the base of the head tax 
broader than that of forced labour.122
Crucial to enabling the abolition of pancen services were the patrimonial 
ties between Residents and the priyayi. After 1882, the overlap between 
pancen, government corvée and desa services gave leeway for the continued 
use of personal services by local elites, to which many Residents turned 
a blind eye, for the sake of harmony.123 Informal procedures of indirect 
rule always survived political change. Its roots were stronger than the 
political realities concocted in The Hague, as officials and indigenous elites 
relied on each other, exchanging information for renumerations.124 Thus, 
central coordination over the administration of labour services remained 
limited. Formal supervision did not reach deep enough into the village to 
adequately monitor their use, as administered by desa chiefs, and officials 
kept protecting Java’s aristocracy against government policy.125
Still, the introduction of head taxes was celebrated as an important first 
step in the reduction of corvée labour. Seizing momentum, Director of the 
Interior Administration J.M. van Vleuten (in office 1885-1889) encouraged 
Residents to stimulate further redemption of services.126 In 1884, a number 
of the maintenance, transport and patrol services were abolished and the 
maximum number of labour days was reduced to 42.127 But all corvée and 
desa services were still regulated under one ordinance covering the whole 
of Java. The central government had limited insight into, let alone control, 
over the highly diverse local principles and practices of corvée labour. 
121 NA MinKol 1850-1900 OV, Vb. 18-4-1879 n31, herein: Vb., pp. 21-22.
122 Stbl. 1892 n136 (abolishment of specifi c pancen services) and 137 (introduction of the head 
tax); Fokkens, De Afschaffi ng der Laatste Heerendiensten, 31; NA MinKol 1850-1900 OV 
3575, Vb. 24-10-1882 n3; Soebekti, Some Facets, 10.
123 NA MinKol 1850-1900 3241, Vb. 16-10-1879 n2, herein: Vb.
124 The relationship between the courts of bupati and the Dutch administrators hinged upon 
private relations between Resident and lord through diplomacy, gift-excchange, favou-
ratism, clientelism, knowledge exchange and spying. See Houben, Kraton and Kunpeni: 
Surakarta and Yogyakarta, 1830-1870 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1994), 21-26, 96-97, 126-129.
125 Ernst, “Afschaffi ng of Afkoopbaarstelling der Heerendiensten op Java”, IG 12 (1890), 
1434-1462: 1447. Ernst was the pseudonym of colonial offi cial W.P.D. de Wolff van West-
errode (1857-1904).
126 Vleuten, “Belasting in Arbeid en Belasting in Geld”, 218-221, 224-225.
127 Fokkens, De Afschaffi ng der Laatste Heerendiensten, 8. Stbl. 1885 n211. Additionally, manda-
tory delivery of privately owned materials and goods for fulfi lling labour services was 
prohibited and corvée was stipulated to be levied at a maximum distance of 2.5 hours 
of walking from the labourers’ home, or under reimbursed travel costs, though as 
mentioned in chapter 3, many controleurs tended to ignore this. See Fokkens, De Contro-
leur op Java en Madoera II: Belastingen, 15; NA MinKol 1850-1900 3208, Vb. 3-7-1879 n5, 
herein: Vb.
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In the later nineteenth century, the colonial state would no longer allow 
absence of knowledge to impede its reforms. Investigations into Java’s 
landholding patterns had been carried out in 1868-1869 and resulted in 
bulky reports published in 1876-1896.128 These were inspired by the need to 
justify liberal bias towards individual landowners, born from an aversion 
to government-managed communal landholding patterns.129 They shaped 
a reality in which the limited terminology of individual and communal 
landholding was repeated. The next step was to explore, or rather define, 
how these landholding patterns related to labour duties. A pilot project was 
commenced in the Residency of Kedu, in Central Java. Around the same 
time, tensions about corvée principles and the new head taxes arose in the 
Residency of Banten on West Java. These cases provide intriguing insights 
into the severe consequences of Dutch attempts to understand and rewrite 
corvée regulations.
Mapping and changing the adat archive
The case of Kedu offers a fascinating example of how deeply land rights 
and corvée services had become entangled.130 Kedu had been among the 
Sunan’s more prominent apanage lands, providing high amounts of rice, 
corn and dry crops, before being annexed by the British in 1912. Although 
around 1815, it was among the most densely populated areas of Java, after 
the Java War it experienced such heavy depopulation that a premium 
was imposed to attract new settlers. This population decrease, plus the 
high burden imposed by land rent, demanded in cash rather than kind 
and the coerced cultivation of tobacco and coffee (the principle cash crops 
cultivated in Kedu), forced peasants into debt and encouraged chiefs to 
enlarge the number of coerced labourers, by awarding land-tenure.131 Kedu 
was therefor considered representative of an area of intensive land-labour 
distribution, under the impact of forced labour, suitable for an experiment 
with ‘buying off’, and furthermore, replacing services with head taxes.132
128 W.B. Bergsma, Eindresumé van het bij Goevernements Besluit d.d. 10 Juni 1867 no. 2 Bevolen 
Onderzoek naar de Rechten van den Inlander op den Grond op Java en Madoera (3 vols., Batavia: 
Ernst & Co, 1876-1896); Goh, Communal Land Tenure, 28-29.
129 Goh, Communal Land Tenure, 29; R. Van Niel, “Landholding in Java: Discussion Paper for 
a Conference Workshop” (Conference paper, Congrè s International d’Histoire, 1982), 21 
n65; Furnivall, Netherlands India, 163-164.
130 NA MinKol 1850-1900 4312, Vb. 5-11-1889 n22, herein: Vb. The fi nal report can be found 
in: ANRI AS GB MGS 4397, herein: Besl. 28-8-1889: ‘Onderzoek naar de verplichte dien-
sten der inlandsche bevolking in de residentie Kedoe.’
131 Fokkens, Eindresumé I, part 2, 68-69; Carey, The Power of Prophecy, 383, 464-466; Bakker, 
Patrimonialism and imperialism, 213-214; Bergsma, Eindresumé , 153-156. Many corvée 
services were used during the construction of the fortress ‘Willem I’ at Ambarawa in 1839-
1840.
132 Fokkens, Eindresumé I, part 2, 67-68; Fokkens, Bijdrage tot de Kennis, II, 5-6; Carey, The 
Power of Prophecy, 11, 41, 380, 424-425; Elson, Village Java, 14. There was also small industry 
in Kedu, See Fernando, “Growth of Non-Agricultural Economic Activities”, 83-85.
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A thorough investigation, coordinated by the later Director of Inte-
rior Administration H. Kuneman and carried out by specially appointed 
controleurs Fokkens, J.L. van Gennep and special advisor and tea planter K. 
Holle, commenced in 1884.133 Its final, report, counting over 1000 pages and 
ultimately incorporated into Fokkens Eindresumé , demonstrated that during 
the Cultivation System, gondol – the local term for tax or corvée liability – 
had started depending on very precise distinctions in land rights, dating 
back to eighteenth-century apanage-principles. With some exceptions, 
Kedu, as well as some other areas formerly administered by the Sunan, 
generally knew a distinction between those people who had full rights to 
tegal and sawah yasa, called kuli kenceng, and those possessing only a house 
with a yard, garden or smaller plot of land, called indung pekerangan (or 
kuli karangkopek).134 Each group performed its own specific types of services. 
Owning more land-shares automatically increased one’s supposed capacity 
to contribute to the tax burden. Thus, heavier services were awarded to 
kuli kenceng, while lighter services were performed by those with less land 
shares.135
However, Fokkens interpreted the situation as if the kuli kenceng had 
‘full’ and the indung pekerangan had ‘half’ gondol, so that in theory, compared 
to the kuli kenceng, the indung pekerangan had to perform only half of the 
amount (or days) of services.136 This was acknowledged in the Kedu corvée 
regulation of 1889, drafted after the investigation.137 Subsequently, kuli 
kenceng paid one guilder in the head tax of 1882, and indung pekerangan only 
133 The initial investigators, P. van der Weide (who served as Government Secretary in 
1883-1886) and his successor Controleur J.A.B. Wiselius both passed away unexpectedly 
before completion of the investigation. The only advise Wiselius was able to formulate 
was to decentralize labour service regulations by arranging them under the authority 
of provincial committees. His successor, H. Kuneman, disagreed with him, considering 
such decentralization harmful to fi scal unity. See ANRI AS GB MGS 4397, herein: Besl. 
28-8-1889: RvI 15-3-1890: MinKol to Koning, 5-11-1889, ‘Onderzoek naar de verplichte 
diensten der inlandsche bevolking in de Residentie Kedoe’, pp. 1-17; Fokkens, Bijdrage tot 
de Kennis, II, 6-7.
134 In the Regency of Tumenggung no distinction in arable land was made. Full liability 
based on possession of sawah and tegal existed in Magelang and a number of districts in 
Perakan. Those not possessing a house and living on the plot of another peasant, but in 
possession of some land rights, were called kuli gundul.
135 Moertono, Negara, 144-145. Additionally, there were two other groups: those who only 
had a house and those who had no property at all.
136 Full corvée liability theoretically comprised 52 days of service, so half liability came 
down to 26 days and quarter liability to 13 days of labour. In practice, kuli kenceng 
performed the majority of labour services, while indung pekerangan were only expected to 
assist when required. See Fokkens, Eindresumé I, part 1, 99.
137 Stbl. 1889 n267. By this time, corvée services were mostly used for construction and 
maintenance of waterworks and roads and the occupation of guardhouses. A number 
of these (‘regular’) services was abolished, and only allowed to be levied in case ‘not 
enough coolies were available.’ Fokkens, Eindresumé I, part 1, 102, 103-104.
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50 cents.138 Corvée duties were made exchangeable for an annual tax of 5 to 
10 guilders and coffee cultivation services for 12.50 to 20 guilders.139 In the 
case of non-performance or non-payment, land shares could be revoked. 
When peasants had land shares in multiple desa, they would have gondol in 
both – the Dutch called this ‘plural liability’ – and was expected to appoint 
one or more replacement labourers (jagul) in the desa he did not inhabit. 
‘Plural liability’ also occurred when peasants bought (but not when they 
inherited) multiple plots of land within the area of one desa.140
The situation as described above most likely emerged under the differ-
entiating pressure of corvée and cultivation services. Inspector for Agricul-
ture J.H.F. Sollewijn Gelpke emphasised that the principle of the volume of 
land rights determining tax lability, was not considered unfair.141 However, 
the complex reality in Kedu and in many surrounding Residencies142 
was that many peasants enjoyed a collection of land rights disseminated 
throughout various desa.143 ‘Plural liability’ was a concept particularly hard 
to grasp for the colonial bureaucracy, which sought to create fiscal equity 
by redistributing corvée services among neatly territorially defined desa, 
rather than among scattered individuals.144 But peasants with land-rights 
across desa in Kedu were not necessarily wealthy. To many peasants double 
gondal posed an unbearable burden as it taxed the number rather than the 
size of the lands they owned; they could barely afford sufficient jagul. Most 
importantly, full gondal offered chiefs and the state much more potential 
labour power than half gondal. Hence individual (rather than communal) 
landholding was actively stimulated to maximize the number of fully 
liable corvée labourers and spread the corvée burden over as many people 
as possible, regardless of the size of or rights to lands or the wealth of its 
owners.145 Having a great number of ‘fully liable peasants’ with full rights 
to one small plot of land, provided more labour power than a few peas-
138 Later on, it was ‘discovered’ that many of the latter were illegitimately assessed at 1 
guilder as well Fokkens, Eindresumé I, part 1, 105.
139 Stbl. 1893 n68 and 1894 n282; ANRI AS GB MGS 4038, herein: MGS 13-3-1900, ‘Nota 
Heerendienstplicht, Res. Kedoe’ (date unclear), pp. 4-5.
140 Ibid., I, part 1, 99-100; ANRI AS GB MGS 4038, herein: MGS 13-3-1900, ‘Nota Heerendien-
stplicht’, Res. Kedoe, pp. 8-10.
141 He wrote: “People in the desa appreciate it when persons with more shares in land 
perform more corvée services.” This argument was also voiced by the Resident of Kedu. 
See ANRI AS GB MGS 4038, herein: MGS, 15-3-1900: Nota Heerendienstplicht, Res. 
Kedoe (date unclear), pp. 5-6, ‘Verslag van het onderzoek naar de werking van regelingen 
der heeren- en desadiensten in de Res. Kedoe.’
142 These included at least Bagelen, Karawang and Banjumas. which were also former 
apanage lands of the Sunan, and used the same principles of half and plural gondal.
143 Hence, the regulation for Bagelen of 1890 also distinguished between ‘whole’ and ‘half’ 
gondal, See Stbl. 1890 n162.
144 From 1894 onwards, in case an investigation showed that local people appreciated plural 
liability, the resident could approve to maintain it: Stbl. 1894 n282 art 1.1; Van den L.W.C. 
van den Berg, “Het Inlandsche Gemeentewezen op Java en Madoera”, BKI 52:1 (1901), 1: 84.
145 Ernst, “Afschaffi ng of Afkoopbaarstelling”, 1444.
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ants who accumulatively had rights to much more land, but were only ‘half 
liable’ in the desa they ‘owned’ these lands.
This way, the development of landholding in Kedu started aiding 
colonial labour extraction, to the frustration of liberal officials such as 
Sollewijn Gelpke and Head inspector for Cultivations J.W. van der Valk, 
who dismissed differences in gondal as “artificial institutions” and “theo-
retical incongruities.”146 Using land shares as a base for corvée liability was 
“continued where it existed” in 1890147, but according to the Resident of 
Kedu it had become the “sacred cow […] of corvée labour.”148 He preferred 
to fully abolish principles of half and plural gondal and define new prin-
ciples to connect corvée liability to wealth instead of land.149 However, 
individual levels of wealth were unknown. In the eventual ordinance of 
1901, the differences between gondal were abolished.150 The Resident was 
supposed to redistribute services among desa to enhance equity. But lacking 
detailed knowledge on individual wealth, he delegated administration of 
corvée to desa chiefs. As such, while on paper the system was updated to fit 
principles of modern taxation, in practice the system continued to rely on 
village chiefs, regulated by direct bargaining and clandestine deal-making, 
and many services kept being performed in the old way.151
Distorted liability. The case of Banten.
In Banten, Dutch intervention had even greater consequences. The Sultanate 
of Banten remained independent until the mid-eighteenth century. It 
retained a strong local identity and tradition, until it became a VOC vassal 
state after a series of internal disruptions eagerly capitalized on by the 
Dutch. In 1808 it was fully incorporated within the Dutch empire and by 
146 ANRI AS GB MGS 4038, herein: MGS 15-3-1900, Nota Heerendienstplicht, Res. Kedoe, 
pp. 1-10, esp. pp 4-5; ‘Advies HIC, in: MinKol, Nota, herziening […] heerendienstre-
geling voor Kedoe en Bagelen.’ See also: H. Maat, Science Cultivating Practice: A History of 
Agricultural Science in the Netherlands and its Colonies, 1863–1986 (PhD thesis, Wageningen, 
2001), 147.
147 As established by Stbl. 1890 n248.
148 ANRI AS GB MGS 4038, herein: MGS 15-3-1900, Nota Heerendienstplicht, Res. Kedoe, 
pp. 1-10, 16-20. See also: J. de Louter, Handleiding tot de Kennis van het Staats- en Adminis-
tratief Recht van Nederlandsch-Indië (‘s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1904), 239.
149 ANRI AS GB MGS 4038, herein: MGS 15-3-1900, Nota Heerendienstplicht, Res. Kedoe, 
pp. 18-19, 22-25, 28-30.
150 Stbl. 1901 n204, art. 1 and 5; ANRI AS GB MGS 4038, herein: ‘Voorschriften ter uitvoering 
van de ordonnantie tot regeling der heerendiensten in de residentie Kedoe’; Fokkens, 
Bijdrage tot de Kennis, II, 90.
151 ANRI AS GB MGS 4038, herein: MGS 15-3-1900, ‘Nota Heerendienstplicht, Res. Kedoe, 
p. 22-23. For instance, it appeared that after being prohibited many “lesser useful 
services” (such as guarding of warehouses or planting of ‘shade-trees’ next to corvée 
roads) were still performed. See NA MinKol 1850-1900 4332, Vb. 14-1-1890 n27, herein: 
RvI 14-6-1889; NA MinKol 1850-1900 4457, Vb. 14-3-1891 n54, herein: GG to MinKol, 
20-10-1988 and Besl. GG, 17-12-1890.
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1832, the Sultanate was abolished.152 The Sultan was replaced with foreign 
priyayi from elsewhere in Java, who enjoyed little legitimacy in the eyes of 
the peasantry leading to frequent resistance.153 Against the backdrop of these 
tensions, the Dutch misinterpreted patterns of landholding and tax liability 
to diminish corvée, leading to a large peasant rebellion in 1888.
In Banten, distinction was made between sawah yasa, lands reclaimed 
by sikep, and sawah negara, lands belonging to the Sultan. Traditionally, 
sawah negara were leased by apanage holders, who developed them using 
the royal irrigations system in exchange for a tribute of ten percent of the 
yield (later doubled to 20% by Daendels).154 Sawah yasa, were held under 
individual inheritable rights, which did not impose personal liability for 
taxes and services to the Sultan. Rather, sikep made a specific payment in 
recognition of the Sultan’s supreme landholding rights. The Sultan was 
originally allowed to levy corvée services only from sawah negara users.155 
Priyayi in Banten enjoyed far fewer benefits than those elsewhere in Java, 
due to poor agricultural performance, largely caused by land infertility and 
low peasant participation in the Cultivation System.156 After the abolition of 
the Sultanate, the indigenous elite of the Sultan’s former land grantees had 
to compete, over salaries, lands and peasant labour, with the priyayi installed 
by the Dutch. Many bupati started levying excessive amounts of services, 
including from those possessing sawah yasa. This became well-known 
through the example of the bupati of Lebak, Karta Natanagara, immortalized 
in Multatuli’s Max Havelaar.157 Many persons who, according to local adat, 
were not liable for compulsory services, performed them nevertheless.158
152 A. Ota, "Banten Rebellion, 1750-1752: Factors Behind the Mass Participation", Modern 
Asian Studies 37:3 (2003), 613-651: 615-616, 628-629; A. Ota, Changes of Regime and Social 
Dynamics in West Java: Society, State and the Outer World of Banten, 1750-1830 (Leiden: Brill, 
2006), 15-18, 134-147; M.C. Williams, Communism, Religion, and Revolt in Banten (Athens: 
Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1990), xxvi-xxvii, 72. See also J. Talens, 
Een Feodale Samenleving in Koloniaal Vaarwater: Staatsvorming, Koloniale Expansie en Econo-
mische Onderontwikkeling in Banten, West-Java, 1600-1750 (Hilversum: Verloren, 1999).
153 Kartodirdjo, The Peasants’ Revolt, 105-107; Williams, Communism, Religion, and Revolt, 32, 
68-69, 81-83; Ota, Changes of Regime, 1750-1830, 153-155, 158.
154 The sawah negara were subdivided into the lands exploited by the Sultan (sawah kesul-
tanan), his family members and courtly dependents (sawah kewargan) and civil servants 
and grandees. According to Kern, this 20% rate was used as a guideline by Raffl es for 
the land rent rate, see R.A. Kern, “Het Landelijk Stelsel in het Bantensche Rijk”, IG 28 
(1906), 685-710: 589-592. See also: Bergsma, Eindresumé II (1902), part 1, 4; Kartodirdjo, The 
Peasants’ Revolt, 34-35; Ota, “Banten Rebellion”, 625-626; Ota, Changes of Regime, 40-51.
155 Kern, “Het Landelijk Stelsel”, 696-698.
156 Comprising primarily cultivation of coffee. See Williams, Communism, Religion, and 
Revolt, 5-6, 19; Ota, Changes of Regime, 53-58; Fasseur, Kultuurstelsel, 19, 217.
157 Kartodirdjo, The Peasants’ Revolt, 29, 33-37, 38-39, 42-43, 87-89; Williams, Communism, 
Religion, and Revolt, 63-68; Bergsma, Eindresumé , 1-4. Additionally, during the nineteenth 
century, the increasing tax burden made planting of secondary crops (tanaman pajeg [tax 
crops]; cultivated to raise money for paying taxes) more important.
158 Kartodirdjo, The Peasants' Revolt, 42; Kern, “Het Landelijk Stelsel”, 697, 698-699; Fokkens, 
Eindresumé I, part 1, 18-21 and II, part 2, 17-23.
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The abolition of pancen services and the introduction of head taxes in 
1882 complicated matters further. The liability to perform pancen and other 
services on sawah negara rested not on land (shares), but personally on the 
kepala rumah or baku (‘house/family chief’), the eldest men of the house-
hold who represented the cacah.159 To cultivate his sawah negara and fulfil 
his duties, services and taxes (including pancen), baku invoked their house-
hold’s labour power, consisting of their menumpang: sons and other rela-
tives, bujang, abdi (serves) and mardijkers.160 So baku were the taxable persons, 
who used their families and dependents to fulfil their tax assessments. Yet, 
Resident A.J. Spaan interpreted the head tax of 1882 as a replacement of 
performance rather than liability to pancen, and ordered the assessment all 
‘able-bodied’ men aged between 15 and 50 with an annual one guilder head 
tax.161 This, he thought, would redistribute the burden more equally.162 But in 
the eyes of the baku, it indicated a huge and unjust tax increase. Suddenly, 
they were taxed at a rate of one guilder for each of their menumpang, 
instead of one guilder per household. Spaan’s misinterpretation is a typical 
example of officials attempting to improve equity by marking reciprocity in 
a domestic labour economy as a form of taxation, and raising the amount of 
taxpayers had to pay, while ignoring their capacity to do so.163 The error was 
discovered in time, but Spaan’s administration pursued the introduction of 
the head tax nevertheless, announcing it as a tax reduction.164 Combined with 
the heavy burden imposed by trade taxes and land rent, also levied under 
erroneous presumptions, many peasants began to believe that the govern-
ment was purposely overtaxing them.165 During the following years, growing 
discontent fused with other anti-colonial sentiments, ultimately igniting the 
revolt.
159 Fokkens, Eindresumé I, part 1, 19., 19; See also: ANRI AS GB Besl. 142, herein: ‘Monografi e 
betreffende de heeren- en desadiensten’ and Besl. 19-4-1893 n9: RvI 28-9-1892. If a baku 
divorced, he returned to his ‘own’ family where his father or an elder brother was the 
‘taxable’ baku.
160 Williams, Communism, Religion, and Revolt, 41.
161 NA MinKol 1850-1900 OV 4234, Vb. 7-2-1889 n4, herein: Res. Banten to GG, 7-4-1882; See 
for the same interpretation: Fokkens, Eindresumé I, part 1, 18-29.
162 NA Exhibitum 5-3-1892, herein Res. Banten to Ass-Res van Banten and Regent en Contro-
leur of Serang, 3-12-1888; Kartodirdjo, The Peasants’ Revolt, 31-32.
163 This can be compared to the case of the somahan-regulation of 1834 in Priangan, which 
disconnected the corvée duty from landholding, abolished the cacah system and made 
all peasants personally liable to perform corvée services. The burden imposed by labour 
services consequently increased, as the landless menumpang, already performing a large 
part of forced agricultural work (either on command or for a wage) suddenly faced more 
corvée services to which they became liable in their personal capacity, even though they 
were assessed more lightly then landowners. Breman, Koloniaal Profi jt, 21-22, 24, 244.
164 Kartodirdjo, The Peasants’ Revolt, 63.
165 Ibid., 63-64, 282-284; Williams, Communism, Religion, and Revolt, 74-78.
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As shown by Kartodirdjo, this revolt was a well-orchestrated event, 
inspired by the leaders of popular religious brotherhoods (tarekat).166 Fed 
by enduring tensions between belligerent rebellious groups, consisting of 
the remnants of the Sultanate’s old aristocracy and the new Dutch-installed 
and salaried bureaucratic elite of locally distrusted Pangreh Praja, it prin-
cipally sought to get rid of both ‘pagan’ Western dominance and the alien 
nobilities occupying the Regent positions.167 Indeed, “the history of peasant 
struggles in Banten is a history of opposition, not between peasant and 
lord, but between peasants and agents of outside government.”168 The 
Dutch had underestimated the social political tensions they had caused 
during the preceding decades. Ultimately, the imposition of head taxes 
was experienced as more burdensome and less acceptable than the services 
they replaced and resentment finally set alight a dangerous tinderbox of 
political tensions, religious extremism and socio-economic difficulties.169 
Combined with the consequences of natural disasters, disease and taxation 
in the 1880s, the alienation of the peasantry from its foreign governing elites 
helped to mobilize them for action.170 As summarized by Scott, “Whether 
peasants who perceive themselves as being exploited actually rebel depends 
on a host of intervening factors – alliances with other classes, the repres-
sive capacity of elites, and social organization of the peasantry itself.”171 In 
Banten, these factors conjoined. During the revolt the archives at the houses 
of the (assistant)-wedana, patih and Assistant-Resident were purposely 
destroyed. Thus, the peasants obliterated the institutional memories that 
supported the much-hated practices of tax-levying.172
The rebellion was harshly supressed but left a festering wound. None of 
its underlying tensions were permanently resolved.173 Kartodirdjo maps a 
number of disentangled circumstances as the cause of the revolt, but within 
the contemporary colonial administration it was attributed, primarily, to the 
imposition of the head tax.174 Resident J.A. Velders (in office, 1888-1895), 
appointed immediately after the revolt, wrote an exceptionally insightful 
note to his staff. He stressed the point that it was not sufficient to simply 
blame the insurgency on the “lust of rascals” (the typical colonial response 
166 Kartodirdjo, The Peasants’ Revolt, 66.
167 Ibid., 30, 73-76, 83-84; Williams, Communism, Religion, and Revolt, 79-82.
168 Williams, Communism, Religion, and Revolt, xxviii, 61.
169 Ibid., 77-78.
170 These disasters included cattle diseases and smallpox raging in the early 1880s, and the 
Krakatau eruption of 1883. Kartodirdjo, The Peasants’ Revolt, 63-65; Williams, Communism, 
Religion, and Revolt, 16-17.
171 Scott, The Moral Economy, 3. Kartodirdjo argues that, indeed, the fusion, or “eclipse” of 
religious into economic factors shaped the base platform for potential revolt. Kartodirdjo, 
Protest Movements, 51.
172 Ibid., 231, 233-5.
173 See Williams, Communism, Religion, and Revolt, 143-274.
174 Kartodirdjo, The Peasants’ Revolt of Banten, 63, 274-287.
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to revolts), or their desire to “have Islam triumph over Christianity”, but 
to scrutinize deeper socio-economic factors underneath the resentment 
against Dutch governance, including Resident Spaan’s error in levying 
tax on menumpang.175 This involved a close investigation of specific, socio-
religious influences on village-politics, which disclosed that village chiefs 
often required the assistance of local strongmen in order to levy taxes, and 
that these ‘strongmen’(jago), in fact, sometimes started overshadowing the 
actual village chiefs, as powerholders.176
A good example are the alliances that chiefs sought with ‘kyai’, to 
bolster their position.177 Kyai were Islam experts trained in Mecca and, 
once back home, tutored young students through networks of pesantren 
(religious boarding schools). In some areas, acceptance of colonial gover-
nance depended on the mediation of kyai, who enjoyed high social status 
in Banten, higher than many priyayi.178 The Dutch were highly suspicious 
of them but could not ignore their influence. As leaders of the tarekat, it was 
alleged they had a determinant role in the rebellion.179 Furthermore, they 
had gained an important role in rural tax-administration by influencing the 
appointment of amil. These were religious village officials who managed 
matters of marriage and divorce, and who through administration of 
zakat, the Islamic mandatory charitable contribution, had slowly extended 
their influence over the collection of various taxes.180 Amil were formally 
appointed by penghulu, Islamic scholars (ulama) from a priyayi background, 
and absorbed into the government as religious officials.181 Dutch officials 
worried that the kyai were a force that could potentially rival the penghulu’s, 
hence the government’s influence in village life, by intervening in the selec-
tion of amil through their control over desa chiefs. Holle, called on for advice, 
suggested awarding the kyai salaries, in order to exercise greater control 
175 NA MinKol 1850-1900 OV 4553, Exh. 6-3-1892, herein: Res. Banten to Ass-Res Banten and 
Regent and Controleur of Serang, 3-12-1888.
176 Williams, Communism, Religion, and Revolt, 42-48, quote p. 44. See also H.C.G Schulte 
Nordholt, "De Jago in de Schaduw: Misdaad en 'Orde' in de Koloniale Staat op Java", De 
Gids: Nieuwe Vaderlandsche Letteroefeningen 146:8/9 (1983), 664-675; M. van Till, Banditry in 
West Java: 1869-1942 (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011), 10-15, 75-78.
177 Ibid., 41-42. ANRI AS GB Besl. 142, herein: MGS 10-12-1892 and MGS 21-9-1892: ‘Extract 
besl. uit het register besluiten Resident van Banten’, 30-1892.
178 C. Geertz, “The Javanese Kijaji: the Changing Role of a Cultural Broker”, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 2:2 (1960), 228-249: 229, 230-231.
179 Williams, Communism, Religion, and Revolt, 56; Kartodirdjo, The Peasants’ Revolt, 170-180.
180 In 1866, it had been decreed that the Dutch colonial government would not interfere in 
the collection of zakat and refrain from interfering in the “religious incomes” of indige-
nous leaders. See A. Fauzia, Faith and the State: A History of Islamic Philanthropy in Indonesia 
(Leiden: Brill, 2013), 114.
181 Williams, Communism, Religion, and Revolt, 64, 93. Kartodirdjo does not seem to distin-
guish between amil and penghulu, but according to the reports of Holle and Snoukc 
Hurgronje (see below) this distinction was crucial. Kartodirdjo, The Peasants’ Revolt of 
Banten, 57. See also G.F. Pijper, Studiën over de Geschiedenis van de Islam in Indonesia, 1900-
1950 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977), 63-96.
Promise Pretence and Pragmatism.indb   189 22-04-21   17:34
190 Chapter 4
over them as “suitable tools” for mapping popular religious thought.182 
However, Snouck Hurgronje, who’s views on religious affairs were gener-
ally considered unassailable, was more cautious about the influence of 
political Islam. He advised protecting the role of the penghulu by appointing 
amil, to form a front against the kyai.183 Though officially the government 
principally refrained from involving in desa politics or adat affairs, it none-
theless prohibited desa chiefs from interfering in the appointment of amil, 
thereby curtailing the kyai’s involvement in desa politics.184
In his final resumé, referring to the Banten-revolt, Fokkens strongly 
warned about paying greater heed to local adat, and prioritizing different 
local circumstances over, “noble but unrealizable government principles.”185 
His chapter on Banten sums up a long list of previously unconsidered 
exemptions, including menumpang, the traditional Badui communities in 
southern Banten, and new settlers, all of a relatively feeble socio-economic 
position and status.186 The head tax, Fokkens claimed, was locally seen 
as pajak badan (‘body tax’) levied on top of land rent or income tax (pajak 
pencarian), and not as a substitute for pancen services.187 Clearer communica-
tion and the soothing effect of salary increases and benevolence towards 
non-payment, he claimed, would prevent friction.188 Eventually the new 
regulations placed liability for corvée on the baku and diminished a series of 
desa services. Velders held all officials personally responsible for the correct 
levying of head tax; no menumpang was to pay head tax.189 If anything, the 
Banten revolt demonstrates the entanglements between taxation and poli-
tics. The Dutch had to give serious thought as to how they reinterpreted 
local society, update their ‘lexicon’ and temper their ambitious moderniza-
tion, centralization and unification plans.
182 ANRI AS GB Besl. 142, herein: MGS 21-9-1892: Adv-Hon Holle to DirBB, 28-8-1892. As a 
matter of fact, Holle was not a great fan of the kyai or the tarekat. Earlier, he had criticized 
Van Vleuten, at the time Resident of Batavia, for appointing a penghulu who was member 
of the Naqsyabandiyah tarekat, a sufi  order which was well known for its rigid conserva-
tive, anti-colonial agenda. But in the case of Banten, he considered keeping the kyai close 
a safer option than rigidly alienating them. See T. van den Berge, Karel Frederik Holle: 
Theeplanter in Indië 1829-1896 (Amsterdam: Bakker, 1998), 255-256.
183 ANRI AS GB Besl. 142, herein: Besluit 19-4-1893 n9: Res. Banten to ‘Adv-Hon Oostelijke 
talen en Mohammedaans Recht’ Dr. Snouck Hurgronje, 18-8-1892, ‘Benoeming Amil in 
Bantam’, 27-2-1893, Snouck-H. to 1e Gov. Sec., [?]-9-1892.
184 ANRI AS GB Besl. 142, herein: MGS 21-9-1892: Extract Besl. 30-1892, Res. Banten to 
DirBB, 25-8-1892 and 8-9-1892.
185 Fokkens, Eindresumé I, part 1, 3, 19, 21-25.
186 Ibid., I, part 1, 20-21.
187 Ibid., I, part 1, 29.
188 Ibid., I, part 1, 28-29.
189 NA MinKol 1850-1900 4553 Exh. 5-3-1892; ANRI AS GB Besl. 142, herein: MGS 21-9-1892: 
Extract Besl. 30-1892; Stbl. 1893 n108.
Promise Pretence and Pragmatism.indb   190 22-04-21   17:34
Labour and money: Socio-economic organization, coerced labour and monetary taxation in Java, c. 1830-1930 191
4.4 Adding to the paper trail: investigations, redefinitions 
and continuities
The cases of Kedu and Banten emphasize how colonial ignorance about 
diversity in social patterns of land-tenure and tax liability in Java obstructed 
reform, unification and the lessening of the burden of colonial corvée and 
taxation. More fundamental and encompassing knowledge of the whole of 
Java was required, if overarching, equalizing and unifying corvée policy 
supportive of Javanese welfare was ever to be established. This motivated 
the investigations of Fokkens in 1889-1893.
Report writing
Fokkens was ordered to map all the different types, numbers and under-
lying principles of corvée labour across Java, in order to formulate an 
island-encompassing route, to head taxes. After 1890, his research would 
become pivotal to colonial tax policy for both Java and other regions. He 
was an official of deep ethical convictions, devoted to welfare policy and 
concerned about the impact of corvée on the well-being of the Javanese.190 
After the final resumé, he published a relentless stream of critical commen-
taries on government policy, in which he advocated for the abolition of 
corvée.
Before discussing Fokkens’ research, it is important to understand 
he was limited by the government’s conflicting obsession with both 
unifying and underpinning tax policy in local labour-service principles. In 
the production of a new tax policy, Fokkens was allowed little room for 
manoeuvre, beyond the existing colonial theories of standardized forms 
of corvée labour.191 So before he commenced, his findings were already 
entrenched in path-dependent principles of forced labour. Indeed, colonial 
investigations and report writing were a recurring strategy to reorganize 
rather than accumulate knowledge. Investigative committees, consisting 
of experienced government-officials or planters (like Fokkens, Kuneman 
or Holle), were expected to “reconstruct historical narratives, decreeing 
what past events were pertinent to current issues and how they should be 
framed.”192 Investigations were used as “quasi-state technologies” to verify 
problems through the eyes of “outside experts”, thereby demonstrating 
“the state’s right to power through its will to the production of truth.”193 
Fokkens and Kuneman were both appointed to Batavia’s central bureau-
190 Claver, Dutch Commerce and Chinese Merchants, 161.
191 Fokkens, Eindresumé I, part 1, iii-v; Fokkens, Bijdrage tot de Kennis, II, 51.
192 Stoler, Along the Archival Grain, 29.
193 Ibid., 31. In fact, ‘outside-advisors’ like Holle frequently met with distrust of controleurs 
and Residents, who feared their meddlesomeness might undermine their authority. See 
Van den Berge, Karel Frederik Holle, 58-84, 60-62, 67; Van Doorn, De Laatste Eeuw, 114-116, 
150-159.
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cracy, Fokkens as Inspector of Cultures and Kuneman as Director of the 
Interior Administration, to ensure the investigation’s political impact.194 
The investigation was delegated to a team of specially appointed controleurs 
under Fokkens’ supervision, who visited each Residency in Java to observe 
corvée practices, interview desa chiefs and peasants and study local adat.195 
However, they did so in cooperation with the local Interior Administration 
and each of their draft reports required the approval of the local (Assistant-)
Residents before being sent to Batavia. Once there, in consultation with 
advisors like Holle and Sollewijn Gelpke and the Algemeene Secreratie, they 
were codified into locally tailored ‘corvée service ordonnances’, as a set of 
uniform guidelines for corvée performance.196
Another good example is the desa service investigation of C.J. 
Hasselman, conducted in 1902-1903. Hasselman’s report displays views 
quite opposed to Fokkens’ opinions about the use of labour services. The 
contrast between Hasselman’s and Fokkens’ work exemplifies the fact that 
that the writing of reports was used to shape and legitimize predetermined 
truths, ideas and practices circulating in the colonial administration, but 
never fused into structural, final solutions to governmental problems.
Constructing corvée
Fokkens’ final resumé, published in 1901-1903, describes an ‘adat reality’ 
shaped by colonial intervention. As shown by the examples of Kedu and 
Banten, policies tying landholding principles to labour duties were moti-
vated by the liberal quest to define as many individual labourers with 
individual incomes as possible. Fokkens consolidated these presumptions 
into two fundamental principles of tax liability, resting either on ‘personal 
workability’ (as in Banten) or on shares in arable land (as in Kedu).197 These, 
194 Fokkens, Bijdrage tot de Kennis, I, 10-13. See also: UBL, Collectie Kuneman, D H 1403-[6], 
herein: “Stukken over aanstelling, ambtelijke loopbaan en tijdelijke functies, 1866-1889.”
195 These were: H.G. Heijting, J.L. van Gennep, H.E.B. Schmalhausen, D. Tollenaar and A.J.F. 
Veenstra, S. de Graaff, A.J.N. Engelenberg and J.P.E. Versteegh.
196 In the case of Kedu, for instance, the Resident had claimed fi nal say in policy advise to 
Batavia, which is ultimately why the principle of quarter and half gondal was abolished. 
The local corvée regulations were issued immediately in 1893 (Stbl. 1893 172-186 and 
189) for the majority of Java: Probolinggo [Stbl. 1893 n172], Semarang [173], Madura 
[174], Cirebon [175], Kediri [176], Surabaya (with different ordinances drafted for the 
districts of Surabaya, Sidoarjo, Mojokerto and Jomang [n177] versus Gresik, Lamongan 
and Sidayu [n178] and Bawean [n179]), Tegal [180], Pekalongan and Besuki [181] (with 
different ordinances drafted for the districts of Besuki, Panarukan, Bondowoso and 
Jember [n182] and Banyuwangi [n183]), Madiun, Pasuruan and Jepara. The remaining 
Residencies would follow later in the 1890s.
197 Fokkens, Eindresumé I, part 1, 6-8. According to Fokkens, Banten, Priangan and Kara-
wang, Indramayu and Bawean knew individual land tenure (sawah pusaka) and personal 
workability, the rest of Java did not. Rights to sawah pusaka according to Fokkens indi-
cated full corvée liability, while rights to sawah desa obliged only the sikep to perform 
corvée services, regardless of any land-rotation schemes. See ibid., I, part 1, 1-2, and 
Fokkens, Bijdrage tot de Kennis, II, 14-15.
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he claimed, covered all varieties in Java.198 So in essence his report legiti-
mized adherence to principles already in use, just labelled in novel terms.
Among the most burdensome services Fokkens identified were those 
levied for road construction and maintenance. These involved heavy labour, 
such as collecting gravel for road-paving, and took place at irregular inter-
vals and their burden was spread by distributing sections of roads among 
desa groups.199 Nonetheless, due to poor organization and supervision, their 
burden had an unequal impact on individuals. For instance, when labourers 
did not turn up, arrived too late or worked slowly, they “disadvantaged 
others.”200 Moreover, desa in close proximity to roads or riverbanks (for 
gravel collection) were more likely to be subjected to road services than 
other desa.201 In 1889, a survey in Priangan demonstrated how this caused 
unfair distribution of the corvée burden among villages in the same 
district.202 But problematically, whenever such a survey was carried out, 
desa chiefs, knowing they were monitored, administered more meticulously 
than usual or relieved a number of peasants of their performance services, 
to be made up for later by an increase in the use of corvée. This way, some 
officials argued, surveying and experimenting with corvée services always 
led to an increase.203
Fokkens suggested redistributing the accumulated burden of road 
services within districts among desa, and burden each desa with a particular 
type of service to establish some degree of specialization and efficiency.204 
Thus he ignored all of the existing redistribution schemes, individual rights 
and local principles that corvée was locally determined. His rigidity in 
establishing desa encompassing equity, mirrored the colonial government’s 
choice of ignoring individual wealth and the ability to pay, in favour of 
198 Fokkens, Eindresumé I, part 1, 1-5.
199 Also known as golongan, which originally were ‘services branches’ or groups in the kraton 
(palace) of the Sunan. See Van den Haspel, Overwicht in Overleg, 64.
200 Koeboes, “Proef Genomen in Betrekking tot het Onderhoud der Wegen in Heerendienst”, 
TBB 2 (1889), 149-174: 151-155. Such ‘fi scal free-riding’, the social cost imposed upon 
others by not paying taxes, imposes an inherent challenge to the principle of social 
equality that all modern tax systems seek to pursue (so seeking social equality is inherent 
to modern taxes not [only] as an agreement between state and society, but also among 
cooperating individuals adhering to that state). This can be contextualized in both 
terms of reciprocity and social-contract theory. See H. Gribnau, “Belastingen, Ethiek en 
Waarden: Een Weerbarstig Driespan”, NTFR (Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Fiscaal Recht) 
18:11 (2017), 1-7; H. Gribnau, “Belastingen als Olifant”, NTFR 17:8 (2016), 1-5.
201 Fokkens, De Afschaffi ng der Laatste Heerendiensten, 23-24; Handelingen Tweede Kamer 
1905-1906, 12e vergadering, 24-11-1905, herein: Van Deventer, pp. 3-4. Lack of enthusiasm 
for the collection of gravel in corvée service was considered a cause of the poor condition 
of many roads. J.P.W. Houtman, “Over het Walsen der Heerendienstwegen”, TBB 22 
(1902), 249-259; J.P.W. Houtman, “Over den Invloed van Eenige Factoren op het Verbruik 
van Verhardingsmateriaal voor Grint- en Steenslagwegen”, TBB 22 (1902), 449-455.
202 Koeboes, “Proef”, 164-170.
203 B., “Heerendiensten op Java”, 203-209: 204-207.
204 Fokkens, De Controleur op Java en Madoera II: Belastingen, 16. This was not uncommon in 
the case of cultivation services, See Elson, Village Java, 136-137, 140-142.
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making more persons liable and redistributing the corvée burden over as 
many shoulders as possible. The Dutch did not allow local social differ-
ences to endanger the equal spread of the tax burden. Put simply, adhering 
to locally specific principles of corvée, as ordained in 1854, clashed with 
the quest for theoretical equity among taxpayers across the archipelago. 
Unification automatically violated specificity. Kuneman realized this and 
advised the redistribution of corvée labour according to local institutions 
and principles.205 But Fokkens, convinced of his task to improve equity and 
welfare-redistribution, designed new, meticulous redistribution systems for 
all Residencies. While he claimed to root corvée labour in local adat prin-
ciples, he in fact rewrote them, ensuring the resultant corvée-ordinances 
were attuned to one another.
Fokkens most important advice was to abolish and redistribute corvée 
by using locally raised head taxes to fund free wage labourers, in order 
to diminish the corvée demand, and after 1893, this did become standard 
government policy.206 However, levying taxes was more arduous than 
demanding services. With the head tax payment threshold set at 50 guil-
ders, many peasants made sure to report incomes below this threshold, 
and so to remain untaxable. Village officials deliberately under-assessed 
the number of taxable peasants to their own benefit.207 Moreover, much to 
Fokkens’ annoyance, local head tax revenues were increasingly absorbed in 
the central treasury, rather than being used to supress local use of corvée.208 
This was because head taxes in fact expressed the monetary value of corvée, 
showing its inequality across Java much more clearly (see table 4.1 and 
4.2). And since money was transferred more easily across Residencies than 
labour, head taxes became appealing instruments in the redistribution of 
the corvée burden across Java, preventing ‘undesired migration’ caused 
by unequal distribution of the tax burden.209 This way, rather than locally 
diminishing the corvée burden, head taxes were used to coordinate a 
gradual, central relocation of the corvée burden across Java. As such, the 
Residency with the weakest base for monetary tax and highest usage of 
corvée, determined the persistence of corvée labour across Java.
205 ANRI AS GB MGS 3808, herein: RvI 23-4-1892: DirBB to GG, 12-4-1892.
206 Stbl. 1893 n68 (art. 1). This ordinance specifi ed that the head tax revenue should at least 
equal the costs or budget necessary to fulfi l abolished corvée services. See NA MinKol 
1850-1900 4582, Vb. 10-6-1892 n37, herein: Vb.; Stbl. 1893 n68 art. 1. Kuneman and Holle 
had also urged to spend head tax revenue where it had been levied to keep the ‘surplus 
of labour’ within the desa it was produced.
207 NA MinKol 1850-1900 4596, Vb. 21-7-1892 n22, herein: Vb. and ‘RvS to Koninging 
Weduwe, 12-7-1892.’
208 Fokkens, Eindresumé III (1903), part 1, 1903-1904. See also F. Fokkens, De Afschaffi ng van 
Heerendiensten in de Memorie van Antwoord Betreffende de Ontwerp-Indische Begrooting van 
1913 (‘s-Gravenhage: s.n., 1912), 4-5; Fokkens, De Afschaffi ng der Laatste Heerendiensten, 
16-17, 20.
209 NA MinKol 1850-1900 4312, Vb. 5-11-1889 n22, herein: Vb. and ‘Nota A2, heerendiensten 
in Kedoe’.
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Bureaucracy and centralization
Inter-Residential alignment, therefore, became imperative. Whenever 
Residents abolished some form of corvée without consultation with the 
Governor-General, they faced a severe reprimand. A fascinating example 
of this is the case of P. Stijhoff, Resident of Semarang (1900-1904). In 1900, 
Sijthoff abolished a set of specific services in exchange for an annual head 
tax without consulting Batavia first. Unfortunately, he misjudged the costs 
of the labour projects that this head tax had to fund, resulting in budget 
deficits.210 Sijthoff had promised the population full reduction of corvée 
services, but because of these deficits he was forced to levy them anyway.211 
This alarmed ‘Head Inspector for Cultivation’ H.J.W. van Lawick van 
Pabst, who accused Sijthoff of ill-considered governance, concealing an 
experimental policy from Batavia, lying to the government, meddling with 
corvée services and deceiving the population.212 Even though Sijthoff had 
cooperated with district chiefs, who agreed to reduce the corvée services 
in exchange for an incidentally levied extra head tax213, the fact that Sijthoff 
had taken the initiative without the permission of the Governor-General 
was sufficient reason to have his new regulation withdrawn. In fact, Van 
Lawick van Pabst admitted that that ‘corvée circumstances’ in Semarang 
had generally improved, much to “popular satisfaction”, after Sijthoff’s 
changes, but nonetheless recommended that Sijthoff be replaced.214 The 
Raad van Indië ruled that Sijthoff had been motivated by what he thought 
was best for the population – and therefore should not be fired – but had 
severely exceeded his authority nonetheless.215 Although corvée and 
head tax regulations were designed locally, in order to be effected they 
required the approval and ratification of Governor-General, Minister 
of Colonies and the King, in the form of an ordinance. Sijthoff remarked 
that Batavia’s procedures only obstructed him from modifying the corvée 
burden.216 However, by skipping the crucial step of acquiring the requisite 
signatures and awaiting an ordinance, he compromised the validity of his 
210 ANRI AS GB Besl. 826, herein: MGS 12-9-1900: RvI 27-8-1900, Res. Semarang to GG, 
30-10-1899, DirBB 18-8-1899, Res. Semarang to GG 8-4-1899, ‘Over de conversie der HD 
in Semarang in vrijen arbeid’, DirBB, 19-6-1900 and DirBB to GG, 29-11-1900, Res. Sema-
rang to DirBB, 16-2-1900.
211 ANRI AS GB Besl. 826, herein: MGS 12-9-1900: DirBB to GG, 29-11-1900: ‘Rapport HIC 
‘over HD in Semarang (Onderzoek Resultaat en Advies).’
212 ANRI AS GB Besl. 826, herein: MGS 12-9-1900: DirBB to GG, 29-11-1900: Rapport HIC 
over HD in Semarang; HIC to GG, 31-10-1900 and HIC to GG, 24-12-1900.
213 ANRI AS GB Besl. 826, herein: MGS 12-9-1900: Res. Semarang to DirBB, 16-2-1900. The 
predecessor of van Lawick van Pabst in fact called this “the only way to abolish all corvée 
services” as they stimulated “further conviction of the favourability of a small sum of 
money over the continues plague of corvée.” (HIC to DirBB, 16-3-1900 in ibid.)
214 ANRI AS GB Besl. 826, herein: MGS12-12-1900: ‘Nota afkoop van Heerendiensten in 
Semarang.’
215 ANRI AS GB Besl. 826, herein: Besluit 25-4-1901, RvI 15-3-1901.
216 ANRI AS GB Besl. 826, herein: Besluit 25-4-1901, Res. Semarang to GG, 19-1-1901.
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plan which, according to colonial-bureaucratic logic, had to be revoked. His 
self-opinionated irreverence was not tolerated in Batavia’s larger order of 
centrally-coordinated, unified progress, and a head tax was not introduced 
in Semarang until 1914.217
Sijthoff’s case is not exceptional. 25 years earlier, Resident A. Pruijs van 
der Hoeven of Palembang (in office 1873-1879), autonomously abolished 
specific transportation services in his province. Promptly, even though the 
regulation was lauded as having positive effects, he was seriously repri-
manded for not consulting the Governor-General.218 
Figure 4.3. Resident P. Sijthoff of 
Semarang, c. 1904.
Source: KITLV 2603 / E. Breton de Nijs, 
Tempo doeloe: fotografi sche documenten 
uit het oude Indie, 1870-1914 (Amsterdam: 
Querido, 1960), 115.
217 That year, a central head tax ordinance for Java was adopted (Stbl. 1914 n313). Van 
Lawick van Pabst and Hasselman were ordered to investigate the reintroduction of head 
taxes in Semarang. They suggested to democratize the choice for buying off corvée: in 
case of a 75% majority within the desa in favour of monetary tax, head taxes would be 
implemented. The Director of the Justice Department intervened in this plan, fearing 
it would cause confl ict among villagers and the possibility of a minority (of 26%) of 
villagers blocking the potential of effective monetary taxation – or, conversely, as Minister 
of colonies Van Asch van Wijck pointed out, the potential harm of a quarter of the village 
getting “punished with monetary tax which they might not be able to pay.” ANRI AS GB 
Besl. 1261, herein: MGS 19-1-1903: RvI 20-10-1902, DirJus to GG, 15-6-1902.
218 NA MinKol 1850-1900 2866, Vb. 8-3-1876 n70, herein: Vb., GG to MinKol, 16-11-1875, 
‘Rapport Res. Palembang and besl. GG and correspondence: Extract Besl. GG, 16-11-1875 
n9, Res. Palembang to GG, Dir BB to GG, Res. Palembang to DirBB, 13-7-1875, 1e Gov. 
Sec. to RvI 5-10-1875, ‘Afschrift Rapport, voorstel’ Res. Palembang to GG, 13-7-1875, RvI 
23-6-1875. Article 55 of the Government Regulaton of 1854 already posed that “protection 
of the indigenous population against arbitrary actions by anyone, at any time, was one of 
the weightiest of the Governor-General’s obligations.” See Elson, Village Java, 130.
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Such cases tell a lot about the relations between the complex world of local 
officials demanding decisive action and the tardy order of the central state 
which, in the minds of contemporary supreme officials, was of course only 
as tardy as it needed to be to retain centralized authority.
The pertinacity of corvée
As such, corvée services remained central to colonial tax policy. In 1902, the 
head tax was disconnected from the local monetary value of corvée (or its 
‘buy-off’ sum), much to Fokkens’ frustration. Indirectly, he claimed, corvée 
labourers paid for the abolishment of services themselves.219 The head tax 
basically became a tax for ‘not performing services’, levied on top of, rather 
than as, a replacement of corvée, which kept providing an addictive source 
of cheap labour supply to meet the demands of the colonial state for infra-
structural development.220 In the words of Gonggrijp:
“government corvée is required to provide for all possible needs of the govern-
ment and its servants […] promoted to satisfy their whims, vanity, desires and 
ambitions.”221
Often, scarcity of free labour was invoked, to legitimize the use of corvée 
labourers.222 Government engineers actually preferred free coolies, who 
were skilled and were paid for their work, over corvée labourers223, and 
large scale indentured labour and free wage labour rose in importance, 
in and outside Java, around 1900.224 Yet, while the number of days of 
219 Fokkens, De Afschaffi ng van Heerendiensten, 5-6.
220 In Cirebon for example, expansion of the sugar industry in the 1880s led to greater invest-
ments in infrastructure and irrigation, all in constructed by use of corvée service. Breman, 
Koloniaal Profi jt, 104-107; Elson, Village Java, 16-17, 84-85.
221 Gonggrijp, Schets eener Economische Geschiedenis, 40.
222 In 1890 a regulation passed that allowed use of corvée labourers only in case ‘not enough 
coolies were available’, insuffi cient availability of coolies was persistently reported by 
Residents to be more problematic than budget defi cits. See NA MinKol 1850-1900 3575, 
Vb. 24-10-1882 n3, herein: Vb.; NA MinKol 1850-1900 3970, Vb. 12-7-1886 n3, herein: GG 
to MinKol, 22-5-1886, DirBB to GG 27-2-1886 and DirBOW to GG, 13-2-1886; NA MinKol 
1850-1900 4170, Vb. 10-7-1888 n17, herein: GG to MinKol, 22-3-1888, Res. Cirebon to GG, 
4-1-1888, Res. Karawang to GG, 19-1-1888, Res. Kediri to GG, 7-2-1888, Res. Madura to 
GG, 1-2-1888 and Res. Banyumas to GG, 15-1-1888.
223 Specifi cally confi ned to construction, repairs and maintenance of roads and bridges, 
occupying guardhouses, guarding waterworks, and transporting troops. See Stbl. 1890 
n248; Boomgaard, Children, 56.
224 Badan Perpustakaan dan Kearsipan Jawa Barat (Provincial Library and Archives of West 
Java, BPKJB), BOW Archives 11, herein: DirBOw Besl. 26-5-1924, DirBOW, 21-12-1922 and 
Res. Batavia to DirBOW, 6-1-1913; BPKJB BOW Archives 52, 53 and 55, herein: ‘Begroting 
Kosten tot vordering langs respectievelijk Kali Kendal, van desa Singapaduu tot desa 
Trumpu tot behoud van de Desa langs lopende Herendienst weg, 1910’. See also R.E. 
Elson, “Sugar Factory Workers and the Emergence of ‘Free Labour’ in Nineteenth-
Century Java”, MdAS (1986), 139-174;
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performed corvée labour declined from 26.4 to 20.6 million days, the 
number of liable persons grew from 9.6 to 11.1 million, between 1886 and 
1895.225 Corvée labour became less efficient and less productive than free 
labour, but provided such easy access to the Javanese labour market, that its 
use persisted anyway.
Furthermore, new corvée ordinances dramatically overestimated 
the administrative capacity of local officials to supervise and control desa 
administrations. The head tax ordinance of 1893, for instance, reads that 
“the assessment is one guilder, multiplied by the number of corvée-liable 
persons settled in one desa”, is to be collected by the desa chief, for the 
usual 8% collectors wage.226 As a result, the main concern of a desa chief 
was not to tax all with the mandatory annual guilder, but rather to ensure 
the collection of sufficient revenue representative of the number of liable 
persons.227 Officially, all liable villagers were to be accounted for in the desa 
tax registers, but these were filled out by the desa chiefs themselves, as were 
population censuses and other village surveys.228 This motivated chiefs to 
under-report and overtax. As the government fully relied on desa chiefs for 
its administrative practice, these chiefs controlled who were registered as 
taxpayers and who were not, and determined how taxes and services were 
distributed. As put by a Leiden professor, L.W.C. van den Berg:
“the only true, and in fact powerful guarantee […] against arbitrariness in the 
redistribution of corvée services depended, not on the [Colonial] State Gazette, 
but on the solidarity among community members and their relations.”229
Meanwhile, small groups of government supported desa elites, consisting 
of richer peasants, had gained much greater avail over land and labour. 
This invested them with the power to reallocate the tax burden to larger 
groups of less fortunate peasants, without limit.230 These people, lacking the 
225 Van Rossum, The Carceral Colony, 74.
226 Stbl. 1893 n68, art.3 and 6. This was repeated in the ‘Instruction Manual for Civil Servants 
in Java and Madura’ of 1922: Departement van het Binnenlandsch Bestuur, Handleiding 
ten Dienste van de Indische Bestuursambtenaren op Java en Madoera, no. 2/BB: Hoofdengeld 
(Weltevreden: ‘s Landsdrukkerij, 1918) 10-14, 28-30: art.3a.
227 Van den Berg, Het Inlandsche Gemeentewezen, 101.
228 Handleiding 2/BB, 32-36; The regulations of Stbl. 1906 n455 decentralized the drafting of 
registers and assessments and made this the responsibility of ‘the presidents of the local 
assessment committees’, i.e. the local district offi cials, in cooperation with the village 
chiefs.
229 Van den Berg, Het Inlandsche Gemeentewezen, 103-104. L.W.C. van den Berg was an Orien-
talist scholar in Leiden who also served as a government advisor for some years.
230 On average, desa elites owned up to 20% of the lands by the later nineteenth century. 
Hüsken, Een Dorp op Java, 34-42; F.A.M. Hüsken and B. White, “Java: Social Differentia-
tion, Food production, and Agrarian Control”, in G. Hart, A. Turton, and B. Fegan (eds.), 
Agrarian Transformations: Local Processes and the State in Southeast Asia (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1989), 234-265.
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potential to earn money, favoured corvée services over paying taxes.231 They 
deployed various strategies of resistence, by evading population counts, 
underreporting the number of family or household members or reporting 
young men in the category of underaged, untaxable boys.232 Censuses of 
taxable people, organized every five years following the quinquennial revi-
sion of corvée, were likely to show a downward bias as a result of such 
strategies.233
Additionally, the pressure to reduce labour services encouraged many 
controleurs to under-assess the services they actually levied, for instance, 
by ignoring the long walking distances between the labour locations and 
residences of corvée labourers. In fact, this was a burdensome part of corvée 
labour that, formally, had to be included in labour time. They were also 
inclined to call to service only those that lived nearby the work location, 
thereby disturbing the attempted policy of redistributing as many services 
over as many villages, as possible.234
Hence, the changes brought by Fokkens’ investigation should not be 
judged by its socio-economic impact, but rather by the administrative 
reinterpretation it offered of the function of corvée labour. By reorganizing 
corvée services on paper, Fokkens’ reports enabled not only their aboli-
tion but also their continuation. In theory, in almost all Residencies, heavy 
maintenance services on culverts and bridges were abolished235, and the 
maximum amount of service was reduced to 36 days.236 However, across 
Java, more than 50 years after the government regulation of 1854 that 
stipulated gradual abolition, forced labour was still widely used. One of the 
more prominent causes of this was that various corvée services, formally 
abolished, returned as desa services.
Defining and defying desa services
Desa services took place in the same space as other corvée services. They 
were different in nature, as they were executed in service of the desa 
community instead of some aristocratic overlord or the state, but villagers 
themselves experienced little difference between corvée and desa services. 
231 M. Hoadley and N. Hatti, “Revenue Nodes in South India and Central Java” (Lund 
Papers in Economic History, Development Economics No. 2017:169, Lund: Lund Univer-
sity, Department of Economic History, 2017), 21.
232 Nitisastro, Population Trends, 45, 49, 51-53.
233 Ibid., 57-58.
234 ANRI AS GB TGA 6938, herein: MGS, 13-8-1915: DirBB to GG, 28-6-1915.
235 C.J. Hasselman, “Een Onverdiend Vonnis over de Gewestelijke Heerendienstregelingen 
van Java en Madoera”, TBB 22 (1902), 503-518: 515-516.
236 Ibid., 509; KV 1901, ‘Bijlage H.’ On ‘privately owned estates’ (particuliere landerijen), 
that fell outside of the scope of unifi ed tax policy, corvée services were still levied at 
the maximum amount of 52 days in 1902. Peasants on these lands worked in service 
of Chinese or European entrepreneurs that had almost unlimited control over its local 
cultivators, See KV 1902, 166; Stbl. 1902 n35.
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The latter increased in importance as the government started to actively 
diminish other forms of corvée.237 Originally, they comprised a variety of 
regionally specific services. In Central Java, for instance, they included 
blablag (maintenance of desa roads, dams and bridges) patrolling (ronde 
desa) and local gugur gungung (emergency-aid and repairs) services. Blablag 
services were traditionally performed by kuli kenceng, and the other services 
by indung pekerangan, but during the nineteenth century these distinctions 
blurred.238 Desa services were generally thought of as more democratic 
because desa administrations were elected239, but not all officials were 
convinced of their value.240 By the time of Fokkens’ investigation, desa 
services were largely an imitation of government corvée services on the 
village level, performed for the desa chiefs (as mini-lords) and administra-
tions (as a mini-state).241 Many desa chiefs levied their own, local pancen 
services and these continued to be levied because the government formally 
refrained from intervening in desa politics. Desa heads held no rights to 
pancen themselves, but they were granted these from their overlords as a 
reward for their cooperation. This enabled chiefs to demand the assistance 
of villagers in maintaining their houses and lands242, collecting firewood 
and water (gamel services), and accompanying them on tours (gundal 
services).243 The government hoped that such practices would terminate 
following the abolition of pancen in 1882, but many desa chiefs used their 
influence to keep demanding pancen as a general form of desa service. The 
informal labour economy of ‘illegal’ desa services started overshadowing 
that of other labour services. Fokkens’ report includes a detailed overview 
237 S.M.P. Tjondronegoro, Social Organization and Planned Development in Rural Java: A Study 
of the Organizational Phenomenon in Kecamatan Cibadak, West Java, and Kecamatan Kendal, 
Central Java (Singapore/Oxford: ISEAAS/Oxford University Press, 1984), 11-12.
238 Van den Haspel, Overwicht in Overleg, 7.
239 In precolonial times the offi ces of patuh and village chief were indeed awarded or elected. 
The Dutch made these offi ces inheritable to create reliable rural dynasties which they 
could use. Thereby they took away political competition in access to economic resources. 
Hasselman, Eindverslag, 2.
240 Director of Interior Administration J.M. van Vleuten (in offi ce 1885-1889), for instance, 
claimed that desa services had no legal-traditional base at all, and were rather an abusive 
colonial invention used to consolidate the ties between desa chiefs, communities and 
lands. Van Vleuten, “Belasting in Arbeid en Belasting in Geld”, 218-221, 224-225.
241 Fokkens, Eindresumé II, part 1, 1901, 1904, 1912-1915.
242 Kunduran and sambatan services; communal shared labour, exchanged in service of each 
other. See Aass, Chayanov and Java, 40.
243  F. Fokkens, “Onze Naaste Plicht ten Aanzien van de Inlandsche Bevolking op Java en 
daar Buiten, naar Aanleiding der Indische Begrooting voor 1903” (‘s-Gravenhage: s.n., 
1902). Usually, pancen for the desa chief were performed by rotating shifts of peasants 
for three subsequent days. Desa chiefs without entitlement to pancen were entitled to 
angguran, service performance by permanently appointed (usually wealthy) villagers 
who in return were (partially) exempted from other corvée duties. ‘Buy-off’ of these 
services generated an extra source of income for the village chiefs. Fokkens, Eindresumé II, 
part 1, 5.
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of the various desa services in use which he claimed were experienced as 
much heavier, than other forms of corvée.244
Comparing Fokkens’ report to that of Hasselman, published in 1902, 
it becomes clear that few people agreed upon the terms and types of the 
services levied. Some officials interpreted them as crucial community 
work, others saw them as a favour awarded to local chiefs to ensure 
their loyalty and restrain the costs of colonial administration.245 Fokkens 
believed that desa services were individually awarded and coordinated 
by chiefs. Hasselman claimed that families were communally responsible 
for performing them and sharing in their burden without much chiefly 
intervention.246 He believed that they were a proto-capitalist form of reci-
procity within self-regulating communities, not to be meddled with by a 
profit-oriented state. Precisely this confusion allowed for the continuation 
of corvée as desa services. Chiefs simply tailored various services to their 
own needs, using the absence of proper regulation and Dutch ignorance 
about local entitlements, to their own advantage.247 No one really knew 
which desa services served who’s interest or were levied to what end.248 
Hasselman claimed that as they were of immediate local benefit, they were 
more eagerly performed than other services.249 Such local impetus, he 
argued, did not require an intervention by the government.250 As such, he 
skilfully legitimized the policy already in place.
Hasselman, a seasoned and widely-quoted colonial investigator, had 
in fact participated in Fokkens’ corvée investigation as controleur in Sema-
rang, but was much more conservative than Fokkens.251 The Javanese, in 
Hasselman’s opinion, had “lower material aspirations” than “Westerners, 
who would see the requirement to perform of services to the state as a 
violation of personal freedom”, and as Javanese peasants “used their spare 
time unproductively anyway”, they would “take performance of personal 
services much more lightly.”252 This provoked much agitation among 
contemporary ethicists. The famous journalist P. Brooshooft, worried that 
Hassleman’s “elegant reports” would “rock the government to sleep”; his 
advice “gave the government […] ammunition eagerly grabbed to avert the 
244 Fokkens, Eindresumé II, part 1, 4-5, 8.
245 Ibid., 2-4, 4-5.
246 See Hasselman, Eindverslag, 76-77-95.
247 Ernst, “Afschaffi ng of Afkoopbaarstelling”, 1448-1451.
248 Ibid., 4-10, 85.
249 Hasselman, Eindverslag, 73, 109-110.
250 Ibid., 12-13, 15, 36, 41, 42, 43, 46-51, 51-56, 66-73, 112.
251 Both his father and uncle had had long administrative-political colonial careers, and 
expressed rather negative views on the labour ethics and socio-political morality of the 
Javanese, which Hasselman junior eagerly adopted, see H.W. van den Doel, “Hasselman, 
Catharinus Johannes (1861-1944)”, in: Biografi sch Woordenboek van Nederland (http://
resources.huygens.knaw.nl/bwn1880-2000/lemmata/bwn4/hasselm; consulted on 
14-11-2019).
252 Hasselman, Eindverslag, 73.
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costly revision of one of the most rotten elements of desa life.”253 Fokkens 
obviously disagreed with Hasselman, and was in fact rather indignant 
that the desa-service investigation had been ordered in the first place, 
claiming his investigation had already unveiled most of the facts but had 
been ignored by the government.254 “Abstinence policy”, he claimed, had 
corrupted desa elites and richer (landholding) peasants, who were ‘tradi-
tionally’ responsible for organizing public security and redistribution of 
labour. Desa heads always found ways to continue demanding labour, so 
abolition of specific services frequently necessitated or led to expansion of 
others. In Buitenzorg, for example, the abolition of guardhouse occupation 
services caused an increase in patrolling services.255 Fokkens calculated that 
this way, excessive use of desa services increased the average number of 
services actually levied, by to up to 50 days per person annually.256
Without a properly tax-funded local administration and policing 
services, villagers patrolled the villages themselves at night (ronda/ronde 
or patrol desa), making Java of the early 1900s still very much a “night-
watchers state in the most literal sense.”257 So village security, policing and 
also physical maintenance of the village, manning the fire brigade and mail 
delivery258 were all organized, not by using tax money, but carried out by 
villagers themselves using variations on these patrol or ronde desa services, 
reflecting the absence of a properly functioning fiscal state.259 Diminishing 
desa services would not only necessitate alternative renumerations for 
the desa elites, to ensure their continued cooperation, but also a full rein-
vention of how villages worked. Hasselman suggested merging desa (as 
happened on Ambon) to help redistributing services across provinces.260
253 P. Brooshooft, “Links en Rechts: De Druk der Dessadiensten”, De Locomotief, 29-9-1906.
254 Fokkens, “Onze Naaste Plicht”, 38-40.
255 ANRI AS GB Besl. 898, herein: Besl. 4-2-1912, Besl. 21-5-1901: RvI 17-5-1901; MGS 
8-6-1901, HIC to DirBB, 6-5-1901.
256 Fokkens, De Afschaffi ng van Heerendiensten, 9-10.
257 Breman, Koloniaal Profi jt, 133. These services were called ronde or patrol desa also used 
to check on the guard house occupants, performed in shifts and under supervision of 
a desa chief. These security services were repeated on the district level, as ronda galong 
(patrolling between desa), also known as ronda monco-lima or moncopat, referring to 
specifi c clusters of villages, See Fokkens, Eindresumé II, part 1, 8-9, 10; M. Bloembergen, 
De Geschiedenis van de Politie in Nederlands-Indië: Uit Zorg en Angst (Amsterdam/Leiden: 
Boom/KITLV Uitgeverij, 2009), 40-41; Tjondronegoro, Social Organization and Planned 
Development, 82; Fokkens, Eindresumé II, part 1, 5, 6-8.
258 Fokkens, Eindresumé II, part 1, 9-10; Bloembergen, De Geschiedenis van de Politie, 58-60. 
Specifi c village or districts became specialized in one particular form of ronde or patrol, 
depending on their proximity to objects to which these specifi c services were allocated, 
for instance railway crossings (patrol spor), fi re extinguishing installations (ronda pompa) 
or government warehouses or gardens (for instance patrol kopi on coffee fi elds). Under the 
Sunan, this was quite similar; many villages in Central Java had become specialized in the 
delivery of specifi c goods, see Moertono, “Dulu, Kedudukan Wajib Pajak itu Terhormat”, 
59-62: 59.
259 Fokkens, Eindresumé II, part 1, 3. ibid., II, part 1, 11-15.
260 Hasselman, Eindverslag, 76, 82-89, 95, 104-107; Van Niel, Java under the Cultivation System, 79.
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But decades of village-centralization and the elevation of spokespersons 
and middlemen had shaped a powerful ruling elite unwilling to change. 
Thus, the government emphasized the power of the desa chiefs once 
more, in 1906, by reaffirming their exclusive authority to redistribute desa 
services.261
‘Buying-off’ of desa services remained unpopular.262 Fokkens’ advice 
was to at least diminish those services that were of little popular interest –
such as planting ‘shadow trees’ alongside inter-provincial roads.263 Some 
of these services, such as police services for guarding sugar fields in 1892, 
were indeed prohibited.264 Fokkens claimed that a total of 15 million days’ 
worth of corvée and desa services had been theoretically abolished as a 
result of his work. But the total amount of desa services levied, in fact, kept 
increasing. In 1901, an overwhelming estimated amount of 200 million days 
of desa services (versus 25 million days of corvée services) was still levied 
annually.265
Rather than setting in motion actual change, colonial investigation 
programs were used to legitimize and continue policies already in place. 
Contrary to Fokkens’ intentions, a more complete understanding of the 
principles and practices of local corvée, actually furnished its further exploi-
tation. Hasselman’s report provided direct, welcome support to the colonial 
government’s unwillingness to acknowledge that in order to curtail the use 
of services, the desa and its ruling elites had to be completely reformed. As 
such, both reports further legitimized and added to the paper-reality that 
the colonial government continued pretending its policies were welfare-
oriented, while in practice continued exploiting Indonesia’s labour reserve 
on an ever-increasing scale.
The head tax
The idea that services benefited local populations had been kept alive 
by Hasselman, and was eagerly adopted by the conservative Minister of 
Colonies J.H. de Waal Malefijt (in office 1909-1913). De Waal Malefijt had 
never been to the Indies, and only knew of the colony from parliamentarian 
dossiers.266 Hence, rather than sympathizing with popular needs, he priori-
tized satisfying the unsatiable hunger for labour, caused by ‘ethical’ infra-
261 Stbl. 1906 n83.
262 Fokkens, Eindresumé II, part 1, 15-16. It was only regulated for pancen and angguran 
services and costed between 1.50 to 7.50 guilders or a fi xed amount of padi.
263 Ibid., II, part 1, 1-5.
264 Bloembergen, De Geschiedenis van de Politie, 120.
265 ANRI AS GB Besl. 826, herein: MGS 25-4-1901, DirBB to GG. 26-1-1901.
266 A.Th. van Deursen, ‘Waal Malefi jt, Jan Hendrik de (1852-1931)’, in Biografi sch Woordenboek 
van Nederland. (http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/bwn1880-2000/BWN/lemmata/
bwn3/waalmalefi jt, consulted on 15-11-2019).
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structural and irrigation projects.267 He believed that corvée labour served 
both the moral and physical resurrection of indigenous society through 
the local organization of the construction of irrigation networks and infra-
structure, the costs of which he wanted to be borne locally, and not by the 
government.268 Such ideas kept being used to justify excessive use of corvée.
In 1914, officials C. Lulofs and E.B. Kielstra, for instance, dusted off 
the old argument that the peasant economy revolved around subsistence 
instead of making a profit, and that as such, they were more suitable for 
performing coerced labour, than paying using monetary taxes.269 In Batavia, 
such conservative views were “no longer appropriate in the context of 
current policy, nor compatible with ambitions of socio-economic evolution”, 
as the Raad van Indië had written in 1911.270 In 1913, the queen announced 
that the government hoped “to abolish the last remaining corvée duties in 
Java and Madura.”271 This solid deadline was imposed by De Waal Male-
fijt’s successor, Th.B. Pleyte (1913-1915), an ardent ethicist who had worked 
in Indonesia as a lawyer and partner of Van Deventer.272 In 1914, a collec-
tion of ‘unexceptional’ government corvée services (for maintenance and 
repairs of roads and irrigation and waterworks and collection and transport 
of gravel) were replaced with head taxes, and the amount of services to be 
maximally levied was reduced to no more than five days.273 In Java, the 
267 ANRI AS GB Besl. 898, herein: Besl. 4-2-1912, ‘Het denkbeeld van opheffi ng van Heeren- 
en Dessa diensten te Java’, MGS, 4-2-1902. See also: Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1905-
1906, 12e vergadering, 24-11-1905, herein: Van Deventer, 3-4; Van C.Th. van Deventer, 
“Het Pijnlijke Kwartier”, De Gids 78 (1914), 254-265; Fokkens, De Afschaffi ng der Laatste 
Heerendiensten, 23-29.
268 ANRI AS GB TGA 10649, herein: Besl. 17-4-1912: AS 15-7-1912, TGA 22414/12: MinKol 
to GG, 15-7-1912. De Waal Malefi jt argued in that the construction of irrigation network 
raised land values to benefi t of the peasants. Many of these works however were not 
constructed in corvée but in desa services. The irrigation works that were constructed in 
corvée services were usually only used to fertilize cash crop plantations.
269 J.C. Kielstra and C. Lulofs. “Verplichte Diensten of Geldelijke Heffi ngen?” TBB 46 (1914), 
28-44.
270 ANRI AS GB TGA 10649, herein: MGS 2-2-1912 n250: RvI 16-12-1911.
271 ‘Troonrede van 16 september 1913’ (via: http://www.troonredes.nl/troonrede-van-
16-september-1913/, consulted on 5-6-2020); Fokkens, De Afschaffi ng der Laatste Heeren-
diensten, 3.
272 C. Fasseur, “Pleijte, Thomas Bastiaan (1864-1926)”, in Biografi sch Woordenboek van Neder-
land (via: http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/bwn1880-2000/lemmata/bwn1/pleijte, 
consulted on 5-6-2020).
273 Stbl. 1914 n101 and 313 and 1915 n21. Initially, this included only Residencies were 
labour servants were defi ned as owners of arable land: Banten, Cirebon, Pekalongan, 
Semarang, Rembang and the district of Karawang in Batavia, followed a year later by 
Pasuruan, Kediri, Madiun, Besuki, Surabaya and Madura. Exceptions were maintained 
for civil servants, desa chiefs, military personnel, retired offi cials and, widows of all these 
persons, and people working and living on lands owned by a business. Some parts of 
Cirebon, Semarang and Pekalongan, where the corvée duty still was considered to rest 
on landholding, the head tax was levied as a surtax to the land rent. In case of emergency, 
the Governor-General was still allowed to levy these services when deemed necessary.
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total average number of levied services per person decreased from 52 to 
about 10 days of work, between 1863 and 1913.274
In Java, after 1914, the number of people subjected to monetary taxes 
matched the number subjected to coerced labour. Corvée labourers were 
substituted to some extent with coolies and convicts for infrastructure proj-
ects, breeding an integrated system of corvée and convict labour crossing 
Java and the ‘Outer Territories.’275 However, the head tax repeated the 
theoretical incongruencies of the corvée services it replaced, and found little 
resonance in the experience of colonial taxpayers, many of whom consid-
ered taxes and labour services unrelated obligations. Contrary to land rent 
and income taxes, corvée was often seen as a social obligation in Java, as 
emphasized at the beginning of this chapter. Simultaneously, the conflict 
between establishing an encompassing equality of the tax burden over the 
whole island and levying tax in accordance with local circumstances, had 
never been resolved. Thus, the head tax kept reflecting the unequal distri-
bution of the corvée burden, levied at different rates in different regions 
following local socio-economic circumstances (see table 4.1). Finally, head 
taxes were structurally claimed to deliver insufficient revenue to fund the 
works previously performed in corvée. 
Table 4.1. Comparison of head tax rates and revenue in various Residencies in Java.276
1913 1914
















Tax revenue in 
guilders
Banten 1 125,869 125,869 2.45 125,869 308,379.45
Batavia 1.65 54,598 90086.70 2.65 54,598 144,684.70
Cirebon 0.70 304,883 213,418.10 2.20 304,883 670,742.60
Pekalongan 1.15 262,237 301,572.55 2.30 262,237 603,145.10
Semarang 0.80 430,515 344,412 2.00 430,515 861,030
Rembang 1 29,010 29,010 2.00 29,010 58,020
Total: 1,304,368.35 Total: 2,646001.85
274 Breman, Control of Land and Labour, 23; Fokkens, De Afschaffi ng van Heerendiensten, 3, 9-10.
275 As such, forced labour served as punishment while punishment was also used in case 
of non-compliance to tax-payment or performance of labour, leading to the somewhat 
burlesque situation where refusal of payment of tax, but also refusal of performance 
of coerced labour was theoretically punishable with coerced labour which these taxes 
intended to replace. Reid, “The Decline of Slavery”; Reid, To Nation by Revolution, 56-59; 
Rossum, The Carceral Colony, 66. From roughly the 1920s onward, planters moved away 
from unfree labour systems because of political resistance, decreasing rubber prices and 
an increase in less labour-consuming rubber production at the cost of other crops. See 
T.M. Li, “The Price of Un/Freedom: Indonesia’s Colonial and Contemporary Plantation 
Labor Regimes”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 59:2 (2017), 245-276. 2007, 
255-256. See also Breman, Taming the Coolie Beast, 24.
276 ANRI AS GB Besl. 1941, herein: MGS, 10-9-1913: Nota DirBB, 14-6-1913; Stbl. 1914 n314.
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Director of Interior Administration S. de Graaff (in office 1910-1916, and 
Minister of Colonies in 1919-1925) had proposed purposefully levying head 
taxes to directly fund road maintenance works for which corvée had been 
abolished277, much to the agitation of Director of Finances F.A. Liefrinck 
(1909-1914), who replied that:
“in a well-organized state, taxes are levied to benefit public funds, and through 
these government expenses are defrayed. Determining the purposes of revenue 
from tax in concomitant ordinances would inevitably cause hopeless chaos in 
financial administration.”278
Clearly, the colonial state was not yet that ‘well-organized.’ Head taxes were 
wielded locally not as a substitute tax unrelated to former labour duties, but 
to directly fund the infrastructural projects formerly performed in corvée, as 
was shown by De Graaff’s successor, D. Tollenaar (1916-1919).279
As demonstrated by the Tax Revision Commissions of the 1920s, 
under the allocated burden of income and head taxes, land rents and desa 
services, inequality and poverty among Javanese peasants increased. The 
bargaining position of those with less or smaller land rights had become 
much weaker than that of wealthier villagers who eagerly lobbied for 
exemption or ‘bought off’ their services.280 By 1926, about 40% of all corvée 
labourers in the whole colony ‘bought off’ their services.281 One member 
of the Committee, Achmad Djajadiningrat (1886-1960), Regent of Batavia, 
ascribed the height of the tax burden not to any theoretical incongruencies 
or problems, but simply to the excessive and inflexible fiscal demands of 
the treasury.282 The head tax was experienced as burdensome because its 
rates were generally high, having been doubled in 1914, after the abolition 
of various services. Additionally, its rates were inflexible. This had a deeply 
regressive effect as it ignored fluctuations in production levels and fell 
indifferently on the heads of richer and the less stable incomes of poorer 
peasants, causing a much heavier burden upon the latter in times of hard-
ship.283 Poorer peasants had been able to negotiate and level out the burden 
277 ANRI AS GB TGA 10649, herein: MGS 16-2-1910: DirBB to GG, 13-11-1909.
278 ANRI AS GB TGA 10649, herein: MGS 16-2-1910: DirFin to GG, 4-7-1910.
279 ANRI AS GB TGA 10649, herein: MGS 31-12-1910: DirBB to GG, 7-10-1910 and MGS 21-1-
1911: RvI 31-12-1910; Fokkens, Bijdrage tot de Kennis, II, 135-136.
280 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 2161, Vb. 5-8-1920 n42, herein: DepFin to GG, 8-4-1920; Welles-
tein, Het Onderzoek, 2.
281 Differentiating from about 30% in West Sumatra to about 50% in Aceh. See ANRI AS GB 
MGS 5052, herein: BGS, 20-3-1928, DirBB to GG, 6-3-1928, ‘nota.’
282 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 2737, Vb. 6-5-1925 n26, herein: ‘Nota over het Derde rapport 
van de Commissie […], commentaar op enkele bevindingen van Djadjadiningrat.’
283 This has also been demonstrated by Scott in the case of Burma and Vietnam, where 
similar head or ‘capitation’ taxes were levied by its respective colonial states. So, “The 
distinctiveness of colonial taxes lay not so much in the fact that they were higher but 
in the nature of those taxes and the blind ability rigor with which they were imposed.” 
Scott, The Moral Economy, 93, 108, 332 (quote).
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of corvée performance in various ways, but under the fixed one guilder 
head taxes, this was much more difficult. Head taxes imposed the same 
burden upon all, presuming an equality within society that simply was not 
there, and the Tax Revision Commission was advised to withdraw them.284 
According to Meijer Ranneft and Huender, they were
“falsely presumed to be an income tax [...] while in fact they taxed the ability to 
perform coolie labour […], determined occasionally by being family chief285, by 
workability286, sometimes by house ownership287, […] or ownership of land.”288
Meijer Ranneft and Huender argued desa chiefs kept collecting tax on an 
ad-hoc base using the number of taxable persons multiplied with the tax 
rate as quota, ignoring those who could not pay and overtaxing those 
who could. Assessments, they claimed, were ‘fictitious’, arbitrary and 
disunified.289 This way, Residents kept struggling to make sense of regional 
socio-economic diversity without endangering the potential for unification. 
Within the Residency of Batavia alone, for instance, head tax rates varied 
from 1.10 guilders in Buitenzorg and the Kepulauan Seribu (an island group 
in the Bay of Jakarta), to 2.90 guilders in Batavia City.290 Some small areas 
within Batavia had never known any labour services at all, but suddenly 
had to pay a head tax of 2.90 guilders – a rather large increase.291
The head tax had become a completely illogical, unsatisfactory and 
disorganized form of taxation, disliked by politicians, officials and the peas-
antry for its arbitrariness and injustice. Its base as a replacement of coerced 
labour had become unclear, especially among younger generations who had 
little experience of forced labour.292
Like the Tax Revision Committee, Meijer Ranneft and Huender advised 
complete withdrawal of the head tax. They proposed the introduction of 
a workability tax for all indigenous peoples as an alternative.293 In light of 
this criticism, and aligned to the improvement of land rent and company tax 
payment, the head tax was finally abolished in 1927, symbolizing at least on 
paper the end of land and labour relations as the basis for taxation in Java.294
284 At the cost of 12 million guilders, to be compensated by increasing excises and import 
levies. NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 2737, Vb. 6-5-1925 n26, herein: ‘Hoofd Landbouw’ to 
DirLb, 16-1-1925, ‘Hoofd centraal kantoor statistiek to DirLb, 21-1-1925’; NA MinKol 
1901-1953 OV 2817, Vb. 18-2-1926 n51, herein ‘Verbaal.’
285 In the case of Banten.
286 In the case of West-Java Madura, Bawean and Banyuwangi.
287 In the case of East Java, Pasuruan, Besuki, South Surabaya and Rembang.
288 In the case of East Java, Central Java, Kediri, and Priangan. Meijer Ranneft and Huender, 
Onderzoek naar den Belastingdruk, 63-64, quote p. 64.
289 Ibid., 65-67.
290 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 2752, Vb. 9-7-1925 n17, herein: Res. Batavia to GG, 13-9-1924.
291 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 2752, Vb. 9-7-1925 n17, herein: DirBB to GG, 21-11-1924.
292 Soebekti, Some Facets, 11.
293 Ibid., 70-73.
294 Stbl. 1927 n152.
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4.5 The perpetuation of a shameful institute
While by 1930, the ‘corvée’ problem seemed to be concluded in Java, in the 
‘Outer Territories’, where corvée services had been introduced at a rapid 
pace, the debate had just begun.295 In absolute terms, colonial expansion 
had only increased the number of services levied. In many ‘Outer Territo-
ries’, they related even less to local social organization; corvée was clearly 
a cheap way to construct and maintain colonial infrastructure. Meanwhile, 
both within and outside the colony, awareness of the flagrant injustice it 
imposed, grew apace.
In 1930, the International Labour Organization (ILO) organized the 
Forced Labour Convention in Geneva to discuss the worldwide banish-
ment of forced labour and slavery, in particular labour performed by 
indigenous people in colonial states.296 At the Convention, the Dutch 
envoy, L. Enthoven, was burdened with the impossible task of defending 
the 14 million annual forced labour services still performed in Indonesia. 
Expecting to meet with a “world of misunderstanding and ignorance”, 
he devised a defence strategy in preparation for the conference in 1929, 
together with Director of Interior Administration W.P. Hillen (in office 1925-
1929) focussing on hard data. Out of the 50 colonial powers at the time, 
eleven still used forced labour services. As only “the Netherlands was able 
to present reliable figures”, Hillen advised to use this fact to ward off other 
powers that “joined in the critique of the Netherlands in order to distract 
attention from themselves.”297
However, present at in Geneva as well was Haji Agus Salim (1884-1954), 
a prominent Indonesian nationalist and, as Volksraad-member, appointed 
advisor to the Dutch Trade Union. He delivered an impassionate plea 
against the excessive use and abuse of corvée labour by the Dutch, which 
found more eager ears among the representatives than the unconvincing 
and vapid Dutch justifications of corvée labour. Agus Salim exemplified a 
district in Palembang, in which he claimed the total amount of unremuner-
ated days of labour amounted to 195 per year.298 Though probably exag-
gerated, the Dutch had to admit that in Palembang and elsewhere, more 
295 A series of corvée ordinances was issued in 1912, for Jambi, Tapanuli, West Sumatra, 
Menado, Ambon, Timor, Bangka, and Biltion. See Stbl. 1912 n119, 504-508.
296 ANRI AS GB MGS 5052, herein: BGS, 20-3-1928, DirBB to GG, 6-3-1928 and ‘nota.’
297 ANRI AS GB MGS 5052, herein: BGS 22-5-1928: DirBB to L. Enthoven, 11-3-1928, ‘Bestuurs-
conferentie 1928: Buitengewesten (eerste dag)’, pp. 22-39.
298 ANRI AS GB TGA 8368, herein: DirBB to Res. Palembang, 4-9-1929. He drew this example 
from an article published in the journal he edited, Fadjar Asia, written by a certain 
Hambali bin Haji Ahjat: Fadjar Asia, 6-7-1929. See also S. Salam, Hadji Agus Salim: Hidup 
dan Perdjuangannja (Djakarta: Djajamurni, 1961), 63.
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services were levied than legally allowed.299 Moreover, the use of forced 
corvée labour had become in itself problematic and internationally frowned 
upon. The British, who had a permanent envoy at the Geneva Labour Office, 
pursued “full abolition of all forms of forced labour”, but the Dutch claimed 
that curtailing corvée labour would impair the economic development of 
Indonesia. Van Enthoven was ordered to negotiate a set of agreements “not 
too onerous” to allow the continuation of colonial infrastructural projects.300 
He bargained for the allowance of corvée labour only in those regions 
where there was an acclaimed lack of free labour (which covered almost all 
of Indonesia). He presented corvée as an alternative to taxation, and argued 
how through ‘local negotiated settlements’ (lokale onderhandse regelingen) 
people could voluntarily opt between performing labour and paying tax.301 
Ultimately, the Dutch and the French (as systematic as the Dutch in their use 
of forced labour in their colonies in Africa) did not come to an agreement, 
and refused to sign the ILO’s final treaty.302 But the Labour Convention did 
provide another wake-up call, forcing the Dutch to face the facts. Across the 
archipelago services were levied, from men, women and children and under 
poor circumstances.303 In North Sulawesi in 1925, for instance, women were 
299 It appeared that Hambali calculated the number of days of performed corvée labour by 
adding the number of days of work averagely required to maintain roads to the total 
sum of ‘bought off’ services, thereby doubling the total amount of services actually 
levied. According to the controleur of the district about which Hambali had made his 
claims, Salim had felt prey to Hambali’s “sensationalism” which abetted the “lowly 
developed and limitedly educated population.” The Controleur assured only 24 days of 
labour were levied annually, exchangeable for a buy-off sum of 15 guilders per year. The 
Resident of Palembang added that 65% of the 190,950 corvée labourers bought off their 
services. However, these 24 days of corvée where only a share in an additional variety of 
‘municipal’ and ‘adat services’ levied “in accordance to adat” without the government’s 
intervention, totalling in the most extreme case a whopping 107 days of unpaid, coerced 
labour. Only 30 of these days were levied with the government’s approval. ANRI AS GB 
TGA 8368, herein: Controleur Ogan Ilir to Ass-Res Palembangse Benedenlanden, 15-12-
1929, Controleur Maroe Doea to Ass-Res Palembang, 4-4-1930: Bijlage III […] Afschrift 
Proces-verbaal, Hambali bin Hadji Ahjat, Res. Palembang to DirBB, 23-4-1930, DirBB to 
GG, 5-6-1930 and DirBB to GG, 5-6-1930; Sajoer Maintjat, no 7, 1-4-1926, pp. 1-2 (in: IPO, 
15-1-1926, p. 2).
300 ANRI AS GB MGS 5052, herein: BGS 22-8-1928: ‘Bestuursconferentie 1928: Buitengew-
esten (eerste dag)’, pp. 22-39.
301 ANRI AS GB TGA 9331, herein: BGS 9-1-1934 / BGS 18-12-1933: ‘Notulen vergadering’ 
RvI 25-11-1933.
302 B.J. Haga, “De Behandeling van den Gedwongen Arbeid te Genève en de Geschiktheid 
van de Internationale Arbeidsorganisatie voor Koloniale Arbeidsvraagstukken”, 
Koloniale Studiën 14:2 (1930), 213–251: 213; Frankema and Van Waijenburg, “Metroplitan 
Blueprints”, 391.
303 In Java and Madura in the twentieth century women and children, before considered 
participants in domestic peasant production schemes, came to be required to perform 
specifi c specialise forced labour services, such as assisting in the households of rulers or 
performing dances at court performances. See De Jonge, “Taxes and Labour Services “, 
75; A.S. Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements in Rural Java: A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the 19th 
and Early 20th Centuries (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973), 28.
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forced to work on the construction of ‘Gorontalo road’ under “cruel circum-
stances” as an inspector reported. Men were reluctant to perform corvée 
and had their wives “answer the door” when they were to be collected by 
village authorities, who would promptly arrest these wives to enforce the 
men’s cooperation.304
Forcing people to perform their services in the ‘Outer Islands’ was often 
more difficult than in Java. Many people were unable or refused to offer a 
full disclosure of their incomes, as indigenous officials could not, or refused 
to prove, who could pay and who could not. Hence, determining who could 
not, or did not want to pay or perform services was virtually impossible 
for the European government. Alleged low levels of monetization and tax 
evasion in some regions impeded a structural revenue flow, and many 
controleurs found continuing the use of forced labour administratively much 
easier than levying monetary taxes.305 In 1933, for instance, the Assistant 
Resident of Makassar, C.H. ter Laag (in office 1932-1936), noticed that many 
people preferred performance of labour over payment of head tax306 and 
concluded that corvée performance occurred ‘voluntarily.’ This enabled him 
to fulfil the large labour requirements with corvée, ignore “constitutional 
objections” against its use and prevent “available labour resources from 
remaining unused.”307 This demonstrates how detached the ambitions of 
Batavia, The Hague and Geneva were from the practical realities faced by 
(Assistant)-Residents, even in the 1930s.
This did not prevent the government from engaging in another series of 
experiments in the mid-1930s in Cirebon, Priangan and Banten. This experi-
ment involved using peasants unable to pay their land rent to perform 
labour instead. Every day, the assistant-wedana rallied those with tax debts 
for labour performance, paid at rate of 20 cents per day, fourteen cents of 
which were deducted as tax debt. The remaining six cent was paid in rice, 
so that all cash flowed to the government, while the tax was technically paid 
in labour. This way a fictional wage was established through which the tax 
debt could be hived off, while in practice, the taxable person still performed 
the same kind of labour as under the corvée labour system.308 An enthralled 
Governor of West-Java concluded that the experiment was a success.309
304 ANRI DepBB 585, herein: DepBB, 18-1-1927, Register No. BG 16/1/1, DepBB, 15-2-1926: 
‘Rapport BB (model 144) over Tevredenheidsbetuiging Ass-Res F. Greven en Controleur 
B. de Jong van GG over gereedkomen Gorontalo weg.’
305 ANRI AS GB TGA 9331, herein: BGS 4-7-1934: Dir BB to GG, 18-6-1934.
306 ANRI AS GB TGA 9331, herein: BGS 2-11-1933: Ass-Res Makassar to Gov. Celebes, 16-3-1933.
307 ANRI AS GB TGA 9331, herein: BGS 2-11-1933: DirBB to Gov Celebes, 19-5-1933.
308 It was mostly “thanks to the efforts of the local assistant-wedana”, the Resident of Cirebon 
reported, that “the scheme was successful.” ANRI AS GB TGA 9331, herein: BGS 30-5-1934: 
‘Resume besprekingen’ 23-11-1933, DepBB, BGS, 2-7-1936: DirBB to GG, 15-1-1936: ‘Verslag 
Resident Cirebon, landrente-inning middel arbeidsprestatie in onderdistrict Ggegesik 
van het district Ardjawinangoen over de maanden Februari tot en met April 1935.’
309 ANRI AS GB TGA 9331, herein: BGS 30-5-1934: Gov. West Java to GG, 17-7-1935.
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For the ‘Outer Territories’ a ‘workability tax’ was drafted, designed to 
be paid as a surtax in the unified income tax by all “road users” including 
Europeans and ‘Foreign Orientals.’310 By implementing the old and 
outdated principles and exemptions of corvée, this tax no longer differ-
entiated between classes and ethnicities..311 Indeed, around 1929, of the 41 
million people in the ‘Outer Territories’ only about 8 million were liable 
for corvée. Of those, about half bought off their services leaving a mere 
4 million people, or less than 10% of the population, carrying the burden 
of road maintenance.312 The workability tax was eventually implemented 
in South Sulawesi and a number of other ‘Outer Territories.’313 It was 
presented as a permanent solution to the perpetual lack of monetization 
as it urged ‘road-users’ to earn cash, as a credible alternative to the head 
taxes that, inevitably, kept referring back to the misunderstood principles 
and old practices of corvée lability.314 Many conservative local officials 
worried about the potential unrest caused by confusion among taxpayers 
over changed principles of old corvée liability and the new road taxes. As 
an alternative to corvée, Director of Interior Administration A. Mühlenfeld 
(1933-1936) admitted, the road tax failed to bridge various local principles 
for taxation315, but these were overruled by the impervious ambition of the 
“gradual diminishment” of corvée labour.316
Through such cunning artifices, officials attempted to manage the 
high ambitions imposed from above, while in practice they kept using the 
labour power of the colonized subjects coercively. Whether as punishment, 
voluntarily or following patterns of negotiation, coerced labour remained 
an attractive alternative to tax payment across the archipelago, to both the 
people and civil servants.317 In many districts the value of labour and time 
was simply lower than that of money. As the people sought to minimize 
the impact of the state’s claims on their existence, and as they often found 
310 NA MinKol 1901-1953 Vb. 2752, 9-7-1925 n20, herein: ‘Nota van Toelichting’, DirFin to 
GG, 22-5-1923, DirBB to GG, 29-6-1923, DirBB to GG, 4-9-1922: ‘Conceptordonnantie.’
311 ANRI DepBB 586, herein: Dep BB ‘Vragenlijst nopens gedwongen arbeid opgesteld door 
het Internationaal Arbeidsbureau’, 15-3-1929 and ‘Reactie DirFin’ (undated); DepBB 587, 
herein: DirBB to GG, 22-6-1929; RvBh to GG, 30-11-1929 and ‘Dienstnota’ DirBB to AS, 
9-7-1929.
312 About half of the people in directly governed areas and a quarter in self-governing 
regions ‘bought-off.’ See ANRI DepBB 586, herein: BB, 18-1-1929: ‘Statistiekkaart.’
313 ANRI DepBB 588: DirBB to GG, 22-6-1929.
314 ANRI DepBB 586, herein: ‘Reactie DirFin’ (undated).
315 ANRI DepBB 587, herein: ‘Dienstnota’ DirBB to AS, 9-7-1929: ‘Bijlage, Nota afdeling 
bestuurszaken der buitengewesten over afschaffi ng herendiensten, nav. BB conferentie. 
Stuk door hoofd der afdeling bestuurszaken, W.G. Hamerster’, Weltevreden, 19-6-1929.
316 As had been once more emphasized in the youngest State Regulation (“Wet op de 
Indische Staatsinrichting” 1925, art. 46).
317 ANRI AS GB TGA 9331, herein: BGS 4-7-1934: Nota to HGB: Mogelijkheid van voldoe-
ning belasting door arbeid’ and DirBB to GG, 18-6-1934. Use of convict labour for 
instance, as shown by Van Rossum, increased during the downscaling of use of corvée 
labour. Van Rossum, The Carceral Colony.
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that performing labour was more convenient than searching for money, 
it should be of little surprise that without the structural development of 
an integrally wage-based and industrialized economy, corvée labour was 
perpetuated in the ‘Outer Territories’ throughout colonial times.
Conclusion
Colonial tax policy in Java was seriously impacted by changes of the modern 
colonial era. As in Ambon, attempts to monetize Java’s assorted labour 
services required the full reinvention of the political constitution of village 
society. The unwillingness of the colonial government to face this chal-
lenging prospect, and its resultant, continuous reliance on existing orders 
of desa elites, explains much of the perpetuation of corvée labour. Colonial 
projects, attempting to understand its various underlying principles and 
uses, showed that corvée labour in Java was virtually impossibly codi-
fied within one overarching system. The vague borders between taxation, 
personal exchange, obligatory labour and village and household duties 
created a grey area of labour performance motivated by aristocratic greed, 
the labour demand of the government, the urge to exchange and redistribute 
capital, land and labour and social mechanisms of reciprocity to insure 
against the insecurities of rural life. This variation in labour services and 
the ways in which they were recognized, as exemplified by Heijting in the 
introduction of this chapter, conveniently suited the ever-expanding labour 
demand following colonial welfare policy of the early 1900s. Coerced labour 
remained an irresistibly cheap and convenient form of labour supply, to both 
the state and its indirect rulers.
Ideologically, after 1860, corvée services came to be seen as a maleficent 
product of colonial exploitation, preyed on by nineteenth century colonial-
capitalist monopolism in cooperation with ‘despotic’ indigenous rulers 
for purposes of personal profit and benefit. To ethical colonial officials like 
Fokkens, they were the epitome of outdated serfdom and social stagnation. 
Subsequently, transforming corvée into direct monetary taxes became one 
of the most prominent colonial bandwagons, in the attempt to induce social 
change in popular organization and behaviour, and to prime peasants for 
a more independent role in the reformed colonial political economy of the 
twentieth century.
This motivated various investigations into Java’s previously obfuscated 
principles of land rights and concomitant labour duties. This chapter exem-
plified the investigations of Fokkens and Hasselman, demonstrating how 
Dutch officials interpreted Java’s social organization of labour precisely 
in the terms that fitted their needs and ambitions. Instead of describing, 
these investigations shaped, codified and generalized land rights and tax 
liability, supportive of the colonial liberal order and geared towards moneti-
zation of corvée, fiscal unification, large-scale socio-economic equity and 
monetization. The investigations reveal much about how colonial knowl-
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edge production worked. They display a constant tension between the 
government’s eagerness to reform and its fear for the consequences of such 
reform. The sacred principle of preserving and rooting corvée services in 
supposedly local adat principles conflicted with the persistent fervour of the 
government to equalize, unify and reform, and the capacity of local officials 
to influence indigenous desa administrations. This is symptomatic of the 
paradox between colonial policies of interference, change and governance 
versus practices of standoffishness and pragmatism, as expressed within 
and between various levels of the colonial administration. To unify corvée 
labour and head taxes was to ignore local adat, to adhere to local adat was to 
maintain differences.
Thus, the centralized corvée regime was a colonial farce that presumed 
a kind of equity that did not exist in Java. In Java’s peasant society, specific 
services were performed by specific people. Wealthy, landed peasants 
bore a heavier brunt which they delegated to larger groups of less wealthy 
peasants. The Dutch, who did not want to allow for such social differ-
ences, ignored social fragmentation, thereby frequently only succeeding 
in expanding the number of taxpayers and the tax burden imposed upon 
these. By embedding head taxes based on the same wrongful principles 
as colonial corvée labour, the Dutch repeated existing problems. In many 
cases the head tax was levied on top of, rather than instead of corvée 
labour. Theoretically, peasants in Java and the ‘Outer Islands’ should have 
witnessed a decrease in the maximum amount of coerced services they were 
obligated to perform and its burden more equally spread. In the reality, the 
government’s influence over corvée labour and taxation simply stopped 
at the point it was rendered to the village administration. Colonial reform 
programs were ignored, or only adhered to upon inspection, while increas-
ingly powerful and corrupted desa chiefs, who fulfilled the dirty work of 
empire, used the state’s absence to exploit corvée performance to their 
own advantage. Either by negotiating with peasants or by extorting them 
outrightly, they continued ‘illegally’ using corvée labour. Hence, promises 
of the full abolition of coerced labour, welfare increase and unification of the 
fiscal system and burden, remained stranded in the reports, pamphlets and 
the archives of ethical officials.
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Map 5.1. West Sumatra.
Districts:
1. Lubuk Sikaping 4. Batipuh and Pariaman 7. Padang
2. Limapuluh Kota 5. Tanah Datar 8. Painan
3. Agam 6. Solok 9. Kerinci
** Current day Batusangkar
** Current day Bukittingi
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5 Rethinking families
Property rights and conflict in West Sumatra, 
c. 1840-1930
In April 1900, two Sumatran merchants named Mohammed Yusuf and 
Mohammed Tahir, living in Padang, West Sumatra, requested exemption 
from the performance of corvée services in return for payment of tax. A year 
earlier, a group of Chinese merchants had successfully protested against 
their heavy corvée burden, and Yusuf and Tahir hoped to reach an agree-
ment as well.1 But buying-off was not yet made customary in West Sumatra. 
In fact, although equalisation and monetization of the fiscal regime were 
theoretically prioritized in Dutch colonial policies, levying of monetary 
taxes was anxiously avoided, and the requests of Mohammed Yusuf and 
Mohammed Tahir were denied.2 It would take eight more years before the 
government endeavoured to impose direct monetary taxes in West Sumatra. 
This signified a similar lingering, unwieldiness of fiscal transformative poli-
cies as in Java and Ambon, and as in the case of this chapter, infused with 
even more complex concerns related to adat society, that deserve a closer 
study.
This chapter is about the role of women and their families in the tax 
payment system in West Sumatra. As in Java and Ambon, these families 
were subjected to a cultivation system of monopolized trade and coerced 
labour services. The Minangkabau, the ethnic group native to the highlands 
of West Sumatra, and their highly various adat societies, were organized 
around familial possessions inherited through the female line. This suited 
the colonial use of communal labour and principles of forced cultivation, but 
clashed with many of the expectations of later colonial statesmen wishing to 
impose individual monetary taxes and posed a challenging puzzle, which 
they never really solved. Dutch officials experienced Minangkabau adat 
society as a bad fit with their ambitions to reshape society along the patterns 
of their conflicting principles of direct, governmental taxes and indirect 
rule. Obsessed with their policy of appointing a single, central male figure 
as indirect ruler to govern specific social groups and wield authority over 
politics and property, the principle of female inheritance unsettled their 
concepts of male taxability. In the 1880s, when the coffee cultivation system 
started to collapse, making West Sumatra among the costliest provinces of 
1 This group of merchants also protested against the indirect (pig slaughter and dice game) 
taxes they paid; these funded more than half of Padang’s public works at the time. For 
the case of Mohammed Yusuf and Mohammed Tahir, see: ANRI AS GB Besl. 737, herein: 
Besl. 3-4-1900, Besl. 9-8-1899, GovSWK to GG, 20-5-1899. For the Chinese protests, see: 
ANRI AS GB MGS 4299, herein: MGS 24-9-1904 n6, GovSWK to DirBB, 16-5-1902, MGS 
24-9-1904 n6: ‘Petitie Chinezen’ to GG, 26-8-1899, GovSWK to DirBB, 30-1-1901
2 ANRI AS GB Besl. 737, herein: Besl. 3-4-1900.
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the empire, the urge for reform intensified, plunging colonial bureaucracy 
into a similar deluge of reports, advices and lingering theoretical debates, 
as we have already seen in Java. Driven by zealous ambitions for reform 
but infused with constant epistemic anxiety, none of the seemingly sound 
tax policy proposals allowed for much accommodation with the intricacies 
of Minangkabau society. Colossal colonial clumsiness in introducing taxes 
that heavily infracted upon the fabric of adat society, ultimately caused a 
large-scale rebellion in 1908.
While present day literature on the history of West Sumatra under 
Dutch colonial rule has shown a keen interest in the socio-political influ-
ence of colonialism on the shifting patterns of legal, political and the socio-
economic organization of the Minangkabau, this colonial fixation on male 
taxability and authority has never really been questioned. T. Day discusses 
relations between families and states in Southeast Asia at large. He critically 
observes how encompassing issues of gender transcend “Eurocentric and 
reified concepts of the state and draw closer to Southeast Asian political 
practices and power relations”, and argues that “families and family values 
served to bind people together to become historical agents” of states, while 
families “simultaneously played a disorderly, rather than an ordering role in 
premodern Southeast Asian history.”3 In nineteenth-century West Sumatra, 
we shall see how families and family values held much agency in matters of 
property holding and taxation. This encumbered the fusion or integration 
of state and society, as envisioned by the colonial government, and adds 
to our historiographical understanding of the tensions in the colonization 
process of West Sumatra. It shows that apart from constant conflict between 
Western colonialism, radical Islam, and adat-society4, upheavals such as 
the 1908 anti-tax rebellion or the communist uprisings of 1926 were also 
responses to the more specific, ill-considered infringements of puzzled 
Dutch colonial officials on the fabric of adat society itself, in attempts to 
extract fiscal surplus and disentangle the complexities of the indigenous 
society.5
3 Day argues that “the dynamic rise of families and the competition between them” also 
“acted to undermine and unbind structures which historians of Southeast Asia have 
usually associated with the existence of orderly states.” T. Day, “Ties That (Un)Bind: 
Families and States in Premodern Southeast Asia”, The Journal of Asian Studies 55:2 (1996), 
384-409: 384-409, 385-386, 404.
4 J. Hadler argues it were in fact tensions between European rule and ‘radical Islam’ that 
caused the integral upheaval of adat society. J. Hadler, Muslims and Matriarchs: Cultural 
Resilience in Indonesia Through Jihad and Colonialism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2008), 88-89, 111, 155.
5 J.S. Kahn, Constituting the Minangkabau: Peasants, Culture and Modernity in Colonial Indo-
nesia (Providence: Berg, 1993), 31-32 and E.E. Graves, The Minangkabau Response to Dutch 
Colonial Rule in the Nineteenth Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Modern Indonesia 
Project, 1981), 50-76, esp. 51-55.
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Section one addresses the social organization of Minangkabau, and 
section two, the Dutch colonization process and the imposition of forced 
coffee cultivation. Section three investigates the Dutch understanding of 
Minangkabau society, the lengthy colonial debates about taxability, and 
how the imposition of monetary taxes led to the revolt of 1908. The fourth 
section addresses continued colonial resilience, and tensions in the period 
after the revolt.
5.1 Principles of Minangkabau social organization
Geographic orientation has a strong place in Minangkabau culture and 
history. West Sumatra’s mountainous interiors were characterized by fertile 
volcanic rice plains surrounded by steep hills. These formed the darat, 
the traditional heartlands of the Minangkabau realm, as distinct from the 
rantau, the culturally mixed frontiers around and beyond. This chapter 
predominantly analyses these sawah-rich plateaus of the darat or ‘Padang 
Highlands’ (as the Dutch referred to them on their maps), where older 
forms of adat lifestyles were more strongly felt than in the coastal ‘Padang 
Lowlands’, where smaller rice harvests prompted entrepreneurship, trade, 
migration and exchange.6 Moreover, only the highlands were suitable for 
(coerced) coffee plantation. This created a distinct division in the fiscal 
burden between the highlands where people were subjected to coerced 
coffee services, and the lowlands, where people were not. This chasm 
obsessed Dutch policy makers for decades.
The basic territorially polities in West Sumatra were nagari. Several 
nagari formed loosely structured adat federations called lareh or laras.7 As 
in Ambon and Java, nagari came to be treated as villages by the colonial 
government. They were the basic socio-political units for administration 
and institutionalized delivery of forced produced coffee and performance 
of serayo, local communal labour transformed by the Dutch into corvée 
labour.8 In West Sumatra, nagari were associations of one or more suku9, 
matrilineal ‘lineage groups’ or clans of a presumed common foremother, led 
6 Graves, The Minangkabau Response, 4-5.
7 F. and K. Von Benda-Beckmann, Political and Legal Transformations of an Indonesian Polity: 
The Nagari from Colonisation to Decentralisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), 42. These villages may have been of similar organization and functioning as the 
village republics in Ambon (see Chapter 4). See F. and K. Von Benda-Beckmann, “Prop-
erty, Politics, and Confl ict: Ambon and Minangkabau Compared”, Law and Society Review 
28:3 (1994), 589-607.
8 Kahn, Constituting the Minangkabau, 164-165.
9 Not all settlements had nagari status, which required a set of specifi c conditions only met 
after a long process of suku settlement and integration. Von Benda-Beckmann and Von 
Benda-Beckmann, Political and Legal Transformations, 48.
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by a penghulu suku10 who administrated and approved of all social occur-
rences within the suku, according to adat (marriage, death, birth, etc.), and 
communicated with surrounding penghulu to maintain inter-nagari order.11 
Suku were subdivided into (sub-)lineages, buah gadang and kaum12, also 
descending from a presumed common foremother. These lineages were 
divided into rumah, house(hold)s (also known as sebuah perut), the smallest 
units consisting of a mother with her daughters and their children, living 
in a traditional long-house, the rumah gadang. While women grew up and 
continued to live in their rumah gadang after marriage, men moved out 
when reaching adolescence. They would subsequently take their meals in 
their maternal houses, but sleep in surau, religious boarding schools that 
also functioned as dormitories.13 After marriage, men would enjoy dinner 
and spend the night in their wives’ rumah gadang, but during daylight they 
were not expected to enter the house. Instead, they inhabited the rumah 
gadang and worked the lands belonging to their mothers and sisters, as even 
after marriage they shared in the property and held social authority in their 
maternal families.14
That does not mean that men held no responsibility towards their 
wives’ lineages or households, to which they were expected to contribute, 
by for instance, supporting the education of their children.15 They just had 
no property or political rights in their wives’ houses. Authority over men’s 
children was in hands of their wives’ eldest brother, who functioned as 
mamak kepala waris, the guardian of the kaum and representatives of lineages 
10 Note that the meaning of penghulu in West Sumatra differs from Java. In Java, penghulu 
were Islamic scholars (ulama), sometimes appointed by the government in the adminis-
tration of the Regents as religious offi cials or advisors.
11 These suku can be traced back to two models or ‘matrilineages’ of specific political 
organization and succession that shared the same adat. The legend goes that the fi rst 
four suku, Bodi, Caniago, Koto and Pilang were the original fragmented exogamous units 
of the Minangkabau. These split into two sections or moieties, basing the two major 
overarching adat systems, and had developed into 100 differently named suku by the late 
eighteenth century. In the case of Kota-Pilang every suku was headed by a chief called 
penghulu suku who inherited the title, while Bodi-Cianago had a more egalitarian and 
democratic organization in which penghulu suku were (s)elected. Von Benda-Beckmann 
and Von Benda-Beckmann, Political and Legal Transformations, 41-42; E.M. Loeb, Sumatra: 
Its History and People (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1972), 102-105.
12 Kaum became the standard term used by the Dutch to indicate lineages and their pusaka 
property. Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann, Political and Legal Transforma-
tions, 69, 77.
13 Graves, The Minangkabau Response, 6. Surau may be compared to the pensantren in Java, 
it’s religious leaders (ulama) to the kyai (see chapter 5).
14 F. and K. Von Benda-Beckmann, Property in Social Continuity: Continuity and Change in 
the Maintenance of Property Relationships Through Time in Minangkabau, West Sumatra (The 
Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1979), 108-110.
15 Van Fraassen, Sociografi e van de Minangkabause Samenleving, 6-7; See also V.E. Korn, “De 
Vrouwelijke Mama in de Minangkabausche Familie”, BKI 100 (1941), 301-338.
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to the outside world. 16 Before marriage, some men would leave the darat for 
the rantau, to acquire knowledge and wealth. This practice, called merantau 
(to go abroad), was an important feature in Minangkabau society. Some 
men were fortunate and returned wealthy, able to marry a Minangkabau 
wife, some never came back at all, and married abroad.17 Merantau helped 
in ameliorating poverty, prevented the build-up of social pressures and 
provided extra income for the families, as some of the incomes of ‘meran-
tauing’ men were channelled back home.18
Property and inheritance
Every lineage had the rights to a number of rice fields.19 These were the 
most important part of the harta pusaka, the lineage’s shared properties and 
perquisites representing power, prestige or social positions, also including 
the rumah gadang, jewellery, family artefacts and rights to the penghulu title 
or other adat positions.20 Rights (hak) to the harta pusaka were inherited in 
the female line and inalienable, in order to provide constant social secu-
rity to women and their families.21 Together, the lineages and their pusaka 
were treated as an entity. When lineages became too large, the harta pusaka 
were split up and divided among the new lineages under newly appointed 
family leaders.22 All lineage members had to guard and maintain the pusaka 
lands. Men were also expected to reclaim new lands which they initially
16 In colonial archives, the sub-lineages (or kaum) are treated as a family and the mamak 
kepala waris as family chiefs, but this is not unambiguous. In 1930 the colonial government 
counted about 12,000 mamak kepala waris. They were usually the eldest men who could 
claim direct descent from their family’s ancestral female and who bore responsibility for 
their families’ wellbeing and property. Occasionally the mamak kepala waris were women, 
in case they were considered the most competent and knowledgeable person concerning 
familial lands and land rights. In some nagari the mamak kepala waris (as chief of the buah 
gadang) had a penghulu title. See E. Postel-Coster, Het Omheinde Kweekbed: Machtsverhou-
dingen in de Minangkabause Familieroman (Delft: Eburon, 1985), 35; Von Benda-Beckmann 
and Von Benda-Beckmann, Property in Social Continuity, 61-72 and Political and Legal 
Transformations, 42.
17 Graves, The Minangkabau Response, 19.
18 Ibid., 19-21.
19 These use rights were owned by all members of the kaum, and indivisible. No individual 
could express his or her own ownership (hak milik) over any of the harta pusaka. Use rights 
to harta pusaka were called ganggam bantuek. See Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-
Beckmann, Property in Social Continuity, 162-164.
20 Graves, The Minangkabau Response, 6; Van Fraassen, Sociografie van de Minangkabause 
Samenleving, 9-10. Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann, Property in Social 
Continuity, 148-149, 165-167. The penghulu title was usually inherited as part of harta 
pusaka but could also be awarded through a process of (s)election.
21 Graves, The Minangkabau Response, 6.
22 Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann, Political and Legal Transformations, 77.
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controlled themselves after gaining their family’s consent.23 This type of 
property was known as harta pencarian, which included all forms of personal 
wealth acquired during one’s lifetime, by individual efforts. However, harta 
pencarian would become harta pusaka upon the death of the ‘owner.’24 By 
acquiring harta pencarian, men ensured their lineages of the prospect of 
additional harta pusaka after their passing.25 Both harta pusaka and harta 
pencarian were held within the ulayat, the territory over which the nagari (or 
a clan association) held rights.26
Use of rights of harta pusaka were vested in women and guarded 
by the mamak kepala waris who managed and maintained consensus 
and observed adat in matters of pusaka administration and inheritance, 
under supervision of the penghulu.27 Death or the demise of the eldest 
mother, birth and marriage and divorce, had a deep impact on shifts 
in pusaka usufruct rights and the division and redistribution of harta 
pusaka. This was a rather complicated matter, arranged through specific 
adat that varied among different nagari, though every woman knew 
which lands belonged to her lineage and which did not.28 In practice, 
the penghulu sometimes determined how lands were used and owned 
by whom. Village taxes, such as isi adat and uang adat were collected 
by the penghulu and, up to 1914, deposited in the nagari treasury.29
To twentieth century Dutch officials, this complex of matrilineal inher-
ited rights to lineage property, as constituents of a socio-economic organiza-
tion, was particularly hard to grasp. Not only was it subject to continuous 
change and reinterpretation, it also lacked any ingredients of individual 
ownership and responsibility, into which individual forms of taxation could 
be tied. Thus, like Ambon and Java, West Sumatra was subjected to a system 
of coerced cultivation and indirect rule.
23 The penghulu had to formally approve the man’s ownership of the land to ensure balance 
of ownership among lineages, but always under consultation and negotiation with the 
involved families. Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann, Property in Social 
Continuity, 151. This reminds of the division between sawah pusaka and sawah yasa as 
encountered in various places in Java, the difference being that in Minangkabau culture 
the continuation of ownership of land within a given lineage was essential to lineage’s 
survival, while Javanese peasant households were a bit more mobile and dynamic.
24 Ibid., 149; Graves, The Minangkabau Response, 8.
25 One colonial author even described harta pencarian as harta pusaka in “chrysalis state”: 
G.D. Willinck, Het Rechtsleven bij de Minangkabausche Maleiërs (Leiden: Brill, 1909), 584.
26 T.A.L. Kroesen, “Het Grondbezit ter Sumatra’s Westkust”, TvNI 4:3 (1874), 1-28 (quoted 
in: Kahn, Constituting the Minangkabau, 162).
27 Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann, Property in Social Continuity, 164.
28 Ibid., 139-215.
29 Kahn, Constituting the Minangkabau, 164.
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5.2 Colonial conquest and coerced cultivation
Precolonial West Sumatra knew no powerful centralized authority or 
political structure above the nagari. The old Kingdom of Minangkabau, 
Pagaruyung, was a “collective name for a multitude of independent petty 
states”30, the king permanently invisible, using language and representa-
tion, rather than presence and interference, to express his power.31 While in 
Java, harmony within the state was believed to arrive from a general faith 
in the supreme ruler at the centre, in West Sumatra welfare depended on 
the synthesis and congruence amongst its components, the nagari. Many 
colonial authors considered this obstructive to colonial authority.32 Every 
nagari had its own adat council (balai) of penghulu, with which the Dutch 
had to conduct business. This high degree of local independence was 
reflected in the political elaboration of lineage administration: for every 
decision, the mamak kepala waris had to reach consensus among the lineage 
members.33 Additionally, all major decisions in the nagari had to be reached 
unanimously, by reason and debate, in village meetings (rapat) led by the 
penghulu.34 Only when consensus (mupakat or mufakat) was reached, could 
action be taken.35 Although initially it seemed as if preserving this ‘indepen-
dence’ and ‘democracy’ was at the core of colonial policies in West Sumatra, 
it would not withstand the pressure of forced coffee production.
The contest for West Sumatra
Full Dutch colonization of West Sumatra commenced in the 1820s, when 
Dutch troops intervened in the Padri-war, a conflict between old adat elites 
and the so-called Padri-movement that consisted of radical Islamic reform-
ists who had been raging against traditional Minangkabau culture and what 
they considered social anarchy (most notably alcohol consumption and cock 
30 Graves, The Minangkabau Response, 18. See also Loeb, Sumatra, 98-99.
31 Drakard, A Kingdom of Words, 16-18, 108-109, 264-267.
32 See for example B.J.O. Schrieke, “Het Probleem der Bestuursorganisatie ter Sumatra’s 
Westkust” Koloniale Studië n: Tijdschrift van de Vereeniging voor Studie van Koloniaal-Maat-
schappelijke Vraagstukken 11 (1927), 57-106: 62-64.
33 Postel-Coster, Het Omheinde Kweekbed, 7-18, 34-38; Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-
Beckmann, Property in Social Continuity, 155-157.
34 Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann, Property in Social Continuity, 81.
35 This was similar in the later land rent system in Java, see Soebekti, Some Facets, 16.
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fighting) and impure behaviour, as opposed to ‘true’ Islamic teachings.36 The 
Dutch, who had established a trading outpost in Padang in the seventeenth 
century, interpreted the growing influence of the Padri movement, which 
was furnished by rapid socio-economic change, as a considerable threat 
to their presence in Sumatra.37 In 1821, after sending troops to support the 
penghulu against the radical Islamic teachers (tuanku) of the Padri move-
ment38, the Dutch were successfully resisted by the heroized Padri leader 
Tuanku Imam Bonjol. In 1833 a truce was agreed and codified as the Plak-
kaat Panjang (long proclamation) which declared, amongst other things, that 
“no direct tax would ever be levied in West Sumatra.”39 Therefore it bore 
significance for the eventual introduction of direct taxes in 1908 (see below). 
However, the fighting continued as both parties believed the truce was 
being ignored and in 1837, Tuanku Imam Bonjol was defeated and exiled.40 
During the Padri-war, the Dutch established deep ties with the adat chiefs 
of the nagari – marking the beginning of Dutch incorporation of the West 
Sumatran highlands into their colony.
Another ‘cultuurstelsel’
Because the Dutch considered West Sumatra a disunited agglomeration 
of mutually distrustful nagari engaged in “manifold quarrels and wars”, 
they delegated many aspects of local governance and economic orga-
nization to their new allies of the adat-elite, shielding it against ‘radical 
religious elements’ and ‘disorder.’41 The administration was funded with 
export duties and pasar taxes levied over free coffee production which was 
hoped to help in “channelling the fruits of indigenous labour to Dutch 
36 These Padri were hajji’s returning from Mecca where they had been infl uenced by the 
conservative reformist Wahhabi movement. See C. Dobbin, “Tuanku Iman Bondjol (1772-
1864)”, Indonesia 13 (1972), 5-35: 5-10; G. Teitler, Het Einde van de Padrie-Oorlog: Het Beleg en 
de Vermeestering van Bonjol 1834-1837. Een Bronnenpublicatie (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche 
Leeuw, 2004), 11-12; J. Hadler, “A Historiography of Violence and the Secular State in 
Indonesia: Tuanku Imam Bondjol and the Uses of History”, Journal of Asian Studies 67:3 
(2008), 971-1010: 972-977-979; Laffan, “The Tangled Roots”, 399-400. M.F. Laffan, The 
Makings of Indonesian Islam: Orientalism and the Narration of a Sufi  Past (Princeton: Princ-
eton University Press, 2011), 91-92.
37 C. Dobbin, “Economic Change in Minangkabau as a Factor in the Rise of the Padri Move-
ment, 1784-1830”, Indonesia 23 (1977), 1-38.
38 Graves, The Minangkabau Response, 22-25.
39 Teitler, Het Einde van de Padrie-Oorlog, 11-12; Dobbin, “Tuanku Iman Bondjol”, 9-10, 12.
 See for the full tekst of the Plakkaat: H.J.J.L. de Stuers, De Vestiging en Uitbreiding der Neder-
landers ter Westkust van Sumatra (Amsterdam: Van Kampen, 1849), Vol II. The relevant 
parts are also quoted in T. Abdullah, “The Making of a Schakel Society: the Minangkabau 
Region in the Late 19th Century”, Madjalah Ilmu-Ilmu Sastra Indonesia 6:3 (1976), 13-29: 15.
40 Teitler, Het Einde van de Padrie-Oorlog, 16-19; Hadler, “A Historiography of Violence”, 
985-987. See also C. Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism in a Changing Peasant Economy: Central 
Sumatra, 1784-1847 (London: Curzon Press, 1983).
41 Schrieke, “Het Probleem der Bestuursorganisatie”, 62-63; Hadler, “A Historiography of 
Violence”, 987.
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warehouses.”42 However, the Minangkabau were unwilling to pay these 
taxes. Coffee, meanwhile, was ‘smuggled’ via eastern routes to Singapore 
to avoid duties levied in Padang.43 A plunge in coffee prices in the 1840s 
and an impending fiscal crisis, ultimately moved the Dutch to impose 
a full-fledged monopolized cultivation system, which in all its aspects is 
reminiscent of the repressive cultivation systems in Java and Ambon.44
As in Ambon and Java, specific adat chiefs and orders were elevated into 
paramount indirect rulers. Adat chiefs who had helped win the Padri-war 
were appointed as ‘nagari chiefs.’ The nagari were centralized as territorial 
units, and regrouped into overarching sub-districts (afdelingen), named laras 
(after the precolonial overarching adat federations) under chieftainship of a 
tuanku laras (laras chief).45 The Dutch appointed ‘head-penghulu’ to chair the 
penghulu councils and gain influence over the lineages, but the consultative 
nature of the councils was ostensibly maintained to continue the appear-
ance of independence and political participation. In reality, indigenous 
governance became much more hierarchical and authoritarian.46 All nagari 
were expected to produce and deliver predetermined amounts of coffee to 
government warehouses for a fixed price. In 1862, coffee production was 
made compulsory to enhance production. Apart from working on the 
coffee plantations, people were also expected to perform corvée labour for 
the construction of warehouses and roads and government buildings and 
transport coffee downhill to Padang.47 Private production and export of 
coffee was not allowed.
42 Graves, The Minangkabau Response, 55, 57-58. Coffee production grew from 2,000 to 80,000 
piculs in 1800-1833.
43 J. van Swieten, “De Invoering en Werking van het Koffi jstelsel in het Gouvernement van 
Sumatra’s Westkust”, TvNI 1(1863), 203-224: 205.
44 A. Oki, “The Dynamics of Subsistence Economy in West Sumatra”, in History and 
Peasant Consciousness in South East Asia: Proceedings of the Sixth International Ethnological 
Symposium Held at the National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka (Osaka: National Museum 
of Ethnology, 1984); E.B. Kielstra, “De Koffi ecultuur ter Westkust van Sumatra”, IG 10:2 
(1888), 1437-1486 and 1609-1674: 1439, 1446-1450, 1460-1465, 1473-1486; W.K. Huitema, De 
Bevolkingskoffi ecultuur op Sumatra: Met een Inleiding tot hare Geschiedenis op Java en Sumatra 
(Veenman, 1935), 47; C. Lulofs, “Koffi ecultuur en Belasting ter Sumatra’s Westkust”, IG 
26:2 (1904), 1629-1661 and 1787-1815.
45 The former larah had no administrative heads and the new colonial boundaries rarely 
coincided with the boundaries of the new laras. Colonial laras were “erroneously 
assumed nagari-federations.” Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann, Political 
and Legal Transformations, 66.
46 Ibid., 66-67. Schrieke mentioned that the rapat culture gave way to the infl uence of the 
appointment laras heads and penghulu kepala, so that a signifi cant decrease in mupakat was 
noticeable. Schrieke, “Het Probleem der Bestuursorganisatie”, 77. See also Graves, The 
Minangkabau Response, 38.
47 Graves, The Minangkabau Response, 63. Kielstra, “De Koffi ecultuur”, 1475, 1483-1484, 
1631-1632, 1648-1650, 1660; Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann, Property in 
Social Continuity, 122.
Promise Pretence and Pragmatism.indb   223 22-04-21   17:34
224 Chapter 5
Thus, the Minangkabau were slowly excluded from free trade and 
consumption. Colonial stereotypes of the Minangkabau followed this 
transition towards coerced cultivation. Prior to the imposition of the coffee 
cultivation system, Sumatrans were seen as more commercial, free, mobile 
and dynamic beings than the “docile” and “obedient” Javanese.48 Such ideas 
initially infused the ‘Sumatra-policies’ of Van den Bosch and Baud. In the 
1830s and 40s there were attempts to encourage peace and stability, enable 
local trading networks to flourish to activate local revenue streams to fund 
local governance in newly acquired territories in Sumatra.49 After it became 
clear that indigenous trade was unlikely to benefit colonial revenue due to 
circumvention of Dutch offices and free commerce was replaced with forced 
labour, colonial conceptualizations of Sumatrans were realtered, and the 
“free, independent nature”, the headstrongness and “wayward household 
institutions” of the Minangkabau were presented as the cause of the local 
inability to organize large scale coffee export.50 The Minangkabau were 
portrayed as disputatious beings, obsessed with consultation and equality, 
and therefor unsusceptible to the supposedly bureaucratically organized, 
tax-funded governance.
Hence, the Minangkabau were subjected to the same principles of 
capitalist-monopolist governance and indirect rule as the Javanese and 
Ambonese. The tuanku laras and penghulu suku were awarded fixed shares 
and production-dependent bonuses and expected to supervise forced 
cultivation of specific amounts of coffee trees by their lineages.51 The Dutch 
created specific working groups, kerja rodi, to execute the coffee and its 
adjacent corvée services, supervised from the 1860s onward by another 
invented official, the penghulu (suku) rodi, who also received bonuses related 
to production levels.52 Despite prevalent ideas that the Minangkabau 
were poor agriculturalists, cultivation methods were not interfered with 
to sustain ostensible agricultural autonomy and ensure cooperation.53 As 
put by controleur C. Lulofs of Danau and Matur (in office 1901-1908), “The 
Malay was used to plant his coffee individually in village or forest lands, 
according to his own judgement.”54
48 See for instance B.J.O Schrieke, “Het Probleem der Bestuursorganisatie”, 81-82, 96.
49 E. Locher-Scholten, Sumatraans Sultanaat en Koloniale Staat: De Relatie Djambi-Batavia 
(1830-1907) en het Nederlandse Imperialisme (Leiden: KITLV, 1994), 52-56, 88-94; A.J.S. Reid, 
The Contest for North Sumatra: Atjeh, the Netherlands and Britain 1858-1898 (Kuala Lumpur/
London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 19-20.
50 As phrased by the architect of the coffee Cultivation System in West Sumatra, Governor 
A.V. Michiels (in offi ce 1837-1848) quoted in W.R. van Hoëvell, “Generaal Michiels”, 
TvNI 12:11 (1850), 374-376.
51 Kielstra, “De Koffi ecultuur”, 1453, 1455, 1480-1482.
52 J.S. Kahn, Minangkabau Social Formations: Indonesian Peasants and the World-Economy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 123; A.L. van Hasselt, Volksbeschrijving 
van Midden-Sumatra (Leiden: Brill, 1882), 188.
53 ANRI AS GB Besl. 279, herein: MGS 18-10-1894 n348: DirBB to GG, 7-9-1894.
54 Lulofs, “Koffi ecultuur en Belasting.”
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In this way, as we have seen in Java and Ambon, the Dutch governed 
without being present, using and commanding at a distance the local social 
organization of power. Representative, consultatory family leaders whose 
appointment had been based on inherited titles, were replaced with what 
Hadler calls a “false adat elite.”55 Traditional power, prestige and political 
significance were increasingly eroded as a consequence of the chiefs’ 
dual, conflicting role, as government-controlled administrative agents 
and enforcers of an increasingly resented system of forced production and 
labour on the one hand, and adat-chiefs bearing socio-religious responsi-
bility towards their suku on the other hand.56 Dutch colonial bureaucracy 
and its coffee system became an alternative source of opportunity and 
access to power and wealth, but only for the happy few.57 As a result, a gap 
emerged between those with and those without links to the Dutch system 
and its profits, and as in other regions under cultivation systems, it was 
an easy step from dominance to overexploitation.58 The artificial combina-
tion of adat-leadership and Dutch governance propagated a political myth 
of partnership, but was in fact a perspicuous attempt to conceal increasing 
Dutch dominance and exploitation. By infracting in the appointment of 
chiefs, the coffee system deeply impacted the pusaka system which included 
inheritable rights to adat positions.59 This brought lasting institutional 
change to Minangkabau socio-political composition, and drove much of the 
subsequent course of Dutch colonial political-fiscal policy.
5.3 Taxing lineage property
Debate about the abolition of the Cultivation System followed the same 
basic pattern as we have seen in the cases of Ambon and Java. Boosted by 
the conceptualization of free trade and labour as civilizing values, its actual 
abolition was only considered upon the realization of its economic failure, 
as production declined, falling below 1847 levels by 1890. Arguing about 
the causes of this decline, officials repeated the usual allegations of indig-
55 Hadler, A Historiography of Violence: 990.
56 T.A.L. Kroesen, “Het Inlandsch Bestuur ter Sumatra’s Westkust”, TvNI 2 (1873), 81-109 
and 208-230: 108; Schrieke, “Het Probleem der Bestuursorganisatie”, 72. Graves, The 
Minangkabau Response, 41; Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann, Political and 
Legal Transformations, 77.
57 Graves, The Minangkabau Response, vii, 47-49; Abdullah, The Making of a Schakel Society: 
19-20.
58 According to former army offi cer and parliamentarian E.B. Kielstra, the tuanku laras 
in particular “eagerly grabbed the opportunity that gained them personal income […] 
attaching themselves closer to the government which they considered a support of their 
own authority.” Kielstra, “De Koffi ecultuur”, 1452.
59 Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies I, 150.
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enous laziness and agricultural-commercial inefficiency and incapacity.60 
Production decrease had in fact resulted largely from a combination of 
a leaf disease and a decline in coffee prices as a result of overproduction 
throughout the 1860s. The land was exhausted by overproduction, the 
people too, and an economic disinterest in coffee planting led to negligence. 
Many peasants left the beans “to rot on the tree”61 further adding to the 
colonial conviction that the Minangkabau were incapable coffee planters.62 
To revive production, the government’s inept response was increased force, 
by criminalizing the refusal to perform cultivation or corvée services and 
the subordination of legal jurisdiction of adat institutions to the colonial 
court system in 1875.63 These measures had a quite opposite effect to what 
had been intended, as increased coercion resulted in more discontent and 
impaired the social formula of averred freedom, on which the system’s 
success had depended.64 This eventually led to a further downfall of the 
system.65 Many peasants simply made “too little profit […] from too much 
work.”66 Government investigators advised revoking of the use of force 
and proposed levying a head tax to fund the costs of the gradual transi-
tion towards free plantation.67 But the traces of coerced cultivation and its 
deeply ingrained socio-political anchors were, as in Java and Ambon, not 
that easily eradicated. West Sumatra proved a particularly testing case to 
the reformatory ambitions of Dutch colonial officials. Specific adat elements 
60 See for instance: Lulofs, “Koffiecultuur en Belasting”, 1643; ANRI AS GB Besl. 226, 
herein: MAS 3-8-1893: Adv-Hon, ‘Koffi ecultuur en belasting ter Westkust van Sumatra’, 
17-5-1893.
61 ANRI AS GB Besl. 352, herein: MGS 10-10-1895: Nota A, behorende Bij Conc-Ord [...] 
Voor Hoofdelijke Belasting, GovSWK, 13-7-1895.
62 Lulofs, “Koffi ecultuur en Belasting”, 1658-1661. These visions were shared by Director 
of Binnenlands Bestuur P.C. Arends (in offi ce 1895-1903), see ANRI AS GB MGS 4233, 
herein: RvI 8-4-1904: DirBB, 31-12-1901, 8-27) and the controleur for Coffee Cultivation, 
L.E. Dom, see F.A. Heckler, Voorstellen Betreffende de Invoering van Directe Belastingen in 
het Gouvernement Sumatra’s Westkust III vols., vol. II (Batavia: 1906), herein: ‘Bijlage I: 
Nota n.a.v. de missives van de Gouvernementssecretaris, 4-11 en 20-12-1905, Controleur 
koffi ecultuur L.E. Dom en Secretaris op het Departement van Landbouw Gobius, 1931-
1912-1905.’
63 F.A. Heckler, Voorstellen I (Batavia: 1905), herein: ‘Bijlage I. Advies van den Assistent-
Resident van Loeboe Sikaping, J. Ballot [...]’ and ‘Bijlage II. Missive van den Assistent-
Resident voor de politie te Padang, J. van Hengel’, 10, 40 (The original letter of Ballot can 
be found in ANRI AS GB MGS 4762); Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann, 
Property in Social Continuity, 123.
64 Huitema, “De Bevolkingskoffi ecultuur”, 53; Anonymous, De Gouvernements-Koffi ecultuur 
van 1888-1903 Deel II, (de Gouvernementskoffi ecultuur in de Buitenbezittingen) (Batavia: 
Landsdrukkerij, 1904), 28.
65 J. van Bosse, Eenige Beschouwingen Omtrent de Oorzaken van den Achteruitgang van de 
Koffi ecultuur ter Sumatra’s Westkust, Benevens eenige Opmerkingen omtrent de Economische en 
Politieke Toestanden Aldaar (‘s Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1895), 26, 77, 82-87.
66 Kielstra, “De Koffi ecultuur”, 1669.
67 Anonymous, De Gouvernements-Koffi ecultuur van 1888-1903, II: 28; ANRI AS GB Besl. 9, 
herein: MAS 18-7-1890 n1728: ‘Advies Raad van Indië (RvI) van Wijck’ [1st page missing, 
date unknown], p. 26.
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had become overemphasized as a political basis, having served to force 
coffee cultivation through collectively organized coerced labour groups.68 
Levying head taxes required individual incomes and this would need 
a change back to the system of commerce and individual liberty, which 
had been destroyed. A return to commerce posed the same problems as 
in Java and Ambon, related to determining taxability in accordance with 
local social principles of labour and the right to produce, without affecting 
the old rights of the indirect ruling elites. In West Sumatra, the position of 
women as property right-holders added an extra dimension to the challenge 
of capturing the taxability of families into the ‘right’ colonial bureaucratic-
fiscal categories of European officialdom. This puzzled Dutch officials for 
decades to come and ultimately impelled them to launch a tax regulation 
unacceptable to Minangkabau rulers and people.
Obstacles to change
Initially, the Dutch decided to continue coerced production and raised the 
salaries of chiefs, a common colonial response to production decline. But 
in West Sumatra, it only augmented further inequality in profit redistribu-
tion.69 Meanwhile, the coffee crisis caused a direct decline in indigenous 
commercial activity, resulting from the demonetization and declining 
purchasing power of the coffee producing population.70 As a result, by 1890, 
West Sumatra was once again no longer able to cover its own expenses.
Governor R.C. Kroessen (in office 1885-1889) proposed making corvée 
and cultivation services eligible for ‘buy-off’, in order to enhance moneti-
zation of the economy. However, Director of Interior Administration J.M. 
van Vleuten was wary of entrusting the penghulu suku rodi with reimburse-
ment money, and feared further economic collapse of coffee production if 
too many peasants, irreplaceable because of ‘lack of free wage labourers’, 
‘bought-off’ their services.71 Additionally, corvée liability had been linked to 
place of birth, supposedly according to adat, to ensure that ‘corvée labourers’ 
contributed to the villages of their mothers’ households. However, many 
68 K.R. Young, “Minangkabau Authority Patterns and the Effects of Dutch Rule”, in J. Maxwell 
et al. (ed.). The Malay-Islamic World of Sumatra: Studies in Polities [i.e. Politics] and Culture 
(Five Lectures Pres. at AIA-CSEAS Winter Lecture Series for 1982, at Monash University), 
63-73.
69 A.W.C. Verwey, “De Belasting in Natura ter Sumatra’s Westkust. Open Brief aan den 
Heer Joh. F. Snelleman”, IG 3:2 (1881), 59-90: 66-73.
70 K.R. Young, Islamic Peasants and the State: The 1908 Anti-Tax Rebellion in West Sumatra 
(New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1994), 26; Kahn, Constituting 
the Minangkabau, 172, 177, 204-205.
71 ANRI AS GB Besl. 9, herein: MAS 18-7-1890 n1728: DirBB to GG, 12-3-1890; ANRI AS 
GB Besl. 226, herein: MAS 3-8-1893: GovSWK to GG, 16-3-1899 and 5-7-1893. Such a 
purported lack of free wage labourers, as we have seen before, was often invoked to 
continue coerced labour. See for instance in the case of Java: Van Vleuten, “Belasting in 
Arbeid en Belasting in Geld”, 216.
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‘merantauing’ men lived outside their birthplace and were forced to walk 
for miles in order to perform their services. Enforcing corvée or tax liability 
within the place of residence was deemed an infraction of the adat bond 
between a person and his ‘home nagari’, but would have been much more 
efficient.72 Ultimately, the new labour service regulation ordained that after 
five years of ‘merantau’, corvée liability in the birthplace halted. Services 
were made eligible to ‘buy-off’ at a rate of one guilder per service per year.73 
Hence, older interpretations of adat were slowly replaced with new ones 
that supported the proclaimed benefits of modern colonialism. We have 
seen how, in Java, such processes both disrupted local order and created 
new lived experiences of adat at the same time. In West Sumatra, this was 
no different. Under the influence of ‘ethical’ colonial vigour to redistribute 
the tax burden, monetize the economy and equalize society in accordance 
with colonial modernity, policy-makers started exchanging their reliance on 
local values for colonial governmentality. Looking for methods to replace 
collective tax in labour with individual tax in money, without relinquishing 
economic growth, they would infringe on adat society with renewed 
passion. The forced cultivation systems in Ambon, Java, West Sumatra and 
elsewhere, were indifferent to the individual burden they imposed upon 
people, and rather collectively ‘taxed’ larger groups of labourers aggregated 
in household economies (such as lineages, nagari, and laras) through the 
requirement to deliver crops under the supervision of appointed chiefs. In 
this way, they connected to existing principles of communal social organiza-
tion of labour and property. This advantage was lost in the levying of head 
taxes as these were expected to equitably target individual incomes, which 
did not exist in many of Indonesian household economies.74
As in Ambon and Java, the Dutch grew more concerned about the distri-
bution of the burden upon household economies after abolishing coerced 
cultivation. For instance, when Minister of Colonies W.K. van Dedem (in 
office 1891-1894) advocated the introduction of land taxes targeting the agri-
cultural output of lineages (kaum)75, Governor-General C. Pijnacker Hordijk 
(in office 1888-1893), argued that within lineages, because people contrib-
uted at different degrees to the household economy, such a tax enhanced 
unequal redistribution of the burden among lineage members. He aimed 
to introduce a head tax which he considered more capable of handling the 
varieties in incomes similarly, for instance, of coffee peasants in the moun-
72 ANRI AS MGS 4299, herein: MGS 24-7-1904, ‘GovSWK to GG’, 9-3-1904; Verwey, “De 
Belasting in Natura”, 66-73.
73 Ibid.
74 Van Vollenhoven demonstrates that wherever landholding rights were unsuitable to 
determine tax liability, the entire family units were collectively made into the taxable 
objects, as we have seen in the case of Ambon where the soa and dati were designated as 
taxable objects. Vollenhoven, Het Adatrecht, 399-400.
75 Anonymous, De Gouvernements-Koffi ecultuur van 1888-1903, II: 31-36.
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tains and merchants in the lowlands.76 But Pijnacker Hordijk overlooked the 
fact that within the kaum, people participated according to their capacity, 
motivated by mutual development, protection and the caretaking of fami-
lies and lands. As in Java, households maintained their own mechanisms 
for economic distribution Taxing the kaum collectively, simply made a lot 
more sense than individually taxing its members. Hence Governor O.M. de 
Munnick (in office 1889-1894) proposed taxing the incomes of kaum, based 
on the value of crops produced. The next question was who within the kaum 
was to be held responsible for tax-payment. De Munnick proposed levying 
the tax from nagari chiefs, while holding the mamak kepala waris account-
able for their lineage members’ contribution and payment77 – a problematic 
overestimation of male authority over female inheritance, further discussed 
below. Officials like Pijnacker Hordijk and many of his contemporaries in 
Batavia, considered monetary communal taxation problematic because, 
being held captive in old-fashioned dogmas of Oriental despotism, they 
distrusted the indirect ruling classes with tax collection. They believed 
that the assorted chiefs, formerly engaged in overexploitation of their own 
subjects through coerced labour, would continue abusing their power by 
overtaxing the wealthier lineages to their own advantage, collecting suffi-
cient revenue at minimal cost and pocketing a handsome collectors wage 
without going to the trouble of applying regulations to the letter of the 
law.78 As such, indirect ruling systems were always considered obstructive 
to the transformation of coerced labour into monetary taxes.
De Munnick’s plan was consequently discarded by Governor General 
Pijnacker Hordijk, but reissued under the succeeding Governor General, 
C.H.A. van der Wijck (1893-1899). In 1894, Van der Wijck ordered all offi-
cials in West Sumatra to organize meetings with the penghulu to estimate 
popular acceptance of monetary taxes.79 Meanwhile, he lobbied among offi-
cials in The Hague for Royal consent to introduce these head taxes. By then, 
De Munnick had been succeeded by W.J.M. Michielsen (in office 1894-
1895), who was a proponent of the continuance of the forced coffee system. 
76 For this reason, the Council of the Indies, presided by C.H.A. van der Wijck (who later 
succeed Pijnacker-Hordijk as Governor-General) considered a price increase in coffee, 
proposed by Pijnacker Hordijk, to be unfair, as this indirectly benefi tted the entire popu-
lation, while the burden of coerced coffee cultivation only affected those in the highlands: 
ANRI AS GB Besl. 9, herein: MAS 18-7-1890 n1728: RvI p. 40-45; L. Wessels, De Voorstellen 
van de Indische Regeering Omtrent de Gouvernements-Koffiecultuur op Java en Sumatra’s 
Westkust (‘s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1892), 54. Huitema, “De Bevolkingskoffi ecultuur”, 54; 
Anonymous, De Gouvernements-koffi ecultuur van 1888-1903, 36-43.
77 ANRI AS GB Besl. 226, herein: MAS, 3-8-1893: GovSWK to GG, 5-7-1893, p.15, and DirFin 
to GG, 27-4-1893; ANRI AS GB Besl. 1341, herein: RvI 13-3-1906.
78 As both the Directors of Finance (J.A. van Dorsser, 1893-1894) and Interior Administra-
tion (A.C. Uljee, 1892-1894) asserted: ANRI AS GB Besl. 226, herein: MAS, 3-8-1893: 
DirFin to GG, 27-4-1893, DirBB to GG, 24-4-1893.
79 ANRI AS GB Besl. 226, herein: MAS, 3-8-1893, DirFin to GG, 27-4-1893; Young, Islamic 
Peasants and the State, 46. See also: ANRI AS GB Besl. 279, herein: MGS 18-10-1894 n348: 
DirBB to GG, 7-9-1894.
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Michielsen considered the penghulu to be unreliable “autocrats without 
any sense of duty.”80 He cancelled the proposed meetings with the peng-
hulu chiefs, which he claimed would only be used as a platform to voice 
complaints about the Dutch government. Additionally, Michielsen calcu-
lated that head taxes would only deliver half the revenue rendered by the 
coffee monopoly, which he claimed would result in relocating the ‘burden of 
governance’ to people in the lowlands, instead of equalizing it.81 Besides the 
problematization of the role of chiefs, officials also used the Plakkaat Pand-
jang as a reason to postpone head taxes. The Plakkaat had explicitly stated 
that the government would never impose direct taxes, and a concerned 
lawyer argued that breaking the Plakkaat’s promises would be interpreted 
as a direct violation of mutual thrust between the government and the 
people82, a warning taken to heart by Director of Interior Administration 
Kuneman.83 Still, West Sumatra was suffering an annual loss caused by an 
outdated and over-exploitative cultivation system, so in 1890 the Council of 
State of the Netherlands vigorously invalidated the Plakkaat as an “outdated 
government paper […] in the way of modern change.”84 In addition, some 
officials contended that the Minangkabau had never kept their part of the 
bargain, a promise to expand coffee cultivation interpedently, which they 
creatively presented as a prime precondition upon which the colonial 
government promised not to levy direct taxes.85 Others, travelling around 
the Highlands to investigate the potential acceptance of taxes, discovered 
many penghulu did not really worry about the Plakkaat, but were concerned 
all the more about the demonetization of their people due to general welfare 
decrease.86
Coerced cultivation continued
Minister of Colonies J.H. Bergsma (in office 1894-1897) cautiously awarded 
his approval for the introduction of a head tax in 1895, but ordered the 
maintenance of forced production in those regions where it was still prof-
itable (the ‘Padang Lowlands’, Sibolga and Natal).87 However, upon its 
80 ANRI AS GB Besl. 352, herein: MGS 10-10-1895: Nota A, [...] GovSWK, 13-7-1895.
81 ANRI AS GB Besl. 352, herein: Besl. 24-10-1895: RvI 10-10-1895, GovSWK to GG, 13-7-
1895: Nota A.
82 P. Maclaine Pont, “Belasting op Sumatra’s Westkust” in NRC, 24-9-1907 and Nieuwe 
Courant 2-11-1907.
83 ANRI AS GB Besl. 9, herein: MAS 18-7-1890 n1728: DirBB aan GG, 12-9-1890.
84 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 441, Vb. 6-3-1907 n27, herein: ‘Nota, hoofdelijke belasting In 
SWK’, RvI 13-3-1906.
85 Among these offi cials were Controleur Lulofs, Governor Taylor Weber and Governor 
General Rooseboom. See: ANRI AS GB MGS 4233, herein: MGS 6-12-1904 n4976: 1e Gov. 
Sec. to Gov SWK, 6-12-1904. See also Lulofs, in Heckler, Voorstellen I, 64-82.
86 A. Oki, Social Change in the West Sumatran Village: 1908-1945 (PhD thesis, Australian 
National University, 1977), 71.
87 ANRI AS GB Besl. 352, herein: Besl. 24-10-1895: RvI 10-10-1895.
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actual introduction in 1897, a resistance movement, allegedly fomented by 
Acehnese rebels, emerged in Tapanuli and Pariaman.88 The local administra-
tion ‘revealed’ a large plot involving armed resistance. As the government 
could not afford any military intervention, requiring its military to focus 
on Aceh, the introduction of the head tax was once more postponed.89 This 
was problematic, since the replacement of forced cultivation with monetary 
taxes had already been publicly announced during a meeting with peng-
hulu. This led to popular scepticism about government policy. So, while the 
recession in West Sumatra worsened, officials buried themselves in more 
paperwork, fearful of establishing potentially disruptive change.
Ten years of debate had brought limited progress; in 1895, 75% of the 
total tax burden in West Sumatra was still calculated to be carried by coffee 
producing families in the highlands, assessed at around half of the popu-
lation.90 Coffee cultivation became, according to Governor A.M. Joekes (in 
office 1898-1902), “the only source of welfare being taxed.”91 A head tax had 
actually been in place in Padang since 185892, and was predominantly paid 
by ‘Foreign Orientals’ to ‘buy-off’ various labour services. The low coffee 
prices however prevented the indigenous population of West Sumatra from 
‘buying-off’ as well, or, as we have seen in the case cited at the beginning 
of this chapter, ‘buying-off’ was not allowed.93 Joekes suggested raising the 
price of coffea Arabica (also produced in Java) and to liberate the plantation 
of coffea liberica (only produced on Sumatra) to boost economic develop-
ment and monetization. Moderate taxation, he added, was essential, to 
allow the population to accumulate cash.94 In response, Director of Interior 
Administration P.C. Arends (in office 1895-1903) repeated hackneyed ideas 
of indigenous agricultural incapacity and self-organization, to argue for 
the continuation of government-organized plantation. He agreed to a wage 
increase, but proposed a ‘buy-off’ price higher than the potential total earn-
ings of coerced labourers, to discourage peasants ‘buying-off’ and legiti-
mized by the old argument that “Malays rather spend time than money.”95 
88 ANRI AS GB Besl. 1341, herein: Besl. 20-6-1906: ‘nota Afd. A.Z’. See also: Heckler, 
Voorstellen II, herein: ‘bijlagen deel 2: DirFin to GG, 5-2-1906 met Bijlage, rapport over 
invoering: Bijlage: invoering directe belasting in Gouv. Sumatra’s Westkust en Tapanoeli.’
89 Young, Islamic Peasants and the State, 46-47.
90 ANRI AS GB Besl. 352, herein: MGS 10-10-1895: Nota A [...] SWK, 13-7-1895. In 1889, 82% 
of the households were involved in forced coffee cultivation. See: P. de Zwart, “Globalisa-
tion, Inequality and Institutions in WestSumatra and West Java, 1800–1940”, Journal of 
Contemporary Asia (Published online, 5-6-2020), 5.
91 ANRI AS GB MGS 4233, herein: MGS 24-9-1904: GovSWK to GG, 18-7-1901, p. 20.
92 Stbl. 1858 n66 and 67.
93 ANRI AS GB MGS 4233, herein: RvI 8-4-1904 and DirBB (nota), 31-12-1901, p. 33-6.
94 ANRI AS GB MGS 4233, herein: MGS 24-9-1904: GovSWK to GG, 18-7-1901, p. 20-25
95 Men were to continue to work on coffee plantations for 24 days per year at a wage of 0.15 
guilders per day, so they would earn 3.60 guilders in total per year, producing an esti-
mated value of about 20 guilders of coffee. The buy-off price of these 24 days of service 
was set at 6 guilders in Arends’ scheme. ANRI AS GB MGS 4233, herein: MGS 24-9-1904 
n3773: DirBB to GG, 31-12-1901.
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He suggested exempting only those families that independently managed 
to deliver 20 piculs of coffee annually96, though by around 1900, the average 
production per family was below 15 picul per year.97 Such unrealistic 
quota and unaffordable ‘buy-off’ prices are easily unmasked as sly colonial 
ruses to continue the coffee Cultivation System and corvée labour, albeit 
relieved of its sharp edges. It allowed Arends to come to the convenient 
conclusion that the Minangkabau underproduced without force, and that 
labour remained “the most opportune principle of taxation.”98 To enhance 
supervision, the Resident of Padang Panjang proposed replacing the indig-
enous officials with Dutch overseers to more closely monitor who actually 
produced what coffee (usually coffee was delivered by women and children 
to the storehouses) in order to reward overproduction and fine underpro-
duction. Failure of family chiefs to disclose the origins of produced coffee 
was made a criminal offense.99
5.4 Male oriented-orientalism, or making sense of female 
inheritance
While officials averse to reform, like Arends, might have found comfortable 
shelter in ‘lazy-native arguments’, the fact remained that the coffee cultiva-
tion system persistently caused provincial-deficits which were carried by 
taxpayers in other provinces, most notably the overexploited peasantry of 
Java.100 The persistent issue of the redistribution of the ‘colonial adminis-
trative burden’, both within and across provincial borders, had remained 
unresolved. In the subsequent debates, two interrelated elements of 
Minangkabau social organization were particularly hard to grasp in colonial 
terms: communal landholding and female inheritance.
96 ANRI AS GB MGS 4233, herein: MGS 24-9-1904: Gov SWK to GG, 18-7-1901.
97 About 2,5 million picul in total produced by around 180.000 families. See: KV 1901 
‘Bijlage C’ 5.62; At its peak years, between 1864 and 1870, the system delivered around 
180,000 piculs, but after 1880, exports never exceeded more than 100,000 piculs anymore. 
See: Lulofs, “Koffi ecultuur en Belasting”, 1658-1661; Young, Islamic Peasants and the State, 
204. And Booth, The Indonesian Economy, 27.
98 ANRI AS GB MGS 4233, herein: MGS 24-9-1904 n3773: DirBB to GG, 31-12-1901.
99 ANRI AS GB MGS 4233, herein: GovSWK to GG, 18-7-1901: ‘Bijlage V, Advies Res. 
Padang Pandjang’, 14-9-1899.
100 ANRI AS MGS 4477, herein: MGS, 11-5-1908: GovSWK to GG, 30-4-1908. The argument 
was also made by Director of the Interior Adminsitration Arends in 1901, see: ANRI 
AS GB MGS 4233, herein: RvI 8-4-1904 and DirBB (nota), 31-12-1901, pp. 33-36, and by 
Director of Finances J.P.C. Hartevelt (in offi ce 1906-1909), see: Heckler, Voorstellen II., 
herein: ‘bijlagen deel 2: DirFin to G.G., 5-2-1906 met Bijlage, rapport over invoering: 
Bijlage: invoering directe belastingt in Gouv. Sumatra’s Westkust en Tapanoeli.’
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The ‘problem’ of communal labour
We have already seen how the deconstruction and transition of cultivation 
and coerced labour systems into monetary tax, in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, resulted in new colonial perceptions and questions of 
income and taxation. Crucial among these was defining taxable objects and 
taxpaying subjects. In their eagerness to tax individually and monetarily, 
Dutch officials became fixated on locating concepts of private ownership 
in Minangkabau society. They started issuing ‘ownership deeds’ of shared 
land (pusaka eigendomsaktes) from 1853 onwards, in an attempt to register 
private ownership – a concept unknown in Minangkabau society – of 
harta pusaka.101 This also served to further legitimize Dutch access to land, 
for which the Domain Declaration of 1874 had already laid the basis (see 
Chapter 2). This gave Dutch industry legalized access to land on all the 
‘Outer Islands’, stating that all non-cultivated lands (or ‘wastelands’) were 
the domain of the government for economic development.102 The contents 
of the Domain Declaration were initially kept secret from the Minangkabau 
in order to ‘prevent unrest’, as it severely restricted authority of lineage 
heads over ulayat lands. Uncultivated lands, on which use rights rested with 
lineages and nagari under hak ulayat, were theoretically subjected to expro-
priation without compensation103, which was legitimized by repeating the 
colonial argument that the Minangkabau were incapable land developers.104 
This potential expropriation became a major controversy in the debate 
about colonial economic development in Sumatra and a general source of 
popular vexation.105 Local officials knew that many uncultivated lands were 
under the disposition of lineage heads, and warned that the government 
had a legal obligation to consider such local land rights and adat – as clearly 
attested in the Government Regulation of 1854, which was still in effect.106 
In their quest for change, the Batavian armchair experts had devised a 
colossal theoretical violation of land right principles, which would have 
far-reaching consequences.
101 Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann, Political and Legal Transformations, 69, 77.
102 Oki, “Social Change”, 107-108.
103 Stbl. 1874 n94b; Oki, “Social Change”, 102, 108. 110-112; Kahn, Constituting the Minang-
kabau, 162-165, 205-211; Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann, Political and 
Legal Transformations, 77.
104 One member of the Coucil of Justice in Padang claimed they structurally “plundered and 
destroyed their own forests”, G.D. Willinck, in Java Bode, 6-11-1905.
105 See Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann, “Myths and Stereotypes”, 177-179.
106 Another member of the Council for Justice in Padang, H.G. Nederburgh, demonstrated 
that enforcing a head tax under the threat of seizure of the harta pusaka was in fact illegiti-
mate unless the Government scrapped the provisions of adhering to adat jurisprudence 
in issuing tax ordinances. A heated debate emerged between Nederburgh and Wellink in 
the local press about the inviolability of pusaka lands. See H.G. Nederburgh, “Hoofdelijke 
Belasting en Poesakagoed”, Sumatra Bode 28-1-1905, See also Anonymous, “Belastingen 
ter S.W.K.”, Sumatra Bode 30-9-1905 and Kroesen, “Het Grondbezit ter Sumatra’s West-
kust”, 6, 8-9.
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The ‘problem’ of female inheritance
Because of the female inheritance system and because men lacked inheri-
tance rights, only receiving shares in the fruits of the communal possessions 
of their lineages, colonial observers believed that they lacked the stimulus 
to develop a proper work ethic to accumulate capital, income, property or 
other individualized capitalistic modes of production required for personal 
taxation.107 As put by Director of Interior Administration Arends, ‘Malay’ 
men
“were poorly taxable subjects […] They miss the stimulus to increase their pos-
sessions in order to provide their families with higher prosperity”, so while “[…] 
the women work at home” […] the men wander around.”108
Assistant-Resident J. Ballot of Lubuk Sikaping firmly agreed:
“It is women that work on the sawah […] and men who help their wives are 
laughed at by other men – they must be on a short leash […] men are shy and 
proud, ashamed to work in their own nagari (though abroad they perform labour 
for foreigners) […] and have few needs – a few coins for tobacco on market day 
and they are satisfied. […] Consequently, the women cared little for their men, 
who’s plate of rice is meagrely allotted, after which they will seek condolence 
with their sisters or loves. […].”109
As a result, these officials purported that the tax burden would land entirely 
on the shoulders of women. Minangkabau men were in fact expected to 
assist in ploughing and harvesting the sawah, and to add to the commu-
nally owned harta pusaka by developing harta pencarian. There can be little 
doubt that this provided stimulus for labour. Still, the communality of the 
Minangkabau lineages provided little footing for individual taxation of 
men, and clashed with the expectations of colonial officials. Colonial male-
oriented conceptions pursued a harnessing of European state categories of 
taxability and property, which was absent in Minangkabau society. Frus-
trated by this, they harked back to clichés of indigenous laziness, though 
interestingly, only applied to men in this case. Colonial notions always 
treated men as taxable persons110, not only because of underlying patriar-
chal societal conceptualizations, but also because men were supposed to 
diffuse their tax burden over society by employing the labour power of 
107 See for instance: Heckler, Voorstellen I, herein: ‘Bijlage IV. Nota van den Controleur C. 
Lulofs, getiteld: “Sumatra’s Westkust. Hoofdelijke inkomstenbelasting contra grond- of 
oogstbelasting”, met bijlage.’ 64-82.
108 ANRI AS GB MGS 4233, herein: MGS 24-9-1904 n3773: DirBB, 31-12-1901.
109 ANRI AS GB MGS 4762, herein: ‘Advies Ass-Res Loeboe Sikaping nopens de middelen 
om de inkomsten ter Westkus. van Sumatra te verhogen’, 21-11 and 6-12 1904, pp. 29-30.
110 In all ordinances, men of a specifi c age were always explicitly mentioned as the desig-
nated taxpayers.
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their women and children if necessary. In other words, taxing men enabled 
indirect rule and keeping distance. Whereas in Ambon and Java men held 
both political power and authority over property111, in Minangkabau society 
these roles were separated; (male) political leaders held no authority over 
taxable income or property. This rendered Minangkabau leaders unsuitable 
for appointment to a position of colonial political indirect rule and property 
management to carry out taxation. The cultivation system, as both Arends 
and Ballot realized, had avoided this issue altogether by remaining blind to 
what happened below the level of commissioned chiefs and relying on self-
organization of communal labour and production.112 However, imposing 
monetary taxes required facing this ‘problem’ head-on.
Prejudices, proposals, and a bitter pill
Two ideological camps of diametrically opposite views on the fiscal future 
of West Sumatra developed. One consisted of more conservative officials 
opting for the continuation of coerced labour, and the other of reformist-
ethicists, who believed change was inevitable. In 1904, all officials in 
West Sumatra were asked to reflect on the tax problem, upon which they 
produced extensive reports which can basically be classified into either 
of the two camps, opting between coerced cultivation or head taxes.113 In 
particular the advices of the above mentioned controleurs, Ballot and Lulofs, 
stand out for the strength of their convictions.
Ballot, as we have seen above, was not necessarily against coerced 
cultivation. He had started his career at the Department of Interior Admin-
istration in Batavia, still “under the influence of common ideas of modern-
ization, new to the Indies but already old-fashioned in Europe.”114 But upon 
becoming a field-agent, entering service as a district governor, he turned 
rather anti-Multatulian and lost faith in such modernization theories.115 His 
report, co-authored by Assistant-resident J. van Hengel116, can be read as an 
outright rejection of monetary taxes. Ballot and Van Hengel believed head 
111 In Java, women served as links between families, preserved culture and took care of 
education of the young priyayi at court, and were also entitled to inherit, own and redis-
tribute property under Javanese-Islamic law, but only in a supportive and entitled way, 
not as a crucial pillar in socio-political organization. See P.B.R. Carey and V.J.H. Houben, 
“Spirited Srikandis and Sly Sumbadras: The Political, Economic & Social Role of Women 
in late 18th and Early 19th-Century Java”, in E. Locher-Scholten and A. Niehof (eds.), 
Indonesian Women in Focus (Dordrecht, Foris, 1987), 12-43: 24-30.
112 See ANRI AS GB MGS 4233, herein: MGS 24-9-1904 n3773: DirBB to GG, 31-12-1901 and 
Heckler, Voorstellen I, herein: ‘Bijlage I. Advies [...] Ballot, 29.
113 Published by Heckler in 1905-1906 (Heckler, Voorstellen).
114 ANRI AS GB MGS 4762, herein: ‘Belastingvoostellen SWK’, ‘Advies Ass-Res van Loeboe 
Sikaping nopens de middelen om de inkomsten ter SWK te verhogen, comiss. 21-11 en 
6-12 1904’, p. 14.
115 ANRI AS GB MGS 4762, herein: Belastingvoostellen SWK, Advies Ass-Res Loeboe 
Sikaping, 21-11 en 6-12 1904, pp. 17, 19-20.
116 Van Hengel was ‘Assistant-Resident for the police’ in Padang.
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taxes caused an erosion of adat property and further inequality in the distri-
bution of the tax burden, due to the alleged unequal distribution of labour 
within the lineages, and structural lack of money.117 They both considered 
harta pusaka untaxable, and land expropriation “a rape of adat.”118 Ballot 
blamed the “weak governance of his predecessors” for allowing negligence 
of coffee cultivation in his district, causing economic digression, poverty 
and famine, contrary to districts where forced cultivation was maintained 
by a willing population and administered by “firm controleurs.” “Only 
recently”, he epitomized,
“...a man asked to enter my service to keep maintaining coffee plants […] a tell-
ing example […] of how Malays cannot do without our tutelage, desiring to be 
guided by a powerful hand […] eager to follow when put to and kept at work in 
their best own interest.”119
The mistake of previous decades, according to Ballot, was the overuse of 
force which, he warned, had caused uncontrolled migration to which 
Minangkabau men were deemed particularly susceptible because of their 
tradition of merantau.120 Colonial order, as we have seen in former chapters, 
required people to remain within their designated territorial space. Any 
migration without colonial approval was ‘undesired.’ Still, Ballot acknowl-
edged, merantau had many benefits for the “Malay”, who
“...would surely not become wealthy in Deli, but at least would be able to wear 
fancy clothes and live an easy life, attracting other Malays to follow. […] In the 
home of his mother, the Malay [man] is insignificant; the house of his temporary 
wife is no home to him. It is this ‘outgoingness’, the loose marriage structure 
connected to matriarchy, and the attraction of nearby Deli, that make the Malay a 
true vagabond, and a rolling stone gathers no moss.”121
Immensely underassessing male obligations within Minangkabau society, 
Ballot avidly agreed with Arends that Minangkabau men were untaxable 
subjects. To him, as ‘rolling stones’, they would never be able to bear indi-
vidual tax responsibility.
117 Heckler, Voorstellen I, herein: ‘Bijlage II. Missive van den Assistent-resident voor de 
politie te Padang, J. van Hengel, 38-44.
118 ANRI AS GB MGS 4762, herein: Ass-Res Hengel to Gov SWK, 18-3-1905, pp. 7-8.
119 ANRI AS GB MGS 4762, herein: Belastingvoostellen SWK, Advies Ass-Res Loeboe 
Sikaping, 21-11 en 6-12 1904, pp. 21-23.
120 Men, Ballot claimed, would simply leave their home-districts and depart to East Sumatra, 
Deli or the Straits, where, as outsiders, they would not be subjected to burdensome 
corvée and cultivation services or taxes. Heckler, Voorstellen I, herein: ‘Bijlage I. Advies 
van [...] Ballot: 24-26; ANRI AS GB MGS 4762, herein: Bel. Voorstellen SWK, Advies 
Ass-Res. Loeboe Sikaping, pp. 26-27. See also: Oki, “Social Change”, 132-137; Coolhaas, 
Controleur B.B., 227-228.
121 ANRI AS GB MGS 4762, herein: RvI 21-11- and 6-12-1904: Belastingvoostellen SWK, 
Advies Ass-Res Loeboe Sikaping.
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Van Hengel was more reluctant to continue forced cultivation because 
of the unequal burden it imposed within lineages and among nagari, as 
discussed above. He reported how in 1899 at a new-years reception in Fort 
de Kock (current day Bukittinggi), a group of penghulu expressed awareness 
of this inequality. They complained that the Minangkabau in the Highlands 
carried the costs of governance by participating in forced production, while 
the lowlanders remained virtually untaxed. This provided a breeding 
ground for growing discontent, they warned.122 Van Hengel proposed the 
introduction of a 2% income tax based on land value for the non-agricultural 
population, to reallocate part of the burden from coffee producing peasants 
in the Highlands to people in the Lowlands, raise coffee prices and make all 
forced production and other labour services eligible for ‘buy-off’, either in 
a specific amount of coffee or a sum of money.123 People unable to ‘buy-off’ 
were to be employed on government plantations. ‘Buying-off’, Van Hengel 
predicted, would automatically become more popular following the gradual 
conversion of this more lightly applied cultivation system.124 Another 
controleur, H. de Vogel, added that head taxes were “blind” to income differ-
ences at village level, and reiterated Van Dedem’s old idea of imposing land 
taxes levied per lineage, split into a tax on revenue from coffee and padi and 
supplemented with a company tax for non-peasants.125
Lulofs opposed all of these ideas, considering them “a semi-contin-
uation of forced cultivation.”126 He was much in favour of individual 
head taxes which, he averred, would support the mission of reforming 
the economy by coercing people into acquiring individual incomes 
through commerce. “Snatching parts of the yield”, as Lulofs interpreted 
Van Hengel’s proposal, would have the opposite effect.127 Lulofs and his 
co-authors agreed to ‘indigenous laziness, unproductivity and incapacity’, 
but expected that releasing coffee production would improve commercial-
ization and monetization to furnish payment of head taxes, which in the 
long term would outbalance the prospect of budget decreases immediately 
122 ANRI AS GB MGS 4762, herein: Ass-Res Hengel to Gov SWK, 18-3-1905, pp. 16-17.
123 Heckler, Voorstellen I, 42-44. The original letter of Hengel can be found in ANRI AS GB 
MGS 4762.
124 Ibid., herein: ‘Bijlage II. Missive van den Assistent-resident voor de politie te Padang, 
J. van Hengel, 38-44.
125 Ibid., herein: ‘Bijlage III. Brochure van den Controleur H. de Vogel getiteld: Belasting-
invoering ter Sumatra’s Westkust (met uizondering van Tapanoeli) ontwerp voor een 
belastingstelsel met bijlagen, [...]’, 45-63: 45-50 (see also W.F.P. Ockerse, ‘Koffi ecultuur en 
belasting ter Sumatra’s Westkust’ in Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, 28 and 30-3-1905).
126 Ibid., ‘Bijlage IV: Nota van Lulofs’, 72.
127 Ibid., ‘Bijlage IV: Nota van Lulofs’, 72-73.
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after the abolition of forced labour.128 And because of the supposed obses-
sion of the Minangkabau with parley, egalitarianism and discussion, Lulofs 
considered any form of ‘buy-off’ or a flexible income tax unsuitable for West 
Sumatra. Land or yield taxes, he believed, would primarily burden women. 
The Minangkabau, he claimed, were best served by firm, fixed head taxes 
imposed upon men and coerced by forced labour in case of non-payment.129
In Batavia, the ultra-conservative Director of Finances N.J. Struick 
du Moulin (in office 1905-1906) still regarded the Cultivation System the 
“bedrock of popular welfare”, which was, as it rendered continuous losses, 
“maintained for the benefit of the people rather than the government.” 
He expected coffee trade to be “doomed” when released, and agreed that 
“indolent Malays” were unable to independently maintain coffee planta-
tions. In words highly reminiscent of Van den Bosch’s remarks, he insisted 
that forced cultivation services were not to be seen as “tax in labour”, 
but rather as a “coercive tools” to “help a lamentable people towards 
progress and prosperity, enabling them to fulfil their financial obligations 
to the state.”130 Interestingly, around the same time an investigation that 
compared various planting methods came to the inescapable conclusion 
that “indigenous methods actually worked best.”131 Experimenting with 
free cultivation had shown some success132, and although Struick du Moulin 
clung tenaciously to Ballot’s misinformed opinions about indigenous labour 
patterns and a sense of responsibility provided legitimacy of risk-averting 
continuance of forced production policies, the welfare politics of the 
‘ethical era’ refused to consider the use of any form of coerced labour.133 
As summarized by Minister of Colonies Fock (in office 1905-1908), “The 
times of forced coffee cultivation are simply over.”134 Moreover, to Governor 
General Van Heutsz further postponement of introduction of taxes sounded 
128 Ibid., 74-75; Lulofs, “Koffi ecultuur en belasting”, 1648. Heckler, Voorstellen I, herein: 
‘Bijlage VI. Ontwerp belastingordonnantie, samengesteld door de commissie Ris-
Heijting-Lulofs’, 88-91 and ‘Bijlage VIa. Toelichting op de ontwerp belasting-ordonnantie, 
met Naschrift’, 92-105. See also the considerations of ‘Controleur for coffee cultivation’ 
L.E. Dom in Ibid.: ‘Nota n.a.v missives 1e Gov. Sec. 4-11 en 20-12-1905, Controleur koffi e-
cultuur L.E. Dom, Secretaris Dep. Landbouw Gobius 31-12-1905.’
129 Heckler, Voorstellen I, herein: ‘Bijlage VI: Ontwerp belasting-ordonnantie Commissie 
Lulofs’, 88-91.
130 ANRI AS GB Besl. 1341, herein: DirFin, 14-12-1905 (Also found in Heckler, Voorstellen II).
131 ANRI AS GB MGS 4762, herein: MGS 20-12-1905: Res. Padangse Bovenlanden to 
GovSWK, 12-12-1904. See the underlying correspondence in this bundle among the 
assistant-resident of Tanah Datar, Controleur Lintau Buo (De Nijs) and the resident of 
the Padangnse Bovenlanden, and the ‘Daily Journal’ of this Controleur of Lintau Buo 
attached to his correspondence on the experiments he had to conduct in coffee planta-
tion, only to conclude that the native way of planting was still better.
132 Heckler, Voorstellen II, herein: ‘DirFin to GG, 14-12-1905’, 1904-1906.
133 ANRI AS GB Besl. 1341, herein: MGS 20-5-1906: Besl. 20-6-1906: Missive GovSWK 14-12-
1905, DirFin 6-9-1905, and DirLb 11-9-1906.
134 ANRI AS GB MGS 4459, herein: MGS 6-4-1907: MinKol Fock to Koningin, 6-3-190, pp. 
4-5.
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like “cowardly transferring the burden of this necessary measure on to the 
shoulders of successors.”135 It was time, the new Director of Finances, J.P.C. 
Hartevelt (1906-1909) added, to “take the bitter pill at once”, and abolish the 
cultivation system.136
An incompatible income tax
The Dutch over-emphasis of male authority over income and property 
in registration of pusaka lands underpinned lineage-oriented taxation, in 
which harta pusaka were presumed to be legal proprietors of the mamak 
kepala waris.137 This deliberate misconception enabled the designation of 
harta pusaka as taxable objects, the mamak kepala waris as responsible for 
payment to the entire lineage, and irreverent confiscation of the harta pusaka 
in case of non-payment, which the government increasingly seemed to 
endorse.138 Lulofs, Ballot and other officials warned their superiors of the 
consequences of their alarming delusion. Harta pusaka were designated to 
be inherited in the female line, and could only be taken away or pawned 
– temporarily – under very specific rules.139 Land dispossession would be 
not only a huge violation of adat, but also an immediate threat to the liveli-
hood of families and the very continuation of their existence as an entity, 
which was impossible without their land.140 Ballot argued that confiscating 
harta pusaka in case of non-payment “punished women for the laziness of 
men.”141 Lulofs theorized that apart from ruining families, it also offered 
little impetus for men to contribute to harta pusaka, because as they lived 
off their wives’ familial possessions, they would remain unaffected by their 
lineages’ loss of land and “imperturbably regard how their tax debts would 
be redeemed from their sisters’ property.”142 (Thereby he overlooked the 
fact that all men took part in the lineage system one way or another, and 
that confiscation of pusaka lands would always affect some men, whether 
135 ANRI AS GB MGS 4233, herein: MGS 6-12-1904 n4976.
136 ANRI AS GB MGS 4477, herein: MGS 2-2-1908: DirFin to GG 2-1-1908.
137 Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann, Political and Legal Transformations, 
69-70.
138 As discussed by the Council of the Indies in 1907. NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 441, Vb. 
6-3-1907 n27, herein: RvI 13-3-1906.
139 Pawning did become more common over the nineteenth century, see: Von Benda-Beck-
mann and Von Benda-Beckmann, Political and Legal Transformations, 58-59, 76.
140 Heckler, Voorstellen I, herein: ‘Bijlage VI. Ontwerp belastingordonnantie, samengesteld 
door de commissie Ris-Heijting-Lulofs’, 88-91 and ‘Bijlage VIa. Toelichting op de 
ontwerp belasting-ordonnantie, met Naschrift’, 92-105.
141 ANRI AS GB . MGS 4762, herein: Belastingvoorstellen SWK, Advies Ass-Res Loeboe 
Sikaping, 21-11 en 6-12 1904, p. 32. Ballot later published a book at his own on the topic 
(Ontwerp Agrarische Regeling voor Sumatra’s Westkust, Mei 1911, S.I.: s.n.), in which he 
argued for the recognition of pusaka lands in colonial law, and was dismissed because 
of his disagreeemnts and severe critique on government policy on the matter. Kahn, 
Constituting the Minangkabau, 187-223.
142 Heckler, Voorstellen I, herein: ‘Bijlage VIa. Toelichting’, 94.
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or not they were men who could lay claim to those lands.) Governor, E.A. 
Taylor Weber (in office 1902-1906), advocated taxing the incomes of sebuah 
perut instead of kaum, to tax closer to the individual level without violating 
pusaka lands.143 He suggested using various indirect taxes such as vehicle, 
firearm and slaughter taxes to cover the deficits, which had grown from 
451,000 to 2,373,000 guilders in 1902-1904, and passed 6 million guilders in 
1907.144
Navigating this bureaucratic minefield, advice and information-
overflow, Van Heutsz and Fock had to bridge social responsibility and 
engineering with keeping balanced budgets and the ambition to reduce 
coerced labour across the archipelago. They both considered the incomes 
of sebuah perut too small to be taxed efficiently, and Fock was not in favour 
of the levying of ‘additional taxes’ which “offered no structural solution as 
long as the head tax question remained unanswered.”145 Hence they made 
the fateful decision to settle on an income tax that used harta pusaka as tax 
objects under the lineage’s responsibility.146 The ordinance was hurriedly 
drafted by Director Hartevelt and imposed a 2% tax over technically all 
‘incomes gained from harta pusaka’ (and not pusaka lands themselves).147 
This way, it was presented as an income instead of a property tax.148 Still, 
pusaka lands were indirectly maintained as taxable objects. Men were held 
accountable for their wives’ incomes, and the mamak kepala waris were made 
143 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 666, Vb. 6-8-1909 n40, herein: ‘Rapport’ GovSWK to GG, 
5-3-1909 and RvI 10-4-1909; NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 441, Vb. 6-3-1907 n27, herein: 
‘Nota A2: “voorstelling invoering directe belasting SWK”: Afschriften GovSWK (E.A. 
Weber) to G.G., 26-2-1904; ANRI DepFin 348, herein: GG to DirFin, 29-7-1905, DirFin 
23-3-1909 and GovSWK to GG, 5-3-1909.
144 NA OV 441 Vb, 6-3-1907 n27, MinKol to RvMin: ‘Nota A2’, 6-3-190; AS GB MGS 4762, 
herein MGS 21-6-1905: RvI 7-6-1905: ‘Invoering van belasting ter SWK, Ag. 11037/5.’
145 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 441, Vb. 6-3-1907 n27, herein: ‘Nota A2.’
146 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 441, Vb. 6-3-1907 n27, herein: Vb., MinKol to RvMin., ‘concep-
tordonnanties’ and ‘Advies A2’, 6-3-1907.
147 Stbl. 1908 n93.
148 This was advised by botanist and Director of Agriculture M. Treub (1905-1909), brother 
of M.W.F. Treub (who had mitigated the introduction of the corporate tax, see chapter 
2). M. Treub argued that because the Dutch colonial government had introduced coffee 
to Sumatra, maintained and organized its cultivation, and had taken care of its sale, the 
“coffee cultivators” and their lands had merely had an “instrumental role.” Hence, he 
continued, the government had rights not to land, but to the coffee that was produced 
on this land, and these rights he claimed could be replaced by levying income taxes. 
See: ANRI AS MGS 4477, herein: MGS 2-2-1908: DirLb to GG, 3-1-1908 and 16-1-1908, 
DirFin to GG 2-1-1908, AS, ‘Nota: Invoering directe geldelijke belasting’; See also Heckler, 
Voorstellen II, herein: ‘Bijlage: DirLb to GG, 5-1-1908.’
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responsible for payment.149 Mamak were to ensure that men contributed to 
the lineages’ taxable incomes.150 In theory, non-payment was punishable 
with confiscation of harta pusaka or pencarian, but this was strongly discour-
aged in practice.151
The tax illustrates the colonial obsession with adopting a definition 
of hierarchy as organized and structured around local omnipotent, male 
Oriental despots, lords or ‘kings’, for continuation of indirect rule. Such 
lords were absent in West Sumatra, so they were created and appointed 
from the old adat elite, and made to move between colonial and ingenious 
registers of power, in exchange for collectors wages.152 But in Minangkabau 
society, as men had some representative political authority but no property 
rights, the power-relations between women, men and children who lived 
as members in familial society having specific roles, duties and obligations, 
simply could not be reproduced in such inflexible terms of colonial indirect 
rule, rendering the potential of indirectly ruling and taxing male-figures 
impossible.
For Governor Taylor Weber the tax ordinance was a reason to resign, 
as he strongly advocated for the inviolability of harta pusaka.153 In Batavia 
and The Hague his resignation caused some reluctance to impose the tax, 
out of fear of unrest. But in light of recent military successes in Aceh and 
consolidation of Dutch power on Sumatra and elsewhere in Indonesia, the 
succeeding Governor, F.A. Heckler (in office 1906-1910), expected the Dutch 
position on Sumatra would be strong enough to deal with the safe introduc-
tion of taxes.154 Though some level of resistance was considered unavoid-
able, they figured that taking away the “pinching bands” of forced coffee 
149 Stbl. 1908 n93; ANRI AS MGS 4477, herein: MGS 2-2-1908: DepFin to GG 2-1-1908, Besl. 
17-2-1908. As in other provinces, it was coined ‘termed ‘tax on company- and other 
incomes’ (belasting op de bedrijfs- en andere inkomsten), while in Malay the term bea penca-
rian (“levy” or “payment over income”) was used. The term head tax was to be avoided, 
as in Malay it translated to uang kepala which was the term used by the Minangkabau for 
a specifi c kind of payment paid by non-Muslims to Muslims, and therefore considered 
offensive. NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 441, Vb. 6-3-1907 n27, herein: RvI 13-3-1906. (The 
term bea derives from beya, which literally means ‘costs.’ Moertono, Dulu, Kedudukan 
Wajib Pajak itu Terhormat, 60.)
150 Stbl. 1908 n93 (art. 4); Heckler, Voorstellen II, herein: RvI 8-6-1906: 19-24.
151 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 441, Vb. 6-3-1907 n27, herein: Vb., MinKol to RvMin., Conc-
Ord and ‘Adviesnota A2’, 6-3-1907.
152 As customary, local chiefs (tuanku laras and penghulu suku), clergymen, teachers and Indo-
nesian offi cials were exempted. Estimated revenue for 1908 was assessed at 1,135,000 
guilders at a 4% rate, or 550,000 guilders at a 2% rate and 81,000 guilders in the slaughter 
tax (on horses, buffalo’s, cows and pigs, also announced in 1908) together guaranteeing 
at least 560,000 guilders in collector’s wage. AS GB Besluiten 1341, herein: DirLandbouw 
to GG, 5-1-1906; DirFin to GG, 6-9-1905 and DirFin, 5-2-1906; NA OV 441 Vb. 6-3-1907 no. 
27, herein: Vb.
153 ANRI DepFin 348, herein: Nota DirFin’, 15-10-1909 and GovSWK to GG, 29-9-1909; 
Amran, Pemberontakan Pajak, 23-25; R. Amran, Sumatra Barat Plakat Panjang (Jakarta: 
Penerbit Sinar Harapan, 1985), 332.
154 ANRI AS MGS 4477, herein: MGS, 11-5-1908: GovSWK to GG, 30-4-1908.
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cultivation would help in “making a good impression on the population.”155 
Heckler ordered the calling together of all laras, nagari and rodi chiefs to 
announce the introduction of the tax and communicate instructions for data 
collection, assessment and levying practices. He encouraged the use of an 
“explanative and instructive instead of a consultative tone”, to discourage 
the chiefs from interpreting these gatherings as open-ended meetings, 
supposedly leading to unanimous agreement (mupakat). Heckler referred 
to the story of an Assistant-Resident of the district Tanah Datar, who once 
held such a meeting in Fort van der Capellen (present-day Batusangkar), 
where “one out of thousands of chiefs” was not present. This chief later 
claimed that all decisions made at that meeting were invalid to him, as he 
had not been consulted. This demonstrates how specifically instrumental-
ized aspects of indigenous society, in this case chief meetings, were wielded 
much more capably by indigenous chiefs. In trying to employ elements 
of indigenous society to control it, the state was often outwitted by local 
powerholders who obviously knew how to use the intricacies of their 
society much better.
Hence, Heckler moved to a much more coercive strategy, and stressed 
that the aim was to impose taxation, not discuss it.156 But in the case of the 
Minangkabau, such a policy was seriously misguided. The government 
attempted to determine which conversations were allowed and which not; 
it expected self-surveillance through indirect rule and compliance with its 
taxes from a population that experienced its policies as oppressive, deceitful 
and unwavering in its inaccurate convictions. How could such self-surveil-
lance ever come about, if the instructions of the state to its indirect rulers 
conflicted with the most fundamental conceptions of social organization 
and identity? Not only did the Dutch incorrectly appoint mamak kepala waris 
as privately responsible for the harta pusaka and accountable for the incomes 
of their lineages, thereby completely ignoring every aspect of the traditional 
female inheritance system, they also attempted to curb the consultative 
nature of Minangkabau family life, which provoked the strongest reac-
tions. In 1908, Heckler cancelled all further tax announcement gatherings, 
reasoning in imitation of Michielsen that these only provided a platform for 
such resistance.157 The Raad van Indië advised that the Dutch position was 
“undoubtedly strong enough to cripple any resistance”, but considered it 
“shameful to have to make the population of a province, in which we [the 
Dutch] have been supreme for so long, obey with violence.”158 This was 
155 ANRI AS MGS 4477, herein: MGS, 11-5-1908: GovSWK to GG, 30-4-1908.
156 ANRI AS MGS 4477, herein: MGS, 11-5-1908: GovSWK to GG, 30-4-1908.
157 ANRI AS GB MGS 4477, herein: MGS 2-2-1908: AS nota: ‘Invoering directe geldelijke 
belasting’; ANRI DepFin 348, herein: DirFin, 7-9-1908: GG to DirFin 19-8-1908.
158 ANRI AS GB Besl. 1341, herein: RvI 13-3-1906. See also: RvI 8-6-1906 in: Heckler, Voor-
stellen II. The Council of the Indies had already made this argument in March 1906, and 
claimed that having to oppress resistance after introduction of taxation would be “bad 
for the government’s prestige” (NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 441, Vb. 6-3-1907 n27, herein: 
RvI 13-3-1906.
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acknowledged by both Heckler and Fock, who had declared in 1905 that the 
tax was by no means to be introduced “by using bayonets.”159 A call which 
was admirable for its optimism but insensible considering the monstrous 
disregard for indigenous society and rule the Dutch were about to present.
Bayonets after all: the tax rebellion of 1908
Responses to the tax-introduction were fierce. Multiple penghulu refused to 
comply, furious about not being consulted and the imposed vulnerability 
of harta pusaka. The course of events is assiduously reconstructed by Rusli 
Amran and K. Young. They describe how in Empat Kota, in the district 
of Old Agam, large public meetings were held by outraged villagers. The 
400 penghulu of the nagari in Empat Kota swore an oath not to pay.160 One 
of them, Angku Haji Saidi Mangkuto, claimed that the “Kumpeni” only 
had rights to coffee delivery and infrastructural development, but not to 
taxation.161 A week after the announcement of income taxes, twenty-four of 
the leading penghulu of Empat Kota had been arrested and taken to Fort de 
Kock.162 The controleur of Old Agam unsuccessfully attempted to persuade 
the mamak kepala waris in Empat Kota to submit data.163 Touring the nagari 
under armed surveillance, he arrested more uncompliant penghulu, as the 
revolt spread across West Sumatra. In Batusangkar, lineage heads refused 
to provide information on landownership and groups of armed villagers, 
wearing white robes, believed to offer divine protection against bullets, 
confronted Dutch troops accompanying the local Assistant-Resident and 
were slaughtered by Marechaussee gunfire.164 These incidents grew in 
number. Masses of protesters, under the influence of ulama calling for perang 
sabil, united in a consolidated anti-colonial front. In June, in the region of 
Kamang, villagers under leadership of the local penghulu Haji Abdul Manan 
drove out other penghulu, loyal to the Dutch, and threatened to attack those 
planning on paying their taxes.165 Dutch troops sent to Kamang clashed 
with men dressed in white robes.166 This ‘Perang Kamang’ (Kamang War) 
was followed by revolts in Batipuh, Sepuluh Kota and Pariaman (where 
the insurgency is commemorated as the Perang Manggopoh), only supressed 
159 ANRI AS GB MGS 4477, herein: MGS, 11-5-1908: GovSWK to GG, 30-4-1908, ‘Verklaring 
Fock, Nov. 1905.’
160 Young, Islamic Peasants and the State, 63.
161 Ibid.; Amran, Pemberontakan Pajak, 129-130.
162 Young, Islamic Peasants and the State, 62.
163 Oki, “Social Change”, 74; Amran, Pemberontakan Pajak, 138.
164 Young, Islamic Peasants and the State, 66-67; Oki, “Social Change”, 76. The Marechaussee 
or, ‘Korps Marechaussee te voet’ (literally "marshal corps on foot"), was an army unit 
established during the Aceh War (see Chapter 6). It was the elite gendarmerie corps of 
the Dutch colonial army, composed of special troops specialized in counter-Insurgency, 
deployed to sweep up resistance in small patrols
165 Young, Islamic Peasants and the State, 67-73.
166 Ibid., 71; Amran, Pemberontakan Pajak, 130-131.
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around July after reinforcements arrived from Java.167 The tuanku laras of 
Old Agam, where the revolt had started, paid 7,400 guilders tax which was 
interpreted as surrender.168
The 1908 tax-rebellion still occupies an important role in the local collec-
tive memory of Dutch colonialism in West Sumatra. It is seen as an indicator 
of the strength of popular response to Dutch attempts to alter social adat 
roots to effect socio-economical, religious and politically-driven change 
through tax policy.169 Contemporary colonial officials considered the rebel-
lion to have been caused by structural neglect of the Plakkaat Pandjang and 
ignoring the penghulu’s expectation to be consulted.170 Heckler blamed the 
protracted lingering and delay in imposing the tax, believing it caused a 
“climate of restraint” in which family chiefs had become overconfident and 
arrogant towards Dutch officials.171 He also accused the media, in particu-
larly the Sumatra Bode (a local newspaper), of causing uproar by criticizing 
Dutch policy and stirring up the “usual opportunists and troublemakers”, 
on whom Dutch officials typically blamed resistance.172 The majority of the 
population, Heckler asserted with assurance, accepted Dutch supremacy. 
The presence of “recalcitrant elements”, he concluded, using an ostenta-
tious Bismarck-quote, only proved that “good politics cannot be conducted 
without a good army.”173 To Heckler, a true ‘modern imperialist’, whenever 
colonial policy proved unpopular, the only possible and defensible explana-
tion was to blame it on the opportunism of malicious extremists.
Of course, the causes and effects of the revolt were more complex and 
multifaceted. By including the significance of religious leadership and 
peasant mentality Young argues that the 1908 rebellion was partly caused 
by “a crisis of elite displacement.” He interprets the outburst as a response 
of former political-economic elites that were abruptly marginalized by the 
167 Young, Islamic Peasants and the State, 73-78.
168 Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 21 (1908) no. 152, 30-06-1908, p. 2; Oki, “Social Change”, 76. 
A surprising 36,000 guilders was still collected in Old Agam during the revolt under the 
threat of violence.
169 R. Amran, Sumatra Barat: Pemberontakan Pajak 1908 (Jakarta: Gita Karya Geka, 1988), 328-329.
170 Young, Islamic Peasants and the State, 63; Oki, “Social Change”, 78.
171 ANRI AS MGS 4477, herein: MGS, 11-5-1908: GovSWK to GG, 30-4-1908. At a meeting in 
Batavia with the Governor General, residents of Tapanuli and members of the Raad van 
Indie in 1924, it was agreed upon that the cause of the revolt was primarily the surprise 
of the population about the actual introduction of taxes in 1908, after two decades of 
postponement. See: NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 2752, Vb. 9-7-1925 n25, herein: ‘Verslag 
Buitengewone vergadering RvI’, 15-3-1924.
172 Ibid.; G.A.N. Scheltema de Heere, “De Belastinginvoering op Sumatra’s Westkust”, IG 
44:1 (1923), 122-156. The editor in Chief of the Sumatra Bode, Karl Baümer, was even pros-
ecuted for libel, scorn and slander of Lulofs, and received a fi ne of 50 guilders by the court 
in Padang, but acquitted in high appeal in Batavia. See Anonymous, “Het Persdelict”, Het 
Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië , 21-05-1907, p. 1; 14-06-1907, p. 3; 16-10-1907, 
p. 2; “Onnodig op Kosten Gejaagd”, Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië , 1-11-
1907, p. 1-2. See also De Sumatra post, 9/160, 13-07-1907, tweede blad p. 3.
173 ANRI AS GB MGS 4477, herein: MGS 11-5-1908: GovSWK to GG, 30-4-1908; NA MinKol 
MvO 163: F.A. Heckler, Sumatra’s Westkust, 1910.
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abrogation of the Cultivation System. Indeed, by siding with charismatic 
religious leaders in response to popular discontent aroused by the intro-
duction of monetary taxes, these elites mobilized the population in armed 
resistance to restore some of their former authority.174 Islamic reformism 
had never disappeared after the Padri war and was still at odds with the old 
adat and the colonial state. Competing tarekat whose poplar authority found 
wide adherence among some Minangkabau through institutionalized reli-
gious education, rose and fell under the influence of modern Islamic tenets 
throughout the nineteenth century.175
The 1908 rebellion was no isolated event. It resonated with overarching 
political developments related to colonial taxation across the archipelago. 
The parallels between Young’s and Kartodirdjo’s analyses of the rebellions 
in West Sumatra in 1908 and Banten in 1888 are striking. In both cases reli-
gious leaders stepped into the vacuum caused by marginalized or alienated 
and ‘displaced’ political elites that, as a consequence of their cooperation 
in the colonial forced cultivation systems, lost legitimacy in the eyes of the 
population. What sparked and caused people to join both rebellions seemed 
to be principle of the introduction of taxes as an alternative to labour rather 
than the specifics of these taxes, even though the rebels pointed to these as a 
direct motive for the revolt. In 1919, an adat-leader confessed he participated 
in the anti-tax rebellion of 1908 because he simply “did not understand why 
the Minangkabau had to pay income and slaughter taxes to the Dutch.”176 
Certainly, the tax system’s immediate violation of local social institutions 
cannot be ignored. It added another dimension to the rebellion. Apart 
from the response of displaced political elites, conjoined with religious 
fervour, it should also be seen as a collective popular response to decades 
of purposeful Dutch disregard of adat life. The imposition of income taxes 
in 1908 and the brutal violation of pusaka lands was recognized as another 
leap in this process, and as a deliberate imposition of colonial bureaucracy, 
replacing older institutions and imposing more direct control that threat-
ened further social reform and diminishment of rights and traditions. These 
rights, under the cultivation system, had been relatively well conserved.177 
‘Field agents’ like Ballot and Lulofs realized that taxation was seen as an 
expression of colonialism and a threat to the development of local social 
norms. Adat was always subjected to change and transformation, but the 
continuous explicit threat of foreign interference through these radical, 
importunate tax reforms engendered the idea that Dutch policy was bound 
to unsettle adat society and crucial aspects of family life and organization. 
The anti-tax rebellion marked not only the “decline of adat-based leader-
174 Young, Islamic Peasants and the State, 33, 145, 249.
175 Ibid., 128-129; Oki, “Social Change”, 103. In West Sumatra, it was not the Naqsyabandiyah 
but the Syattariyah brotherhood that attracted support and fuelled the religious dimen-
sions in the 1908 uprisings.
176 Warta Hindia, 30-5-1919 (in: IPO 1919 no. 55), quoted in: Oki, “Social Change”, 79.
177 Young, Islamic Peasants and the State, 273-281.
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ship” and the “rise of prominence of Islamic reformists and modernists 
together with the emergence of Western educated leadership”178, it also 
marked the idea of the decline of adat society itself. And it was this last, the 
decline of adat society, that people resisted.
Figure 5.1. Tax collection in West Sumatra.
Cartoon in a Dutch socialist newspaper in response to the tax rebellion in West Sumatra 
in 1908. The description reads: ‘The bloodbaths in West Sumatra. The Dutch tax collector: 
“Your purse or your life!”’
Source: Het Volk, dagblad voor de arbeiderspartij, 21-06-1908 “prent over de belastingopstand in West 
Sumatra.”
5.5 After the storm: ‘false elites’, pretence and distrust
The rebellion should certainly not be perceived as a sudden, violent break 
with a peaceful past, but rather as fitting into a long tradition and onset 
of expedited Minangkabau resilience against foreign influence. Peace 
returned, and income taxes were collected without much disturbance, 
178 Oki, “Social Change”, 80, 103.
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but under increasing colonial distrust and an awakening ‘Mohammedan 
fanaticism’ in West Sumatra. Coffee production, free since 1908, had in 
fact barely suffered from the revolt and increased gradually, invalidating 
the apprehensions of Ballot and Struick.179 The economy seemed to benefit 
from free labour as commercialization and monetization in various districts 
increased, to the benefit of merchant classes in Padang and colonial tax 
revenue (see graph 5.1).180
Still, the annual tax collections were characterized by mutual 
aggravation and delay. Heckler reported how taxes were only paid after 
being haggled down, or not at all.181 In 1909, concurring with the further 
encroachment of the colonial state into the smaller corners of Indonesia, the 
colonial government had unsuccessfully tried to expand the income taxes 
to the Mentawai islands (about 100 kilometres West of West Sumatra), the 
only part of the province still untaxed. Government outposts, established on 
the islands of Sipura and Siberut to facilitate tax collection, were regularly 
attacked. In 1915, an army commander was murdered, and Resident182 
J.D.L. le Fèbre (in office 1915-1919) proclaimed that the islanders were 
“unfit” to pay direct taxes.183
Meanwhile, in spite of the objections of Ballot (promoted Governor of 
West Sumatra in 1910), the Agrarian Law had been promulgated for West 
Sumatra in 1915, facilitating further exploitation of West Sumatra’s soil by 
foreign entrepreneurs and further violation of pusaka and ulayat lands.184 In 
addition, the tax rate was doubled from 2 to 4% to align it with the 1914, 
archipelago-wide company tax.185 In response, four infuriated Islamic 
leaders plotted another revolt, but they were discovered and captured.186 
Dozens of men in the home region of these leaders refused to pay tax and 
perform or buy off their services. They were punished severely with heavy 
forced labour and imprisonment.187 Tax-exemption of (usually wealthy) 
chiefs and civil servants was especially provocative of discontent among 
the Minangkabau, as in the old adat order they were expected to share and 
participate within society, rather than exploit and govern from above.188 The 
cause of resistance was once again attributed to the purported subversive 
179 Huitema, “De Bevolkingskoffi ecultuur op Sumatra”, 62.
180 KV 1910, 27-30; Oki, “Social Change”, 103.
181 NA MinKol MvO 163 (Heckler, 1910).
182 In 1915 the ‘province of Sumatra’s Westcoast’ was downgraded to a Residency following 
administrative reforms across Sumatra.
183 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 1586, Vb. 10-8-1916 n44, herein: Res. SWK to GG, 2-3-1916; 
Stbl. 1915 n308.
184 Kahn, Constituting the Minangkabau, 210; Oki, “Social Change”, 113.
185 Stbl. 1914 n131; 1915 n191.
186 Oki, “Social Change”, 91.
187 Warta Hindia 15-5-1926, no. 45-49.
188 Oki, “Social Change”, 93; A.J. Hamerster et al., Rapport van de Commissie van Onderzoek 
Ingesteld bij het Gouvernementsbesluit van 13 Februari 1927 No.1a Dl.2: De Economische 
Toestand en de Belastingdruk met Betrekking tot de Inlandsche Bevolking van Sumatra’s West-
kust (Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1928), 47, 117.
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nature of the Minangkabau. But an extensive investigation into corvée 
services in Jambi, Palembang, West Sumatra and Tapanuli demonstrated 
that the heavy burden imposed by corvée labour had, just as in Java, not 
been diminished after the introduction of monetary taxes. The putative ‘lack 
of coolies’, lead investigators J.H. Liefrinck and J. van der Marel argued, 
continued the use of local labour at wages too low to sufficiently increase 
monetization for tax payment.189 This had lured officials and local chiefs into 
demanding corvée rather than levying taxes.190 Avoidance of performing 
services was punished vigorously, and across Southern Sumatra the 
increasingly oppressive corvée regime caused popular outrage leading to 
revolt.191 The subsequent measures are reminiscent of the policy on Ambon 
and Java. In order to soothe tensions, reduce its administrative interven-
tion and at the same time bolster its grip over the chiefs’ engagement in 
the new fiscal infrastructure, the government awarded the nagari council’s 
greater autonomy to administer taxes by the adoption of the so-called 
‘nagari ordinance’ of 1915. This also restricted membership of the nagari 
council to the those men the government recognized as ‘original penghulu’, 
and helped to standardize nagari governance.192 These penghulu had to be 
self-funded through collectors wages, and, as elsewhere, soon acquired the 
skills and tricks to manipulate people and information, ensuring minimal 
taxation and maximization of incomes for their own lineages, at the cost of 
others.193 Officials arrived at the same conclusion as their predecessors, that 
189 Liefrinck, Onderzoek naar de Heffi ng van Belastingen 1; J. van der Marel and J.H. Liefrinck, 
Bijlage van het Verslag van het Lid van den Raad van N.-I., J.H. Liefrinck, over zijn Onderzoek 
naar de Heffi ng van Belastingen en de Invordering van Heerendiensten ter Sumatra’s Westkust. 
Nota over den Druk der Heerendiensten 5 vols., vol. 2: Onderzoek naar de Heffi ng van Belas-
tingen en de Vordering van Heerendiensten in Eenige Deelen der Buitenbezittingen (Batavia: 
Landsdrukkerij, 1917). (J.F. Liefrinkc was the brother of F.A. Liefrinck, Director of 
Finances in 1908-1918.) C. Th. Van Deventer proposed to import labourers from outside 
West Sumatra to fulfi l in the labour demand, but Director of Interior Administration 
D. Tollenaar (in offi ce 1910-1916) preferred use of local labour which he hoped would 
cheaply help increasing employment, monetization and tax payment. Van Deventer, 
“Het pijnlijke kwartier”; ANRI AS GB TGA 6938, herein: DirBB to GG, 24-11-1914.
190 ANRI AS GB TGA 7853, herein: BGS 28-12-1918: RvI 16-11-1918; ANRI AS GB TGA 6938, 
herein: DirBB to GG, 24-11-1914.
191 The Assistant-Resident of Solok, for instance, once arrested and imprisoned two persons 
who had been ‘neglectful’ in performing corvée by the armed police, even before they 
were actually convicted. But in light of recent events, it was advised not to use armed 
police – even by the police chief – and spare the ‘truants.’ ANRI AS Besl. 17-1-1920 n37, 
herein: DepBB, 6-1-1920: Res. SWK to DirBB, 30-5-1918, Afschrift Res. SWK to Ass-Res 
Solok, 8-10-1917, Ass-Res Solok to Res. SWK, 15-5-1918, ‘Hoofd Korps Gewapende 
Politie’ to DirBB and ‘Divisiecommandant Gewapende. Politie te Solok’, 17-7-1918.
192 Oki, “Social Change”, 82-83; A. Kahin, Rebellion to Integration: West Sumatra and the Indo-
nesian Polity, 1926-1998 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1999), 26.
193 As argued by Director of Interior Administration Tollenaar (in offi ce 1910-1916): ANRI 
AS GB TGA 6938, herein: DirBB to GG, 24-11-1914. See also: Oki, “Social Change”, 93.
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chiefs were too incapable and dishonest to be trusted with tax money.194 
Relocation and transferral of penghulu across districts supposedly countered 
‘corruption’ by breaking old ruling patterns, but as a side effect cost the 
penghulu much of their former legitimacy.195 The perpetual imposition and 
aggrandization of ‘false’ ruling elites created a rift between the govern-
ment’s responsibility and the effects of its policies. It was much easier to 
blame indigenous corruption and misrule for the reprehensible effects of 
the tax policy, rather than to acknowledge that the indirect ruling system 
in itself stood in the way of shaping a just and transparent local tax system.
Graph 5.1. Income tax revenue from ‘Inlanders’ in West Sumatra, 1908-1922.196
194 Liefrinck’s report had (like that of Fokkens twenty years earlier in the case of Java), led 
to a new series of ordinances in which villages were encouraged to buy-off collectively. 
Director Tollenaar and the Advisor for Decentralization, H.A. Kindermann, had little 
reliance in the pengulu to collect these taxes uncorrupted: ANRI AS GB TGA 7853, herein: 
BGS 13-9-1918: ‘Zendbrieven, Adviseur Decentralisatie (Kindermann)’ to GG, 16/18-2-
1918, DirBB to GG, 23-4-1918 and AdvDec to DirBB, 24-5-1918.
195 Oki, “Social Change”, 93.
196 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 2752, Vb. 9-7-1925 n25, herein: ‘Resume, Voorstellen tot 
wijziging belastingstelsel Sumatra’s Westkust en Tapanoeli: bijlage VI: Bruto aanslag 
inkomstenbelasting inlanders in Sumatra’s Westkust en Tapanoeli, 1908-1922.’ The 
decrease between 1916-1921 is explained by the World War I recession in coffee produc-
tion.
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Mistakes and opportunities
As a result, tax data was unreliable and tax-levying uncontrolled. Relocated 
penghulu enjoyed little autonomy, and dared not tax the incomes of families 
and people wealthier than themselves, hence smaller incomes bore the 
brunt of the burden.197 Liefrinck and Van der Marel suggested levying land 
rent in West Sumatra, based on ‘impersonal’ measurable data, as a more 
adequate tax.198 This was discussed in Batavia, in 1924, at a staff meeting 
with the Residents of West Sumatra and Tapanuli, the Raad van Indië and 
various Directors. The meeting had been called by the Governor General 
who had grown concerned about the unequal distribution of the tax burden 
in West Sumatra, and the relatively poor tax-performance of the region in 
general. The average assessment per person was below 4 guilders annu-
ally, while in comparable provinces, such as Palembang, West Borneo and 
Lampung, it exceeded seven guiders.199 At the meeting all agreed that a 
land rent was generally a fairer method of taxation, based on the size of 
arable land, average rice prices and productivity. However, both Residents 
did not share in Liefrinck’s optimism for the attainable realization of an 
adequate measurement and levying system. Surveying sawah productivity, 
the Resident of West Sumatra asserted, would take at least ten years.200 
Ultimately the government opted for the middle ground, surveying arable 
lands to improve levying of the same old income tax.201 In the meantime, 
the Director of Finances, was vaguely instructed to continue estimating 
incomes, as “efficiently as possible”, in order to reach assessments that 
would “concur with the spirit of the income tax ordonnance.”202 Such was 
the discrepancy between a government that was logical and theoretically 
sound in its ambitions, but limited in its support for local governors, who 
had to put theory into practice.
Meanwhile, the idea of introducing land rent had not gone unnoticed 
in West Sumatra, and was received with little enthusiasm as it promised 
an even more direct type of taxation. The memory of Dutch tactlessness 
in their treatment of adat society, infringement on land, labour and social 
organization was still fresh, and combined with increasing social instability 
and economic ‘aggravation’ as a consequence of a decade of unequal taxa-
tion, provided ample breeding ground in disgruntled Minangkabau society 
197 Liefrinck, Onderzoek naar de Heffi ng 1, 1-5.
198 Ibid., 8, 10-14, 16-17, 25-30; Marel and Liefrinck, Onderzoek naar de Heffi ng van Belastingen, 
2: Bijlagen, 1-2, 5-7, 13-17, 31-32.
199 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 2752, Vb. 9-7-1925 n25, herein: ‘Verslag Buitengewone verga-
dering RvI’, 15-3-1924.
200 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 2752, Vb. 9-7-1925 n25, herein: ‘Verslag Buitengewone verga-
dering RvI’, 15-3-1924.
201 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 2752, Vb. 9-7-1925 n25, herein: ‘Verslag Buitengewone verga-
dering RvI’, 15-3-1924: 1e Gov. Sec. to RvI 19-3-1924 and Concept Besl. 31-7-1924.
202 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 2752, Vb. 9-7-1925 n25, herein: ‘Verslag Buitengewone verga-
dering RvI’, 15-3-1924: DirFin to GG, 24-10-1924.
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for alternative anti-colonial powers to take root. In 1924, the land rent was 
extensively discussed at meetings of the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia; the 
Indonesian communist party) and among local leaders of Sarekat Islam, who 
denounced the land tax proposal – prompting the Dutch to give up the land 
rent.203 The PKI and its anti-colonial rhetoric gathered increasing support204, 
and in 1926 Dutch colonial policemen detected links between noncompliant 
taxpayers and the party’s influence.205 That year, the PKI attempted to over-
throw the Dutch colonial government, starting a nation-wide rebellion in 
Padang. All over West Sumatra, PKI supporters assaulted village chiefs and 
colonial officials.206 But the revolt was poorly coordinated and dissolved 
into chaotic skirmishes before being supressed within a matter of days by 
the Dutch army. Communist resistance also broke out in Banten but was 
quenched as well, and the PKI went underground. In West Sumatra, the 
uprising symbolized “the culmination of a sustained period of conflict 
between Minangkabau and the Dutch over the impact of liberal reforms”, 
dating back to the Domain Declaration of 1874.207 Popular discontent was 
the only logical outcome, after half a century of land alienation and under-
mining of adat cohesions by the Dutch administration, in which tax policy 
had a leading role. As with the Javanese and Ambonese, the Minangkabau 
received little in return for their tax-payments, and experiences of debt, 
land loss, corruption and exploitation engendered popular frustrations. 
Access to education was limited to indigenous elites, which high-lighted 
economic diversification and the breakdown of existing social orders.208 
The communist rebellion of 1926-1927 simply brought together all these 
sentiments, grudges and grievances.209 The fact that so little coordination 
was required to mobilize such anticolonial mass protest, underlines how 
unpopular Dutch policy had been the preceding years.210 Dutch colonialism 
had become an easy target for the communist party.
A critical report about the socio-economic impact of taxation in West 
Sumatra, published in 1927-1928, emphasized the importance of the 
“modernizing effect” of education among West Sumatra’s awakening elite, 
and argued how reliance on obsolete adat-leaders as indirect rulers was 
long past its expiration date.211 The report concluded that tax assessments 
were therefore chaotic, “lucky guesstimates”, in which weak penghulu 
203 Oki, “Social Change”, 92, 96; Kahn, Constituting the Minangkabau, 239; J.J. Mendelaar, 
“Bestuur en Besturen in de Minangkabau”, IG 62 (1940), 529-549: 539-540, 543-544.
204 Kahn, Constituting the Minangkabau, 241-243; Oki, “Social Change”, 96-99.
205 Oetoesan Melajoe, 18 and 25-5-1926, no. 36-39 (in: IPO 424. n26, 1926) quoted in Oki, 
“Social Change”, 94-95.
206 Oki, “Social Change”, 95-96; Kahn, Constituting the Minangkabau, 153, 242-245.
207 Kahn, Constituting the Minangkabau, 243.
208 Ibid.; Oki, “Social Change”, 103-104.
209 Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, 35-36, 46-49.
210 Oki, “Social Change”, 104; Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies I, 158-159; Kahin, Rebel-
lion to Integration, 33.
211 Hamerster et al., Rapport, 2, 122-127.
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struggled to maintain order during time-consuming tax-gatherings and 
then afterwards swindled the assessments.212 The government had fitfully 
monopolized local systems of law and governance to levy and increase 
taxes, without realizing the promised standards of equality, justice and 
impersonal administration.213 Corvée labour was increasingly bought 
off, which decreased the overall inequality of the labour burden, but also 
created such a demand for money that some mamak, still responsible for the 
payment of all their family members, sold their pusaka lands illegally.214 The 
report compared the income tax to the British Indian income tax of 1922, 
that recognized the “undivided Hindu family”, and reiterated the idea of 
taxing families as a whole to “respect the economic unity of lineages.”215 
But officials in Batavia and West Sumatra were unwilling to take the risk 
of profoundly changing the tax regime once again. The 1927 report clearly 
recognized the drastic socio-economic changes colonial taxation had 
produced, yet it still echoed trite stereotypes of the ‘egalitarian, free spirit’ 
of the Minangkabau as an explanation for their unwillingness to pay and 
their dissatisfaction with Dutch rule.216 Such stereotypes were, until the 
end of colonialism, always favoured as an explanation for the difficulties 
of taxation over acknowledgement of structural mistakes that necessitated 
risky corrections. As a result, for every supressed revolutionary movement, 
another one took its place.217 In the 1920s, coffee trade increased, and tax 
revenue collected from ‘inlanders’ showed some growth after 1925.218 For a 
moment, all seemed well; using forceful persistence, the Dutch had seem-
ingly consolidated the colonial tax state in West Sumatra. But this was only 
on the surface. Below that surface, of indirect rule and pretence, the Dutch 
had created a society in which taxes were resented for numerous reasons. 
Compliance remained problematic as a result, and after 1925 revenue stabi-
lized despite steady population growth. An increasing number of people 
paid less taxes, while the average assessment per capita flatlined (see graph 
5.2 and table 5.1).




216 Ibid., 105 and Hamerster et al., Rapport 1: Politiek gedeelte, algemene politieke richtlijnen voor 
de toekomst; het communisme ter Sumatra’s Westkust ((Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 
1927), 33-35 and
217 Verslag van Bestuur en Staat, 1930, 11; T. Abdullah, Schools and Politics: The ‘Kaum Muda’ 
Movement in West Sumatra (1927-1933) (PhD thesis, Cornell University, 1970), 35-60.
218 After Palembang, West Sumatra showed the highest export fi gures of the colony. At the 
time, about 90 percent of all labour services were bought off, delivering close to a million 
guilders, and by 1930 the total tax assessment of ‘inlanders’ stabilized around 2 million 
guilders.
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Graph 5.2. Income tax revenue from ‘inlanders’ in West Sumatra and Tapanuli, 1925-1929.219
Table 5.1. Tax revenue collected from ‘indigenous inlanders’ in the income tax in West 
Sumatra, 1925-1929.220
Sumatra’s West Coast Tapanuli
Tax 
year














1925 1,661,926.5 352,973 4,71 845,151.19 194,465 4,35 Ca. 1,500,000
1927 2,236,338 363,532 6,15 1,057,535.4 206,485 5,12
1927 2,288,594.9 375,883 6,08 1,023,473 210,243 4,87 1,594,320
1928 2,143,073.8 381,805 5,61 996,433.85 211,500 4,71
1929 2,132,632.6 386,606 5,52 1,009.956 215,329 4,69 Ca. 1,800,000
219 Verslag van Bestuur en Staat, 1926 (bijlage S, pp. 28-29); 1927 (bijlage R, pp. 40-41); 1928 
(bijlage S, pp. 42-43); 1929 (bijlage S, pp. 38-39); 1930 (bijlage R, pp 36-37).
220 Ibid.
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Conclusion
The refusal to exempt from corvée the two merchants from Padang in 
1900 mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, illustrates the difficulties 
experienced by the state to grant monetary taxes in West Sumatra, even on 
request. As in Ambon and Java, corvée labour constituted an important part 
of the tax burden in West Sumatra, until well into the twentieth century.
This chapter has explained how in the case of Minangkabau society, 
continued dependency on coerced labour related to the male-oriented indi-
rect ruling systems shaped under the cultivation system. The Dutch were 
obsessed with modernizing and monetizing taxation. This entailed redis-
tributing the tax burden across the empire and among islands, provinces 
and districts. In West Sumatra, officials attempted to cram the multitude of 
adat variations of the Minangkabau and the economies of Lowlanders into 
the same tax regime aligned to archipelago-encompassing fiscal obligations. 
But officials were structurally unable to grasp and control Minangkabau 
society on its own terms. The Minangkabau were not organized around 
omnipotent figures of male authority and landownership, but this had little 
consequences for the system of forced coffee cultivation and corvée services 
as it put to use the collectivized social organization of the Minangkabau 
through an indirect rule system, the principles of which were indifferent to 
who performed labour or how it was performed. However, the principles 
of monetary income taxes were not, as monetary income tax expressed the 
value of labour in money and aimed to redistribute the tax burden. In the 
case of West Sumatra, this required the adoption of a definition of statecraft 
and social organization that was not king-centric or structured around a 
single, male Oriental-despot.
This required a full revision of the monolithic state structures and theo-
ries already in place. A deconstruction of the state for the sake of the family 
necessitated a type of introspection that would have acknowledged that the 
alternative social models in play in West Sumatra were viable sources for 
tax-organization. And to European colonizers, that was unthinkable. It was 
society that had to change, not the state. Stubborn Batavian officials refused 
to compromise the “bureaucratic spirit of their writing-table theories”221 
to the realities of popular resistance. At grassroot level, Dutch policy was 
experienced as ill-considered, unwieldy, and most of all, dreadfully igno-
rant of local principles of rule.222
‘Colonial spectacles’ could not see beyond models of male, Oriental 
despots, and local officials could not operate without indirect rule prin-
ciples, fully assuming male-authority over politics, rule, property and taxa-
tion. The Dutch forcefully introduced their monetary taxes, and blamed the 
inevitable rejection of them by the Minangkabau, on ‘radicalism’, popular 
221 As put by Kroessen. Quoted in: Schrieke, “Het Probleem der Bestuursorganisatie”, 78-79.
222 Contrary, in fact, to the ever-valid Government Regulation of 1854.
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‘ineptitude’ and the ‘shortcomings’ of society. This way, they limited the 
necessity of taking action, but also structurally denied the fiscal, political 
and administrative problems underpinning their tax regime. Popular influ-
ence on taxation, which had existed during the cultivation system, declined 
through the imposition of theoretically authoritarian but pragmatically 
weak indirect rulers. Meanwhile, the tax burden increased, all adding to 
popular dissatisfaction and social tensions which, logically, culminated in 
regular rebellion and resistance.
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6 Hiding behind the oriental despot
Indigenous elites and violence in Aceh
“Head downstream, gentlemen, to war! It is God’s will [...] obey our prophet! [...] 
Fighting the kafir is your duty! [...] If you accept the hand of the infidel, you will 
become one yourself [...] If no one fights the Dutch, great will be our penance! 
[...] They will appropriate land [...] take half of all popular possession to enable 
their expenses [...] such is the rule of the keumpeni [...] They will take everything 
they find […], confiscate all weapons, and once having all of them, change the 
laws and command all to participate in the labour of the keumpeni [...].
Out of every seven days, one must be worked in service of the overlord! Such 
laws they invent, that women and men, small and large, old and young, even 
small children and the sick, are called for work when strong enough [...] See for 
yourself in Padang, Deli and Batavia in Java, where divine laws are no longer 
obeyed! [...] Such is the system of those cursed by Allah [...] who do not fear His 
punishment.”1
These are the severe warnings of the Hikayat Perang Sabil, an Acehnese 
Islamic epic written around 1880 as a political-religious call for the 
Acehnese to go into battle against Dutch colonial oppression. To the Dutch, 
the phrases of the Hikayat signalled merely the rage-filled rant of ‘Islamic 
radicals’, but the Hikayat is much more than that. It displays the genuine 
mixture of concerns of Acehnese resistance fighters about the colonial 
government’s extreme demands and their impact, as expressed in the 
confiscation of weapons, imposition of forced labour and taxes, attempts 
at de-Islamization, and the establishment of a rule of heresy and extortion. 
Allegedly, this had already happened in Java and other parts of Indonesia 
subject to Dutch rule. These concerns are understandable when considering 
the fact that few regions in Indonesia experienced a more rapid and radical 
political-fiscal and socio-economic metamorphosis than Aceh, in the late 
nineteenth century. In 1870, it was an independent Sultanate – in fact the 
only remaining principality on Sumatra still unscathed by Dutch imperi-
alism. By 1900 it was devastated, after decades of Dutch imperialist war 
for expansion. By 1920 it was fully incorporated as another integrated and 
taxed province of the colonial state.
1 H.T. Damsté , “Hikajat Prang Sabi”, BKI 84 (1928), 545-609: 573 (line 260-265), 581 
(l. 340-345, 355), 585 (I. 395, 400), 587 (l. 410-420, 415-425), 589 (440-445), 595 (l. 520-525), 
597 (l. 545-550).
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Indeed, by 1915, company taxes had been introduced, and were in fact 
(to some extent) paid. Testament to this are the two tax forms displayed in 
the prologue of this dissertation, which are, indeed, from Aceh. The fact that 
these forms have been used and preserved as proof of payment throughout 
the decades signals the importance that Dutch bureaucracy started to play. 
Perhaps the paper-based culture of the government presented new oppor-
tunities for resistance. In Aceh under the Sultanate, no direct taxes or labour 
services were levied in the manner made customary, by the Dutch colonial 
government. So how did Aceh move from the severe warnings of the 
Hikayat Perang Sabil to the seemingly compliant tax payment of 1907? The 
two seem to conflict, or at least represent two profoundly different experi-
ences of, or views upon, colonial rule; the one defines an unholy, extortive 
regime, the other a reasonably functional colonial tax state. This is striking, 
because Aceh was unique in the archipelago in the sense that its “colonial 
occupation was from start to finish a military one.”2 How did the Dutch 
enforce tax compliance and ‘normalize’ tax payment in such a region? How 
did they attempt to transform a population, perceived as religiously over-
zealous, unstable and violent ‘fanatics’, into obedient, taxpaying subject-
citizens?
To answer these questions, this chapter highlights the importance of 
indirect rule. By the time the Dutch invaded Aceh, the colonial practice 
of shaping indirect ruling classes out of ‘Oriental despots’ had become a 
standardized method of governance that had known a long evolution 
throughout the archipelago. It had been invented in Ambon and Java, 
refined during the nineteenth century on Sumatra, and was optimized in 
Aceh, where the role of Acehnese regional lords, uleebalang3, became crucial. 
Taking over from the Acehnese Sultan, the Dutch developed a profitable 
local system of trade, tariffs and taxes. By appropriating and employing this 
system through incorporation of the uleebalang in the colonial bureaucracy 
as ‘feudal’, ‘traditional’ lords (which they had never been), the Dutch 
professed a continuity of the precolonial political-fiscal system, but at the 
same time deeply intervened by modifying the roles of the uleebalang and 
introducing coerced corvée labour and direct taxes. This chapter discusses 
how state agents at various levels attempted to outbalance the looming 
inconsistencies between this purported continuity and radical change. It 
illustrates how conflicts between colonial interventionist governance and 
‘standoffish’ indirect rule complicated the legitimization and elaboration of 
the state-building process.
2 A.J.S. Reid, “Colonial Transformation: A Bitter Legacy”, in A.J.S. Reid (ed.), Verandah of 
Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem (Singapore/Seattle: Singapore University 
Press/University of Washington Press, 2006), 96-108: 96.
3 The term derived from the Malay ‘hulubalang’ which literally means military leader. 
Andaya L.Y. Andaya, Leaves of the Same Tree: Trade and Ethnicity in the Straits of Melaka 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2008), 132.
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The first section of this chapter briefly addresses Aceh’s pre-colonial 
political and fiscal constitution to highlight the pre-colonial role of the 
uleebalang. Section two discusses the colonial conquest of Aceh. In section 
three, the fiscal-political inclusion of the uleebalang during the Dutch inva-
sion through contract-based indirect rule, developed in East Sumatra, 
will be analyzed. The fourth section describes the imposition of corvée 
labour and the company tax in 1908, and investigates the fiscal inclusion 
of the Acehnese into the same fiscal regime as the Ambonese, Javanese 
and Minangkabau, against the backdrop of continuous resistance and 
continuous colonial anxiety.
6.1 Power in trading, trading in power
The Acehnese Sultanate, strategically located on the northernmost tip of 
Sumatra, was among the first regions in the archipelago to encounter both 
Islamic and European merchants. A mercantile hub, it appealed to many 
foreign traders, which supported its rise as the dominant power in the 
Malacca Strait around 1600.4 The Sultanate reached its zenith under Sultan 
Iskandar Muda (r. 1607-1636), who established a consolidated empire on 
Sumatra, with Banda Aceh as its cultural, commercial and religious capital, 
and many satellite states around the Strait. He was only halted at his fourth 
attempt to conquer Portuguese Malacca in 1629. In Dutch sources he is 
depicted as an arbitrary and cruel ruler, a classic ‘oriental despot.’5 In Aceh, 
Iskandar Muda is heralded as the epitome of Acehnese royalty, power and 
potential, supporting Aceh’s “historical myth […] of the golden age, a time 
of greatness” that would gain in strength under the increasing Dutch influ-
ence in the nineteenth century.6
4 Andaya, Leaves of the Same Tree, 122-124. According to Reid, the unifi cation of various 
states into the unified Acehnese Sultanate in the sixteenth century was essentially 
enabled by the “intolerable intervention of the Portuguese.” A.J.S. Reid, An Indonesian 
Frontier: Acehnese and Other Histories of Sumatra (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 
2005), 95. See also Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra, 2.
5 Kreemer, Atjè h, I, 6, 230.
6 E. Aspinall, Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2009), Islam and Nation, 22.
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Political organization under the Sultanate
Trade in various commodities – pepper being the most important one –
made Banda Aceh a bustling commercial hub that attracted merchants 
from across the globe, informing its political and fiscal organization. Trade 
dictated the political constellation of the Sultanate and the distribution 
of power.7 The Sultan, at the apex of the system, collected revenue and 
commanded trade by levying various duties (see figure 7.1).8 He was 
elected by, and from, a powerful class of wealthy merchants, orangkaya (‘rich 
men’), as principal among equals. The Sultan was of supposedly exemplary 
pious, just behaviour, and outside his court-capital he was considered 
a symbolic head of state, as protector of Islamic law and faith, and not a 
supreme, feudal lord. Only within ‘Great Aceh’ (current-day Aceh Besar 
or Aceh proper), the vicinity of the capital of Banda Aceh, the Sultan held 
executive administrative power.9 The orangkaya co-administered the city, 
conducted their own trade and were allowed to levy duties of which they 
had to award shares to the Sultan. They were also expected to provide him 
with military assistance. In return they were bestowed with military titles, 
such as uleebalang and panglima, under so-called sarakarta, royal deeds of 
appointment.10
7 Across Indonesia, an intertwined process of commercialization, Islamization and state 
formation helped formulating the cultural identifies of kingdoms and Sultanates as 
part of an ‘Indonesian Islamic cosmopolis’; Aceh was the most prominent one in the 
seventeenth century, followed later on by Goa and Bone in South Sulawesi, Banten, 
Minangkabau and other sultanates in Sumatra the eighteenth centuries. See: T. Abdullah, 
“Islam and the Formation of Tradition in Indonesia: A Comparative Perspective”, in J.C. 
Heesterman et al., Comparative History of India and Indonesia Vol. 4: General Perspectives 
(Leiden/New York: E.J. Brill, 1989), 17-36.
8 K.H. Lee, The Sultanate of Aceh: Relations with the British, 1760-1824 (Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), 8.
9 J.T. Siegel, The Rope of God (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969): 10-11, 30, 38-39; 
T. Ito and A.J.S. Reid, “From Harbour Autocracies to ‘Feudal’ Diffusion in Seventeenth 
Century Indonesia: The Case of Aceh”, Sydney Studies in Society and Culture 2 (1985), 
197-213: 202; Sher Banu A.L. Khan, Sovereign Women in a Muslim Kingdom: The Sultanahs of 
Aceh, 1641-1699 (Singapore: NUS Press, 2017), 48-50, 271-272.
10 Reid, An Indonesian Frontier, 98, 103-104; Siegel, The Rope of God, 20; Andaya, Leaves of 
the Same Tree, 132-133. Uleebalang would become territorial rulers while Panglima were 
appointed by the court as major military fi efs of important parts of the Kingdom, or as 
important offi cials at the court itself. These royal deeds of appointment were needed to 
lend legitimacy to the position of uleebalang, see Lee, The Sultanate of Aceh, 10. According 
to Siegel the possession of a sarakarta, or linkage to the original holders of it, started to 
base descent and inheritance of the uleebalang title.
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Figure 6.1. Provisions for import and export rights, issued by Sultan Ala ad-Din Djauhar al-
’Alam Shah of Aceh (1795-1823). The Sultan determined which goods were taxed and under 
what tariffs, and shared these tariffs rights with the uleebalang of Great Aceh, who levied them.
Source: Dutch National Museum of Ethnology, Inv. Nr. RV-163-48b. The list has been translated and described 
by G. Drewes.11
11 G.W.J. Drewes, “Atjèhse Douanetarieven in het Begin van de Vorige Eeuw”, BKI 119 
(1963), 402-411.
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The surroundings of Aceh’s court-capital were governed by semi-indepen-
dent rulers that largely derived from a class of local entrepreneurs, mainly 
peutuha pangkai or ‘pangkai holders’, the funders and overseers of pepper 
gardens. Providing capital for pepper plantations, they gained a dynamic 
position between village societies as commercial tycoons, gaining incomes 
by levying trading tolls and duties.12 Using their profits to support a body 
of deputy retainers and collect groups of followers, they slowly established 
themselves as the hereditary, territorially bound rulers of a mukim (an area 
of multiple kampung centred around one mosque), gain a sarakarta from 
the Sultan and establish themselves as uleebalang in their own realm. In the 
core region of the Sultanate, multiple mukim were organized in a federation 
(sagi) led by the supreme uleebalang (sometimes under the greater title of 
panglima).13 The Sultan awarded these provincial lords the uleebalang title, to 
tie them and their regions to his influence and access their profits through 
taxes.14 So the use of the uleebalang title was fluid and differed through time 
and space. In the capital, uleebalang were state-officials who balanced out the 
Sultan’s power. In the province, they formed a class of independent territo-
rial rulers and warlord-merchants who held ambiguous patron-clientele 
relationships and competed over commercial interests and resources with 
the Sultan.15 This power balance of rivalry and partnership between Sultan 
and the various uleebalang dictated Aceh’s political dynamics.16
12 Peutuha pangkai and other subordinate chiefs were sometimes able to collect their own 
group of followers and break away to establish themselves as independent uleebalang 
in their own realm. See Siegel, The Rope of God, 17-20, 33-34; J.H. Heyl, De Pepercultuur 
in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden (S.l.: s.n., 1913), 4-5; R. Kamila, The Disobedient Uleebalang: 
Sarekat Islam and Colonial Civil Rule in Aceh, 1918-1923 (MA thesis, Leiden University, 
2017), 13.
13 These sagi were named after the number of mukim they incorporated. Andaya, Leaves 
of the Same Tree, 144; D. Kloos, “From Acting to Being: Expressions of Religious Indi-
viduality in Aceh, ca. 1600–1900”, Itinerario 39:3 (2015), 437-461: 444; Reid, An Indonesian 
Frontier, 107-108.
14 Siegel, The Rope of God, 36-37, 40-41.
15 Kloos, “From Acting to Being”, 441. Lee suggests provincial uleebalang originally were 
military commanders of mukim, and later assumed more diverse functions such as tax 
collection, becoming the mukim’s undisputed leaders. Mukim were often united in larger 
federations (nanggru). Lee, The Sultanate of Aceh, 8-9.
16 The situation may be compared to Java’s power division between the Sunan and apanage 
holders in the crown lands or Bupati in the provinces (see Chapter 4), the difference being 
that in Java power was determined by disposition over men and agricultural produce 
(taxed in yield shares, cash or labour), while in Aceh power was driven by commerce 
(taxed in tariffs and duties).
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The tax system under the Sultanate
As in Java, the Sultan was entitled to a range of taxes and duties, but lacked 
the administrative power required to enforce these and relied on the orang-
kaya, uleebalang and syahbandar (harbourmasters), to do so.17 Uleebalang in 
Great Aceh held rights to levy wasé, export and import duties, their most 
important source of income. To levy these wasé, uleebalang needed as 
much access as possible to harbours, rivers and bays, where export was 
taxed under a ‘mooring’ or ‘docking tax’ (adat labuan).18 Uleebalang had to 
distribute portions of their wasé-revenues to their own administrative elites, 
and award a share to the Sultan, as wasé àm, or wasé sultan.19
Uleebalang also collected wasé jalan (toll duties) from foreigners for 
the use of roads, and wasé lueng from pepper growers for the use of their 
irrigation channels.20 Irrigation itself (as on Bali), not land (as in Java), was 
considered a tax base.21 Uleebalang, contrary to Javanese lords, levied very 
few direct taxes and virtually no corvée services – though according to 
Snouck, some powerful uleebalang used feudal services or forced labour as 
punishment for people unable to pay their fines.22 Indeed, the uleebalang 
in Great Aceh also had the authority to levy fees (hak or ‘adat’) from their 
followers for organization of specific services, legal procedures and 
conflict resolution related to, for instance, marital affairs (hak or adat balé) 
or inheritance distribution (hak praké) in which village officials (keuci and 
teungku) were entitled to share. Villagers who violated adat, paid fines to the 
17 Lee, The Sultanate of Aceh, 10, 127-128.
18 Predominantly in the coastal areas around Sigli and Lhokseumawe (see map 6.1). Heyl, 
De Pepercultuur, 32-33; J. Kreemer, “De Inkomsten van het Landschaps-Bestuur in het 
Gewest Atjèh en Onderhoorigheden”, IG 42:2 (1920), 123-148: 136.
19 I only use wasé as the term for indigenous import, export and trading duties the Sultan 
and uleebalang levied. In literature and archival material, the terms wasé (right) and hasil 
(yield or tax) are used interchangeably, though having different meanings. According to 
Heyl, wasé were rights over land and export, and other levies were called adat or hasil. In 
the case of wasé raja or wasé sultan this can be confusing as in East Aceh the term hasil raja 
was also used for what Heyl termed wasé or hasil uleebalang, a generic term for the share 
of pepper yield uleebalang were entitled to. Heyl, De Pepercultuur, 28, 31-32; Kreemer, “De 
Inkomsten”, 133-134.
20 Wasé lueng or loeëng was levied by a special offi cial, the kenjoeroeëng balang, usually a 
family member of the uleebalang, or executed in unpaid labour services. See: UBL KITLV 
Collectie Rouffaer (173) D H 875-[1], herein: ‘Ass-Res Meulaboh’ 1, p. 4-8, 11; Siegel, The 
Rope of God, 22-23.
21 Ibid., 25; cf. Schulte Nordholt, The Spell of Power, 12-13, 247-254, 335-336.
22 C. Snouck Hurgronje, De Atjehers, II vols. (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1893-1895), 123, 290. 
One offi cials mentions that some uleebalang levied ‘usoy’ (or ‘oesoy’), a direct tax levied 
“arbitrarily” from rayat or non-agricultural subjects, while agriculturalists were some-
times expected to pay a “boeët oemong”, or yield tax to the uleebalang. UBL KITLV Collectie 
Rouffaer (173) D H 875-[1], herein: “Nota van de civiel gezaghebber, P.A.H. Heldens, te 
Meulaboh, over belastingplicht en agrarisch recht voor de Atjehers, Meulaboh.”
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uleebalang.23 But whether the uleebalang really “ruled through fear”, using 
these fines and punishments (or confiscation) to intimidate and extort their 
followers and top their incomes with “as much cash as possible […]” simply 
because “the common Acehnese […] easily lets himself be maltreated […] 
by the uleebalang”, as argued by Snouck, is difficult to verify.24 As elsewhere, 
negotiation was at the heart of the tax assessment procedure, and though 
many uleebalang enjoyed unassailable status, the risk of potential unrest and 
economic instability provided a sufficient counterbalance to overexploita-
tion.25 In contemporary sources uleebalang are presented as “independent 
harbour kings” who presumably attempted to retain as much revenue as 
possible for themselves at the cost of the Sultan. The Sultan’s alleged poor 
tax administration and record keeping prevented him from obtaining his 
rightful share and provoked structural negotiation of distribution of wasé 
among the Sultan’s delegates and local syahbandar in service of uleebal-
ang.26 But all parties depended on each other for the continuation of trade, 
redistribution of profits and power and religious protection. Taxation was 
political business, in which interested parties were assured of gaining a 
maximum profit for themselves, but never at the cost of the collapse of other 
crucial players in the system.
Yet in Dutch eyes’, the uleebalang personified the typical ‘mini-despots’ 
suitable to act as a local counterforce against the Sultan’s rule. As such, 
they developed into their consolidated role as the local tyrants (which 
Snouck claimed they were) only under colonialism and backed-up by the 
military. Systematized rule through fear and violence should perhaps not be 
understood just as a result of the provincial uleebalang’s double position as 
entrepreneurs, adat chiefs and warlords, as claimed by J. Siegel, but also as 
a method of passing down the increasing strain caused by colonial violence 
and expansion.27
23 Usually, hak praké was ten percent of the value of inherited property. Snouck Hurgronje, 
De Atjehers, I: 69, 73, 74-78, 122-123, 481. Among other taxes levied were “adat peukan” 
(market tax for covering the costs of maintaining the ‘market house’); “adat kroeëng” 
(for cleaning rivers and river banks) and “adat blang” (paid to chiefs for maintaining 
irrigation works). Zakat, it was claimed, was the “only tolerated form of taxation among 
the Acehnese Muslims” and was “prioritized above adat blang.” UBL KITLV collectie 
Rouffaer (173) D H 875-[1] and (63) D H 699-[12 serie I], herein: “Nota van C. Winter Sr.
betreffende ‘Inlandsche Geestelijkheid’, ‘Inlandsche Rechtsbedeeling’, ‘Landelijke 
Inkomsten’ en ‘Belastingen door het Inlandsch Bestuur geheven’, Soerakarta, 1836-1837, 
met aantekeningen van G.P. Rouffaer.”
24 Snouck Hurgronje, De Atjehers, I: 102, 125, and see pp. 122-123 for the full list of uleebalang 
incomes. See for another detailed account on these levies and average amounts Kreemer, 
“De Inkomsten”, 135; Heyl, De Pepercultuur, 32-34.
25 See for instance Visser, Een Merkwaardige Loopbaan, 24-33.
26 See for instance UBL Collectie Rouffaer, D H 875-[1], herein: ‘Nota Ass. Res. Meulaboh 
over belastingheffi ng’, 13-6-1905; NA MinKol OV 5251, Vb. 1-3-1898 n16 herein: RvI 26-5-
1891; Heyl, De Pepercultuur, 32. See also K.H. Lee, “Aceh at the Time of the 1824 Treaty”, 
in A.J.S. Reid (ed.), Verandah of Violence, 72-95: 79-84.
27 Siegel, The Rope of God, 31-32, 44.
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6.2 From Sultanate to province
Aceh underwent a rather different colonization process than Java, Ambon 
or West Sumatra. It was deliberately conquered and colonized during the 
heydays of Dutch imperialism in Indonesia. After the death of Iskandar 
Muda (in 1636) and the Dutch capture of Malacca (in 1641), Aceh had 
slowly lost its political influence in the Straits and its protectorate states 
on Sumatra. Two and a half centuries later it was sole surviving indepen-
dent monarchy on the island, and found its own independence heavily 
contested.28
The Sultanate contested
Around 1870, economic focus translocated from Java to Sumatra. Legions 
of international entrepreneurs interested in rubber rather than coffee or 
sugar, poured in from across the globe, constituting a new genre of colonial 
entrepreneurs. They were based in the North-east, Sumatra’s plantation 
belt, oriented towards the planter’s capital of Medan rather than Batavia, 
and financed their business in Singapore, a town Fransen van de Putte 
complained that attracted many “malcontents […] and adventurers, who 
[…] readily choose this place as the base for undertakings, detrimental to 
Dutch interest.”29 These ‘adventurers’ settled their own concessions and 
contracts with indigenous rulers, which colonial statesmen feared harmed 
Dutch supremacy and ‘local stability’, and compelled abandonment of the 
‘abstention policy.’30 Following the expansion of private concessions, the 
28 After Iskandar Muda’s death, Aceh was ruled by four succeeding Sultana’s, and the 
Acehnese empire declined but remained politically stable. Khan, Sovereign Women, 17-23; 
Khan, “The Sultanahs of Aceh, 1641-99”, in A. Graf, S. Schröter, and E. Wieringa (eds.), 
Aceh: History, Politics and Culture (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010), 3-25; Reid, An Indonesian Fron-
tier, 104-106; J. Kathirithamby, “Achehnese Control over West Sumatra up to the Treaty of 
Painan, 1663”, Journal of Southeast Asian History 10:3 (1969), 453-479.
29 Translated and quoted by Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra, 271. The planters used 
the Straits dollar as effective currency and found a steady labour supply in Malacca. See 
A.J.S. Reid, “Chains of Steel; Chains of Silver: Forcing Politics on Geography, 1865-1965”, 
in Lindblad (ed.), Historical Foundations of a National Economy, 281-296: 284-287.
30 Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra, 21. Abstention policy had been introduced in the 
1840s (see C. Fasseur, “Een Koloniale Paradox”), and was still strongly defended by 
Minister of Colonies J. Loudon in 1861, who wrote to the Governor-General: “Every 
expansion of our authority in the archipelago I consider a step closer to our downfall.” 
Quoted in P. van ’t. Veer, De Atjeh-Oorlog (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 1969), 96. See 
also J.M. Somer, De Korte Verklaring (Breda: Corona, 1934), 94, 120-124. See for colonial 
‘adventurism’ as a trope in relation to the end of abstention policy: J.A. Michener and 
A.G. Day, Rascals in Paradise (London: Secker & Warburg, 1957), 110-144; ’t Veer, De 
Atjeh-Oorlog, 17-19, 24-25, 40; E. Locher-Scholten, “Dutch Expansion in the Indonesian 
Archipelago Around 1900 and the Imperialism Debate”, JSAS 25:1 (1994), 91-111: 109 and 
Locher-Scholten, Sumatraans Sultanaat, 101-116.
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governmental imperial machine pushed the colonial frontier across North 
Sumatra until Aceh’s border was reached.31
At the time, Aceh’s independence was guaranteed by the London Treaty 
of 1824, which had secured Dutch expansion on Sumatra and settled British-
Dutch imperial disputes, for the time being, by swapping Malacca for 
Bengkulu. Meanwhile, the opening of new pepper plantations – following 
the growing world demand for pepper from around 1800 onward – by 
immigrants from Great Aceh to Aceh’s Western and Northern coastal areas, 
spurred the economic power of independently minded coastal uleebalang, 
and boosted the economic revival of the Sultanate. This enabled the Sultan 
to expand his trading network and continue maintaining commercial, 
political and diplomatic relations with the outside world.32 However, it also 
triggered increased political competition with the self- enriching, powerful 
uleebalang, adding to political instability.33 These vibrant interior tensions, 
and regular diplomatic contact between Aceh and foreign powers fuelled 
Batavia’s concern.34
Aceh became the last frontier obstructing the idea of a strong, united 
Dutch colonial state in Indonesia. After the opening of the Suez-canal in 
1869, trading routes shifted, raising the importance of the Malacca Strait, 
over which Aceh held effective maritime control.35 Despite the ‘treaty of 
friendship’ between Aceh and the Dutch government, signed in 1857, the 
Dutch started accusing the Acehnese of supporting piracy in the Strait 
– a common colonial trope36, used to legitimize a much more aggressive 
strategy towards Aceh.37 In 1871, the British and Dutch concocted a new 
Sumatra treaty that ‘allocated’ Sumatra to the Dutch in exchange for Dutch 
possessions on the Gold Coast. It signified complete Dutch withdrawal 
31 Locher-Scholten, “Dutch Expansion”, 95; Lindblad, “Economic Aspects”, 3.
32 Lee, “Aceh at the Time of the 1824 Treaty”, 73-74, 76-77. Aceh produced more than an esti-
mated half of the world’s pepper supply at the time. See J.W. Gould, Sumatra: America’s 
Pepperpot 1784-1873 (Salem: Essex institute, 1956), 100-104.
33 Lee, “Aceh at the Time of the 1824 Treaty”, 79-89.
34 Veer, De Atjeh-Oorlog, 41-42; Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra, 52.
35 Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra, 75-77. The Suez Canal reduced traveling time from 
Europe to Indonesia from 120 to 40 days.
36 Western powers responded with increasing aggression to this so-called ‘pirate menace’ 
in Southeast Asia which they deemed a serious threat to European commerce. Many 
Southeast Asian rulers, including the Acehnese Sultans, made use of the services of such 
‘pirates’ in return for shares in their profi ts. Obviously, whoever was considered a pirate 
depended on who claimed legitimate power over the territorial waters. Not only South-
east Asian, but also European sailors frequently found themselves accused of piracy. See 
Noor, The Discursive Construction, 57-63, 135, 151; S. Eklöf Amirell, “Civilizing Pirates: 
Nineteenth Century British Ideas about Piracy, Race and Civilization in the Malay Archi-
pelago”, Humanetten 41 (2018), 25-45; Locher-Scholten, Sumatraans Sultanaat, 49-50, 55.
37 Kreemer, Atjè h, 10-11; S. Eklöf Amirell, Pirates of Empire: Colonisation and Maritime Violence 
in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 153-157. Like the 
Dutch, the Sultan and uleebalang accused those who did not pay tolls of piracy.
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from the ‘scramble for Africa’ and exclusive focus on Indonesia.38 Knowing 
that the treaty gave the Dutch carte blanche, the Acehnese Sultan lobbied 
for support against Dutch aggression, among American, French and 
Italian diplomats in Singapore and the Ottoman Sultan, without success.39, 
However, his actions did provoke long held Dutch suspicion of interna-
tional interference in their colony.40 Interpreting the Sultan’s quest for aid as 
betrayal of the 1857 treaty, the Dutch found their casus belli and prepared 
for an invasion.
The Sultanate destroyed
In 1873, the Dutch colonial army landed in Banda Aceh. The following 
devastating war has taken a prominent position in both Acehnese and 
Dutch historical memory. To the Acehnese it was the end of independence, 
to the Dutch another bloody episode in their long record of colonial 
violence. The Dutch army greatly underestimated potential resistance; the 
first attack was repulsed and the general in charge killed. The second wave 
succeeded in capturing the keraton, but to little avail. The Dutch retreated 
behind a ‘concentrated line’ around the capital (rebranded Kuta Raja), 
and the war lingered on in the surrounding province for the decades to 
come.41 By 1877, it had cost over 70 million guilders, causing heated debates 
among succeeding Governors, officials and in parliament about whether 
to continue or retreat, or how to enforce victory.42 To many Acehnese, the 
war was increasingly fought for self-preservation against foreign rule. 
Local ulama provided religious inspiration to young men collected in dayah 
(religious boarding schools) and the praying houses of the tarekat.43 As in 
38 Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra, 56-75; Lindblad, “Economic Aspects”, 3-4.
39 Aceh historically maintained diplomatic relations with the Sultanate, using the Ottoman 
fl ag on its fl eet, and continuously tried to enhance its ties with and confi rmation of the 
Ottoman empire of its vassal states. However, the attempts to keep this bond warm 
remained largely unilateral. See A.J.S. Reid, “Aceh and the Turkish Connection”, in Graf, 
Schröter, and Wieringa (eds.), Aceh, 26-38; I.H. Göksoy, “Ottoman-Aceh Relations as 
Documented in Turkish Sources”, in M.R. Feener, P. Daly and A.J.S. Reid (eds.), Mapping 
the Acehnese Past (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2011), 65-96.
40 Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra, 119-155; Locher-Scholten, “Dutch Expansion”, 99-100.
41 ’t Veer, De Atjeh-Oorlog, 52, 98-102; Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra, 97-99; M. Kitzen, 
“Between Treaty and Treason: Dutch Collaboration with Warlord Teuku Uma during the 
Aceh War, a Case Study on the Collaboration with Indigenous Power-holders in Colonial 
Warfare”, Small Wars & Insurgencies 23:1 (2012), 93-116: 156-160.
42 A. Missbach, “The Aceh War (1873-1913) and the Influence of Christiaan Snouck 
Hurgronje”, in A. Graf, S. Schröter, and E. Wieringa (eds.), Aceh, 39-62: 46; Reid, The 
Contest for North Sumatra, 12; Reid, An Indonesian Frontier, 12; Veer, De Atjeh-Oorlog, 
126-133.
43 Kloos, “From Acting to Being”, 444; Reid, An Indonesian Frontier, 146. The ulama’s posi-
tion had been strengthened under leadership of the prominent Teungku di Tiro, as some 
uleebalang had compromised their position by cooperating with Dutch. Reid, The Contest 
for North Sumatra, 251.
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West Sumatra, the ulama promised, “the unity of all men despite the social 
identities which separated them […] leaving behind the ties of kinship in 
order to unite as Muslims”, while “Islam […] offered a release from tradi-
tional obligations” and opportunities outside village life.44 The non-kinship 
related identity of the ulama distinguished them from the villages’ political 
orders, on which they had profoundly different views than (especially 
coastal) uleebalang.45 They legitimized enactment of Islamic (property) law, 
and increasingly mingled in disputes ‘normally’ the domain (and source 
of income) of uleebalang, gaining increasing political power and popularity, 
and took the lead in resistance to the Dutch.
The Sultanate incorporated
Snouck Hurgronje was among the first to realize the importance of the role 
of ulama in the conflict. He was invited in 1891 to conduct fields research 
in Aceh to advise the government and acquire intelligence. Through a 
thorough mastery of written sources and deep engagement in lived reality, 
Snouck recognized the political conflict over resources and authority 
between uleebalang, and ulama whose role as ‘mystical leaders’ he inter-
preted in terms of his typical reformist views on Islam.46 Ulama, Snouck 
argued, posed an ‘anti-modernizing power’ as they were not interested 
in defending territorial rights or commerce, contrary to uleebalang, but in 
submission to God – as represented in widely circulating epic poems such 
as the Hikayat Perang Sabil or Hikayat Perang Keumpeni.47 Still, they wielded 
strong worldly power and the ability to mobilize popular support to pursue 
financial and material means. To “restore natural harmony between lords 
and peasants” and secure and maintain Dutch authority, Snouck recom-
mended a focus on fighting the ulama and support those uleebalang that 
recognized Dutch rule, by enhancing their positions and privileges. This 
was a repetition of the same techniques of indirect rule that had helped the 
Dutch gain a foothold virtually everywhere else in the archipelago.48
Snouck’s advice enabled a Dutch breakthrough in the war. For decades, 
military and civil authorities debated whether uleebalang could be trusted, 
climaxing when the notorious uleebalang Teuku Umar, who had repetitively 
submitted to and then defected from the colonial state, once more ‘betrayed’ 
44 Siegel, The Rope of God, 51-55, 73-74, 77; D. Kloos, Becoming Better Muslims: Religious 
Authority and Ethical Improvement in Aceh, Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2018), 15.
45 Siegel, The Rope of God, 11.
46 Snouck Hurgronje, De Atjehers, I: 174; Laffan, The Makings of Indonesian Islam, 147-234; 
Kloos, Becoming Better Muslims, 34-35; G.W.J. Drewes, “Snouck Hurgronje and the Study 
of Islam”, BKI 113 (1957), 1-15: 11; Siegel, The Rope of God, 42, 50-51, 56-67.
47 Aspinall, Islam and Nation, 25; Kloos, Becoming Better Muslims, 34; Siegel, The Rope of God, 
49; Kamila, The Disobedient Uleebalang, 16.
48 Aspinall, Islam and Nation, 25; Locher-Scholten, “Dutch Expansion”, 108.
Promise Pretence and Pragmatism.indb   268 22-04-21   17:34
Hiding behind the oriental despot: Indigenous elites and violence in Aceh 269
the Dutch.49 Shortly after, in 1898, J.B. van Heutsz was appointed Governor 
General. His policies were strongly guided by Snouck’s theories as he 
unleashed a total, devastating assault on the ulama and their followers, 
conquering one district after another, while installing ‘favourable’ uleebalang 
as territorial chiefs instead. In 1903, Sultan Alauddin Muhammad Da’ud 
Syah (1864-1939, r. 1875-1903) surrendered and the Sultanate, for what it 
was still worth, was abolished, making “a peaceful outcome impossible.”50 
After 1903, guerrilla fighting lingered on for decades, while Dutch control 
over the province remained unbalanced and feeble. Despite considerable 
criticism51, Van Heutsz formulated and exercised a solid but brutal strategy 
of targeted violence. Continued bloodshed cost thousands more lives 
during his and his successors’ relentless campaigns in Eastern and Southern 
Aceh.52
The Dutch established a repressive regime of terror, characterized by 
arbitrary application of the law, violence and forced labour which left a 
considerable mark on the Acehnese people, resonating until deep into the 
twentieth century.53 Van Heutsz was awarded the position of Governor-
General in 1905, and Snouck retired from government service, becoming 
a Professor in Leiden.54 Their strategies were instrumental to the colonial 
regional conceptualization or “geographic imagination” of Aceh as a 
frontier region. As such it was inherited by succeeding officials and a class 
of expert-advisors trained by Snouck55, to be politically, economically and 
49 Kreemer, Atjè h, 22-23. Together with his wife Cut Nyak Jin, Teuku Umar played a pivotal 
role in the Acehnese resistance after his ‘betrayal.’ His fi nal defl ection in 1896 was crucial 
to the application of Snouck Hurgronje’s political advice. See ’t Veer, De Atjeh-Oorlog, 
148-156.
50 Reid, “Colonial Transformation”, 98.
51 The retired Major L.W.A. Kessler, for instance, infl ated two volumes of the Tijdschrift 
voor Nederlansch-Indië with articles in a personal mission to prove the “Van Heutsz-
Snouck Hurgronje strategy” wrong, and argued that to prevent further alienation and 
revengefulness of the Acehnese, the Sultan of Aceh should have been restored under 
acknowledgement of Dutch authority to end the war. L.W.A. Kessler, “Onze Tegen-
woordige Atjeh-Politiek”, TvNI 3 (1899), 105-117: 108 (quote); “Bij Wie de Fout Schuilt 
in zake Atjeh”, ibid., 180-181; “Geschiedvervalsing in zake Atjeh”, ibid., 215-220; “De 
Oude Atjeh-legende”, ibid., 407-415; “Atjeh”, ibid., 461-473; “Herstel van het Sultanaat 
in Atjeh”, TvNI 4 (1899), 160-164; “Dr. Snouck Hurgronje en de Macht der Atjehsche 
Oelama’s”, ibid., 245-255; “Een Helder Licht over den Tegenwoordigen Toestand in 
Atjeh”, ibid., 497-503.
52 ’t Veer, De Atjeh-Oorlog, 247, 270. In the Netherlands these campaigns were heralded as 
the heroism of the Marechaussee. In reality, they were slaughtering frenzies in which many 
men, women and children were brutally murdered. Snouck Hurgronje held Van Heutsz’ 
and Van Daalen personally responsible for the general state of unrest in Aceh and enmity 
of the Acehnese people and chiefs..
53 ’t Veer, De Atjeh-Oorlog, 280; Anonymous, “De Atjeh Paragraaf in de Troonrede”, TvNI 3 
(1899), 627-639: 628-630.
54 A position he had turned down in 1891 to be able to conduct his fi eld research in Aceh as 
government advisor. See Drewes, “Snouck Hurgronje and the Study of Islam”, 11.
55 Laffan, The Makings of Indonesian Islam, 190-208, 235.
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fiscally integrated into the unified colonial state.56 Much complicated by the 
ambiguity of their ambitions – utilizing the political-fiscal foundations of 
a society they deeply distrusted – and by the political fragmentation and 
diversification within the former Sultanate, the Dutch engaged in a complex 
colonization process and ruthless establishment of their power. That process 
was perpetually sustained with shrewd strategies of military administration 
and carefully targeted “exemplary” violence and terror.57
6.3 Imperialism by contract
Despite continued unrest and warfare, Aceh was subjugated likewise to a 
neat colonial paper administration. Borders were drawn and administrators 
appointed. Whereas Great Aceh was directly ruled as ‘government-territory’
gouvernementsgebied), the provinces became ‘self-governing’ territories 
(zelfbesturende landschappen) as indirectly ruled, semi-autonomous ‘Depen-
dencies’ (onderhoorigheden), together shaping the new province ‘Aceh and 
Dependencies.’58 Each district was ruled by a Dutch controleur and sub-
divided into numerous territories, each one usually housing a few thousand 
inhabitants unified under a local uleebalang.59 ‘Self-government’ (as opposed 
to directly administrated ‘government-territory’) was a crucial pillar in 
Dutch imperial governance. It was used in Java (where the Principalities 
of Yogyakarta and Surakarta were self-governing), and exported enthusi-
astically to Sumatra, Borneo and East Indonesia where many principalities 
remained ‘self-governing’ regions and Dutch bureaucratic influence was 
quite minimal (see map 6.2). The imposition of self-governance in Aceh 
cannot be separated from experiences in North-eastern Sumatra, where 
experiences of treaty- and contract settlement would deeply influence 
similar practices in Aceh.
56 D. Kloos, “Violence, Religion, and Geographic Imaginations in Aceh, 1890s-1920s” (Paper 
Presented at the Workshop ‘Violence, Displacement and Muslim Movements in South-
east Asia’, KITLV/LUCIS, June 2016), 27.
57 As argued by Schulte Nordholt, and more recently by P. Groen, see: H.C.G. Schulte 
Nordholt, A Genealogy of Violence in Indonesia (Lisboa: Centro Português de Estudos do 
Sudeste Asiático CEPESA, 2001); P.M.H. Groen, “Colonial Warfare and Military Ethics 
in the Netherlands East Indies, 1816–1941”, Journal of Genocide Research 14:3-4 (2012), 
277-296. See for similar examples Locher-Scholten, Sumatraans Sultanaat, 22; L.Y. Andaya, 
“Treaty Conceptions and Misconceptions: A Case Study from South Sulawesi”, BKI 
134:2-3 (1978), 275-295.
58 Munawiah, Birokrasi Kolonial di Aceh 1903-1942 (Banda Aceh/Yogyakarta: Ar-Raniry 
Press/AK Group, 2007), 4-7.
59 Every territory or landschap was split up in smaller domains of which rulers carried the 
title of uleebalang-cut and usually aspired to control their own landschap in the future. See 
A.J. Piekaar, Atjè h en de Oorlog met Japan (‘s-Gravenhage: Van Hoeve, 1949), 140-141.
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Contract rule in Northeast Sumatra
Though ‘directly administered’ territories also employed a level of indirect 
rule, self-governing territories enjoyed much higher levels of autonomy. 
During the industrial, tobacco and rubber driven expansion in East Sumatra 
the government experienced difficulties following in the high pace of the 
entrepreneurs’ footsteps. In 1873, the Residency of ‘Sumatra’s East Coast’ 
was established, but the new Resident was understaffed and had little foot-
hold in funding and effectuating his bureaucracy.60 Meanwhile, the entre-
preneurial elite, furnished by the Agriculture Law and Domain Declaration, 
had successfully secured major concessions for their ‘frontier’ tobacco and 
rubber plantations through diplomatic engagement with the indigenous 
aristocracies of the Sultanates of Deli and Siak.61 The state soon followed, 
concerned to guide, standardize and unify the colonization process, now 
driven by the interests of private capital.62 In Sumatra’s plantation belt, the 
advent of new plantation societies was accompanied by the well-known 
“racial and ethnic confrontations” and tensions between the faiths of 
different classes, including coolie laborers, migrants, European governors 
and industrialists and the local population.63
Between 1858 and 1863, through forceful diplomacy, political power-
play and cunning exploitation of internal rivalry, important contracts were 
negotiated and settled with the Sultanates, determining the transfer of tax, 
pawning and opium sale rights to the Dutch, in exchange for handsome 
rewards.64 These contracts awarded the Governor-General rights to “levy 
and alter or replace all existing customs and taxes, […] for a fair compensa-
tion to the Sultan, viceroys and grandees [rijksgroten].”65 Typical colonial 
claims that Siak’s indigenous tax regime was despotic, and that the colonial 
60 W.H.M. Schadee, Geschiedenis van Sumatra’s Oostkust (2 vols., Amsterdam: Oostkust van 
Sumatra-Instituut, 1918) vol. II, 1-2, 3.
61 In fact, the Sultan of Siak was the superior regional ruler, and his approval was required 
for conducting any trade. see: ANRI AS Besl. 13-8-1879 n19, herein: Res. Deli to GG, date 
unknown. See for the same, NA MinKol 1850-1900 3061, Vb. 16-1-1878 n51, herein: Vb., 
Nota A2 and GG to MinKol, 28-8-1875. See also: Lindblad, “Economic Aspects”, 102 and 
T.K. Wie, “The Development of Sumatra, 1820-1940”, in A. Maddison and G.H.A. Prince 
(eds.), Economic Growth in Indonesia, 1820-1940 (Dordrecht/Providence: Foris Publica-
tions, 1989), 133-158: 149.
62 Lindblad, “Economic Aspects”, 10-12 (quote p. 12); Wie, “The Development of Sumatra”, 
134-141.
63 A.L. Stoler, Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra’s Plantation Belt, 1870-1979 (Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1985), 2-10.
64 These contracts were extended in 1875-1876 by the Director of Finances upon personal 
inspection, as part of a huge package deal, settled with approval of the (supreme) Sultan 
of Siak, and including the smaller sultanates of Bola Panai, Kota Pinang, Serdang and 
Langkat. Sultans often had different interests than their viceroys and grandees who 
received smaller concessions. Schadee, Geschiedenis van Sumatra’s Oostkust I, 80-81. See 
also Locher-Scholten, Sumatran Sultanate, 59-84, 277.
65 NA MinKol OV 1850-1900 3061, Vb. 16-1-1878 n51, herein: Vb.
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government would “impose much fairer taxes on the population”66, was 
used to legitimize this takeover of taxation. However, there was a differ-
ence between whoever was authorized to sign these contracts and whatever 
its experienced value was, on the spot. In the Javanese (self-governing) 
principality Surakarta for instance, the local grandees (rijksgroten) signed 
contracts individually. All of them, except those holding offices at the court, 
were entitled to apanage, and as such, rulers in their own rights. In many 
other places (where this was not the case) only the central ruler signed a 
contract in which the rights and duties of his grandees were included.67 
These contracts followed the standardized model of the ‘Long Declaration’ 
(Lange Verklaring) that redefined the fiscal autonomy, duties and rights of the 
involved rulers and the colonial state, thereby impacting the subject-relation 
of people to their ‘rulers’, or to whomever they really paid tax.68 These 
‘Long Declarations’ prescribed that ‘self-governors’ could levy no other 
taxes than those specified in the contracts, and as such they were relegated 
from autonomous rulers to government servants annex tax agents.69
For decades, if not centuries, establishing contracts with local governing 
elites to legitimize the colonial presence had been the elementary pattern 
of the Dutch strategy for colonial expansion and indirect rule. By luring 
local aristocracies into contracts to exert influence over their tax rights, 
using internal political fragmentation and awarding gifts and salaries, the 
government slowly intervened in political order, law and society.70 For 
many rulers, the best option was to accept Dutch supremacy and make 
the best of it, but inevitably, all local rulers slowly lost power, as the Dutch 
increasingly took charge of territorial rule, arrangement of royal succession, 
legal procedures, diplomacy, trade, tax rights, personal services and mining 
concessions. Increasingly skilled at influencing the multiple layers and 
factions at ruling courts, the Dutch spied and plotted against rulers out of 
favour, keeping alive the practices of the patrimonial bureaucracy of the 
nineteenth century. While theoretically, these practices had been discarded 
as ‘unmodern’ and obstructive to social progress, pragmatically it remained 
at the core of Dutch political imperialism throughout the archipelago. In 
East Sumatra, it helped the Dutch to gain all rights to export duties, opium 
and liquor sales and game and pawning tax by 1875, without having to 
66 NA MinKol 1850-1900 3061, Vb. 16-1-1878 n51, herein: Vb. and Nota A2. Under the 
Sultanate, local rulers had to render shares of their agricultural profi t to the Sultan at 
eighty percent of the market value, and buy part of the Sultan’s merchandize for double 
the market price. This imposed a high burden on the local peasantry according to the 
Dutch who obtained the rights to these taxes and abolished it. This gave birth to the 
‘Model contract for the East Coast of Sumatra 1906’, used for new contracts with Deli, 
Langkat, Asahan and Serdang. See Schadee, Geschiedenis van Sumatra’s Oostkust II, 4-8.
67 Bongenaar, Zelfbesturend Landschap, 118-121.
68 Ibid., 133-183.
69 Ibid., 229-230.
70 Lev, “Colonial Law”, 57-58.
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maintain a burdensome, full-fledged administration.71 The government 
kept a “system of bribes and prerequisites […] much cheaper than the taxa-
tion of a modern government structure”72, greatly to the benefit to the colo-
nial government and its officials.73 The Sultans, who enriched themselves 
through their royal concessions, salaries and privileges, became paragons 
of constituted ‘traditional’ rulership and luxurious planters life.74 East 
Sumatra demonstrates how contract rule crystallized into an exemplary 
model of standoffish governance, shaping “states within states”, that would 
condition colonial rule throughout the archipelago.75 Dependent on the 
infusion of Western capital and industrial entrepreneurs, many indigenous 
rulers across the archipelago lost financial autonomy, and by signing over 
71 At a lumpsum of 182,000 guilders in total annual compensation of local raja, the cost of 
government was outweighed drastically by the raising profi ts of the tobacco industry, 
increasing tenfold between 1864-1865 and surpassing 33 million guilders by 1899. See: 
W. Westerman, De Tabakscultuur op Sumatra’s Oostkust (Amsterdam: De Bussy, 1901), 4; 
ANRI DepFin 369, herein: ‘Extract besluit’, 3-12-1883, DirFin to Res. SOK and GG, 30-1-
1885 and Extract 10-11-1885. See also Stbl. 1885 n198 (In- en Uitvoerrechten SOK) and 
NA MinKol 1850-1900 3061, Vb. 16-1-1878 n51, herein: GG to MinKol, 28-8-1875. See the 
‘Advies A2’ for the exact specifi cation of what rights were taken over from whom. In 
1884, total tax revenue surpassed 2.5 million guilders versus total expenses of around 1 
million guilders, making Sumatra’s East Coast by far the most profi table province of the 
empire. Schadee, Geschiedenis van Sumatra’s Oostkust II, 8.
72 A.J.S. Reid, The Blood of the People: Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule in Northern 
Sumatra (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979), 45.
73 Dutch civil servants in East Sumatra received copious collector’s wages because of 
presumed high costs of life in Deli, making it a much-desired posting. In 1904 the 
Government considered to abolish these wages, as the Director of Finances claimed 
that it was not in the “interest of the state” if civil servants participated in the “exclu-
sive planters’ life.” Local offi cials protested heavily against the intended abolishment, 
claiming that when deprived of income and no longer able to take part in local colonial 
social life, they would lose face and authority. See NA MinKol OV 1901-1953 319 Vb. 
23-6-1905 n16, herein: GG to MinKol 30-4-1904, Gov. Sec. to Res. SOK 1-11-1904, Res. SOK 
to GG, 4-2-1905 and DirFin to GG, 23-2-1905.
74 Be it only temporarily, as by 1930 it appeared the royal extravagance of the East Sumatran 
Sultans had resulted in spectacular debts, and that display of their wealth had only 
helped them “making up in majesty what they lacked in power.” Reid, The Blood of the 
People, 46. The Sultan of Siak alone received compensation of 40,000 guilders for all his 
tax rights, the Sultan of Serdang more than 47,000. This excluded the salaries awarded to 
their grandees. A complete overview is found in NA MinKol 1850-1900 3808, Vb. 12-11-
1884 n19, herein: GG to MinKol, 18-8-1884: ‘Advies A3’, ‘voorlopige visie A2’, 20-10-1884 
and ‘Afschrift’, Res. SOK to GG, 28-6-1884, Res. SOK to GG, 14-7-1884, as well as in ANRI 
Besl. GG, 13-8-1879 n19, herein: Res. Deli to GG, date unknown. See also Handelingen 
Tweede Kamer, 1879-1880, Kamerstuk 86 nr. 4, ‘Overeenkomsten met inlandsche vorsten 
in den Oost-Indischen Archipel’: ‘Contract met Serdang voor de overneming van belas-
tingen’, 13-8-1879.
75 Stoler, Capitalism and Confrontation, 22, quoted from K.J. Pelzer, Planter and Peasant: 
Colonial Policy and the Agrarian Struggle in East Sumatra 1863-1947 (s-Gravenhage: Nijhof, 
1978). See for the manifold legal and constitutional complexities of the position of Indo-
nesian semi-independent kingdoms, self-governing landscapes, regencies, petty states 
(etc.), Resink, “Inlandsche Staten.”
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their tax rights to the government, their power seeped away. Entrenched 
in these ever obtrusive ‘Long Declarations’ and a life of luxury, they often 
experienced little choice but to keep subscribing to Dutch sovereignty.76
Contract rule in Aceh: recasting the ueleebalang
In the 1890s, when Aceh was deemed sufficiently ‘pacified’, the colonial 
government commenced the integration of Aceh into its fiscal framework 
by approaching uleebalang, who had been identified as the Oriental Despots 
suitable for indirect rule. Because the uleebalang were seen as merchants 
rather than landholders, trade was prioritized over land or labour as the 
dominant source of tax revenue and power. The Dutch therefore coveted 
control over wasé, Aceh’s most important fiscal resource.77 Lange Verklar-
ingen had been established with some uleebalang in 1874-1884, allocating 
these rights to the colonial government. However, the uleebalang in the 
Dependencies valued their relative independence and did not always 
adhere to the agreement, attempting to avoid the state as much as possi-
ble.78 Moreover, their primary interest was not ‘to rule’; warlord-merchants 
rather than chiefs, they prioritized maintaining commercial-financial and 
fiscal stability over territorial domination and popular welfare. As such, 
they were deemed of much lower status than many other territorial lords 
on Sumatra – Snouck characterized them as “so insignificant that the raja-
title seems rather ludicrous.”79 Hence, the uleebalang were taxed based on 
commercial interests, and not out of some sort of bureaucratic need for 
administrative justice, in which they had little interest. However, that did 
not fit in with the expectations of colonial officials, so, based on Snouck’s 
theories, the uleebalang recast into territorial-administrative chiefs, just as 
the raja on Ambon, the assorted village officials in Java and penghulu and 
mamak in West Sumatra had been recast into ascribed roles that conflicted 
with their previous positions.
Uleebalang were argued to have “few ties with villagers whom they 
supposedly ruled…”, rather using “…their profits from trade to support 
a body of retainers who were the real source of their power.”80 This was in 
fact largely the result of the deteriorating relationship between uleebalang 
and the people, as a consequence of the war. Siding with the Dutch, the 
76 In Lombok, Kalimantan, South Sulawesi and many other parts of Sumatra, indigenous 
rulers were accused of ‘despotism’ in case rulers refused to cooperate as a pretext for 
conquest. Ironically, the most durable guarantee for some level of autonomy was signing 
a Verklaring and participate in arbitrary forms of indirect rule, but the outcome was 
always growing Dutch dominance. See Locher-Scholten, “Dutch Expansion”, 98, 103-104.
77 Missbach, “The Aceh War”, 41.
78 Somer, De Korte Verklaring, 251-253-255, bijlage 254, 357-359: ‘Model Verklaring in 218 
artikelen, door verschillende Atjehsche Hoofden afgelegd in de jaren 1876 tot 1884, art. 
1876-1878.
79 Quoted in ibid., 261, see also pp. 273-274.
80 Siegel, The Rope of God, 11.
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uleebalang had lost potential fiscal and administrative authority over their 
people. As a result, according to Inspector of Finances J.J. Roëll, in the 
majority of the coastal regions of North and Eastern Aceh (Sigli, Idi and 
Lhokseumawe), wasé were in practice increasingly collected by Dutch 
civil servants under military escort, who became the “tax administrators 
of the raja.”81 Indeed, tax-levying was enforced through military means by 
the Dutch, so it is unsurprising that, as Roëll observed, the uleebalang in 
Idi and Lhokseumawe “highly appreciated the government’s intervention, 
realizing that […] levying and monitoring [by the Dutch] was guaranteed 
much better” than before.82 But its side-effect was a deepening crack in the 
relations between uleebalang and the people. Collaborating with the Dutch 
ensured income continuity and political security in relation to the ongoing 
power-struggle with the ulama, but paradoxically, might have driven people 
who were no longer protected from the greed of their ‘despots’ through 
negotiation and bargaining, back into the hands of the ulama, thereby in fact 
further stimulating resistance and violence.
Their influence over the uleebalang enabled the Dutch to punish non-
cooperation and resistance to a much greater extent than the uleebalang 
could before, and control the uleebalang by withholding part of wasé 
revenue. “Levying of taxes […] became a political instrument […] that 
the government appropriated […] to enable putting less benevolent chiefs 
under pressure.”83 The burden of these punishments was passed down 
onto the general population, by levying extra duties over pepper export 
or by confiscating property, causing popular anger, occasionally resulting 
in uncontrolled migration.84 And because the collection of wasé principally 
depended on export values which differed, depending on the region, the tax 
burden remained unequally spread.
Many uleebalang in East Aceh, where pepper was the only commodity 
being taxed, levied all kinds of surtaxes on pepper to maximize revenue.85 
Because of generally poor compliance in the payment of wasé and other 
duties, the appropriation of the rights to levy them was politically rather 
than fiscally significant. However, as in East Sumatra, control over local 
the revenue apparatus created space to expand the fiscal revenue base 
by levying new taxes or by monopolizing local financial networks. For 
81 NA MinKol 1850-1900 5251, Vb. 1-3-1898 n16, herein: DirFin to GG, 15-5-1897 and InspFin 
Roëll to DirFin, 8-11-1896: ‘Rapport, omtrent het onderzoek naar de in het Gouvernement 
van Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden gedane belastingen en heffi ngen, welke niet op wette-
lijken grondslag berusten’: ‘a. Groot Atjeh.’
82 NA MinKol 1850-1900 5251, Vb. 1-3-1898 n16, herein: InspFin Roëll to DirFin, 8-11-1896: 
‘Rapport’: ‘b. Noord- en Oostkust.’
83 NA MinKol 1850-1900 5251, Vb. 1-3-1898 n16, herein: InspFin Roëll to DirFin, 8-11-1896: 
‘Rapport’: ‘b. Noord- en Oostkust.’
84 H.T. Damsté , “Atjèh-Historie”, KT 5:1 (1916), 318-339, 449-468, 609-627: 462, 467-468, 610, 
613.
85 NA MinKol 1850-1900 5251, Vb. 1-3-1898, herein: RvI 26-5-1891; Heyl, De Pepercultuur, 
35-36.
Promise Pretence and Pragmatism.indb   276 22-04-21   17:34
Hiding behind the oriental despot: Indigenous elites and violence in Aceh 277
instance, upon the occupation of coastal areas, the efficiency of Dutch 
bureaucracy ensured the take over and control of harbours and the 
usurping of the fiscal relations with syahbandar, who collected all import 
and export duties.86 In Meulaboh, opium revenue was an important income 
source for uleebalang, so opium sale was monopolized by the government, to 
“pressurize” local uleebalang into cooperation.87
This gradual reform of the uleebalang from within was standardized 
in two different ways. In ‘directly governed’ Great Aceh, the uleebalang 
were appointed as civil servants in the Inlands Bestuur, under substantial 
fixed allowances.88 In the ‘Dependencies’, the more than 100 uleebalang 
were maintained as ‘self-governors’, and forced into a new, more concise 
model-contracts, specially drafted by Snouck for Aceh (but also applied 
elsewhere), called Korte Verklaring (short declaration).89 These ‘three-point’ 
contracts determined that a ruler’s domain became part of the colonial 
empire, that the ruler agreed to obey the Governor General’s orders, main-
tain law and order and that the ruler promised to refrain from engaging in 
or maintaining relations with other states.90 Taxation was left unregulated in 
the Korte Verklaringen to, as advised by Snouck:
“…increase [import duties] without actual takeover, lest the chiefs lose interest 
in the development of their districts, going asleep while receiving a fixed, annual 
compensation fee.”91
Locked in a Korte Verklaring, uleebalang could no longer circumvent their 
colonial overlords. Their “rightful shares” to wasé were allocated under 
supervision of officials who subtracted the cuts of the government.92 Even-
tually, in 1908, the imposition of local treasuries guaranteed separation of 
86 In 1907, for instance, a new harbour was acquired in Langsa, and the syahbandars were 
immediately bribed or replaced with Dutch offi cials. Stbl. 1907 n379; NA MinKol PVBBg 
1 (Atjeh 1907), herein: Dossier Mailr. nr. 1041-1387: Gov. Sec to Gov. Aceh, 5-9-1907, 
DirFin to GG, 25-7-1907, DirBB to GG, 5-8-1907, Gov. Aceh to GG, 18-3-1907.
87 This fitted into similar policies of monopolization of what before was a tax farming 
system. NA MinKol 1850-1900 5251, Vb. 1-3-1898 n16, herein: ‘Rapport’: ‘c. Westkust’; 
DirFin to Gov. Aceh, 13-12-1897; Kreemer, “De Inkomsten van het Landschaps-Bestuur”, 
124.
88 Kreemer, Atjè h, 68-70; Bongenaar, Zelfbesturend Landschap, 84-85; H. Colijn, Politiek 
Beleid en Bestuurszorg in de Buitenbezittingen (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1907) vol. I, 116. 
According to Reid, direct rule was imposed over Aceh Besar because there were too little 
uleebalang remaining to fulfi l the required amount of ‘self-governors.’ Reid, The Contest 
for North Sumatra, 203. See also Kreemer, Atjè h, I, 68-70; Reid, “Colonial Transformation”, 
102.
89 Somer, De Korte Verklaring, 254.
90 Ibid., 95, 108-109, 362-363; Kreemer, Atjè h, II, 182-184; Locher-Scholten, “Dutch Expan-
sion”, 98 n32, 108; ’t Veer, De Atjeh-Oorlog, 237-238. The Korte Verklaring-model expresses 
the principal Dutch motives and fears in dealing with Indonesian states: that for rebel-
lion, misgovernance and intervention by other imperial powers.
91 Quoted in Somer, De Korte Verklaring, 264.
92 NA MinKol 1850-1900 5251, Vb. 1-3-1898 n16, herein: RvI 26-5-1891.
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the uleebalang’s private from public incomes which “dramatically reduced 
their power in relation to the Dutch and enabled the colonial authorities to 
bring greater uniformity [...].”93
Local treasuries also enabled the direct allotment of tax revenue to 
local expenses.94 As only taxes collected under a ‘Batavian’ ordinance 
could be deposited into the government’s treasury, taxes collected under 
a ‘self-governance regulation’ (zelfbestuursregeling) could be deposited and 
spent without Batavia’s consent.95 In Batavia, such unruliness was not 
appreciated, not only because of potential fiscal profligacy but also because 
various taxes in Aceh started to be levied spontaneously and without 
control.96 The wasé Sultan (the Sultan’s share in wasé levied over pepper 
export), for instance, fully appropriated in 1897, was allocated directly by 
colonial officials for road construction and maintenance.97 In some places, 
wasé Sultan became erroneously known as wasé jalan (in fact this was an 
access-toll which peasants paid to uleebalang to use their roads) collected 
in so-called ‘road funds.’98 As a result, local colonial administrations began 
independently adjudicating on infrastructural budgets and development, 
without Batavia’s ratification, causing a lack of balance and divergence 
in fiscal-infrastructural policy. Hence, Inspector Roëll was ordered by the 
Director of Finance to “legislate” the Acehnese tax system; bureaucratic 
jargon for issuing central ordinances to preserve central coordination. In 
1899, Van Heutsz’ declared all roads ‘tax-free’ and replaced the ‘road-funds’ 
with vehicle taxes.99
93 M. Gade Ismail, “The Economic Position of the Uleëbalang in the Late Colonial State. 
Eastern Aceh, 1900-1942”, in Cribb (ed.), The Late Colonial State, 79-92: 85-86, quote p. 85; 
Kreemer, “De Inkomsten”, 123-124.
94 Kreemer, Atjè h, II, 154; Gade Ismail, “The Economic Position”, 86.
95 NA MinKol 1850-1900 5251, Vb. 1-3-1898 n16, herein: DirFin to Gov. Aceh, 13-12-1897.
 This came in useful when local rulers and offi cials planned on making controversial or 
risky expenses. When General Deijckerhoff (Governor of Aceh in 1892-1895), for instance, 
planned to adhere to Teuku Umar’s controversial request for material support (before his treason) 
to fi ght off ulama gangs active in his region, he bought him extra fi rearms and munition paid for 
using local tax revenue collected in the local treasury of Sigli. NA MinKol 1850-1900 Geheim/
Kabinetsverbaal 6247, Vb. 29-5-1897 R9, herein: GG to MinKol, 13-10-1896, Gov. Aceh to 
GG, 24-7-1896; ’t Veer, De Atjeh-oorlog, 181-182, 201-202.
96 Governor J.W. Stemfoort (1896-1897) even audaciously proposed takeover of levying of 
zakat, which he claimed was structurally embezzled by the ulama to expand their fi nan-
cial capacity and popular infl uence. But as infringement in religious institutions was 
generally considered off limits, the plan was discarded. Instead, options were discussed 
for awarding tax revenue shares or collector’s wages to the kampung elite to undermine 
the fi nancial power of the ulama. NA MinKol OV 5251 (1850-1900), Vb. 1-3-1898 herein: 
DirFin to Gov. Aceh, 13-12-1897.
97 NA MinKol 1850-1900 5251, Vb. 1-3-1898 herein: RvI 26-5-1891.
98 NA MinKol 1850-1900 5251, Vb. 1-3-1898 herein: RvI 26-5-1891; DirFin to Gov. Aceh, 
13-12-1897.
99 Kreemer, “De Inkomsten”, 131.
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In 1906, Van Daalen prohibited the uleebalang from levying any tax 
other than wasé over pepper at a maximum rate of 10%, including the 
shares for pangkai holders (fixed at 0.35 guilders). This sealed the ongoing 
development of the Dutch gaining influence over the fiscal instrumentation 
of uleebalang.100 Aceh became a focal province of the Dutch policy, demon-
strating the Dutch capacity, to uplift what was considered a despotic and 
extortive fiscal regime to the heights of colonial-coordinated, centralized 
and ‘legalized’ fiscal modernity. In 1910, wasé uleebalang were fixed at 1.50 
guilders (of which 0.50 was to be awarded to the pangkai holders)101 and 
the government expanded its central toll area over all of Aceh. A tariff of 
four percent was imposed, which finalized the expansion of Batavia’s tax 
rights over the province.102 All of the uleebalang’s rights had been confiscated 
and transformed into government levies, funding the local treasuries from 
which their salaries were paid, and which were co-managed and scrutinized 
by civil servants in Kota Raja.103 Their financial independence had been fully 
dissolved. Instead of entrepreneurs in their own rights holding monopolies, 
uleebalang became Aceh’s facilitators of legitimate tax-levying.104 In similar 
fashion, the system of the hak balé (the uleebalang’s judicial rights to penalties 
and confiscation) was deconstructed by Governor H.N.A. Swart (in office 
1908-1918), who in 1912 ordered 75% of it to be paid to the adat ‘courts’ and 
25% to the local treasury.105
Not all officials shared in this enthusiasm for confiscating the incomes of 
the uleebalang. Particularly critical was controleur H.T. Damsté of Idi (in office 
1908-1912) who feared that the loss of financial independence would harm 
their prestige and authority, potentially causing an resurgence of violence 
and resistance.106 Swart distributed an instructional pamphlet among 
district officials in which he recommended treating uleebalang, “with dignity 
[…] to uphold their position vis-a-vis the people”, and prohibited “coarse, 
scornful or unbecoming treatment of chiefs and people.”107 It seemed to 
have had little effect. In 1919, Swart’s successor complained about the 
“awkwardness” of many officials, who were “unsuitable for diplomacy.”108
100 Munawiah, Birokrasi Kolonial di Aceh 1903-1942, 98-99.
101 Kreemer, Atjè h, II, 143; Heyl, De Pepercultuur, 40-41.
102 Stbl. 1910 n628; Kreemer, Atjè h, II, 138-142. See also: N. Easton, “De Voorgestelde 
Wijziging der Indische Mijnwet”, Quarterly Review of The Royal Netherlands Economic 
Association 65:1 (1916), 795-820.
103 By 1912, all districts had been subjected to the imposition of local treasuries. Kreemer, 
Atjè h, II, 128-129; Heyl, De Pepercultuur, 154-155.
104 Gade Ismail, “The Economic Position”, 87.
105 The same happened to the hak praké (estate/legacy rights). Kreemer, “De Inkomsten”, 
132-134.
106 Damsté , “Atjèh-Historie”, 622-623. Quoted in: Heyl, De Pepercultuur, 40. Before, Damsté 
had been controleur of Sigli, in 1902-1903.
107 UBL Collectie Damsté D H 1084-[29], herein: ‘instructie voor de onderafdelingschefs in 
de Onderhoorigheden van Atjeh’, art. 6.
108 ANRI DepBB 1156, herein: Gov. Aceh to DirBB; DirBB to Gov. Aceh 2-4-1919.
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Swart also prohibited officials from seeking rapprochement with hostile 
chiefs without his consent109, which in the case of Damsté led to severe 
conflict. Damsté, an energetic and independently-minded official, fluent in 
Acehnese and of strong opinions, frequently accused his predecessors and 
superiors of malpractice and mal-governance. He insisted on supervising 
‘his’ uleebalang independently and came into open conflict with Swart, after 
which he was punished with a posting to a remote island.110
The ever-looming threat of religious insurrection created a common 
interest shared by the Dutch state and the uleebalang, creating a bond in 
which both became invested in each other’s hegemony. Because of their 
importance as a front against the ulama and the generally feeble condition 
of Dutch authority, the uleebalang were assured of decent salaries and the 
stability of their positions to a greater extent than the aristocracies of Java 
and Ambon, that had to make up their own salaries from what they could 
get through collectors wages and percentages.111 Supported by growing 
Western industry and Dutch officialdom, their power base became stronger 
than ever before.112
By the end of Swart’s term, reports of ‘unpleasantness’ with uleebalang 
had diminished, and virtually all uleebalang were incorporated within 
the Government’s contract-based framework.113 The employment of the 
uleebalang attests to the consolidation of an aloof contract-rule as inher-
ited from centuries of colonialism elsewhere in the archipelago. It also 
illustrates the pragmatic nihilism permeating Dutch colonial governance. 
By appointing the uleebalang as indirect rulers, the government employed 
chiefs it constantly accused of “enforcement of corvée for private purposes”, 
“unlawful gathering of income” and “illegal occupation of lands.”114 By 
doing so, the government ineluctably incorporated a tax instrumentation 
which, measured by its own standards, was as unjust and arbitrary as it had 
been under the Sultan, even when rephrased in the hollow slogans of the 
colonial regime. In fact, by investing the office of uleebalang with consider-
able administrative-executive power and supporting them militarily, the 
109 UBL Collectie Damsté D H 1084-[29], herein: ‘instructie voor de onderafdelingschefs in 
de Onderhoorigheden van Atjeh’, esp. article 9: “As long as they do not surrender, there 
is only one code of conduct: to try overpower them.”
110 See: C. Fasseur, ‘Damsté, Henri Titus (1874-1955)’, in Biografi sch Woordenboek van Neder-
land (http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/bwn1880-2000/lemmata/bwn4/bwn4/bwn3/
damste consulted on 12-11-2019); UBL, Collectie Damsté D H 1084-[29], herein: ‘Nota’, 
232.
111 Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra, 281.
112 Reid, The Blood of the People, 13; Siegel, The Rope of God, 30-31; Aspinall, Islam and Nation, 
22-23. Bongenaar, Zelfbesturend Landschap, 83.
113 NA MinKol PVBBg 1 (Atjeh 1907), herein: Dossier Mailr. nr. 1041-1387: ‘Afschrift: Half-
jaarlijks verslag omtrent de werking der scheepvaart regeling over het eerste semester 
van 1907.’
114 Piekaar, Atjè h en de Oorlog met Japan, 8.
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Dutch incited a hybridization of the mercantile-administrative interests of 
uleebalang. The uleebalang remained highly active as economic agents and 
used their extended administrative authority to promote their economic 
ambitions to buy land, control the market and monopolize resources. 
This brought them into further competition with their own people, only 
adding to popular discontent and resistance.115 The Dutch had created the 
‘feudalist’ type of draconian potentate that, theoretically, they claimed to 
eliminate.116 How could governance and taxation in Aceh ever be modern-
ized according to the ambitions of colonial developmentalism if, in its 
execution, it kept depending on the apparatus of local power-hierarchies 
that the colonial government claimed to think of as despotic?
6.4 Domination and development
The integration of the uleebalang into the colonial state did not mean they 
were fully trusted. It is significant that the settlement of Korte Verklaringen 
and the appointment of new civil servants in neatly demarcated territories 
during the following decades never led to the abolition of military rule. 
Simultaneously, concern about the costs of war, both in human lives and 
in money, sparked new questions of colonial self-legitimacy. As one author 
argued, the Dutch spent “800 million guilders, wrestled from the Javanese 
(a reference to the batig slot or colonial profits) which was devoured […] 
in an outrageous injustice […] during the Aceh-war.”117 The economy and 
the administrative system were in a deplorable state, in steep contrast to 
colonial promises of developmental colonialism and administrative justice. 
Hence, colonial officials became obsessed with development, focussing in 
particular on the construction of a reliable infrastructure, to both support 
the ongoing war and furnish the growth of the local economy.118 Exemplary 
are the expansion of the Aceh-tramline in 1874-1917 (see figure 6.2), cele-
brated as one of the greatest successes in the development of North Sumatra 
under colonial rule and victory over Acehnese resistance, expressed in 
the sabotage of the railway and the construction of the Gayo road from 
115 Reid, The Blood of the People, 16-17.
116 Reid, “Colonial Transformation”, 102.
117 Anonymous, De Atjeh Paragraaf in de Troonrede, 630.
118 See for instance reports of controleur H.T. Damsté of Sigli (in offi ce 1902-1903) in: UBL 
Collectie Damsté D H 1084-[4], herein: ‘Extract dagboek controleur Sigli, pp. 27-29 (23-8-
1899 – 24-8-1899): ‘Habib Hassim dari Negeri Naloe Djoean’ to ‘Tuan Controleur’, 25-7-
1898 and ‘Cut Muhammad Adam’ to ‘Tuan Controleur’, 29-7-1898. Snouck Hurgronje, 
in his major work on Gayo, also elaborates on the problem of access to main roads in 
Aceh and Gayo. See C. Snouck Hurgronje, Het Gajöland en zijne Bewoners (2 vols., Batavia: 
Landsdrukkerij, 1903), I: 12-54.
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Bireuën into the mountains, around Takengon.119 Maritime trade was 
rebooted following a new naval regulation declared in 1892, and furnished 
by the establishment of a coal depository and harbour in Sabang on Pulau 
Weh, which in 1899 became an important hub of the KPM in countering 
Singapore-based commerce.120
Vital to economic development and the funding of these costly 
projects121 was the discovery of a rich oil field near Perlak (or Peureulak), 
in South-eastern Aceh. This find occurred in 1896 in the midst of the 
accelerating global importance of fossil fuels. The same year, The Royal 
Petrol-Exploitation Company of the Netherlands East Indies reached an 
exploitation agreement with Van Heutsz, who strongly advocated the 
contribution of European industry to Aceh’s economic development, 
and the Raja of Perlak, in return for concessions and royalties.122 Produc-
tion reached almost 250 million litres by 1903, the highest in the Indies.123 
Shares in oil dividends became of great fiscal importance to the colonial 
government in the form of concessions, and to the uleebalang in the form of 
royalties and import and export rights. The oil dollars facilitated an upward 
economic spiral of improved public finance, infrastructural development, 
growing commerce and political stability.124
The question remains, as always in the case of colonial economic 
growth: who benefited? The majority of the Acehnese indigenous popula-
tion drew little benefit of the oil wells in Perlak, Aceh tramline, Gayo road 
or harbour in Sabang; on the contrary. All served Dutch military expansion 
119 Damsté , “Atjèh-Historie”, 613. Some even expected that the construction of the Gayo 
road, developed initially as a “military access road […] to demonstrate that the Dutch 
planned to permanently settle in the Gayo lands”, would help transforming Takengon 
into some sort of spa, as “the tour itself to Takengon, was already delightful.” See: C.L., 
“De Gajoweg”, TBB 48 (1915), 299-302: 300.
120 Kreemer, Atjè h, I, 9-12; à Campo, Engines of Empire, 18; Reid, “Chains of Steel”, 290. Tase-
laar, De Nederlandse Koloniale Lobby, 24.
121 The Gayo road alone cost 1.5 million between 1908-1913, even though it was largely 
constructed using corvée labourers and cheap coolies. In 1915, another 100,000 guilders 
was required to make it suitable for cars. See: Anonymous, “De Gajoweg”, Java Bode 12-4-
1915, 2; C.L., “De Gajoweg”, 299.
122 J. Jonker and J.L. Van Zanden (ed.) Geschiedenis van Koninklijke Shell Vol. I: Van Nieuw-
komer tot Marktleider, 1890-1939 (Amsterdam: Boom, 2007), 52-53. This was of essential 
importance for the Company, as the promising oil wells of Bukit Mas in Langkat near 
Telaka Said unexpectedly dried up, causing shares to plunge. New geological methods 
of searching for new sources were applied in Perlak. After the welcome discovery of 
oil in Perlak, geological teams were dispatched all over the archipelago to apply these 
new methods, to fi nd new sources and secure supply of petroleum for the export market 
(within the Indies, or on Sumatra, there was limited market for petroleum, the sole 
product the Royal produced until the start of the twentieth century). Ibid., 24, 37, 46-48; 
Lindblad, “Economic Aspects”, 11-13; P.A.C. De Ruiter, Het Mijnwezen in Nederlands-Oost-
Indië, 1850-1950 (PhD thesis, Utrecht University, 2016), 119-122.
123 J.P. Poley, Eroï ca: The Quest for Oil in Indonesia (1850-1898) (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2000), 151.
124 M. Gade Ismail, “Aceh’s Dual Economy during the Late Colonial Period”, in Lindblad 
(ed.), Historical Foundations of a National Economy, 229-248: 232.
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Figure 6.2. Railway station ‘Kraton at Kota Raja’ of the Aceh Tramline, 1870-1900.
Source: Rijksmuseum, Obj. nr. RP-F-F18004.
rather than popular economic development and in fact, the Aceh tram was 
generally too expensive for the majority of the Acehnese population.125 To 
them the growth of the provincial economy must have had rather different 
connotations, related to an increase in labour services (used for the construc-
tion of the Gayo road and the tramline) and further exploitation of their 
resources as warned by the Hikayat Perang Sabil.126 The Acehnese people 
noticed little improvement in the development of the local infrastructure, 
125 As a Dutch prestige project serving transport of military troop and goods, the tramline 
was prone to frequent sabotage. See A. Stolwijk, Atjeh: Het Verhaal van de Bloedigste Strijd 
uit de Nederlandse Koloniale Geschiedenis (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2016), 242-252.
126 Ibid., 246-247. Profi ts largely accrued to the foreign-capital holders who invested in these 
industries. It is general presumed that the shift of ownership of companies from Indonesia 
to The Netherlands, as well as the phenomenon of the ‘colonial lobby’ in which the inter-
ests of capital-holders and government overlapped, prevented structural reinvestments of 
locally earned profi ts. See: P. van der Eng, Economic Benefi ts from Colonial Assets: The Case 
of the Netherlands and Indonesia 1870-1958 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 
University of Groningen, 1998); P. van der Eng, The ‘Colonial Drain’ from Indonesia, 1823-1990 
(Economics Division Working Papers: Southeast Asia, Canberra: Research School of Pacifi c 
Studies, Australian National University, 1993); A. Booth, “Exports and Growth in the Colo-
nial Economy”, in Maddison and Prince (eds.), Economic Growth in Indonesia, 67-96: 79.
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which they did actually use. Dutch officials held the uleebalang account-
able for this; particularly uleebalang in the dependencies, they complained, 
structurally underinvested in local infrastructure and only maintained 
the roads that were of direct interest to their trading networks.127 Hence, 
Van Heutsz attempted to enlarge economic control over the uleebalang and 
intensify their engagement in local development, for instance by requesting 
that the Dutch national government impose higher taxes on mining profits 
and channel shares of the oil-profits back into society.128 In 1909 he granted 
far-reaching rights allowing European mining companies to access North 
Aceh, hoping to enhance production and correlated tax revenues.129 Oil 
concessions from mining corporations were distributed onward at a rate of 
40/60 between the government and the uleebalang.130 In many oil-producing 
regions, mining concessions soon took over the importance of pepper 
cultivation – traditionally a sign of wealth and power – especially when, 
in the twentieth century, pepper cultivation declined due to depopulation 
and economic collapse caused by the war, crop disease and market fluctua-
tions.131 However, in those regions where no oil was found, little changed. 
Moreover, pepper quality was assessed differently at different export 
harbours. Therefore the pepper price, and its concomitant export and tax 
revenue, rendered an unfair disadvantage to some uleebalang, inciting price 
competition that eroded profits.132 To reduce the impact of market fluc-
tuations on wasé revenue, in 1902 its rates were fixed.133 Setbacks in pepper 
wasé were counterbalanced by levying wasé over copra, but in 1904 the 
Director of Finances ‘discovered’ that this was illegitimate (the government 
had no right to levy such local export duties – only to demand revenue 
127 NA MinKol 1850-1900 5251, Vb. 1-3-1898 n16, herein: RvI 26-5-1891.
128 Reid, The Blood of the People, 28-30; ’t Veer, De Atjeh-Oorlog, 220-222.
129 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 693, Vb. 8-12-1909 n34, herein: Gov. Sec. to ‘Dir. Gouverne-
mentsbedrijven’, 16-9-1909, Gov. Aceh to ‘Chef Mijnwezen’, 12-6-1909, Dir. Gouverne-
mentsbedrijven’ to GG, 20-8-1909.
130 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 383, Vb. 31-5-1906 n49, herein: Mailr. n362, Besl. 12-3-1906, 
Dir. Onderwijs, Eeredienst en Nijverheden to GG, 24-2-1906. Gade Ismail, “The Economic 
Position”, 85.
131 Heyl, De Pepercultuur, 36.
132 Ibid., 38; Kreemer, Atjè h, I, 129-130. Heyl exemplifi es Lhokseumawe, where pepper was 
taxed 4 guilders lower than in Langsa (to the South), even though the quality of pepper 
exported in Lhokseumawe (from the Northcoast of Aceh) was better than that in Langsa 
(from the East coast). So the uleebalang in Lhokseumawe cashed less tax revenue over 
better quality pepper than in Langsa.
133 Varying between 1.30 to two guilders in the Dependencies and set at four percent of the 
yield in Great Aceh (1% was subtracted as wasé jalan). Wasé revenue rose from 83,000 
guilders in 1898 to 193,100 in 1904, but dropped back to 132,200 guilders in 1905. ANRI 
DepFin 598, herein: DirFin, 18-5-1893, DepFin, 9-2-1905, Gov. Acehto DirFin, 11-3-1904, 
DepFin 10-4-1905; Kreemer, Atjè h, II, 137: ‘Gouvernementsbesluit 1902 n97/k.’
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from the uleebalang levying them), and ‘wasé copra’ was abolished.134 By 
1925-1938, export values of pinang (betel or areca palm), copra and rubber 
all overshadowed that of pepper.135 As a result, the distribution of economic 
resources in Aceh became even more unfair, due to the impact of Dutch 
colonization. Like in Ambon and Java before, while the economic impor-
tance of Northern Sumatra and Aceh to the colonial treasury increased, the 
processes that purportedly fostered regional economic development only 
benefited those lucky enough to be in a position of power.136
The myth of the ‘crazy native’
This is why fiscal policy gained in importance. A lack of balance in the 
distribution of the tax burden was often seen as an indicator of adminis-
trative deficiency, a problem that needed to be fixed. Not only were taxes 
paid unequally within the provincial borders, as various parliamentarisms 
complained, Aceh was seriously undertaxed compared to other provinces, 
especially Java, leaving the majority of the burden of the costs of ‘control-
ling the Acehnese’, on the Javanese.137
The solution to this problem, as phrased by Governors J.A. Vetter (in 
office in 1896) and J.W. Stemfoort (in office 1896-1897), was to centralize 
Aceh’s “numerous, occasional tax arrangements” (by which he meant the 
various wasé) into a full-fledged tax system suitable to Acehnese society and 
behaviour, and gain a balance of budgets within the province.138 But Aceh 
134 ANRI DepFin 598 herein DepFin, 18-5-1893, Gov. Aceh to DirFin, 11-2-1893, DirFin, 
20-3-1895, DirFin, 9-2-1898, DirFin, 7-11-1903, DirFin, 9-2-1905, DirFin 10-4-1905, DirFin, 
21-2-1907, DirFin 4-12-1908 and Gov. Aceh to DirFin 6-4-1910.
135 J.R.C. Gonggrijp, Overzicht van de Economische Ontwikkeling van Atjeh Sedert de Pacifi catie 
(Tijdperk 1923-1938) (Den Haag: Van Stockum, 1944), 9-10. 20. The value of exported 
rubber even tripled that of pepper in 1938 (208,000 vs. 678,000 guilders), but rubber 
(totalling more than 4.5 million guilders) remained the economic champion of Aceh due 
to high export prices. Palm-oil also showed rapid growth in 1925-1938, from 673 tons in 
1929 to 14,415 tons in 1938.
136 H. Bakker, “Het Economisch Belang van Noord-Sumatra tijdens de Atjehoorlog, 1873-
1910”, in J.Th. Lindblad and A.H.P. Clemens (eds.), Het Belang van de Buitengewesten: 
Economische Expansie en Koloniale Staatvorming in de Buitengewesten van Nederlands-Indië 
(Amsterdam: NEHA, 1989), 41-65: 41, 45-47, 51, 55-59, 60-62.
137 Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1896-1897, 11e vergadering, 17-11-1896, herein: Pijnacker-
Hordijk, p. 138, Van Gennep, pp. 141-142, Kuyper, pp. 144-145; the same complaints 
were still expressed ten years onward, see Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1906-1907, 23e 
vergadering, 22-11-1906, herein: Van Deventer, pp. 428-429, 429-430, Van Kol, p. 430.
138 Apart from the above discussed indirect levies, Great Aceh only knew a vehicle tax 
and taxes on streetlights and pasars. Since none of these were arranged by a govern-
ment decree, they did not contribute to the national treasury. Until 1910, all taxes were 
collected in local treasuries. ANRI AS GB MGS 3964, herein: MGS 13-12-1897 n2813, Besl. 
13-12-1897 n1.
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was still seen as a region of violence and instability139, and its people as 
unsuitable for direct taxation. Contemporary scholars like Snouck stereo -
typed the Acehnese as “fanatic, anarchic and treacherous.”140 To his Leiden
colleague P.J. Veth (1814-1895), the struggle in Aceh “represented civiliza-
tion and humanity versus barbarity and cruelty.”141 And Van den Berg even 
proposed an “ethnic cleansing” of the province by Ambonese soldiers.142 
This dominant depiction of the Acehnese as beastly, cunning, crazy and 
degenerate revived, in the 1910s and ‘20s, after the seemingly ‘random’ 
murders of about 120 Europeans. These were ascribed to the heavy psycho-
logical impact of the war on the ‘Acehnese mind’ and the aspiration to 
become syahid (martyrs) in the holy war, allegedly caused by the degen-
eration of Aceh from “veranda to Mecca”, from an independent, exemplary 
Muslim state, to an indirectly ruled colony under foreign domination.143 The 
murders caused much fear and anxiety and spurred attempts to “theorize 
the native mind” through Orientalized forms of psychiatry.144 Such para-
digms of indigenous violence and instability were fundamental to Dutch 
imperialist conquests around the archipelago, as we will also see in the next 
chapter. They fuelled convictions that specific ‘recently colonized’ people 
were ‘unready’ for ‘modern governance and taxation’, which further legiti-
mized the colonial project of tutelage, that claimed to induce this transition.
Snouck invoked the classic ‘oriental despot’ theory and argued that the 
Sultan had forced “subjected natives” into such abusive forms of extortive 
“slave labour” that, upon having an ensured sustenance, the Acehnese 
were reluctant to continue labouring since whatever more they produced 
was confiscated by their chiefs anyway.145 He considered in particular the 
levying of hak tabé or hak sabil, a surtax on zakat collected by groups of ulama 
to fund the holy war, as a typically repressive form of indigenous extor-
tion, a “razzia” rather than taxation, deemed to induce passive economic 
139 Which it was but primarily because of the Dutch invasion. Yet few offi cials (contrary 
to the press) directly related the alleged ‘violent nature’ of the Acehnese people to the 
colonial invasion.
140 Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra, 286, 288-289. The word ‘treacherous’ of course also 
related to the ‘betrayal’ of Teuku Umar, a particularly sensitive and frustrating event to 
the Dutch colonial state.
141 P.J. Veth, Atchin en zijne Betrekkingen tot Nederland; Topographisch-Historische Beschrijving 
(Leiden: Kolff, 1873), 136, quoted in P.J. Veth, quoted in: P. van der Velde, A Lifelong 
Passion: P.J. Veth (1814-1895) and the Dutch East Indies (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2006), 192. 
Also quoted by Locher-Scholten, “lmperialism After the Great Wave”, 32.
142 L.W.C. van den Berg, “De Atjheres”, De Gids 58 (1894), 195-238, quoted in: Locher-
Scholten, “lmperialism after the Great Wave”, 35.
143 Kloos, Becoming Better Muslims, 2.
144 D. Kloos, “A Crazy State: Violence, Psychiatry, and Colonialism in Aceh, Indonesia, ca. 
1910-1942”, BKI 170:1 (2014), 25-65: 28-30 (quote p. 29-30). See also Kloos, “Violence, 
Religion, and Geographic Imaginations”, 15-17.
145 Anonymous, “De Toekomst van Groot-Atjeh”, TvNI 9:1 (1880), 241-255: 248; ANRI AS GB 
MGS 3964, herein: MGS 13-12-1897 n2813.
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behaviour among the Acehnese.146 Kreemer considered the Acehnese 
unfit to work as coolies due to their “dislike of regulated labour.”147 To 
current-day observers, it may not seem surprising that the Acehnese were 
unenthusiastic about working in a colonial system they despised and from 
which they drew little profit, but this was typically interpreted by a colonial 
author like Kreemer as the inherent nature of “Eastern people […]” to have 
“a smaller urge to material prosperity”, even though they were “not neces-
sarily lazy.”148
Such visions supported the precepts of typical colonial self-legitimi-
zation mentioned before, in this case upholding the idea that centuries of 
‘wicked despotism’, ‘economic mismanagement’ and ‘underdevelopment’ 
had resulted in a material insecurity among the Acehnese. This now 
prevented them from aspiring to greater productivity or wealth and 
instilled within them a great distrust towards governance and taxation, as 
those who governed them had never served their needs. As a result, the 
Dutch theorized, the Acehnese were locked in the same sort of ‘societal 
paralysis’ as other ‘inlanders’, but the exceptionally harsh nature of ‘sover-
eignty’ and the presence of ‘religious fanaticism’ in Aceh added another 
dimension of violence and social instability to the province which made 
introducing taxes even harder.
As testified by the Hikayat Perang Sabil, it was of course the Dutch 
government that the Acehnese distrusted most. Caricaturizing the ‘native 
mind’ as violent and unstable and the relations between the Sultan, ulee-
balang and the Acehnese population as extraordinarily extortive provided 
the strawman the state required to justify its presence and remain comfort-
ably blind to the turmoil it caused. The havoc the war had wreaked cannot 
of course be ignored when discussing economic collapse, but to admit that 
would endanger the core principles of colonial self-legitimization, requiring 
a transformation of the epistemology upon which the entire state was based. 
Rather, as in all other provinces, the Dutch cultivated their familiar stereo-
146 C. Snouck Hurgronje, “Een Onbezonnen Vraag”, Java-Bode, 22/23-11-1899 1899, n272; 
Snouck Hurgronje, De Atjehers, I: 186; Kessler, “Dr. Snouck Hurgronje en de Macht der 
Atjehsche Oelama’s”, 250. According to H.T. Damsté, the prominent ulama Teungku Cik 
di Tiro “made the war into a holy one” (Tiro was the one who popularized the Hikayat 
Perang Sabil) and was particularly successful in organizing gangs that levied the uang 
sabil, See: Damsté , “Atjèh-Historie”, 449. See also Anonymous, “De Toekomst van Groot-
Atjeh”, 240-250; Reid, “Colonial Transformation”, 99.
 Reports of misuse, obfuscation or corruption of zakat funds and overlap between zakat 
and colonial tax collection are found throughout colonial Indonesia, and occasionally 
local offi cials urged to regulate zakat collection and other forms of Islamic voluntary 
contributions and philanthropy to more detail under colonial tax law. However, the 
government maintained a policy of secularism that prohibited such interference. See 
Fauzia, Faith and the State, 112-122, 137; A. Salim, Challenging the Secular State: The Islamiza-
tion of Law in Modern Indonesia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008), 120-123.
147 Kreemer, Atjè h, I, 240. Experiments with state-organized rubber plantations had failed 
according to Kreemer because the Acehnese labourers showed up too irregularly.
148 Ibid., I: 188 (quote), see also 241, 522-601.
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types of indigenous ‘instability’, ‘laziness’ and ‘social paralysis’, to provide 
reasons why the colonial government was requisite for the development of 
Aceh. Coerced labour and taxation were envisioned as the primary tools to 
train and change the Acehnese mind, and transform the region from one of 
continuous violence into one of peace and obedient tax-payment.
The introduction of corvée and direct taxes
From the 1890s onward, the government started looking for methods to 
make the Acehnese contribute to the local colonial development project. 
The government was aware of its feeble position, and Snouck warned that 
successfully levying head taxes would be undermined by local political 
disorganization, potential discontent and the aversion of the Acehnese to 
any direct charge in their incomes.149 Governor J.W. Stemfoort (in office 
1896-1897), acknowledged these concerns: “Since we [the Dutch] have little 
foothold in the dependencies” it was essential to use “a prudent policy” to 
prevent “bad-tempered people from exploiting the cherished argument that 
the company is so fiscal.”150
According to Dutch colonial theories of fiscal development, the 
appropriate step prior to levying head taxes was corvée labour. However, 
corvée was an alien concept in Aceh. Before colonization, some uleebalang 
levied services for the construction of mosque’s and the housing of prin-
ciples and chiefs, or used forced labour as a form of punishment, but an 
institutionalized form of labour service to lords, in lieu of taxation, did not 
exist anywhere in Aceh, a fact of which the government was well-aware.151 
Snouck was exceptionally critical of the use of corvée labour. He consid-
ered it “an evil, in some areas […] perhaps necessary […], but still, its 
use to be limited, diminished and abolished as soon as possible.”152 Yet, a 
corvée regulation for Great Aceh was issued in 1898, primarily to supply 
the huge demand for cheap labour, necessary to build infrastructural 
projects required for the war.153 Completion of these projects was claimed 
to automatically reduce the use of corvée services.154 Obviously, this was 
not the case, and by 1906 the expansion of corvée to the Dependencies 
149 C. Snouck Hurgronje, E. Gobé e and C. Adriaanse (eds.), Ambtelijke Adviezen van C. Snouck 
Hurgronje 1889-1936 (‘s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1957), I, III-5: ‘Adviezen over de te volgen 
Atjeh politiek na 1903’, pp. 1384-1391 (advies 1941).
150 ANRI AS GB MGS 3964, herein: Besl. 13-12-1897 n1, MGS 13-12-1897 n2813. See for the 
same: NA MinKol 1850-1900 OV 5251, Vb. 1-3-1898 n16, herein: DirFin to Gov. Aceh, 
13-12-1897.
151 ANRI AS GB MGS 3964, herein: MGS 13-12-1897 n2814: RvI 2-7-187. In some districts, 
uleebalang also levied head taxes, but these were not considered to relate to labour. See 
UBL Collectie Rouffaer, D H 875-[1], herein: Ass. Res. Meulaboh 1, p. 1.
152 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 627, Vb. 22-3-1909 n15, herein: Advies Snouck Hurgronje, 
8-1-1909, p. 4.
153 Kreemer, Atjè h, II, 151.
154 ANRI DepFin 357, herein: Nota DepFin 19-3-1912: DepFin 28-8-1909: Gov. Sec. to Gov. 
Aceh, 3-7-1909.
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was under consideration. To Snouck, the introduction of corvée in Aceh 
“deliberately ignored adat.”155 He dismissed levying of corvée anywhere 
in Aceh as entirely illegal, born out of the ““temporary and local interest” 
of “overambitious civil servants and incapable authorities […], competing 
with each other in their zeal to construct roads”, making “large masses 
perform labour with minimal result” as “roads […] disappeared as fast as 
they were built.”156 Whatever money had been saved by using corvée, he 
assured, “was spent doubly on fighting resistance against it.”157 Snouck 
found support in parliament, where Van Deventer explained how in Great 
Aceh, the use of corvée would only arouse further popular suspicion, resis-
tance and disdain.158 And he was right; corvée was much resented by the 
Acehnese, as also testified in the Hikayat Perang Sabi, l quoted above. The 
Hague’s reply was vindicative and predictable. It denied that civil servants 
in Aceh were overzealous, and, quoting a civil servant in New Guinee, the 
ministerial bureaucrats repeated that:
“years of service experience show that throughout the archipelago’s many dis-
tricts […], a fair regulation of taxation and mild corvée and desa services pro-
duce an unmistakable educational force, in the direct interest of the natives. […] 
Labour services […] compared to a necessary, constructive reformatory.”159
This way, corvée was presented as a suitable first step to give the Acehnese 
a taste of the ‘beneficial experience’ of colonial taxation. Corvée became 
an instrument to ‘tame the Acehnese’, inculcate a belief in the benefits of 
colonial domination and align them for a role in the greater state-society, 
away from a “self-destructive and self-sacrificial pre-occupation with lost 
freedom, and towards positive movements of economic and political reform 
and modernity.”160 In reality, corvée was, of course, little more than a form 
of cheap labour, used for infrastructural development to support the Euro-
pean export-economy, without which the Dutch believed they could not 
survive, especially in the frontier regions of their empire. By twisting the 
words of Snouck Hurgronje, who in the misquote of ministry officials had 
advised “keeping use of corvée as mild as possible”161, the green light gave 
the ‘go-ahead’. In 1908 corvée labour was implemented all over Aceh and 
more specific regulations were issued for all districts during the following 
155 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 627, Vb. 22-3-1909 n15, herein: Vb. and ‘Advies Snouck 
Hurgronje’, 8-1-1909, p. 6; Kreemer, Atjè h, II, 150-151. The corvée regulations in Aceh, as 
elsewhere in the archipelago, highly resemble the ordonnances issued in Java in the 1890s 
following the investigation of Fokkens (see Chapter 4).
156 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 627, Vb. 22-3-1909 n15, herein: Advies Snouck Hurgronje, 
8-1-1909, pp. 3-4, 6-8.
157 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 627, Vb. 22-3-1909 n15, herein: Advies Snouck Hurgronje, 
8-1-1909, p. 8.
158 Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1908-1909, 17e vergadering, 5-11-1908, Van Deventer, p. 270.
159 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 627, Vb. 22-3-1909 n15, herein: Aantekeningen A3.
160 Reid, The Blood of the People, 16.
161 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 646, Vb. 7-6-1909 n10, herein: Vb.
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years. In theory use of corvée was only allowed for the construction of 
‘government’ roads with the explicit approval of the Governor of Aceh, 
at a maximum of 24 days of labour per year (which was higher than in 
surrounding provinces), as local roads were supposedly maintained using 
wasé jalan.162 In Greater Aceh, epicentre of local industry and hence home to 
many more roads and infrastructural projects, the maximum amount todays 
was even higher, at 52 days per year.163
Simultaneously, officials worried that only subjecting the Acehnese 
to corvée would keep them from developing in harmony with the rest of 
the archipelago. The government ultimately aspired the fiscal integration 
of all people across the archipelago, in a unified, monetized fiscal regime. 
Continuing to tax the Acehnese through labour was the sort of exception 
that in bureaucratic terminology was undesirable, as it signalled inequality. 
Hence, Aceh was subjected to a rapid fiscal evolution, at least on paper, 
during which many of the established stereotypes and the fear of hostility 
needed to be overcome. Cavalier as the government had been in intro-
ducing corvée labour, introducing income taxes was considered to entail 
more risk. Corvée labour had been conceptualized as an extension of labour 
punishments by the uleebalang and thereby considered to be popularly 
accepted and easily delegated. Income taxes on the other hand, required 
more thorough legitimization and more direct forms of governance than 
were present at the time in Aceh, compromising the distance the state had 
tried to maintain by using the uleebalang.
As a matter of fact, the Acehnese in the self-governing Dependencies 
were not considered to be liable for full taxes by the colonial government 
because they were subjects of local uleebalang, whom, as self-governors, 
collected taxes from their people and supposedly ensured the govern-
ment gained its ‘rightful share.’ Only European, ‘Foreign Orientals’ and 
‘non-indigenous inlanders’ paid taxes directly to the central government’s 
treasury.164 All other taxes in Aceh were self-organized by self-governors.165 
The government simply hived-off profits from the uleebalang, as stipulated 
by its contracts, and occasionally interfered in the enforcement of collection, 
162 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 627, Vb. 22-3-1909 n15, herein: Vb.; NA OV 782, Vb. 22-11-1910 
n4, herein: Vb., GG to MinKol, pp. 7-9-1910, RvI 4-7-1910; Kreemer, Atjè h, 152-153.
163 Ibid., 151.
164 Bongenaar, Zelfbesturend Landschap, 156, 167, 664. For Aceh, these included the Personal 
Tax and Patent Law followed by the Income Tax of 1905, and for ‘Foreign Orientals’ and 
‘non-indigenous inlanders’ the assorted income taxes, in which Aceh was included in 
1904. Stbl. 1904 n20 (Company Tax for West Sumatra, Aceh, Celebes, Benkulu, Lampung, 
Palembang, South and East Borneo and Ambon). See: NA MinKol 1850-1900 3082 Vb. 
25-3-1878 n78, herein: Afschrift HGB.
165 Including the assorted wasé, pasar levies, streetlight taxes and in some cases head taxes. 
The uleebalang supposedly kept record of tax payment by using tax registers (made 
mandatory in 1897) under supervision of Dutch offi cials, but often many of such tax 
registers once received in Kuta Raja were still empty. ANRI AS GB MGS 3964, herein: 
MGS 16-3-1899, n611: Gov. Aceh to GG, 24-9-1898, MGS 13-12-1897 n2814: RvI 2-7-1897; 
Gov. Aceh to GG, 26-2-1895.
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using its military power. The priority, as emphasized by Director of Finance 
Bakhuizen van den Brink, was not “to create theoretically sound taxes, but 
to substantiate the existing situation as much as possible […].”166 Deliber-
ately keeping these taxes ‘unlegalized’ enabled the government and the ulee-
balang to levy them at their own discretion, using military violence, extortion 
and all other means considered necessary in Aceh. Remaining aloof by 
maintaining ‘self-governance’ and ‘not regulating’ was a clear-cut state 
strategy to avoid the problem of having to abide to its own principles of fair, 
modern governance, and instead to keep relying on the uleebalang, whom 
they could then blame for any problems the tax system brought about.
Only, in the twentieth century this would no longer do, or at least not 
in theory. ‘Ethical’ colonialism demanded a responsible type of taxation in 
which there was no place for uncontrolled ‘indigenous extortion.’ Addition-
ally, diversification in fiscal identities had also provided frequently used 
opportunity for tax navigation. In 1901, a European taxpayer in West Aceh 
even declared himself subject of the uleebalang of Idi, based on which he 
refused to pay Patent Law.167 This fuelled the intensifying call for fiscal 
unification, which was only possible through ‘legalization’ and direct 
administration of all of the various assorted taxes being levied in Aceh by 
issuing ordinances.168
In 1901, the government prudently ‘legalized’ a number of personal and 
indirect taxes on streetlights, markets and consumption, to lead the way to 
head taxes.169 A head tax ordinance was drafted in 1906. As in West Sumatra, 
it was coined bea pencarian (‘income tax’), rather than bea kepala (‘head 
tax’) in order not to offend the Islamic population, who used the former 
term for religious taxes paid by non-Muslims, predominantly Chinese.170 
According to Snouck, all taxes not acknowledged in Islamic law would be 
considered an extortive and illegal levy, no matter what it was called.171 
166 ANRI AS GB MGS 3964, herein: MGS 16-3-1899, n611: DirFin to GG 11-2-1899.
167 NA MinKol OV 183, Vb. 17-6-1903 n31, herein: Gov. Aceh to GG, 16-12-1902.
168 This was proposed by Van Heutsz as Governor of Aceh in 1903 but deemed improb-
able by Governor General Rooseboom (in offi ce 1899-1904) because of the fragility of the 
government on the ground to effectively enforce these ordinances through non-military 
means. NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 183, Vb. 17-6-1903 n31, herein: Vb., Gov. Aceh to GG, 
16-12-1902, DirFin to GG, 28-3-1903.
169 In the Chinese quarters in Oleh Leh, streetlights were funded publicly, contrary to almost 
everywhere else in the Indies where streetlights managed by private companies and 
funded by local governments from local tax revenues. Payment of streetlight tax guaran-
teed exemption from performing corvée services. NA MinKol 1850-1900 5251, Vb. 1-3-1898 
n16, herein: InspFin Roëll lto DirFin, 8-11-1896: ‘Rapport’: ‘a. Groot Atjeh’; ANRI AS GB 
MGS 3964, herein: MGS 16-3-1899, n611: RvI 3-3-1899: Nota RvI (W.J.M. Michielsen); For 
market taxes, see: ANRI AS Besl. 1364, herein: Besl. 8-1-1901 n31: MinKol to GG, 11-4-1900; 
Besl. 4-8-1906: ‘Invoering Persoonlijke Belasting in Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden, nota.’
170 ANRI AS GB MGS 4515, herein: ‘Nota van toelichting “bea pencarian”, directe belasting 
in Atjeh.’
171 Snouck Hurgronje, Gobé e and Adriaanse (eds.), Ambtelijke Adviezen, I, III-5 ‘Adviezen 
over de te volgen Atjeh politiek na 1903’, p. 1390 (advies 1941).
Promise Pretence and Pragmatism.indb   291 22-04-21   17:35
292 Chapter 6
A warning to which the opposition in the Dutch parliament paid heed. 
Led by Van Deventer and socialist parliamentarian H. van Kol, the Parlia-
ment rejected the proposal for head taxes in Aceh. Their opposition to the 
head tax was based on the risk they thought it posed to the preservation of 
peace, and for the unfairness of reclaiming the costs of the Aceh war on the 
Acehnese themselves.172 The Christian-dogmatic government of A. Kuyper 
and Minister of Colonies Idenburg supported the military establishment in 
Aceh headed by Van Daalen, who insisted that prevailing unrest was not 
the result of the upcoming introduction of head taxes, but of local political 
incitement by ex-Sultan Alauddin Mohammed Daud. A few years earlier, a 
group of army officials had proposed the restoration of the Sultanate as a 
sign of goodwill, and Van Heutsz had conceded to their lobbying, offering 
the Sultan a position and salary, contrary to Snouck’s advise.173 According 
to Van Daalen, the Sultan had started using his position to ‘sabotage’ Dutch 
authority by rallying support among uleebalang for the continuation of the 
war.174 The Sultan was exiled to Java, but resistance continued. Incipient 
rumours of the introduction of a head tax were “eagerly nourished”, as 
argued by a local army officer in Kuta Raja, “by the hostile-minded” to 
make people believe “the tax would be the starting point of all suffering […] 
and that in few years the ‘keumpeni’ would come back to confiscate all.”175 
The members of the Raad van Indië were sceptical about potential suffering 
and commented that there were “plenty examples in the archipelago of 
tribes that in a couple of days earn enough money for the whole year […] 
of which they spend the rest in idleness, or worse, by organizing raids and 
headhunting [...] all the more reason to tax them to a higher extent.”176
Interestingly, while this alleged behaviour was used, decades before, to 
argue why people were ‘unready for taxation’, here it is suddenly used in 
favour; monetary taxes, instead of an obstruction or a level not yet reached 
by the Acehnese, were now interpreted as a tool serving the “pedagogic” 
aim of habituating the Acehnese to regular contribution to a unified state.177 
Swart described taxes as “a barometer of political circumstances”, the intro-
172 Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1904-1905, 15e vergadering, 23-11-1904, herein: Van Kol, 
p. 205; Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1905-1906, 15e vergadering, 30-11-1905, herein: 
Begro ting van Nederlandsch Indië voor het dienstjaar 1906, Van Deventer, p. 287. ANRI 
AS GB MGS 4515, herein: Besl. 9-6-1906 n23; Besl. 13-8-1906, RvI 23-6-1906.
173 ’t Veer, De Atjeh-Oorlog, 246. Kessler, “Onze Tegenwoordige Atjeh-Politiek”, 108.
174 ANRI AS GB MGS 4515, herein: MGS 14-9-1907, MinKol to GG, 16-8-1907, Besl. 13-8-1906: 
‘Geheim geschrift 1334 a107, ‘Afschrift brief van Van Daalen aan GG’, s.d., geheim.’ See 
also: ’t Veer, De Atjeh-Oorlog, 281; T.I. Alfi an, “Acheh Sultanate under Sultan Mohammad 
Daudsyah and the Dutch War”, in S. Kardodirdjo (eds.), Profi les of Malay Culture. Histo-
riography, Religion and Politics (Jakarta: Ministry of Education and Culture, Directorate 
General of Culture, 1976), 147-166: 160-163.
175 ANRI AS GB MGS 4515, herein: ‘Geheim geschr. 1334 a107’, Hoofd Offi cier Schroder, 
8-7-1907.
176 ANRI AS GB MGS 4515, herein: Besl. 13-8-1906, RvI 23-6-1906.
177 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 646, Vb. 7-6-1909 n53, herein: Advies A3: Gov. Aceh to GG, 
2-3-1909.
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duction of which would, in fact, help in assessing and repairing hostile atti-
tudes towards the Dutch.178 This was not because the colonial government 
thought the Acehnese had suddenly become more ‘developed’ through 
performing coerced labour, but simply because of the political reality in 
both The Hague and Batavia, where opinion had changed dramatically 
and an unbalanced tax policy was now out of favour. All provinces on 
Sumatra had been subjected to some sort of head, income or company tax. 
The relentlessly high ambitions of politicians in The Hague demanded that 
Aceh reach a similar status. Hence Aceh, with the exception of Gayo and 
Alas, was included in the proportional company tax for the ‘Outer Islands’ 
of 1907 (see Chapter 3), that taxed all incomes at 2%, starting at incomes of 
50 guilders.179 Uleebalang were expected to organize its levying and received 
the standard 8% collectors wage.180
Van Heutsz knew that such a complicated tax instrument was “easily 
introduced on paper” but difficult to levy in practice.181 Indeed, from its 
very inception the collection of company taxes in Aceh met many problems 
and heavy delays. Colijn, chief of the central tax commission in Aceh at the 
time, reported that a majority of the Acehnese population earned below the 
tax payment threshold of 50 guilders, and that the indigenous administra-
tion was incapable of meeting its deadlines because of prevailing ‘unrest.’ 
Its revenue was structurally insufficient to meet the costs of the abolition of 
local levies deposited in local treasuries.182 Chiefs showed a “complete lack 
of interest and cooperation”, Colijn reported, and the people believed taxes 
were levied “only to the personal benefit of government officials.”183 For the 
tax-gatherings, he wrote, an Acehnese taxpayer saved,
“his most pitiful look, rummaging in his belt for his last pennies and eventu-
ally popping out an egg, or something like that, while in the meantime he keeps 
aside some banknotes for his amusements…”184
178 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 646, Vb. 7-6-1909 n53, herein: Vb., Advies A3: Gov Aceh to 
GG, 2-3-1909. Similar vocabulary is used by P.J. Havik, who describes how in Portuguese 
Guinea “fi scal policies and practices” constituted “a barometer for gauging the nature of 
a particular ‘administrative and fi scal culture’ in a colonial setting, and the relevance of 
local conditions for shaping relations between rulers and ruled [...].” See Havik, “Taxing 
the Natives”, 175.
179 Stbl. 1907 n183 and 184.
180 Kreemer, Atjè h, II, 134-135.
181 Van Heutsz himself advocated a simple head tax, which he thought would outbalance 
achievability and fairness. ANRI DepFin 347, herein: ‘Extract besluit’, 9-3-1906.
182 ANRI DepFin 357, herein: DirFin 26-4-1912: Extract DepBB (nota) 30-3-1912, pp. 1-2.
183 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 646, Vb. 7-6-1909 n53, herein: Advies A3, ‘bijlage’: ‘Rapport 
(nota) voor de Civiel en Militair Gouverneur van Atjeh en Onderhoordigheden. Belasting 
van de inheemse bevolking en de aanwending harer opbrengst in het directe volks-
belang, door H. Colijn, hoofdambtenaar commissie’, 31-8-1908, pp. 1-10.
184 ANRI DepFin 357, herein: DirFin 26-4-1912: Extract DepBB (nota) 30-3-1912, pp. 3-4.
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Tax assessments could be paid in two terms, the final annual assessment 
to be due before the first of May.185 Colijn encouraged to have the final 
assessments ready before the second quarter of the year, but at that time 
administrators in many districts were still busy dispersing tax bills and 
filling out assessment lists. The tax forms at the beginning of this chapter, 
for instance, were awarded only in October and September, five months 
late. It might be that late payment and deferral became one among various 
and new every-day strategies of resistance. So, tax-registration, listing and 
form writing became the new paper categories through which the state was 
expressed and through which it was opposed. In this case, the exhausted 
Acehnese no longer gave in to the calls for a holy war, but instead turned 
the state-machinery against itself. This is hard to verify, but considering 
the experiences of the Dutch elsewhere in the archipelago, it is not difficult 
to imagine that in Aceh, paper-based rule was redrafted, negotiated and 
turned around as well. It forced the government to extend its assessment-
deadlines, immediately hampering the subsequent deadlines for tax 
collection and the tax assessments of the next year which, Colijn warned, 
threatened to cause a chain of endlessly postponed tax assessments. As a 
result, one tax year fused into the next, making the system vulnerable to 
sabotage.186 Colijn made a bold proposal: to give up the assessments of 1907 
and focus on a fresh start in 1908 to assure the next tax year would not be 
hampered by the former, to establish the correct “assessment rhythm.”187 His 
superiors agreed and the tax year of 1907 was written off.188
Hiding behind the despot
This way, around 1908, virtually all of Aceh was subjected to corvée services 
and income taxes. In the minds of state-builders in The Hague and Batavia, 
Aceh was subjected to a radical fiscal transformation much faster than we 
have seen in Ambon, Java or West Sumatra. By the time of the introduction 
of income taxes, the Dutch had been in Aceh for only 30 years, and effec-
tively, many parts were never really controlled. The province was barely 
under control, far from understood. It was poorly administered, the subject 
of great dispute and overshadowed by violent upheavals, military domi-
nation and bloodshed. How did they expect to successfully complete this 
transformation under such circumstances? The answer, I think, is that they 
did not. During the years after 1908, taxes were reportedly levied “without 
many difficulties”, through “collection left much to be desired”, attributed 
185 Stbl. 1907 n184: art. 8 (1).
186 MinKol 1901-1953 OV 646, Vb. 7-6-1909 n53, herein: Advies A3, ‘bijlage’: ‘Rapport […] 
door H. Colijn, 31-8-1908, 8-11.
187 MinKol 1901-1953 OV 646, Vb. 7-6-1909 n53, herein: Advies A3, ‘bijlage’: ‘Rapport […] 
door H. Colijn, 31-8-1908, 14-16.
188 Stbl. 1907 n380 and 533.
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to the alleged flawed collection procedures of the uleebalang.189 This was 
accepted as the reality of taxation in Aceh. The province was subjected 
to a centralized income tax system that, unworkable and awkward as it 
played out locally, seemed to satisfy the bureaucrats of Batavia and the 
parliamentarians in The Hague. The government considered its task done; 
it had ‘legalized’ Aceh’s tax system, issued the requisite ordinances and 
developed a regime that worked on paper, and, most importantly, fitted the 
overarching tax-framework of the rest of the archipelago. In theory, no one 
could claim anymore that the Javanese paid for the administration of the 
Acehnese. The annual Colonial Reports, the ordinances in the State Gazette, 
and the paper archives made sure of that. In reality, the state remained as 
aloof as ever, fully ceding the execution of its tax system to self-governors 
whom the colonial government ensured carried total responsibility and 
culpability in case anything went wrong.
Like other indirect rulers across Indonesia, the uleebalang were invested 
with much greater avail over their population than before. They started 
levying excessive amounts of services, much to the benefit of the develop-
ment of the state. This might explain why in 1919 the buy-off rate was fixed 
at a rate of three guilders per service, which was too high for the majority 
of the Acehnese.190 This way, the government kept forcing many Acehnese 
to perform coerced labour, while comfortably hiding behind the uleebalang 
and accusing them of ‘despotism’ and ‘corruption’, whenever too many 
services were levied. As elsewhere in the archipelago, an alleged perpetual 
“lack of coolies” was purported to obstruct the abolition of corvée labour.191 
An inventory of 1933 demonstrated that in many districts corvée was still 
levied at this maximum amount and performed by those unable to pay tax, 
which was a majority of the population. Their labour power was valuated 
monetarily and deducted from their tax assessment.192 In fact, during the 
economic crisis of the 1930s, many Acehnese lost their income as a result of 
an export crisis in the pepper, rubber, oil, and palm-oil industries.193 Locally 
189 KV 1913: C.3, 7; KV 1914, C.3, 9. The total tax assessment of the province of Aceh 
surpassed 200,000 guilders in 1908 of an indigenous population of about 5070,000 people, 
of which less than 400,000 were taxable, rendering the average assessment below 2 guil-
ders. See: KV 1909 C.3, 9; KV 1910, C.3, 9; Boomgaard and Gooszen, Changing Economy 
Vol. 11: Population Trends, 109. The average assessment climbed to 3,36 guilders in 1916, 
see KV 1917; Kreemer, Atjè h, II, 135.
190 ANRI AS GB MGS 5162, herein: BGS 17-2-1923: ‘Uittreksel uit de jaarverslagen betref-
fende den afkoop van Heerendiensten in de gewesten buiten Java en Madoera over 1921: 
Atjeh.’ (The buying off price was 6 guilders in Singkil and 5 guilders on Sabang, where 
the economy was considered to be in better condition.)
191 ANRI AS GB MGS 5052, herein: BGS 20-3-1928: ‘Nota, afkoopbaarheid van heeren-
diensten’, Ag. 8174, I. ‘Nota betreffende het meer algemeen afkoopbaarstellen van den 
heerendiensten’ and II. ‘De afschaffi ng van de heerendienstplicht, DepBB’, DirBB to GG, 
6-3-1928 and ‘nota (kopie)’, BGS 22-8-1928: ‘Bestuursconferentie 1928: Buitengewesten, 
eerste dag’, pp. 22-39.
192 ANRI AS GB TGA 9331, herein: BGS 30-5-1934: ‘Resume bespreking’, 23-11-1933, DepBB.
193 Siegel, The Rope of God, 90-91. See also: Touwen, Extremes in the Archipelago, 77, 399.
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preserved materials housed in Aceh’s provincial archives disclose how road 
maintenance, required after unpredictable and frequently occurring land-
slides and earthquakes, started falling behind.194 An official in Takengon 
reported that no cash was in circulation, and all labour was performed 
in corvée.195 He fully relied on the indigenous chiefs’ ability to force their 
people to perform extra corvée.196 Thus, the government kept a vested 
interest in the continuation of corvée labour as a cheap labour resource.
This, ‘indispensability’ of corvée labour, symbolized the many inherent 
paradoxes of the colonial narrative of development under domination. The 
Acehnese economy had collapsed as a result of Dutch aggression, but the 
government, of course unwilling to admit this, attributed the increasing 
poverty among the Acehnese to their innate characteristics and ruling tradi-
tions. Yet, these ruling traditions were continued by the colonial government, 
incapable of doing without indirect ruling partners. The problem of ‘unpro-
ductivity’ was deemed solvable by using corvée, which only aggravated the 
burden and popular discontent, leading to even further economic disasters. 
Thus, Dutch conceptualizations of the Acehnese became somewhat of a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. If the Dutch had not pursued a policy of ‘despotic 
exploitation’, or if they had allowed for a greater amount of commercial 
freedom, or absorbed some of the economic shock caused by war through 
its treasury, the need for corvée might have been less. Thus, the effect and 
burden of colonialism might have been experienced as lighter and resistance 
might have been reduced. By perpetually refusing to properly invest, and 
by anxiously holding-on to their fixed concepts of ‘native laziness and 
craziness’, the Dutch blocked any potential for the Acehnese to actually 
become monetized, taxpaying subject-citizens. Instead of a tool for ‘social 
elevation’, corvée obstructed the upward economic spiral which could 
have helped to lift the Acehnese from their state of economic desperation.
Conclusion
The Hikayat Perang Sabil, as exemplified at the beginning of this chapter, and 
the two tax forms figured in the prologue, essentially symbolize the two 
opposing responses to colonialism: resistance and compliance. Though the 
Hikayat was certainly still read at the time the exemplified tax forms were 
194 Dinas Kearsipan dan Perpustakaan Propinsi Aceh (Provincial Archives and Library of Aceh; 
DKPPA), Collection Aceh/Aceh Tengah, Tahun 1917-1942: Tk. Aceh Tengah No. 59/Ga: 
‘Financieel onderhoud van wegen en bruggen’, herein: Ass-Res Noordkust Aceh to contro-
leur Takengon, 18-3-1936; Controleur Takengon to Ass-Res Noordkust Aceh, 18-2-1935.
195 DKPPA, Koleksi Aceh Tengah 1917-1942: Tk. Aceh Tengah No. 59/Ga: Financieel onder-
houd […], herein: ‘Jaarverslag no. 47: Financieel en technisch verslag nopens aanleg 
onderhorigen, 1932, wegen en bruggen in de verschillende landschappen in het gewest’: 
‘Controleur/hulpgezaghebber Takengon’ to Ass-Res Gayo- en Alaslanden, 7-10-1931.
196 DKPPA, Koleksi Aceh Tengah Tahun 1917-1942: Tk. Aceh Tengah No. 59/Ga: Financieel 
onderhoud […], herein: Jaarverslag no. 47 […]: Controleur/hulpgezaghebber […], 7-10-
1931; ‘Rondschrijven’ Gov. Aceh to Afdelingschefs, 12-12-1930.
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issued, strategies of resistance had long changed by then, following the 
imposition of Dutch governance. The Dutch had successfully subjected the 
region by incorporating the uleebalang and their fiscal instrumentality into 
their state-machinery. That way, the colonization process of Aceh elevated the 
use of indirect rule to its summit. Self-legitimized by their claim to superior 
abilities, enabling them to justly rule and tax, the Dutch replaced the Sultan 
with their state, his sarakarta with their Korte Verklaringen, and the system 
of rights (wasé) and levies with a unified and centralized system of direct 
taxes. Considerably more than the Sultan ever had, they crept into the tax 
instrumentation of the uleebalang, monopolizing and performing their levies 
using military surveillance. Because in the modern colonial tax state, taxes 
were supposedly never levied under the threat of violence, the government 
hid in the shadows cast by the uleebalang who, invested with greater power 
and capacity than ever before, provided an ideal combination of strawmen 
and scapegoat. Their unique role was used to uphold the farce of self-rule 
to the Acehnese, but also to protect against initiatives from Batavia. Most of 
all, it allowed for the maintenance of a status quo in which taxes were basi-
cally the same form of extortion as the Dutch claimed they had been under 
the Sultanate, without the government having to take responsibility for it.
This does not mean that the uleebalang were passive bystanders or loyal 
collaborators with the colonial regime. As demonstrated by Reid, many 
uleebalang capably manoeuvred the politics of the government to dodge and 
bend its demands and engaged in underground resistance.197 What matters 
here however, is that state agents kept using the uleebalang as an institution-
alized instrument, to which they could attribute the manifold shortcomings 
of colonial governance. Unable to adhere to its own standards of gover-
nance, officials comfortably shielded itself behind the uleebalang to maintain 
its self-legitimizing narrative of development and improvement, which 
ultimately withheld them from designing a better tax system. In practice, 
the ostensible economic development of Aceh and fiscal normalization of 
its population into a socially and spiritually healthy population of produc-
tive individuals according to colonial standards, ultimately depended on 
the structural support of the armed forces, in cooperation with ever more 
despotic uleebalang, and the use of forced labour. The idea that taxation 
would create a fairer and more tenable and productive society dissipated 
in the implausible logic of self-governance and indirect rule. The persistent 
branding of Acehnese as ‘unstable’ and dangerous creatures, and their 
subsequent mistreatment, demonstrates the limitations of the Dutch belief 
in the capacity of the Acehnese to become ‘normalized’ taxpaying citizens, 
subject to the unified colonial state. The Dutch colonial tax system in Aceh 
was permeated with structural ambiguity and ambivalence, resulting from 
a conflict between ambition and the reality on the ground, combined with 
strong disagreements among various levels of governance. This is illustra-
tive of the perpetual conflicts within Dutch imperialist ambitions.
197 Reid, The Blood of the People, 18-25.
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7 Coerced improvement
Taxing within and beyond the state in Seram, 
c. 1860-1920
Figure 7.1. Alfurs chiefs on West Seram, ca. 1905.
Source: F.J.P. Sachse, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1907), 60.
This photo, taken around 1905 during a tour made by Major F.J.P. Sachse, 
‘civil-governor’ of West Seram in 1903-1905, excellently symbolizes Dutch 
colonialism in ‘stateless’ spaces. We see the four village elders or chiefs 
of the nagari Nuniali, Sapalewa, Taniwel and Rumah Soal in West Seram 
(see map 7.1), who were appointed as indirect rulers in the Dutch colonial 
administration. They bore foreign titles such as ‘patih’ and ‘orangkaya’, 
wore European suits and hats, and were bestowed with tongkat, canes 
with a golden or silver knob, while the higher-ranking ‘lords’ are seated, 
to emphasize the differences in their newly acquired status. These new 
clothes, titles and paraphernalia, supposedly expressed new forms of power 
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and authority. As the restyled, spruce indirect rulers of Seram, they were 
supposedly icons of change, representing just governance, fair taxation and 
legalized, rightful rule. Supposedly, they heralded a new era of peace (Pax 
Neerlandica), social development and improvement, imbued with the tones 
of the forceful civilizational-missionary Dutch governmental colonialism of 
the early 1900s. But the men in this photo do seem to make a somewhat 
displaced impression. This is symbolic of their actual status and function, 
which, as this chapter will show, was at odds with the developmental 
agenda the colonial government pursued. Behind this contrived image of 
authority and stateliness stands the stark reality in contrast to what the 
photo attempts to establish. A reality of coercion rather than governmen-
tality, of violence rather than peace and tranquillity (rust en orde) and of 
extortion rather than taxation.
This chapter is about the absolute limits of the colonial state. It discusses 
how colonial conquest on Seram was deployed as a project of replacing 
alleged forms of ‘indigenous ritualism’ and ‘underdevelopment’ with ‘civi-
lizational’, moralizing governance. However, this process was structurally 
constrained by indigenous resilience and the government’s own incapacity. 
Colonial officials brutally interfered in local society, and hoped that through 
indirect rule and administrative techniques of inscription and documenta-
tion they could “change the facts they took note of”1, using documentation 
and archiving as “intricate technologies of rule in themselves” to reproduce 
the very state machines from which they derived.2
Herein, taxation was, once again, presented as perhaps the strongest and 
most fundamental form of governmental administration required to trans-
form ‘primitive subjects’ into categorized, industrious and governable ‘citi-
zens.’ Taxes were seen as a tool to extend the colonial frontier and underpin 
colonial ideas of social improvement. However, continuous resistance and 
evasion drove the state to the limits of its capacity, and the effect of docu-
mentation and administration remained limited to the paper on which it 
was written. In Seram, and comparable regions of Indonesia, many subjects, 
and especially those living in more peripheral, mountainous regions, often 
succeeded in remaining outside the scope of the colonial government. They 
refused to be governed, ruled, inspected, regulated, indoctrinated, sermon-
ized, listed, checked off, estimated, appraised, censured and ordered about, 
and deliberately sought to escape the state.3 As Scott argues, avoidance of 
administrative techniques, village settlement, written culture, monotheism 
and centralized agriculture was important as a strategy to prevent the intru-
sion of state formation and to stay ungoverned in Southeast Asia; to remain 
unknown and unmapped was to remain untaxed.4 The result was coercion 
1 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 47.
2 Stoler, Along the Archival Grain, 20, 28.
3 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 183.
4 J. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 2009), 9, 70, 81-89,183, 229-230.
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by the appointed chiefs supported by the Dutch military, which was in fact 
the leading strategy that outbalanced governance, once again emphasizing 
the inability of the government to play by its own rules.
Geographically, we have again arrived in the Central Moluccas, back 
where started with the first case study on Ambon, but socio-politically the 
contrast could not be bigger. Seram shows the incongruities of colonial gover-
nance as clearly as possible, and illustrates how the Dutch colonial fiscal 
system worked only under the cover of indirect rule and standoffishness.
7.1 Seram: a stateless space
Seram is the largest island in the Central Moluccas (see map 3.1), and is 
referred to as the origin or mother island (Nusa Ina) in Moluccan cultures. 
Its mountainous layout provides unforgiving terrain to explorers, soldiers 
and state-builders alike. The majority of the interior of the island remained 
blank on European maps, and untouched by colonial rule until late in the 
nineteenth century, contrary to its coastal regions, the neighbouring islands 
of Ambon and the Lease and Banda islands, all of which had experienced 
the dark and profound consequences of Dutch spice-monopolism.5 Only 
the western side of the Island, in particular the peninsula of Huamual 
(Hoamoal), had experienced the influence of European colonialism and 
spice production, until it was violently destroyed and depopulated during 
the seventeenth century spice wars.6 The rest of the island was largely 
ignored until the second half of the nineteenth century, when local warfare 
and social upheaval in the interaction between various groups attracted 
Dutch attention. Seram was actively colonized only during the heyday 
of twentieth century aggressive Dutch imperialism. Especially under the 
reign of Van Heutsz, the ambiguous and often conflicting expansionist 
drive for political consolidation and quest for resources of the empire was 
further integrated into an active imperialist, ethical-civilizational agenda, 
signalling the end of independence for many parts of as yet uncolonized 
regions in Eastern Indonesia and the enforcement of Dutch authority and 
morality, with the hardest military means.7 Imperial motivations on Seram 
were largely characterized by moral concerns about resurging violence and 
5 M.C. Boulan-Smit, “Traditional Territorial Categories and Constituent Institutions in 
West Seram: The Nili Ela of ’WELE Telu Batai and the Alune Hena of Ma’saman Uwei”, 
in T. Reuters (ed.), Sharing the Earth, Dividing the Land. Land and Territory in the Austrone-
sian World (Canberra, ANU Press, 2006), 157-177: 158.
6 See Andaya, The World of Maluku, 55, 83-110; Knaap, Kruidnagelen en Christenen, 25-34, 
37-39; Widjojo, The Revolt of Prince Nuku, 19-21; Van Fraassen, Sociografi e van de Minang-
kabause Samenleving, 54-57; Lapian, The Deversifi ed Unity of Maluku-Kie-Raha: Its Historical 
Development, 184; Alwi, Sejarah Maluku. See also: Van Fraassen, Ternate, I: 38-45.
7 P.M.H. Groen, “Soldaat en Bestuursman: Het Indische Leger en De Nederlandse 
Gezagsvestiging op Ceram, een Case Study”, Mededelingen Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis 
Landmachtstaf 5 (1989): 203-244.
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the desire for ‘social improvement’, while its perceived lack of commercial 
power and resources and the difficult terrain rendered it largely economi-
cally unattractive. Using military force, the Dutch would establish their 
colonial administration, paving the way to project their idealistic schemes of 
benevolent imperialism on Seram’s societies and replace what they consid-
ered to be ‘primitivism’ with a ‘civilized society’ that both necessitated and 
reproduced tax payment as a tool for social reorganization.
Tastes of the non-state: views and ideas
Historically, an important distinction is made between Seram’s coastal 
communities (or nagari), home to mixed communities of locals and migrants 
that had adapted to the influences of foreign trade, politics and religion, 
and the Alfurs or Alifuru, the much more secluded inhabitants of the moun-
tainous, impenetrable and densely forested interiors.8 While the coastal 
communities had adopted ‘governed’ lifestyles of swidden agriculture, 
taxes and monotheism9, the Alfurs lived radically different lives. Seram’s 
geographic conditions were unsuitable for large-scale rice cultivation, and 
a typical Southeast Asian sawah-based kingdom, with concordant forms 
of taxation and statecraft, had never emerged. Instead, the Alfurs were a 
heterogeneous, complex society many different ethnic groups (‘tribes’) and 
lived as peripatetic agriculturalists and hunters. Therefore, the Alfurs can be 
recognized as an insular example of the kind of mountainous and periph-
eral people who in Scott’s vocabulary understood, ‘the art of not being 
governed’; the deliberate strategies of avoiding fixed settlement and written 
records and administration to keep the development of states at bay and 
to remain untaxed and free of all of its other burdens.10 As put by a colo-
nial official, the Alfurs were a ‘primeval people’, not ‘stuck’ in their nagari 
8 Note that this was not an ethnic term, but rather a geographical-cultural distinction. 
Dutch sources often speak of ‘mountain inhabitants’ (bergbewoners) when addressing 
the Seramese Alfurs. ‘Alfurs’ was in fact used as a collective term for non-monotheist 
(animist) Indonesian peoples in the interiors of eastern Indonesian islands such as 
Sulawesi, Halmahera and Seram, but in modern-day language is still in use as the generic 
term for the collective people of interior Seram and some other Moluccan islands. See: 
Bartels, In de Schaduw van de Berg Nunusaku, 29, quoted from; W. Manuhutu, “Pacifi catie 
in Praktijk: De Expansie van het Nederlands Gezag op Ceram. 1900-1942”, in J. van Goor 
(ed.), Imperialisme in de Marge: De Afronding van Nederlands-Indië (Utrecht: Hes, 1985), 
267-315: 268-269.
9 Most ‘colonial’ authors oppose coastal inhabitants to the Alifuru, but Duyvendak 
emphasizes that there were no real cultural distinctions per se, and the contrast between 
pesisir and hilir on Seram should be seen only in light of interaction; the coastal inhabit-
ants were just likelier to have been in touch with cultural infl uences from outside. Only 
after conversion and interference from outside were the interiors rendered as profoundly 
different cultural region. See: J.P. Duyvendak, Het Kakean-Genootschap van Seran (PhD 
thesis, Universiteit Leiden, 1926), 10; Bartels, Guarding the Invisible Mountain, 5-6.
10 Scott, The Art of not Being Governed; G. Benjamin, “On Being Tribal in the Malay World”, in 
G. Benjamin and C. Chou (eds.), Tribal Communities in the Malay World: Historical, Cultural 
and Social Perspectives (Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2002), 7-76: 17.
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(village) but “freely roaming around […] their lands” as “‘semi-nomadic’ 
wanderers” which made it particularly difficult to administer them.11 
Hence, they were seen by colonial officials as archetypically ‘undisciplined’, 
‘primitive’ and underdeveloped ‘lazy natives’, who evidently required the 
tutelary guidance of Dutch colonial governance to facilitate their partici-
pation in the global economy. Particularly their non-monotheistic beliefs 
and their habit of headhunting enhanced Dutch concern about fitting the 
Alfurs into their empire, and were seen as principle obstacles towards 
colonial attempts to ‘improve’ the Alfurs’ lifestyles and convinced many 
officials that for the time being the Alfurs were “insusceptible and unripe 
for modern governance.”12 This also helped to keep alive the difference 
between the ‘civilized in the state and the non-civilized in non-state spaces’ 
which was important to the Dutch claim to sociocultural superiority and 
legitimisation of their rule. This explains the Dutch obsession with differ-
entiating between invented colonial categories of ‘coastal-civilized’ mono-
theists versus ‘mountainous-animists’ ancestor-worshippers. Ultimately, it 
legitimized Dutch intervention in order to ‘protect’ the former against the 
latter, eventually inducing deeper colonial penetration into Seram’s heart-
lands. Consequently, as in earlier colonized areas, Seram was subjected to 
the colonial fiscal claim, and hence expected to fund its own colonization 
process, preferably through income taxes.
The Alfurs of course maintained their own concepts and narratives of 
identity and relations with the outside world. According to G. Benjamin, 
“The character of tribal society – in Asia especially – is shaped by the prox-
imity of civilization”; tribal identity is defined not by social conditions, race 
or ethnicity, but by social action: the action of staying within geographic 
remote areas and living outside the state.13 According to Scott, ungov-
erned hill societies are best understood as representing a “reactive and 
purposeful statelessness of peoples who have adapted to a world of states 
while remaining outside their firm grasp.”14 Indeed, the Alfurs engaged 
with the world around them, as Seram was crossed by trading routes since 
long before European colonization, running from Ternate to the Southern 
Moluccas and from Papua to Sulawesi and Java.15 The Alfurs participated 
in commercial activities and followed the tides of violent colonial interven-
tions and monopolization of indigenous trading systems. But as, contrary 
to some of the coastal migrant communities, the Alfurs were unrestrained 
by agriculture or any form of forced labour and cultivation, colonial officials 
thought the island had always preserved its “relatively pristine nature.”16 
11 G. de Vries, Bij de Berg-Alfoeren op West-Seran: Zeden, Gewoonten en Mythologie van een 
Oervolk (Zutphen: Thieme, 1927), 125.
12 ANRI AS GB MGS 4111, herein: MGS 26-1-1891: DirBB to GG, 4-8-1890; ANRI AS GB Besl. 
1522, herein Besl. 28-1-1890: RvI 13-11-1889, DirFin to GG, 9-11-1889.
13 Benjamin, “On Being Tribal”, 9, 10-11, 17.
14 Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 337.
15 Knaap, Kruidnagelen en Christenen, 67.
16 Duyvendak, Het Kakean-Genootschap, 1.
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This independence has shaped the political relations between local chiefs 
and metropolitan governments ever since.17 The Seramese way of life must 
therefore be seen as successful in terms of self-preservation throughout 
history. A closer look at the indigenous situation on Seram in the mid-nine-
teenth century (before full colonization) helps us to properly comprehend 
the impact of the process of state-accustoming and normalization in the 
twentieth century.
Happy and careless lives: colonial stereotypes
Much of what is known of the lifestyles and political organization of 
the Alfurs has been made available through colonial reports and semi-
anthropological works written by colonial officials. This knowledge was 
acquired only after Dutch military intervention and was therefore already 
slightly distorted by colonialism. The Alfurs were depicted by the Dutch as 
a “happy and carefree” people who “do not think of tomorrow”18, “hunters 
in the first place”, living in the “deep tranquillity of the forest” as “the Bohe-
mians of the Moluccas.”19 Such Rousseauan depictions of carefree tribalism 
– a typical orientalist colonial genre20 – are seemingly in conflict with the 
allegedly more ‘violent’, ‘anarchistic’, ‘tribal’ and ‘unhygienic’ aspects of the 
Alfurs’ lifestyles, also deriving from the same sources.21 In fact, both were 
considered symptoms of the same general ‘backwardness’ or ‘primitivity’, 
which the Dutch ascribed to various mountainous people in Indonesia.
The Alfurs maintained a sustenance economy based on hunting, gath-
ering and small-scale sago-planting.22 Access to sago fields was regulated 
by familial relations, depending on marriage, age and social position, as 
were (property) relations within and among the interior Alfurs nagari. As 
in Ambon, these nagari consisted of various, relatively independent clans 
that adhered to adat leadership of a nagari chief (kepala nagari), who usually 
17 R. Ellen, “On the Contemporary Uses of Colonial History and the Legitimation of 
Political Status in Archipelagic Southeast Seram”, JSAS 28:1 (1997), 78-102: 83, 85-86.
18 Sachse, Het Eiland Seran, 86-87. See also Nanlohy, “Bij de Berg Alfoeren van het Eiland 
Seran”, De Christelijke Onderwijzer 14/20 (1928), 173-174: 270, quoted in M.C. Boulan-
Smit, We, of the Banyan Tree: Traditions of Origin of the Alune of West Seram (PhD thesis, 
Australian National University, 1998), 44. See also G.L. Tichelman, “De Onder-Afdeling 
Amahei (Seran)”, TAG 62 (1925), 653-724: 672.
19 De Vries, Bij de Berg-Alfoeren, 17, 20.
20 See for comparison: M. Gray and R. Law, “Images of Africa: The Depiction of Pre-colonial 
Africa in Creative Literature” (Paper presented at the Images of Africa Conference, 
University of Stirling, 1990).
21 Sachse, Het Eiland Seran, 30, 32-35; Vries, Bij de Berg-Alfoeren, 81-82; Tichelman, “De 
Onder-Afdeling”, 674-675, 703-707. Quite striking is the semi-poetic prose on the Alfurs 
of De Vries of 1927. De Vries was chief for about 2,5 years at the bivouac in Hunitetu, and 
wrote about the Alfurs with a particular spark of ‘Rousseauan admiration.’
22 Sago, as also mentioned in chapter 4, was typically depicted by colonial offi cials as an 
abundant crop that did not require much effort to maintain. One family could easily live 
of a sago palm for a year and use its produce at will. See W. Ruinen, “Sagopalmen en 
hunne Beteekenis voor de Molukken”, IG 43:1-2 (1921), 501-523, 598-622: 52-55.
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claimed descent from a mythical village-founder and served as repre-
sentative of the village to the outside world and as arbiter in matters of 
customary law and disputes among the villages’ clans.23 Social, familial and 
property relations within and among nagari were defined by marriage, age 
and religion and maintained by exchanging ceremonial gifts.24 The Alfurs 
nagari interacted in various overarching political, semi-ethnic structures. 
In West Seram, two overarching, ethnically defined ‘tribal’ groups were 
recognized by the Dutch: the Alune (in the north-western part of West 
Seram) and the allegedly ‘more primitive’ Wemale (in the south-eastern 
part of West and Central Seram; see map 7.1).25 They inhabited the basins 
of, respectively, the Eti, Sapalewa and Tala rivers, the three branch rivers 
flowing from the Nunusaku mountain, the mythical place of origin for all 
Moluccans, and were separated in social affairs.26 These and other groups 
on Seram had close relationships characterized by interaction and exchange 
in shifting alliances of hostility and friendship, and did not live in strictly 
demarcated territories.27 On West Seram, traditional communities of nagari 
were composed of several luma inai (‘mother houses’) consisting of specific 
genealogical units. Central Seram was populated over the course of the 
sixteenth to nineteenth century by immigrant groups of various cultural 
backgrounds. These developed into units called ipan, with claims to descent 
from as far away as Malacca or even the Arabian Peninsula.28 Soa, the clan 
groups on Ternate and Ambon (see Chapter 4), did not exist on Seram until 
the colonial government started grouping luma inai under newly appointed 
kepala soa in the twentieth century (see below)29, who were placed under 
direct supervision of familial, clan or provincial chiefs of various kinds.30
23 Bartels, In de Schaduw van de Berg Nunusaku, 76-77, 94-95, 98-88, 100-101.
24 Which, later on, was also used by twentieth century colonial offi cials to tie the tax system 
into. See ibid., 94-95, 98-88, 100-101. See also: F.L. Cooley, Altar and Throne in Central 
Moluccan Societies: A Study of the Relationship Between the Institutions of Religion and the 
Institutions of Local Government in a Traditional Society Undergoing Rapid Social Change (PhD 
thesis, Yale University, 1962), 19-27.
25 Sachse also uses the name Makahala for the Alune, see: F.J.P. Sachse, Gegevens uit de 
Nota Betreffende de Onderafdeeling West-Ceram, ed. F.J.P. Sachse (Batavia: Encyclopaedisch 
Bureau, 1919), 30-31; Bartels, In de Schaduw van de Berg Nunusaku, 37; De Vries, Bij de Berg-
Alfoeren, 9-10; A.E. Jensen, Die Drei Strö me: Zü ge aus dem Geistigen und Religiö sen Leben der 
Wemale: Einem Primitiv-Volk in den Molukken (Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1948).
26 Members of both were, for instance, not allowed to marry. G. Knaap, “The Saniri Tiga Air 
(Seram). An Account of its ‘Discovery’ and Interpretation Between About 1675 and 1950”, 
BKI 149:2 (1993), 250-273, 252.
27 Duyvendak, Het Kakean-Genootschap van Seran, 14, 16-17. The other groups were called: 
Nusawele, Huaolo, Warama and Manusela.
28 These formed larger political units that sometimes (alike in Ternate, Tidore, Bacan and 
Jailolo) merged into a four-unit or Raja Empat. Bartels, In de Schaduw van de Berg Nunusaku, 
76-77.
29 Boulan-Smit, We, of the Banyan Tree 56; W. Ruinen, “Ethnografi sche Gegevens van West-
Ceram”, Mensch en Maatschappij 5 (1929), 220-232.
30 See: Van Vollenhoven, Het Adatrecht, 401.
Promise Pretence and Pragmatism.indb   305 22-04-21   17:35
306 Chapter 7
Alternatives to states: kakean and pela
Another constitutional division between nagari was defined through 
coinciding ancestral or origination groups or complexes called Patasiwa 
and Patalima. The organization of each pertained to similar but specific 
sociocultural devices, origin myths, rites, religion, and other distinctions of 
adat.31 The division relates to the organization of nagari into larger political 
bonds that engaged in persistent warfare, as Patasiwa and Patalima were 
considered to be each other’s ritual nemesis, and followed geographic 
boundaries as well. A majority of the Patasiwa men were characterized by 
wearing tattoos on their chest in the shape of a black cross. They were called 
Patasiwa Hitam (black) while those who had no such tattoo were referred to 
as Patasiwa Putih (white).32
These tattoos demonstrated membership of the so-called kakean, a 
masculine ‘society’ or ‘brotherhood’ on West Seram, into which all Patasiwa 
Hitam boys were initiated in a secluded ritual requisite to reach adulthood. 
The kakean acted as a regional association aiming to continue the honouring 
of common spiritual ancestors.33 Kakean rites were secret and compromising 
them was regarded a serious violation of adat.34 Headhunting as ritual 
murder was coordinated by the kakean, subjected to specific rules and 
important for men to acquire greater social status.35 Though anyone from 
another blood-line could be attacked, no matter of what age or gender, 
specific forms of cognation protected against attacks. Such mechanisms had 
an important war and peacemaking function.36 West Seram in particular 
was a deeply divided society of multiple groups of nagari that managed 
their own subsistence economies and engaged in shifting alliances to assist 
each other in matters of defence and economic aid when required.
31 See on these origination myths: Bartels, In de Schaduw van de Berg Nunusaku, 76-84.
32 This distinction is claimed to have emerged under infl uence of rivalry between Ternate 
and Tidore, Patasiwa adhering to Ternate and Patalima to Tidore. See: Van Hoëvell, Ambon 
en Meer Bepaaldelijk de Oeliasers, 153; Cooley, “Altar and Throne”, 9, 11, 15-16; Duyvendak, 
Het Kakean-Genootschap van Seran, 76-83.
33 Boulan-Smit, We, of the Banyan Tree, 46; J.C. van Eerde, “Gegevens Betreffende de 
Onder-Afdeeling West-Ceram”, TAG 37:4 (1920), 531-535: 553; Ruinen, “Ethnografi sche 
Gegevens van West-Ceram”, 220-221. See also C. de Jong, “Kerk, Adat en Theologie. Een 
Korte Geschiedenis van Amahai, een Christelijke Negorij op Ceram, 1600-1935”, in L. van 
Brussee-van der Zee et al. (eds.), Balanceren op de Smalle Weg. Liber Amicorum voor Kees van 
Duin, Alle Hoekema en Sjouke Voolstra (Zoetermeer: 2002), 313-332: 319-320 n338.
34 Sachse, Het Eiland Seran, 90; F.J.P. Sachse, Seran (Weltevreden: G. Kolff & Co., 1922), 33, 
111.
35 Men were allowed to paint a symbol on their cidako (loin cloth), a black circle for the fi rst 
head and concentric circles around the fi rst one for every new head. However, most men 
would hunt little more than one, perhaps two heads in their lives, and a man that would 
hunt more than fi ve would “be considered a hero of legendary allure.” Bartels, Guarding 
the Invisible Mountain, 38. See also Van Hoëvell’s report in: NA MinKol 1850-1900 4675, 
Vb. 25-2-1893 n44, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 14-9-1891; De Vries, Bij de Berg-Alfoeren, 
58-59, 69.
36 Bartels, Guarding the Invisible Mountain, 38-41.
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Pela, the nagari alliances that emerged on Ambon prior to Dutch colo-
nialism (see Chapter 3), were of similar significance. Based on comparable 
ideas of ‘blood-brotherhood’, they also crossed religious boundaries and 
obliged the involved nagari to assist in each other’s protection.37 Though 
not common on Seram itself, there is evidence that some of Seram’s nagari 
engaged in pela bonds with nagari on Ambon, possibly in response to 
encroaching colonial presence.38 Pela existed prior to the arrival of Euro-
peans, but evolved into defence-and-aid networks only under colonialism.39 
Although certainly not a coherent, integrated political force, these sorts of 
mutual economic and political alliances can be understood as structures 
alternative to larger, centralized political entities or tax-levying states. 
Political and social security was regulated on Seram not through social-
contracts of taxation enforced by states, but through village-alliances and 
fusing political-ritual orders.
Important to bear in mind is that Seram, as encountered by the Dutch in 
the late nineteenth century, was the remnant of three centuries of fluctuating 
interaction, exchanges and war among and between the fluid adat commu-
nities of the interior and coastal areas, under increasing pressure from the 
encroaching Dutch presence. The growing function of kakean, warfare, 
headhunting and pela networks, coordinating politics and diffusing tensions 
was the result of such interaction and building tension. Colonial officials 
however worried increasingly about what they considered continuous local 
‘feuds’, wars and headhunting campaigns. They argued that monitoring 
these in itself already cost the government valuable time and money as they 
caused instability in the region. Officials found themselves increasingly 
busy responding to affairs related to the alleged violent behaviour of the 
Alfurs40, which ultimately provided justification for Dutch military inter-
vention.
Before the 1860s however, except for repelling raids targeted at the coast 
and countering alleged piracy or occasional recruitment for hongi expedi-
tions, the Dutch found little reason to engage with the Alfurs. At the time, 
Seram was formally administered as part of the ‘Residency of Ambon’, 
but except for a few, usually Indo-European posthouders (‘post-holders’, 
the guardians or custodians of small, sometimes fortified Dutch outposts), 
37 Pela networks were also used on the offensive, when one village would attempt an attack 
on another village it would try to fi nd allies and establish a pela. Bartels, In de Schaduw van 
de Berg Nunusaku, 29, 38-41.
38 According to Dutch offi cials these pela bonds were abused by nagari outside Seram to tap 
into Seram’s sago reserves while the Alfurs, feeling ‘honoured’ to maintain pela bonds 
with nagari outside Seram, would likely never visit other islands and use the benefi ts of 
the bond. See: Van Hoëvell, Ambon en Meer Bepaaldelijk de Oeliasers, 157-159; Sachse, Het 
Eiland Seran, 116-117.
39 Van Hoëvell, Ambon en Meer Bepaaldelijk de Oeliasers, 157-159; Sachse, Het Eiland Seran, 
116-117; Bartels, Guarding the Invisible Mountain, 131-134, 140-145, 162-163.
40 NA MinKol 1850-1900 4675 Vb. 25-2-1893 n44, herein: DirFin to GG, 6-12-1890. For the 
same argument, see Sachse, Seran, 144.
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installed in Seram’s coastal regions from the seventeenth century onward 
to maintain ties with coastal nagari, there were few foreigners present on 
the island. In fact, until the later 1910s, Seram was still seen as devoid of 
resources and economic opportunity.41 So what changed during and after 
the 1860s?
7.2 Coast versus mountain
As in the case of Aceh, crucial decisions about territorial expansion were 
“made in Batavia rather than The Hague, and for local raison d’état.”42 
Colonization of Seram related deeply to the idea of European superiority 
and the ‘civilizing’ effect of colonial rule. Because developmentalism served 
as the legitimizing narrative in the majority of the archipelago where the soil 
was rich, labour omnipresent and resources and opportunities abundant 
such as Java, Biliton or East Sumatra, the Dutch could not simply ignore 
other regions where economic opportunity was smaller. Basically, the Dutch 
had to prove to themselves that their empire was benevolent and respon-
sible in every corner of the archipelago; blanks in the map were no longer 
accepted, and the white man’s burden applied to all in the archipelago 
regardless of their economic assets. This sense of moral obligation was to 
be defended at any cost, all the more because civilizational colonialism did 
not accept social deviance or exceptions. It was, in other words, intolerant to 
any people living alternative lifestyles outside of the colonial state, because 
that endangered its myth of social progress. Hence, even the ‘ungovernable’ 
Alfurs were expected to be included in a self-funded mini-tax state under 
the ‘edifying supervision’ of Dutch fiscal governance.
Rumours of taxation
Around 1860, war began around the Elpaputih Bay on West Seram, caused 
when the nagari Tananahu allegedly refused to pay the nagari Sahalau a 
peace offering or harta (in this case meaning ‘property’ or gift as compen-
sation) of gongs and ceramic dishes43 to compensate for allegedly having 
compromised the secrets of the kakean.44 This attracted the immediate atten-
41 Boulan-Smit, We, of the Banyan Tree,43, 63. See also Ruinen, “Sagopalmen”, 501-523; 
Tichelman, “De Onder-Afdeling Amahei”, 690-692, 710; L. Rutten, “Ontwikkelingsmoge-
lijkheden van het Eiland Ceram”, TAG 38 (1920), 43-73: 43-74; Benjamin, “On Being 
Tribal”, 8.
42 Anderson, “Language and Power”, 97.
43 NA MinKol 1850-1900 4675, Vb. 25-2-1893 n44, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 14-9-1891. 
These harta became used as a compensation for hunted heads from the headhunter to the 
‘tribe’ of which he murdered a member. A headhunting campaign could have been the 
response to the violation of kakean rules. See: Bartels, Guarding the Invisible Mountain, 54.
44 De Jong, “Kerk, Adat en Theologie”, 313-321; Ruinen, “Ethnografi sche Gegevens van 
West-Ceram”, 226-227.
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tion of the Dutch, who saw in the war a confirmation of what they considered 
the Alfurs’ ‘habit’ of routinized pillaging, warfare and headhunting. They 
considered the motivations for this war, claimed to be the result of kakean 
disputes, a “myth” instigated by a chief who had been removed and sought 
revenge by eliciting conflict among the Alfurs of West Seram.45 Sachse, the 
above-mentioned ‘civil-governor’, believed the war to have been caused 
by constant disputes over the borders of dusun and fishing and hunting 
terrains.46 But myths and facts were not easily separated in Seram. More-
over, the outburst of violence is also an excellent example of the point made 
above, that the encroaching presence of the Dutch cannot be ignored in the 
emerging tensions, which in 1865 culminated in a large revolt joined by all 
Patasiwa nagari. It is hardly a coincidence that this revolt concurred with the 
imposition of nagari tax in Ambon (see Chapter 4). According to Governor 
of the Moluccas, N.A. Th. Arriëns (in office 1864-1866), news of this was 
spread through pela networks, by people of various nagari who expressed 
concerns that soon the colonial government would impose similar taxes 
upon them.47 The chief of nagari Nuniali wrote to the Assistant-Resident in 
Ambon “that his people were affected by the rumours that an office would 
be established, taxes would be levied, and sawah would be plotted” to estab-
lish some sort of coerced rice cultivation scheme.48 According to Arriëns, this 
was among the most persistent fears of the Alfurs.49 As the cultivation of rice 
had traditionally enabled Southeast-Asian kings to sustainably fix masses 
of people in a domain, so agrarian state-societies shaped by monoculture of 
rice-planting were easier to monitor and tax.50 Hence the Alfurs rightfully 
associated rice-planting with the coming of the state and with techniques 
of methodical cadastral registration and taxation. They would go to great 
lengths to prevent that. The kepala soa of Tanunu declared that his people
“would flee into the mountains until the government would make peace [...] 
and attack all nagari on Seram if the government intended to erect settlements in 
Nuniali and Kaibobo […].”51
Arriëns had little choice but to give in. Though Batavia claimed Seram as 
colonial territory after sending troops supressing the revolt52 – Ministerial 
officials in The Hague even started emphasizing the importance of ‘self-
45 ANRI AS GB MGS 4111, herein: MGS 3-6-1885: Res. Ambon to GG, 13-4-1885.
46 Sachse, Het Eiland Seran, 61.
47 NA MinKol 1850-1900 2126, Vb. 19-8-1868 n6, herein: GovMol to GG, 29-8-1866.
48 NA MinKol 1850-1900 1695, Vb. 23-12-1865 n10, herein: GovMol to GG, 12-10-1865.
49 NA MinKol 1850-1900 2126, Vb. 19-8-1868 n6, herein: GovMol to GG, 29-8-1866.
50 In other words, the means for a state to consolidate power and fi scal capacity was concen-
trating people who cultivated same crop: rice. See Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 
74-83 and Wolters, History, Culture, and Region, 39-40 about the development of mandala in 
rice-cultivated lowlands across Southeast-Asia.
51 NA MinKol 1850-1900 1695, Vb. 23-12-1865 n10, herein: GovMol to GG, 12-10-1865.
52 P. Hagen, Koloniale Oorlogen in Indonesië : Vijf Eeuwen Verzet tegen Vreemde Overheersing 
(Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 2018), 409.
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funded governance’ on the island – these troops were ill-prepared to control 
what happened in the interiors. Seram remained “an area where […] the 
sheer rumour of taxation already provided sufficient ground for rebellion.”53 
Governor Arriëns advised countering these persistent ‘rumours’ by leaving 
the Alfurs untaxed for the time being and using “the softest means possible 
to re-establish awe and respect for Dutch authority.”54
A circle of war and peace
The Dutch of course would not acknowledge that the Alfurs’ resistance 
was targeted at the threat of state-formation itself. Instead, they attributed 
social unrest to the alleged violent nature of the Alfurs and the political 
interplay between coastal and mountainous nagari. Arriëns for instance 
accused the people in the coastal nagari of spreading lies and stirring up the 
mountainous Alfurs on West Seram. And according to Resident J.G.F. Riedel 
(in office 1880-1883),
“The Alfurs in the interior of Seram […] live under the assumption that the 
coastal residents can rob them without punishment and with the knowledge 
of the European authorities. For this reason, they exercised their own vigilante 
justice by hunting heads. […] Headhunting among the Alifuru on Ceram hence 
takes place as a form of revenge.”55
The “sly coastal inhabitants”, Riedel asserted, had a monopoly on knowl-
edge about the Alfurs as no maps of the interior existed yet and few people 
were willing to serve as coolies and guides out of fear of being headhunted. 
These coastal people subsequently misled the colonial government and 
sullied the Alfurs reputation in an attempt to gain Dutch support.56 Unde-
niably, the coastal communities provided the government greater access 
to the Alfurs, and hence were to some extent a threat. Riedel advised the 
appointment of more posthouders, most of whom, he argued, were partly of 
local descent and therefore familiar with the Alfurs’ culture, which would 
help to acquire knowledge of and enhance relations with the Alfurs.57 
But Riedel’s successor, D. Heijting (in office 1883-1891), disagreed. He 
considered revenge only on rare occasions the source of violent uprisings. 
Rather, he deemed the wars an expression of a general greed and a circular 
yearning for violence inherent to the Alfurs’ “untamed nature.” He sought 
the cause of the war in repercussions for not paying harta, resulting from 
“original quarrels that no-one knew the cause of anymore”, and frustrations 
53 NA MinKol 1850-1900 2126, Vb. 19-8-1868 n6, herein: Nota A2.
54 NA MinKol 1850-1900 1695, Vb. 23-12-1865 n10, herein: GovMol to GG, 12-10-1865.
55 See Rieldel’s report on Seramese politics, in NA MinKol 1850-1900 4245, Vb. 19-3-1889 
n61, herein: Former Res. Ambon to MinKol, 5-3-1889.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
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over colonial impediments to organize kakean festivities.58 These ‘festivities’ 
related to headhunting campaigns, that were held in retaliation for failure 
of payment of harta, which were often levied as compensation gifts for 
headhunting campaigns. This, Heijting argued, caused an endless circular 
development of headhunting and failed harta payment. A cycle, he agreed 
with Riedel, that could only be broken by appointing more Dutch officials, 
to induce the saniri and nagari chiefs to settle for peace.59
Colonial Dutch observers typically considered the kakean a constant 
engine of war, and a central element in the resistance to colonial rule.60 
Sachse considered it the source of religious, socio-political and ritual 
fusion.61 Shrewd priests (the mauweng), he claimed, used kakean bonds to 
extend their influence and counter Christianization and the expansion of 
Dutch authority.62 He described the situation on Seram as one where
“murder and manslaughter were a daily business […] the mountain Alfurs 
reigned with terror over the coasters and from time to time shoot at the boats of 
the posthouders […] The governing strategy at the time was of continuous peace-
making among the tribes […] while the mountain inhabitants were appeased 
with gifts.”63
All of this, he added, happened “under the smoke of Ambon […] without 
any consequences.”64 In the early twentieth century, the Dutch ‘discovered’ 
that the prominent elders of the kakean had the power to call together the 
Saniri Tiga Air (‘Council of Three Rivers’; the Eti, Tala and Sapalewa), the 
most important inter-nagari council on Seram.65 Only those initiated into 
the kakean were allowed to attend this Saniri. Initially, colonial officials 
stimulated organization of the saniri meetings because they provided rare 
occasions where a number of Alfur chiefs came together and could be moni-
tored, but officials grew convinced that the saniri had become a ‘vehicle for 
the kakean’ through which “religious enmities turned into political feuds” 
58 NA MinKol 1850-1900 4675, Vb. 25-2-1893 n44, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 14-2-1890; 
Manuhutu, “Pacifi catie in Praktijk”, 280-282.
59 NA MinKol 1850-1900 4675, Vb. 25-2-1893 n44, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 14-2-1890.
60 G.W.W.C. baron van Hoëvell, “Bijschrift bij de Kaarten van Seran (Vulgo Seran)”, TAG 
13 (1896), 508-532: 516, 528-532; Sachse, Het Eiland Seran, 61, 95; Van Eerde, “Gegevens”, 
533-535; O.D. Tauern, Patasiwa und Patalima: vom Molukkeneiland Seran und Seinen Bewoh-
nern. Ein Beitrag zur Vö lkerkunde (Leipzig: Voigtländer, 1918), 29-30, 152.
61 Sachse, Het Eiland Seran, 94-95.
62 Sachse, Gegevens, 104.
63 Ibid., 78.
64 Sachse, Seran, 78. See also De Vries, Bij de Berg-Alfoeren op West-Seran, 4.
65 Also known as Saniri Waele Telu. The importance of this Saniri was rooted in the fact 
that it was considered to represent the primordial ancestral groups deriving from the 
core place of origins of all Alfurs and other Moluccan ethnicities, the holy mountain of 
Nunusaku. The saniri meetings have been recorded since at least 1678. See Knaap, “The 
Saniri Tiga Air (Seram)”, 251, 260-261.
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(Sachse, 1922:138).66 Both the saniri meetings and kakean festivities were 
henceforth actively opposed.67 Headhunting was formally prohibited by the 
colonial government in 1864, but it would take until the twentieth century 
before the colonial government was strong enough on the spot to enforce 
this prohibition.68
Dutch officials seem to have attempted to establish a separation 
between worldly, political and religious, spiritual power in a society that 
had no clear border between these things. Harta payment and headhunting 
campaigns were political instruments of war and peace, infused with an 
important religious-ritual dimension that reflected inter-nagari politics.69 
This was symbolized in the baileo, the meeting place of the intra-nagari saniri 
for political discussion and adat affairs. In earlier times, hunted heads were 
necessary for its sanctification.70 Without enacting the accordant rituals, 
there was no common ground for politics to be organized. The Dutch were 
aware of this and often attempted to employ ritual for their own political 
structures across Indonesia. But in Seram, ritual opposed the colonial state. 
The intertwining of the saniri and kakean symbolized the need of the Alfurs 
to maintain unity despite numerous divisions under the growing threat 
of colonial expansion.71 Non-payment of harta and the increase of head-
hunting, signalled by colonial officials in the nineteenth century, may have 
provided mechanisms to channel local tensions and continue ‘violence’ to 
keep the state at bay.72 By adhering to the spiritual-political foundations 
of their society, as provided by the kakean, the Alfurs legitimized and 
explained what outsiders such as Dutchmen saw as ‘mindless violence’. 
Kakean and harta offerings always provided legitimate causes for war – the 
‘Elpaputih war’ was no exception – observed even more ardently and instru-
mentally, as a reply to Dutch intervention. This helped the Alfurs to sustain 
66 Sachse, Seran, 138. See also Knaap, “The Saniri Tiga Air (Seram)”, 263-264, 267; 
Manuhutu, “Pacifi catie in Praktijk”, 278-280; Boulan-Smit, We, of the Banyan Tree, 46. In 
1886, the sanriri was called together again to calm down tensions and arrange political 
stability See: Fraassen, Ambon, 568-572.
67 After 1906, a special permit had to be granted by the local colonial offi cial for every kakean 
initiation ritual, each of which would require a number of heads to be hunted. See: NA 
MinKol 1850-1900 4675, Vb. 25-2-1893 n44, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 14-2-1890.
68 NA MinKol 1850-1900 1695, Vb. 23-12-1865 n10, herein: GovMol to GG, 23-1-1864.
69 Bartels, Guarding the Invisible Mountain, 36-42.
70 J.S. Aritonang and K.A. Steenbrink, A History of Christianity in Indonesia (Leiden/Boston: 
Brill, 2008), 109.
71 Bartels, In de Schaduw van de Berg Nunusaku, 40-43, 53-54. See for the infl uence of mauweng 
in saniri and the merging between saniri and kakean organization: Duyvendak, Het Kakean-
Genootschap van Seran, 83-95 (esp. 87-88 and 94-95). Whether Duyvendak is right in his 
claims that “the unity of the kakean keeps the saniri together”, that the “Kakean might 
have given rise to the saniri-bonds” and that “whoever is allowed entrance to the kakean-
community, has also gained access to the saniri-council […] gaining his civil-rights” 
(ibid., 94-95), is diffi cult to verify, and it seemed that most colonial offi cials and writers 
were not successful in fi nding what exactly bound them together, but it is assumable that 
both saniri and kakean interoperated on the same social-cultural plane of organization.
72 Bartels, Guarding the Invisible Mountain, 36-42.
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and continue the social spiritual-political foundations of their society, and 
prevent the entry of states, from outside and within.73 Hence, the social 
institutions that the Dutch tried to curtail were only more strongly adhered 
to when they started intervening in them.
The Dutch understood how politics and religion mixed, but missed 
how these bonds intensified as a result of their increasing presence. They 
were hypersensitive to anything that, in their narrow framework of social 
success, failed to meet their standards of ‘modernity’, to which the kakean 
was the very opposite. To them, the kakean was the pinnacle of Moluccan 
‘tribalism’ and ‘primitiveness’ an institute hostile to “civilization and Chris-
tianity”, standing in the way of colonial reform. They grew determined 
to banish it completely.74 Colonial paradigms of indigenous violence and 
instability hang high over these convictions, and should be seen in context 
of the self-legitimizing need of colonial sovereignty for maintaining ‘order, 
peace and tranquillity.’ Around 1900, undergirded by fierce colonial 
competition in Southeast Asia, the Dutch felt compelled to extent their 
control over Indonesia’s territories to round out their political sovereignty 
throughout the archipelago and to ‘prove’ their right to rule, by taking a 
firm stance against indigenous violence and proactively protecting their 
(future) subjects’ general wellbeing and safety. Failure of the state to control 
‘illicit’ or non-state-sanctioned violence in its proclaimed territory would 
disqualify its legitimacy and self-proclaimed right to impose its norms and 
institutions upon society, as the failure of indigenous rulers to do so was 
what disqualified them.75 By remaining outside the state and performing 
headhunting the Alfurs not only disqualified themselves in Dutch eyes 
against European standards of civilization, but also posed a threat to the 
continuation of the Dutch empire. So ultimately, violence attracted instead 
of repelled the colonial state.
Colonial intervention, Heijting explained, required a far greater invest-
ment in local administrative and military power. To fund such expansion, 
taxes were needed, and, as the decentralization-dogma of colonial fiscal poli-
tics held that all people were supposed to carry the costs of their own colo-
nization and administration process, these taxes needed to be levied locally. 
Still, as emphasized by both Directors Kuneman (Interior Administration) 
73 Ibid., 38, 41.
74 Verslag van het Beheer en den Staat der Oost-Indische Bezittingen 1859, 16; Van Hoëvell, 
“Bijschrift”, 516. See also Sachse, Het Eiland Seran, 95, cited in: Boulan-Smit, We, of the 
Banyan Tree, 46. See also Van Eerde, “Gegevens”, 533-535, and Sachse, Gegevens, 103-112.
75 See M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International 
Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 98-178, and G.W. Gong, The 
Standard of “Civilization” in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). The 
state’s ability to control and curtail violence would, however, remain limited in practice, 
due to its relatively weak police force and apparatus of justice administration. See R.B. 
Cribb, “Misdaad, Geweld en Uitbuiting in Indonesië”, in Bogaerts and Raben (eds.), Van 
Indië tot Indonesië, 31-48: 35-39; M. Bloembergen, De Geschiedenis van de Politie; Schulte 
Nordholt, A Genealogy of Violence.
Promise Pretence and Pragmatism.indb   313 22-04-21   17:35
314 Chapter 7
and E.A. Rovers (Finances, in office 1887-1893) only the ‘foreign inlanders’ on 
coastal Seram were considered ‘ready’ to be taxed in such a ‘modern way’, 
and the Alfurs, certainly, were not.76 The war in and around the Elpaputih 
Bay dragged on, and in 1884 Posthouder L.A. van Gent (in office 1882-1902) 
of Amahei (see map 7.1) reported that negotiations had failed and that 
Tanahu had again been attacked by ‘mountain-Alfurs’ of Sahuau.77 After 
the prahu of the posthouder was shot and a Dutch flagpole taken down – an 
outright expression of “contempt” for colonial authority – the chief military 
commander in Batavia urged Governor General Van Rees to end ‘unrest’ 
between mountain and beach nagari on Seram and Buru once and for all 
by sending troops.78 Instead, Van Rees, not a belligerent man, decided to 
transfer a sum of money to the Posthouder to settle the kakean dispute, but 
the Alfurs purposefully did not accept payment by a third party and the war 
continued.79 Over the course of the 1880s and 90s successive Residents G.J. 
van der Tuuk (1879-1880), Riedel and Heijting wrote a number of proposals 
for government expansion and reform to be funded by taxes, none of which 
were approved.80 All agreed that intervention was needed to ensure, as 
put by Director Kuneman, “diminishment of headhunting, so that through 
education and Christianity greater civilization and enlightenment would be 
introduced among the savage mountain tribes.”81 But this would require the 
significant investment of a full-scale military intervention at a time when 
the military had its hands full in Aceh, and the battalions stationed in the 
Moluccas were busy subjecting the Tanimbar, Kei and Aru islands (see map 
1.1 and 3.1).82 Introducing taxes, Resident G. Sieburgh (in office 1908-1910) 
feared, would only add fuel to the fire. He later attributed the failure to 
introduce taxation on Seram in 1880-1900, to what he called:
76 NA MinKol 1850-1900 4675, Vb. 25-2-1893 n44, herein: DirBB to GG, 4-8-1890, DirFin to 
GG, 6-12-1890, GG to MinKol, 23-10-1892 and RvI 26-12-1890.
77 ANRI AS GB MGS 4111, herein: MGS 5-2-1885: Res. Ambon to GG, 12-12-1884, Res. 
Ambon to Posthouder Amahei, 24-6-1884, Posthouder Amahei to Res. Ambon, 25-10-
1883 and 15-11-1884, Besl. 14-2-1885: Res. Ambon to GG, 31-12-1884, Posthouder Amahei 
to Res. Ambon, 17-12-1884.
78 ANRI AS GB MGS 4111, herein: Besl. 14-2-1885: RvI 6-2-1885, ‘Dep. Oorlog / Legercom-
mandant’ to GG 27-1-1885.
79 ANRI AS GB MGS 4111, herein: MGS 3-6-1885: RvI 6-5-1885, Res. Ambon to GG, 13-4-
1885, MGS 29-7-1885. See also Fraassen, Ambon, 565-577.
80 See: NA MinKol 1850-1900 6391, Mailr. 1879 n674, herein: Res. Ambon to GG 5-10-1879; 
NA MinKol 1850-1900 6393, Mailr. 1880 n146, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 5-12-1870; NA 
MinKol 1850-1900 6405, Mailr. 1881 n349, herein: Res. Ambon ‘Verslag over de stand van 
zaken […]’, 4-10-1880; NA MinKol 1850-1900 4675 Vb. 25-2-1893 n44, herein: Res. Ambon 
to GG 14-2-1890.
81 ANRI AS GB MGS 4111, herein: MGS 26-1-1-891: DirBB to GG, 4-8-1890.
82 NA MinKol OV 4675, Vb. 25-2-1893 n44, herein: DirBB to GG, 5-1-1892, DirFin to GG, 
12-7-1892, RvI 29-7-1892 and GG to MinKol, 23-10-1892; NA MinKol 1850-1900 2787, Vb. 
24-5-1875 n54 (geheim), herein: ‘Legercommandant’ to GG, 18-3-1875; NA MinKol 1850-
1900 3447, Vb. 26-9-1881 n20, herein: RvI 10-11-1876; NA MinKol 1850-1900 6389, Mailr. 
1879 n440/38, herein: Legercommandant to GG, 4-5-1879; NA MinKol 1850-1900 6447, 
Mailr. 1885 n81, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 31-12-1884.
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“the potential unfavourable consequences of introducing taxes among a less civ-
ilized people, that would give rise to the idea that establishing deeper ties with a 
government would mean having to pay up.”83
Major A.P. van de Siepkamp, army commander on Seram in the early 1900s, 
strongly condemned the policies of his predecessors, which he interpreted 
as, “compromise and pandering to popular needs”, fed by “a mentality 
that favoured ostensible peace over forceful governance.”84 This was a 
pungent slur on the policy of G.W.W.C. baron van Hoëvell (Resident in 
1891-1896), who believed in societal improvement through local political 
institutions rather than overthrowing the existing order using military 
violence. Van Hoëvell had allowed the Saniri to be organized once more 
in an attempt to gain a grip over the politics of the interiors and resettle 
relations with the Alfurs chiefs.85 He believed that the imagined opposition 
between coast and mountain no longer offered a fruitful basis to counter 
the continuing violence and advised improving the ability of the local 
administration to monitor the coastal nagari, restrict the payment of harta 
and impose punishments for headhunting.86 Newly appointed controleurs, 
funded by head taxes, would then establish and guard peace, order and 
healthcare to improve the relations among the nagari and ‘pacify’ the 
interiors. But the central government, whose ambitions always anticipated 
administrative feasibility, had grown impatient. Around 1900, when victory 
was proclaimed in the wars in Aceh and Southern Moluccas, troops were 
collected for a major expedition into the interior, heralding the end of the 
Alfurs’ relative autonomy.
7.3 Head taxes for headhunters
Enter the stranger-king
Warfare in the Seramese jungle was difficult and gruelling, so the Dutch 
used brief, targeted actions to coerce specific chiefs into cooperation. A 
series of military campaigns under the command of specially selected Aceh-
veterans was dispatched to conquer the interiors of Seram in 1899-1904.87 
83 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 651, Vb. 19-6-1909 n31, herein: Res. Ambon to DirFin, 25-1-
1909.
84 NA MinKol Pol. Verslag Buitengewesten, 377, herein ‘voorstel tot pacifi catie Ceram door 
Civiel Gezaghebber Maj. V.d. Siepkamp.’
85 NA MinKol 1850-1900 OV 4675, Vb. 25-2-1893 n44, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 14-9-1891.
86 In 1888, nine Alfurs in the coastal nagari Kairatu were convicted by the landraad for head-
hunting. See: NA MinKol 1850-1900 4675, Vb. 25-2-1893n44, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 
14-2-1890.
87 NA MinKol PVBBg 373 (Amboina 1899), herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 30-3-1899, Contro-
leur Saparua to Res. Ambon, 27-3-1899, PVBBg 375 (Amboina 1903-1905): herein: Res. 
Van Assen to GG, 1-9-1903 and 7-10-1903.
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Initially, it was difficult to find the right balance between violence and poli-
tics. Troops stationed at Piru were hardly able to resist the Alfurs’ furious 
attacks, and Resident E. van Assen (in office 1900-1905) warned how ‘poli-
cies of abstinence’ would make the Alfurs overly courageous, while undue 
“chastisement with gunfire” would only increase animosity towards the 
coastal nagari, the perpetual “subjects of the Alfurs’ aggression”, and cause 
more raids.88 Instead, Van Assen recommended directly contacting the 
Alfurs’ chiefs and establish diplomatic relations. Covered by military escort, 
starting with an outpost in Piru to be manned by Sachse, the local govern-
ment on West Seram would then carefully ‘police’ the Alfurs to enforce the 
prohibition on headhunting and once ‘civilized’ they would start paying 
head taxes to fund the administration.89 In many cases, internal divisions 
provided such an opportunity to mediate in warring factions, opportuni-
ties from which the Dutch had largely refrained prior to the Elpaputih 
war. This complex variety and hierarchy in families, clans and factions, 
and the tensions among them provided an opportunity for colonial army 
and civil officials to enter as ‘stranger-kings.’90 And it was their ‘deliberate 
blindness’ that enabled them to ignore the majority of these hierarchies and 
break through established patterns of rule and the ‘violent cycle’ of retribu-
tion and revenge. Simultaneously, rather than a clear preference for non-
statelessness, many societies in Indonesia favoured semi-incorporation of 
the quasi-state regime of the VOC and the twentieth-century colonial state 
alike, as this enabled the exertion of some influence over the society-state 
relationship, and provided chiefs with opportunities for social climbing, 
albeit, at the cost of much jealousy.91
Conquest, consolidation, and governmentality; the beginning of peace...
No longer under the radar of colonial surveillance, Seram was subjected 
to the same infamous Dutch utopian ambitions and attempts to improve 
society, as other regions before it. To the Dutch, subjugation would beget 
88 As expressed two years later in similar vocabulary by Fock in the case of West Sumatra 
(see Chapter 5). NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 244, Vb. 6-6-1904 n3, herein: Res. Ambon to 
GG, 13-11-1903: ‘Nota betr. de organisatie van bestuur van het eiland Ceram en andere 
gedeelten van het gewest Amboina’, Extract Besl. GG, 1-1-1904, Res. Ambon to GG, 
2-9-1903. See also Hagen, Koloniale Oorlogen in Indonesië , 409.
89 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 244, Vb. 6-6-1904 n3, Res. Abmon to GG, 13-11-1903: Nota betr. 
de organisatie van bestuur van het eiland Ceram en andere gedeelten van het gewest 
Amboina, Extract Besl. GG, 1-1-1904; Res. Ambon to GG, 2-9-1903.
90 David Henley has argued how in North Sulawesi the VOC used similar strategies to 
intermediate and thereby rule by distance, provided by the constant state of ‘warre’ 
among groups in the highlands. D. Henley, “Confl ict, Justice, and the Stranger-King. 
Indigenous Roots of Colonial Rule in Indonesia and Elsewhere”, MdAS 38:1 (2004), 
85-144.
91 D. Henley, Jealousy and Justice: The Indigenous Roots of Colonial Rule in Northern Sulawesi 
(Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 2002), 10-11, 89.
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peace and tranquillity, and peace and tranquillity would bring socio-
economic development. They believed that to bring ‘better governance’ 
and ‘establish peace’, they had to intervene in the identity of the Alfurs 
and change the conditions under which they lived, thus protecting them 
against their own ‘violent inclinations.’92 This combined different inter-
related methods of behavioural change: the appointment of an indirect 
ruling class, the reconstitution of life through resettlement and relocation of 
people into orderly village communities93 (instead of ‘village wandering’), 
the enhancement of productivity through the levying of labour services and 
taxes, and the curtailment of headhunting and warfare. The plan was, as 
usual, to appoint local chiefs as future self-governors in the regional bureau-
cracy, but unlike many other parts of Eastern Indonesia, Seram remained 
under direct governance. Dutch officials had little reliance on the governing 
capacities of Alfurs’ chiefs. The Alfurs were considered so desperately in 
need of ‘development’, that only under direct, targeted practices of inscrip-
tion, Christianization, military subjection, governance and taxes were they 
deemed likely to successfully become ‘subject-citizens’ of the colonial state.94
Meanwhile, new government sponsored shipping connections from 
South Seram to other parts of the archipelago would activate commerce 
and trigger a cash flow to enable the imposition of income taxes on Seram 
which would help fund a growing number of soldiers and controleurs.95 
The latter would replace the posthouders – whose intellectual capacities 
and administrative abilities were often the subject of critical judgement by 
higher ranking officials96 – in order to professionalize the civil administra-
tion on Seram. Van Assen calculated that their salaries could be fully funded 
by introducing Ambon’s head tax to Seram and the Kei and Aru islands 
92 Li, The Will to Improve, 15.
93 Village relocation and resettlement was a classic technique, practiced in many parts of 
the archipelago as a civilizational tool to break specifi c bonds between land and people 
to gain greater grip over their movements and behaviour. See for instance: Li, The Will to 
Improve, 72-78.
94 R.F. Ellen, “Pragmatism, Identity and the State: How the Nuaulu of Seram Have 
Re-Invented their Beliefs and Practices as ‘Religion’”, Wacana: Journal of the Humanities of 
Indonesia 15:2 (2015), 254-285: 254, 255, 259.
95 Such a line had been in place with a cheap KPM ship, but this ship burned down and 
had to be replaced with a more expensive one. See; NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 244, Vb. 
6-6-1904 n3, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, ‘Nota betreffende de organisatie van bestuur van 
het eiland Seram en andere gedeelten van het gewest Amboina’, p. 7-8.
96 Whereas Heijting thought these posthouders were “children of the land, familiar with land 
and people and speaking the native local tongue”, and hence better able to win the thrust 
of the “distrustful islanders” than Dutch administrators, Sachse’s successor, Major Van 
Siepkamp, was especially critical, claiming that posthouders were of “limited development 
and intellect” and favoured their own interests over the government’s which contributed 
to the diminishment of prestige of the European government. See: NA MinKol 1901-1953 
PVBBg. 377, herein: ‘Voorstel tot pacifi catie Ceram door Civiel Gezaghebber Maj. v.d. 
Siepkamp.’ See also Fraassen, Ambon, 472. See also Manuhutu, “Pacifi catie in Praktijk”, 
287-288; Sachse, Het Eiland Seran, 33.
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(see table 7.1).97 He considered that at least the coastal nagari to have been 
sufficiently influenced by “modern European governance”, to be “ready 
for taxation.”98 But to forestall resistance he urged keeping the assessment 
moderate at a maximum of a guilder per person annually.
As we have seen in other case studies, improvement of archipelago-
wide equity and justice was the primary purported motivation used by 
Dutch officials for the introduction of taxation. Including the Alfurs in 
carrying the burden of governance would alleviate the burden the admin-
istration of the Moluccas imposed upon ‘foreign inlanders’, Ambonese dati, 
and coastal nagari.99 Potential revenue of the head tax had been calculated to 
sufficiently cover the administration of the Alfurs.100 Note however, that the 
majority of revenue was be to collected at the smaller, better controller Kei 
and Aru islands, in essence part of the same Residency. Hence, the Alfurs 
still did not pay for ‘their own’ administration. The estimated total revenue 
of 48,393 guilders was deemed sufficient to fund the salaries of newly 
appointed officials, totalling 33,492 guilders; these were officials posted 
on Seram, but paid for by the inhabitants of the Kei and Aru islands.101 
Additional revenue, Van Assen hoped, could be acquired by abolishing 
the prohibition on importing liquor so that “rather than foreign traders 
[…] the government would reap the profits […] and benefits from alcohol 
sales.”102 After touring around the island and “consulting” (euphemism 
for negotiating) with various chiefs about potential popular acceptance of 
the head tax, he reported that as long as the assessment would not exceed 
a guilder per person, the tax would be accepted.103 Both Batavia and The 
Hague agreed to Van Assen’s plan and reserved a budget for administrative 
expansion on Seram.104
97 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 244, Vb. 6-6-1904 n3, herein: Res. Abmon to GG, 13-11-1903, 
Nota, 29-30.
98 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 244, Vb. 6-6-1904 n3, herein: Res. Abmon to GG, 13-11-1903, 30.
99 NA MinKol 1850-1900 OV 4675, Vb. 25-2-1893 n44, herein: DirFin to GG, 6-12-1890. For 
the same argument, see Sachse, Seran, 144.
100 NA MinKol 1850-1900 OV 4675, Vb. 25-2-1893n44, herein: DirFin to GG, 6-12-1890.
101 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 244, Vb. 6-6-1904 n3, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 13-11-1903, 15, 
31
102 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 244, Vb. 6-6-1904 n3, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 13-11-1903, 
33. Controlling alcoholism was also among the many governmental mechanisms by 
which the government hoped to cure the social ‘deviance’ and improve the lifestyles of 
the Alfurs. Herein lies an integral paradox which we fi nd in all forms of excises levied by 
a government to correct specifi c forms of behaviour; on the one hand, they supposedly 
prevent people from engaging in such behaviour, on the other hand, it is a revenue-
source for state, hence giving states also an interest in this behaviour.
103 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 244, Vb. 6-6-1904 n3, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 13-11-1903, 32.
104 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 244, Vb. 6-6-1904 n3, herein: ‘A2 over voorstellen voor belas-
ting invoering op Ceram’, GG to MinKol, 7-4-1904.
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Total Revenue (at 
assessment of one guilder)
Wahai 305 1,189 - 1,494
Amahei 1,639 3,063 - 4,702
Kairatu 2,590 1,587 - 4,177
Waru - 5,518 - 5,518
(Kei and Aru islands) 2,222 6,132 24,148 32,502
Total: 6,756 17,489 24,148 48,393
As in Aceh, the presence of the military had obviously had its effect on the 
‘negotiations’ with the chiefs. And as in Aceh, officials reported satisfactory, 
undisrupted and full payment of taxes since their introduction, despite an 
occasional refusal which was usually dealt with by the military on patrol.106 
Sachse signalled enormous improvement:
“The mountainous Alfurs have abandoned their provocative, rash attitude and 
follow our orders quite well […] the coastal population renounced its indolent 
attitude and nagari rebuilt […] so that people stop wandering and the interiors 
are repopulated.”107
... and the continuation of war
The threat of war however never faded. In 1904, in the nagari Tihulale on the 
South coast of West Seram, villagers refused to perform the nagari services 
that the government had introduced in various parts of Seram to carry out 
its infrastructural projects.108 They assaulted the kepala nagari and hung 
the Dutch flag upside down during Van Assen’s visit. Order was restored 
by the military.109 This rendered Van Assen unconvinced of his own plan 
to introduce head taxes in the interiors, and he advised limiting its use 
to coastal areas. The Raad van Indië admitted that colonial presence was 
still too weak to enforce tax payment, and ideally “undertaking military 
campaigns to enforce people to pay with military violence […]” was 
averted.110 Yet, the council recommended the replacement of Van Assen as 
“his attitude confirmed the common impression that he did not possess 
105 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 244, Vb. 6-6-1904 n3, herein: Res. Abmon to GG, 13-11-1903, 31.
106 For instance: Sachse, Gegevens, 69; Sachse, Seran, 144-145; Stbl. 1910 n15; NA MinKol 1901-
1953 OV 231, Vb. 21-3-1904 n4, herein: ‘Verslag’ Res. Ambon to GG, 20-4-1906, 20-5-1906 
and 2-7-1906; NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 244, Vb. 6-6-1904 n3, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 
2-9-1903.
107 Sachse, Gegevens, 74.
108 Ibid., 87-88, 89-91; Sachse, Seran, 85.
109 Sachse, Gegevens, 74.
110 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 354, Vb. 13-1-1906 n67, herein: RvI 10-3-1905.
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the required leadership and strength to be regarded a capable governor.”111 
Sachse was also replaced, as both he and Van Assen had refused to send a 
mobile brigade to Wahai, where peace had just been restored.112 The govern-
ment, however, had grown impatient. The central army commander was 
ordered to recruit a “solid captain, who had earned his spurs in Aceh” as 
civil Governor on West Seram and end “needless writing back and forth.”113 
This became the abovementioned Van de Siepkamp. Though impressed 
with the information acquired by Sachse and Van Assen on the Alfurs’ 
‘tribal’ organization114, he pointed out that the Patasiwa, “recognized the 
Dutch East Indies government only in name and in fact maintained a 
hostile attitude.”115 Van de Siepkamp agreed that the rightful grudges of the 
Alfurs towards the coastal nagari had caused the feuds and raids, but also 
strongly believed in the primitive nature of the Alfurs as “physically agile, 
dynamic, distinctive, distrustful and mendacious” beings to be distrusted 
and disarmed to safely implement head taxes.116 A final series of military 
campaigns into the interiors of West Seram subjected the nagari Hunitetu, 
Rumah Soal, Tala, Sapalewa and Ahiolo.117 Following the example of 
Aceh, Seram was subsequently ruled by military officials conforming to 
the aggressive style of twentieth-century Dutch ‘ethical-imperialism.’118 
Instead of premeditated ideologies and ambitions of peaceful compliance, 
the Dutch ultimately resorted to militarism to counter resistance, all in the 
name of development. Violence, a trademark ascribed to the Alfurs, once 
again became the pivot of Dutch colonial rule. In 1915, when kakean rituals 
were (once more) prohibited, the response was a ‘last desperate uprising’ 
111 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 354, Vb. 13-1-1906 n67, herein: RvI 10-3-1905.
112 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 444, Vb. 21-3-1907 n4, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 27-4-1905.
113 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 307, Vb. 25-4-1905 n28, herein: 1e Gov. Sec. to Army 
Commander, 11-3-1905.
114 Van de Siepkamp claimed that only during Van Assen’s and Sachse’s terms, the ‘tribal 
division’ between Patasiwa and Patalima became known, but perhaps he had not yet read 
Riedel’s Sluik en Kroesharige Rassen (1886) or the many other books that do mention these 
different terms.
115 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 444, Vb. 21-3-1907 n4, herein: ‘Commandant van de mobiele 
colonne te Seram’ to GG, date unknown.
116 Ibid.
117 Sachse, Seran, 166-181.
118 Ibid., 190; Boulan-Smit, We, of the Banyan Tree, 64-65. In 1882, Seram had been reorganized 
into four districts (Wahai, [later West Seram] under a civil governor and Kairatu, Amahei 
and Waru under a posthouder). In 1905, the governor of West Seram became governor of 
the whole island. Governance on Seram was appointed to military offi cials in times of 
revolt, alternated with civil governors (an Assistant-Resident) in times of peace, which 
was only during 1906-1907. To ‘stimulate civilization’, two parts of East Seram (Atiahu 
and Werinama) were put under jurisdiction of the Resident of Banda, who had so little 
infl uence over it that it was rendered to the resident of Ambon. See NA MinKol 1901-1953 
OV 244, Vb. 6-6-1904 n3, herein: Res. Ambon to GG; ‘Nota betreffende de organisatie 
van bestuur van het eiland Seram en andere gedeelten van het gewest Amboina’; Sachse, 
Seran, 131-132.
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in the area around Sapalewa. It was brutally quelled, while the involved 
people were forcefully moved closer to the coast.119
Violence in itself set the limits of governmentality. Colonization 
provoked complicated reactions to which officials responded by using their 
wide repertoire of frequently violent, interventionist tools. Sachse’s reports 
in particular demonstrate the techniques the colonial army and govern-
ment used to subject specific regions. Weapons were confiscated120, ‘rebels’ 
(mostly unwilling chiefs) fined or imprisoned, people regrouped into newly 
created soa, nagari were relocated and kakean rituals prohibited.121 Inscrip-
tion into colonial tax registers enforced a paper reality where “wandering 
Alfurs, unused to living in settlements”, were to settle down in kampung 
or nagari.122 Smaller communities of related or allied hamlets, which were 
considered too small to effectively control and tax, were regrouped as much 
as possible into sizable soa and nagari.123 But these measures had limited 
success. New ‘kakean houses’ were secretly constructed to continue initiation 
rituals, fearing that abandoning them after full conversion to Christianity124 
would only expedite inclusion into the colonial state’s registration network. 
In the Alfurs’ experience, conversion, disarmament, relocation, registration 
and taxation, were all components of the same colonial force, and behav-
ioural change in any aspect of them, might empower the others.
As always, enforcement of rule was only possible through indirect rule. 
Chiefs that accepted Dutch supremacy, like so many Indonesian chiefs before 
them, soon found themselves trapped in contracts promising appealing 
salaries, a minimum of 8% collectors wages, and kwarto services from three 
to five men per month which, according to Sachse, when replaced by an 
additional five-guilder head tax would “incite the regent to devote himself 
to the hygienic care of the his subjects, to diminish the number of deaths 
and increase the number of marriages and births.”125 Appointed through the 
same instrumentation as elsewhere in the archipelago, copied from Ambon, 
they were to become the chiefs as displayed in the image of the beginning of 
119 Sachse, Seran, 186.
120 See Sachse, Het Eiland Seran, 73 and Sachse, Seran, 178. Seram became a bustling para-
dise for gun traders or ‘smugglers’, as its challenging geography and rocky shorelines 
provided ample opportunity to evade Dutch surveillance. Frequently, people in a formally 
‘disarmed’ regions were caught still in possession of one or more fi rearms. See NA MinKol 
PVBBg 377, 21-03-1907 nr. 4 1905-1906 herein: Mailr. 1110, pp. 3-10, and Mailr. 1267.
121 Sachse, Gegevens, 84-85, 86-95. Fines for chiefs were usually imposed in kind, for instance 
in damar or sago. See also Sachse, Seran, 95.
122 NA MinKol 1901-1953 1230, Vb. 14 Aug. 1914 no. 41, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 12-1-
1914.
123 Ruinen, Ethnografi sche Gegevens, 228; Boulan-Smit, We, of the Banyan Tree, 57.
124 Missionary activities ever since the seventeenth century had attempted to convert local 
populations and counter headhunting and other ‘barbaric’ and ‘superstitious’ practices 
to reduce internal war and confl icts. Often, however, Christianity was included and 
integrated into existing socio-cultural expressions of religion. See: De Jong, “Kerk, Adat 
en Theologie”, 323-324, 325-326.
125 Sachse, Seran, 134-135,
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this chapter, elevated into nagari chiefs from their original position as congre-
gated clans, into supposedly just rulers, leavened with bureaucratic authority 
as exponents of the wisdom of colonial improvement schemes, but in reality 
becoming the typical authoritarian indirect rulers, or Oriental despots, as 
despotic as anywhere else.126 Obviously, as in the case of the Ambonese raja, 
Javanese village officials, Minangkabau family heads and the Acehnese ulee-
balang, the Alfurs chiefs lost most of their traditional power and respect as 
their influence and wealth started depending on Dutch military support and 
the widening of the economic gap between the people and newly installed 
elites that emerged. Their appointment secured the entrance of the Dutch 
into Alfurs society, and with the chiefs in their pockets, the Dutch dared to 
commence introducing taxes. Prevalent, much repeated objections against 
taxation, such as that the Alfurs were fixated on barter trade, insufficiently 
monetized127, unaccustomed to regularity, wholly economically undevel-
oped or just “insusceptible and unripe for governance”128 were discarded, 
to allow for the imposition of taxes.129 It appeared the ‘stranger-kings’ were 
no longer strangers, but now they represented a full-fledged state, and this 
state demanded change. In 1906 the coastal nagari were subjected to the head 
tax of 1891, which delivered 13,951.50 guilders in 1906 and 19,558 in 1907.130
The political-fiscal consolidation of Seram was presented as the integra-
tion and transformation of ‘hilir people’ into a governed society of ‘civilized’ 
taxpayers according to the development theories of the colonial govern-
ment.131 Rather hollow claims not reflective of the creative ways in which 
the colonised just as easily reversed matters and used these same state-tools 
as weapons against the state.
7.4 Vehicle for change: the total tax experience
In 1905, Seram was considered sufficiently consolidated as a territory of 
the colonial state, and it was considered time to ‘consolidate’ its people as 
taxpaying members of a colonial society. The Alfurs were still considered 
to be living under conditions of ‘abundancy’, where sago and meat were 
produced and people only had to ‘hold out their hands’ for the provision 
of their daily needs. This, as argued by Van Assen’s successor, A.J. Quarles 
de Quarles (1905-1908), rendered them entirely unaccustomed to regular 
labour, unmonetized and untaxable.132 Hence, the Alfurs were to be 
126 Sachse, Het Eiland Seran, 71-72.
127 Riedel mentions that in the later nineteenth century some copper money came in use: 
J.G.F. Riedel, De Sluik- en Kroesharige Rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua (‘s Gravenhage: 
Nijhoff, 1886), 27.
128 ANRI AS GB MGS 4111, herein: MGS 26-1-1891: DirBB to GG, 4-8-1890.
129 ANRI AS GB Besl. 1522, herein: Besl. 28-1-1890: RvI 13-11-1889, DirFin to GG 9-11-1889.
130 Stbl. 1906 n76; NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 231, Vb. 21-3-1904 n4, herein: Verslag Res. 
Ambon to GG, 20-4-1906, 20-5-1906 and 2-7-1906.
131 See Boulan-Smit, We, of the Banyan Tree, 68-69.
132 NA MinKol MvO 311 (Quarles de Quarles, 1908).
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subjected to the colonial political-economy of development to solve ‘unpro-
ductivity.’ And land being abundant, unwillingness to labour was seen as 
the principle limitation to productivity.
Consolidation of a paper reality
In 1907, Quarles de Quarles observed that Seram, “though not yet an open 
book”, had been steadily mapped. Relocation of villages, military assistance 
and greater insight in the Alfurs’ society paved the way for new attempts 
and proposals for taxation. He wrote an ambitious new tax plan for interior 
Seram, the Tanimbar, Babar and Damar islands, in which he claimed that 
the introduction of head taxes in the interiors would prompt:
“even better acquaintance with land and people, as officials […] would travel the 
regions for the assessments, dotting i’s and crossing t’s, establishing even closer 
relations between taxpaying people and our administration.”133
In a matter of years, he assured, the whole of Seram would be paying tax. 
He intended to subject nagari collectively to taxation, following the example 
of Ambon’s nagari tax, to be paid either in money or in kind. De Quarles felt 
confident “that the consequences of their [the Alfurs] subjection to Dutch 
authority […] came with taking part in public expenses” which he consid-
ered “…instrumental […] to stimulate the Alfurs to take the products of 
their lands […] to a market to be transformed into money.”134 Not everyone 
shared in this optimistic, classic expression of the argument that taxes had 
“educative cogency” and would be the instrument with which to monetize 
the Alfurs’ economy and boost the project of taking on responsibility for 
self-development. Director of Finances J.P.C. Hartevelt, not a fan of De 
Quarles’ “bold theories”, believed that establishing taxation as a means of 
exerting influence over economic behaviour was “putting the cart before 
the horse”135 and too precarious a strategy; failure to implement taxes, he 
contended, could be interpreted locally as the incompetence of the govern-
ment, thereby undermining Dutch authority.136 To the Director, taxes were 
a final ‘administrative stage’, only to be implemented in regions that were 
fully ‘pacified’. Thus, the Damar, Tanimbar, Kei and Aru islands, considered 
to be sufficiently stabilized, were subjected to head taxes in 1908, while the 
interiors of Seram remained exempted.137
133 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 587, Vb. 30-9-1908 n6, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 10-2-1908.
134 ANRI AS GB Besl. 1522, herein: Bestl. 5-5-1907: MGS 5-05-1907: Res. Ambon to GG, 11-9-
1906.
135 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 587, Vb. 30-9-1908 n6, herein: DirFin to GG, 13-6-1908.
136 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 587, Vb. 30-9-1908 n6, herein: DirFin to GG, 13-6-1908. See the 
same in ANRI AS GB Besl. 1522, herein: Besl. 5-5-1907: MGS 5-05-1907: DirFin to GG, 
4-3-1907 and Res. Ambon to DirFin, 3-12-1906.
137 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 587, Vb. 30-9-1908 n6, herein: GG to MinKol, 7-7-1908; Stbl. 
1908 n25.
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Seen from the viewpoint of Batavia, Seram simply was not worth the 
trouble of risking further upheaval or squandering the budget, the greatest 
of colonial administrative sins. But as always, as time passed and office-
holders changed, so did policy. When the progressive Governor-General 
A.W.F. Idenburg took office (in 1909-1916), De Quarles’ successor, Sieburgh, 
who agreed that taxes had ‘educative cogency’, reissued the tax plan. As 
long as “excessive fiscalism” was avoided, he claimed, the Alfurs could 
be subjected to forms of ‘gentle pressure’ and would soon realize that tax-
payment was good for them.’138 Sieburgh gained approval, and stealthily 
introduced a head tax of 2 to 7.50 guilders over the whole of Seram in 1910.139 
In Amahei and Wahei, the most densely populated districts, the head tax 
was replaced with the company tax of 1914, with a flexible rate of 0.40 
guilders tax per 10 guilders in income. In 1914-1920, an average amount of 
5.30 guilders per person was collected in Amahei and Wahai, and revenue 
showed steady growth until the Post-World War I recession (see graph 
7.1).140 After a series of short experiments in various parts of the Eastern 
provinces, the government concluded that the capacity for resistance had 
been minimized and the whole of Eastern Indonesia, including Seram, was 
incorporated in the unified income tax of 1920.141
fl.
Amahei totalWahai
Graph 7.1. Income tax revenue levied from indigenous peoples in Amahei and Wahai, 1914-
1920.
138 NA MinKol MvO 312: G. Sieburgh, Ambiona, 1910, pp. 248-249.
139 Ibid.
140 Source: Sachse, Seran, 145. For Wahai in 1910 and Amahei in 1920 data is missing.
141 This even included parts of New-Guinee, after proclaimed successful experiments in the 
districts of Okabe and Kumbe. ANRI DepFin 357, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 18-6-1914: 
Ass-Res South New Guinea to Res. Ambon, 16-5-1914 and AdvBzBG to DirBB, 12-9-1914.
H07_Promise Pretence and Pragmatism.indd   324 06-05-21   12:50
Coerced improvement: Taxing within and beyond the state in Seram, c. 1860-1920 325
The practice of taxation and limitations of governmentality
The Dutch celebrated their intervention as a success. Through a couple of 
technological changes in the fabric of society and by imposing taxes, they 
claimed to have established social improvement. Local officials reported 
undisrupted full tax payment.142 The Alfurs, it was claimed, paid above the 
archipelago-wide average tax assessment of indigenous people in the Outer 
Islands.143 De Quarles wrote of “eager, swift and timely tax payment.”144 
Sachse reported a significant reduction of arrears, and predicted how 
further institutionalization of corvée would help to counter alcoholism 
and instil greater obedience and respect.145 The controleur of Amahei (1918-
1922), G.L. Tichelman (whom we have met in Chapter 2 as the author of the 
article about tax gatherings in North Sumatra), celebrated the ‘educative 
effects’ taxation had had. He signified how the Alfurs easily met their tax 
assessments, by performing a few days of extra labour to earn cash, without 
experiencing a much higher burden.146
At the same time, much resistance was still reported.147 Sachse mentions 
that there was not yet a “politically favourable state, because of deeply 
rooted disillusion and dissatisfaction about the prohibition of kakean and 
baileo” (baileo were also prohibited because of the alleged strong connections 
between saniri and kakean).148 He expected that “many years would likely 
pass before these feelings would disappear.”149 The contradiction between 
these rather gloomy expectations and the more optimistic descriptions of 
the above, reflect how the various ambitions of officials themselves were 
already at odds with each other. They were tasked with ensuring order 
142 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 231, Vb. 21-3-1904 n4, herein: Verslag Res. Ambon to GG, 20-4-
1906, 20-5-1906 and 2-7-1906; NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 244, Vb. 6-6-1904 n3, herein: Res. 
Ambon to GG, 2-9-1903.
143 Fievez de Malines van Ginkel, Verslag, 24-25, 28-29, 53-54.
144 NA MinKol MvO 311 de Quarles, 1908, pp. 135-138.
145 Sachse, Seran, 190; NA MinKol OV 444, Vb. 21-3-1907 n4, herein: Res. Abmon to GG, 
20-5-1906. According to Sachse, “regular labour, supervision on hygiene and especially 
the prevention of opportunity to drink sago wine” by imposing corvée services was 
“defi nitely to the benefi t of the people.” Sachse, Gegevens, 20 32-35, 37-38 (quote) and the 
same in Sachse, Het Eiland Seran, 85, also quoted in: Boulan-Smit, We, of the Banyan Tree, 
54. Sometimes, tax and corvée confl icted; in 1915 work on the road between Murikau 
and Piru was temporarily suspended to enable the people to pay their taxes. See Sachse, 
Gegevens, 99.
146 NA Collectie 133 G.L. Tichelman, 1907-1940 7: MvO Amahei, 1922, pp. 290-298.
147 Resistance against taxation was reported in 1915 in Maneo and Amahei. See NA MinKol 
MvO 313: H.J.A. Raedt van Oldenbarnevelt, Amboina, 1915 in Van Fraassen, Bronnen 
Betreffende De Midden-Molukken, p. 394; MvO 314 (Van Drunen Littel, 1918) in Van 
Fraassen, Bronnen Betreffende De Midden-Molukken, p. 570.
148 Sachse, Gegevens, 101. For these prohibitions, see: Stbl. 1910 n15; Stbl. 1914 n132.
149 As quoted by the Resident of Ambon in NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 1230, Vb. 14-8-1914 
n41, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 12-1-1914. See also: NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 812, Vb. 
31-3-1911 n9. See for similar lines of argumentation: NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 949, Vb. 
24-7-1912 n48, herein: Nota Ass-Res Seram, 20-6-1911.
Promise Pretence and Pragmatism.indb   325 22-04-21   17:35
326 Chapter 7
and stability, finding local sources of revenue, covering the costs of local 
governance as well as exercising a governmental rationality and improving 
the human condition of the newly subjected populations. The only means 
by which they could carry out these wild ambitious and often conflicting 
instructions was through the power of indigenous chiefs, but awarding 
these chiefs canes, suits and titles was not the same as communicating 
the governmental agenda. Traveling on Seram was a burdensome and 
dangerous endeavour that few officials were willing to undertake, and all 
government outposts were located on, or near the coast. Hence, the entire 
execution of the integrated practice of taxation – population counts, drafting 
assessments lists, organizing tax gatherings, collecting taxes, etc. – was 
left to local chiefs. These chiefs cared little for the government’s develop-
mental agenda, as, like all chiefs in Indonesia, at the end of the day they 
were rewarded or punished according to the revenue they collected. Their 
selection was dependent on their fluency in Malay and their administrative 
skills, and not necessarily on their great governmental skills or their ties 
with local communities.150 Uncompliant chiefs were replaced. Additionally, 
the system was founded on social structures and settlements ‘invented’ by 
the colonial governments, such as soa, rather than the origin groups (luma 
inai)151 and left entirely in the hands of elevated clan chiefs whose primary 
interest was to keep pleasing colonial officials with adequate tax funds 
and reports of stability and peace. The result, as recognized by Tichelman, 
inheritance lines were broken, chiefs replaced, social orders remodelled152, 
and the influence of traditional institutions such as saniri, pela and kakean 
was curtailed.153
Obviously this elicited protest and the Alfurs ignored the new joint 
administration as much as possible and ‘escaped’ their designated villages 
on a regular basis in order to evade registration, tax assessments, forced 
conscription and coerced labour.154 Resident H.J.A. Raedt van Olden-
barnevelt (1910-1915) mentions how forced settlement in nagari and 
construction of roads was experienced as such a restriction of freedom that 
many refused to be registered or reveal their names and took off into the 
forests.155 The local army official had to use force to bring them back.156 
150 Ruinen, Ethnografi sche Gegevens, 228-229.
151 Boulan-Smit, We, of the Banyan Tree, 51.
152 Tichelman, De Onder-Afdeling Amahei, 696-698. See also Ruinen, Ethnografi sche Gegevens, 
230-231. See also R. Ellen, Nuaulu Religious Practices: the Frequency and Reproduction of 
Rituals in Moluccan Society (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2014), 254.
153 De Vries, Bij de Berg-Alfoeren op West-Seran, 140; Sachse, Gegevens, 65-66; see also: R.F. 
Ellen, “Conundrums about Panjandrums: On the Use of Titles in the Relations of Political 
Subordination in the Moluccas and along the Papuan Coast”, Indonesia 41 (1986), 47-62.
154 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 1230, Vb. 14-8-1914 n41, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 12-1-1914. 
See also Manuhutu, “Pacifi catie in Praktij”, 298-299, and Tauern, Patasiwa und Patalima, 
177.
155 Boulan-Smit, We, of the Banyan Tree, 53, 56.
156 NA MinKol 1901-1953 1230 Vb. 14-8-1914 n41, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 12-1-1914.
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Other local strategies of resilience involved constructing ‘fake’, provisional, 
ramshackle houses on the beach and only inhabiting these when the 
government inspection occured.157 Only under the implicit threat of military 
violence were the Dutch able to enforce village inhabitancy and payment of 
tax. In august 1917, for instance, the posthouder in Kesula was assisted by an 
army brigade for tax collection, and reported that the “tax was paid without 
disruption.”158
The frames of colonial governance did not allow for the admittance of 
failure. Non-payment of taxes became the greatest of colonial crimes, inter-
preted as the full rejection of Dutch governance and schemes for improve-
ment, for which the chiefs were held responsible. Hence, as in other parts of 
the archipelago, chiefs would think twice about failing to deliver, extorting 
as much as they could from their people – extortion was widely reported – to 
the satisfaction of the Dutch, underreporting on the latest population count, 
or renegotiating, thereby developing into true ‘oriental despots.’159 In the 
absence of Dutch administrative capacity, the role and behaviour of these 
chiefs started too look very like that of tax revenue farmers, the only differ-
ence being that they were formally appointed within the colonial adminis-
tration. The only welfare development taking place, was that of the chiefs.
As we have seen in the preceding chapters, other interest groups 
emerged, testing the boundaries of the state. In the 1920s, when villagers in 
the nagari of Rutah refused to perform nagari services, it appeared the entire 
population had joined the anticolonial party Insulinde, under the impres-
sion that party-membership would remove their obligation to perform 
services and pay taxes.160 People who paid their party contribution claimed 
they opted for alternative governance, and refused to pay taxes or perform 
services.161 According to Tichelman, this rendered “the small nagari man the 
157 Manuhutu, “Pacifi catie in Praktijk”, 277-278, 295.
158 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 2001, Vb. 7-6-1919 n50, herein: Ass-Res Ambon to Res. Ambon, 
11-5-1918. Guns, however, were still widely available as full confi scation proved impos-
sible, and offi cials always needed to remain very careful when heading on an inspection 
tour. See: NA MinKol PVBBg 377, herein: Mailr. 1110, pp. 3-10, and Mailr. 1267. See also 
Sachse, Gegevens, 87-88, 89-91; Sachse, Seran, 85 and Manuhutu, “Pacifi catie in Praktijk”, 
293.
159 NA MinKol MvO 314 (Van Drunen Littel, 1918) in Van Fraassen, Bronnen Betreffende De 
Midden-Molukken, p. 570; Sachse, Seran, 20, 32-28, 122-135; Sachse, Gegevens, 99; Sachse, 
Het Eiland Seran, 85.
160 The ‘Indische Nationale Partij’ (Indonesian Nationalist Party or PNI; Partai Nasional Indo-
nesia) had made similar promises across the archipelago and also in various nagari on 
Seram. Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatists, 96.
161 These parties sought fair distribution of taxation, equality to the law and to some extend 
regional unifi cation of rules and regulations in diminishment of corvée and taxes. See 
Anonymous, “10 Geboden der Sarekat Ambon”, in Mena Moeria I/6 (1922); see also 
NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 2441, Vb. 3-8-1922 n64, herein: Legercommandant to GG, 
19-7-1920; NA MinKol 1901-1953 Mailr. 149, Mailr. 1920 n2713, herein: Res. Ambon to 
GG 20-8-1920; NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 2153, Vb. 16-7-1920 n69, herein: ‘Kort verslag’ 
Res. Ambon to GG 24-11-1919; NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 2406, Vb. 12-4-1922 n37, herein: 
Gezaghebber Amahei to Ass-Res Seram, 17-4-1920.
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scapegoat of sly Insulinde leaders.”162 The typical colonial reflex was to catch 
alleged ‘instigators’ (‘onruststoker’) and thus to restore colonial political 
order. But officials found an able competitor had appeared, challenging their 
authority over the Alfurs using issues of taxation. As elsewhere in Indonesia, 
the inability of the government to fulfil its promises of improved welfare 
and social development created a space for new players who sketched out 
plans for a more appealing future, developing a political awareness and 
activism that in the long term could not and would not be contained.163
Conclusion
On Seram the Dutch encountered a puzzlingly complex society of a people 
that by all standards was beyond their scope of governance, taxation and 
development and embodied a challenging ‘governmental problem’ which 
the Dutch civilizing mission was designed to ‘cure.’ More than that, the 
Alfurs unbound, stateless lifestyle, animistic beliefs and practicing of head-
hunting posed a threat to the continuation and internal order of the empire 
and its policies of progress and improvement, in which there was no room 
for exceptions or social deviance. Dutch colonial ideology was intolerant 
to strategies of social organization that discorded to its sacred formula of 
administrative governance, even though such strategies, as in the case of 
the Alfurs’ , were in fact quite successful in providing alternative models to 
statehood to keep administration and settled village life at bay.
Hence, the ingrained patterns of the Alfurs’ ways to maintain public 
and spiritual order (as expressed in inter-village relations of war and 
peacemaking) were ignored and discarded as ‘mindless’ and ‘perpetual 
violence’, a ‘dangerous fusion of politics and ritual’ born out of ‘vengeful’ 
and ‘barbaric’, ‘uneconomic’ and ‘self-destructive’ behaviour, symptomatic 
of the imagined indigenous inability to reach or even strive for sociocultural 
progress, civilization and modern statecraft. In the initial unwillingness of 
the Alfurs to ‘cooperate’ the Dutch saw a clear confirmation of their hypoth-
esis that they were still ‘unready’ to be governed and unfit to be condi-
tioned by the beneficial effects of taxation and administration. Seen from 
within the parameters of the colonial ‘truth regime’, such ‘native incapacity’ 
legitimized military intervention and forceful conversion and reform.
Both the alleged aims and methods in the subsequent colonization 
process were governmental: to replace forest wandering, headhunting and 
loose social structures with the planned colonial system of village inhabit-
ancy, administration and taxation, to thereby ‘improve’, ‘correct’ and disci-
pline behaviour and ‘optimize’ the Alfurs’ lives and economies and enable 
their integration into the colonial fiscal state and global economy. However, 
162 NA MinKol 1901-1953 OV 2406, Vb. 12-4-1922 n37, herein: Gezaghebber Amahei to 
Ass-Res Seram, 17-4-1920.
163 NA MinKol 1901-1953 Mailr. 135, Mailr. 1920 n553, herein: Res. Ambon to GG, 22-4-1920.
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while at first glance Dutch colonization of interior Seram seems, indeed, 
to have exemplified a process of registration and social reform, in reality 
it was a regime of oppression, extortion and military violence. Once again, 
the entire tax practice was placed in the hands of appointed chiefs. Entering 
as ‘stranger-kings’, the Dutch offered these chiefs various attractive new 
bases to enhance their power. This allowed the Dutch to keep their distance 
from local social hierarchy and administration. As in Ambon, Java, West 
Sumatra and Aceh, local leaders were elevated into governing elites under 
contracts as indirect rulers of empire, to enforce order and levy taxation and 
services and uphold the image of a supposedly almighty, unified, equitable 
tax state. They were invested with the power to provide information on 
which to base the tax assessments, and it was in their interest to extract 
the maximum, rather than to harness the educational functions of taxation 
and introduce social progress. The loyalty of these chiefs was pragmatic, the 
resultant form of governance equally so.
Figure 7.2, shows the aforementioned controleur Tichelman and his 
wife preparing for Queen’s Day at Amahei (the the ‘W’ stands for Queen 
Wilhelmina). Such photos of Tichelman, many of them taken in his back-
yard or close to his home, support the image which the government tried to 
portray of its administrators on Seram, leading an orderly life on what used 
to be the domain of violent headhunters, now a peaceful place, brought 
under the control of the strong, unified colonial state. Yet, Amahei was only 
a stone’s throw away from Rutah, the village exemplified above, where 
people refused to perform their services in 1920, and joined political parties 
instead, symbolizing how the true authority of the Dutch government 
reached, perhaps, not much further than the controleurs’ house. Erecting 
triumphal arches and celebrating Queen’s Day expressed rule, but did not 
embody it, just as suiting-up indirect rulers and awarding them sceptres 
and titles was not a successful model of decreeing order or enhancing local 
development. Expressing the power of the state via symbolism, ritualism, 
and pomp and circumstance, elements attributed to the indigenous ‘theatre 
state’, were at the heart of colonial governance.164
On Seram, the apex of Dutch imperial aspiration seemed to have coin-
cided with the nadir of its administrative capacity. This was no coincidence. 
Seram is perhaps the clearest example addressed in this thesis of how 
much colonial fiscal systems benefited from keeping distance. State and 
society worked at cross purposes and interests, and the colonial govern-
ment had met many rivals for influence over indigenous society, such as 
local ritual-political institutions like kakean or pela networks or, later on, 
nationalist parties. These were constrained by colonialism into a framework 
164 To compare, as put by B. Cohn: “From the eighteenth century onward, European states 
increasingly made their power visible not only through ritual performance and dramatic 
display, but through the gradual extenson of ‘offi cialising’ procedures that established 
and extended their capacity [...]”. B. Cohn, Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The 
British in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 62.
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that required mutual interaction and engagement. Resilience, desertion and 
migration became new techniques of escaping the state; violence as a means 
of resistance lost popularity as the Dutch had proven to be equally, or 
perhaps even more violent than the Alfurs. As a result, colonial governance 
and taxation became a process of deal-brokering, negotiation, improvisation 
and response and compromise, to astute strategies of evasion and resistance 
under the constantly looming threat of violence. The far-reaching ambitions 
of Dutch fiscal policies were not transmitted by handing out titles, sceptres 
and suits or celebrating Queen’s Day, but depended on changing the living 
realities of popular resistance and the responses of chiefs and administrators 
on site. This should not be seen as just the failure of European models or of 
indigenous people to adapt to these, but rather as the creation of negotiated 
colonial governance in its own right. After all, it were the occupied, and 
not the occupiers, who determined how difficult it was to manage the colo-
nial empire. The apparently powerless had that much power. Resultantly, 
taxation schemes and related practices were worked out by the interaction 
between Dutch colonizers and indigenous society through pragmatism 
and resourcefulness. The disruption of the Alfures’ society by colonialism 
perhaps created as much anxiety as opportunity for both colonizers and 
colonized; to the government, the ‘failure’ of governmentality was easily 
absorbed in the reality of reliance on indigenous middlemen, while to the 
Alfurs, the limits of state administration and governmentality provided the 
opportunity to continue their much-preferred, stateless lifestyles.
Figure 7.2. G.L. Tichelman and his wife and notables preparing for Queen’s Day in Amahei, 
ca. 1920.
Source: UBL, KITLV A185, 83518.
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This dissertation began by noticing there was a wide gap between the aspi-
rations of the Dutch colonial government to reform its tax system and the 
capacity of its administrative machinery to do so. In the introduction, this 
was identified as a problem of colonial governance, related to the tensions 
between grand colonial ambitions to improve and reform and the colonial 
state’s inherent exploitative and imperious nature. This was compared 
to recent literature that has identified similar dynamics in colonial states 
elsewhere, emphasizing how they were structurally shaped by local social 
foundations, conditions and limitations rather than metropolitan blueprints 
or ideological guidelines. Overarching assumptions of fiscal power, repre-
sentation and governmentality did not work the local operation of colonial 
governance. Thus, this dissertation asked what the consequences were of 
the programmatic ‘modernization’ of the Dutch tax system in the expec-
tation that this might help us to better understand processes of colonial 
governance. In this conclusion, I return to this question and elaborate on 
the implications of the answers to our understanding of colonial and fiscal 
history. I will conclude with a discussion, reflect on my research approach 
and perspective, and suggest a few follow-up questions that may emanate 
from the results of this dissertation.
The consequences of fiscal modernization
Modernity on paper: imposing a new order of governance
The first two chapters of this dissertation investigated what the modern-
ization of the colonial tax system entailed in the mindset of contemporary 
officials, by contextualizing it in overarching changes of colonial ideology 
and governance and the concurrent colonial political and economic trans-
formations.
The first chapter demonstrated how, in The Hague and Batavia, specific 
changes in tax and coerced labour policies were designed to intertwine 
with political, economic and technological developments and reforms. 
Increasingly, these policies prioritized changing the way colonized subjects 
lived their lives, to fit the patterns and needs of processes of colonial state-
building. From its inception, colonial statecraft was built on ideologies of 
social improvement and progress and continuously driven by the under-
lying theories and rhetoric of enlightened governance. This related to how, 
in general, colonial officials perceived indigenous societies and legitimized 
themselves through the concept of European ‘administrative superiority.’ 
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They identified various ‘innate problems’ in indigenous society, such as 
‘inefficiency’, ‘laziness’, ‘backwardness’, ‘agricultural disorderliness’, 
‘political disorganization’ and ‘despotism.’ They maintained that these 
ascribed characteristics prevented people from self-development, and that 
only through colonial intervention they could be uplifted into diligent and 
obedient, taxpaying subjects. To them, only what they considered ‘modern’, 
European administration and taxation, especially in contrast to what they 
considered the intrinsically disruptive patterns of Southeast Asian politics 
and organization, indicated successful statecraft.
In the Dutch colonial state of the mid-nineteenth century, such a 
bureaucracy or tax system did not yet exist. Around 1870, socio-economic 
and ideological-political changes, supported by Dutch liberal politicians, 
motivated the colonial government to jettison the principles that supported 
coerced cultivation and monopolization of the export of cash crops in order 
to accommodate a political-economy directed at private entrepreneurship 
and free trade. This necessitated the expansion of the tariff system, greater 
attention to justice, better redistribution of the tax burden, professional-
ization of the colonial administration, and most essential, replacement of 
‘feudalistic’ personal compulsory labour services with a monetized tax 
system. This transformation supposedly strengthened the ongoing evolu-
tion of the state. The cultivation systems of the nineteenth century had 
conditioned specific patterns of indirect rule and administration which, by 
1870, was considered outdated. Fiscal modernization required a full rein-
vention of the design of the colonial administration and the relationships 
between the colonial government, local officials, middlemen and subjected 
people. So in order to reform and ‘modernize’ colonial society, it was quite 
necessary to first ‘modernize’ the colonial state itself.
Monetary head and income taxes, as the second chapter demonstrated, 
were introduced for all population groups, in different phases between 1878 
and 1920. Slowly but steadily, Dutch administrative sway over Indonesia 
consolidated, as the entire archipelago was made subject to a colonial claim 
of fiscal uniformity. In the minds of officials, fiscal modernity required 
centralized revenue streams and an invariably uniform system of taxes, 
levied from settled, monetized and wealthy populations operating in the 
same legal sphere.1 To tax the entire archipelago by the same laws, terms 
and instrumentation was envisioned as the endpoint of colonial fiscal 
evolution and economic justice. Among the core ambitions in this process 
was to decentralize government finances by making each and every region 
fund its own administration, to outbalance inequalities among regions, 
ethnicities and families, and ensure each contributed to capacity to what 
was presented as a ‘modern colonial fiscal state.’
Interwoven into these ambitions as well was an expansive quest to 
incorporate as many people into the state’s schemes as possible, to ensure 
1 See also Scott, Seeing Like a State, 8, 32.
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all coercively ‘benefited’ from Dutch imperial expansion. These purportedly 
‘beneficial’ aspects were at the core of contemporary ideas of governance 
and social improvement. Colonial taxes were claimed to have the power 
to ‘cure’ alleged indigenous idleness, disorganization and violence, and 
enhance local economic development and indigenous welfare. Taxes 
addressed the core principles of society – income, property, inheritance 
and consumption – that the Dutch aimed to reconstitute and change. Taxes 
(and coerced labour services) were considered to possess the disciplinary 
power to collectivize and standardize subjects, redistribute wealth, enhance 
equality and justice, and unify and reform the colony at large. This enlarged 
the appetite of colonial officials to integrally control, structure and formalize 
society by acquiring more knowledge of and codifying social norms. They 
sought to strengthen the state’s ties with its subjects, and make every 
subjected male a productive and taxed member of the centralized colonial 
state.
The transition from collective labour, tributes and services to individual 
monetary taxes required permanent and ‘orderly’ residence, the posses-
sion of measurable property, ‘productive behaviour’ and the earning 
of individual, monetary incomes. This included the extirpation of what 
many colonial officials considered social deviance, such as nomadism and 
statelessness (which is why tax forms also served as travel passes or proof 
of identity), to keep increasingly large numbers of people under control. 
This does not mean these officials had some sort of “hidden agenda” in 
which this programme of rationalization was used to mask the “true aims 
of empire.”2 Rather, taxation was presented as part of the ‘civilizing process’ 
and interlinked with the governmental rationality of twentieth century, 
‘ethical’ colonialism Taxes were believed to contribute to the ongoing 
process of familiarizing more and more people with centralized production 
for the market, village life and the benefits of European forms of gover-
nance, thus motivating higher standards of productivity and wellbeing and 
guiding people into the trajectories of capitalist, twentieth century life. To 
colonial officials, the will to improve integrated with the need for colonial 
domination; the nature of “pastoral” and “liberal power” complemented 
one another.3
Of course, subjected people believed their societies already functioned 
to full capacity. Governmental accumulation of knowledge, abstraction and 
legibility always served the explicit purposes of the government. It enabled 
constant extraction and reform by locking ‘natives’ into essentialized, 
sometimes even dehumanized identities, such as the exploited peasant or 
uncivilized headhunter. These confined people into their fixed, allocated 
and purportedly rightful position and economic role under state rule.4 Seen 
2 Li, The Will to Improve, 5-6, 9.
3 U. Kalpagam, “Colonial Governmentality and the ‘Economy’”, Economy and Society 29:3 
(2000), 418-438: 420.
4 Noor, Data-Gathering in Colonial Southeast Asia, 67.
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from the state, this turned indigenous people into governable populations.5 
Seen from below, it was “an attempt at domestication.”6
By 1900, the purposes of colonial taxation and governance were largely 
recast in terms of colonial governmentality. In theory, the modernized tax 
system purportedly sought to optimize the economics, behaviour, politics, 
reorganization and wellbeing of subject populations through capitalist 
discourse of development and roadmaps to modernity, by subjecting 
societies to modalities of governance that secured colonial presence for 
the following decades. This both motivated and justified the introduction 
of income taxes from the 1870s onward, and ultimately, the unification of 
these in 1920, consolidating a supposedly just, transparent, equal system of 
self-enhancing compliance and efficiency.
Modernity in practice: using knowledge
As this dissertation has demonstrated, even though the modern tax system 
did allow for more centralized flows of revenue, its ‘governmental’ effects 
remained mostly limited as the capacity of local colonial administration 
could not keep up with the unrestricted political ambitions expressed by the 
central state.7 Officials rarely delivered the reform they promised, as they 
never had the “all-pervasive totalizing influence” they desired; numerous 
circumstances, factors and mechanisms drastically constrained “hollow 
claims of having introduced the colonies to liberal-democratic political prin-
ciples” and its purported “principles of good and humane government.”8 
What were these circumstances, factors and mechanisms, and how did they 
influence the ways in which the modernization of the tax system played out 
and was experienced on the spot?
First of all, the tax system in theory remained essentially discrimina-
tory and exploitative in nature; it practiced racial segregation until 1920, 
excluded women and ignored people whose incomes were below the tax-
threshold. Moreover, in The Hague and Batavia, the interests of corporate 
entrepreneurship, indigenous governance and local administrative prag-
matism overshadowed and undermined colonial governmental schemes. 
The implementation of the corporate tax, as exemplified in chapter 2, 
demonstrates how deeply colonial politics and corporate exploitation were 
entangled.
However, many of the circumstances that obstructed the elaboration 
of colonial tax policies are found locally, within the practical workings of 
colonial statecraft. One of the key arguments of this dissertation is that the 
5 D. Neu, “‘Discovering’ indigenous Peoples: Accounting and the Machinery of Empire”, 
The Accounting Historians Journal 26:1 (1999), 53-82: 53.
6 Scott, Seeing Like a State 184, 188-190.
7 See also Frankema, “Colonial Taxation and Government Spending”, 9-10 and Frankema 
and Booth, “Fiscal Capacity and the Colonial State”, 18.
8 D. Scott, “Colonial Governmentality”, Social Text 43 (1995), 191-220: 192.
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context in which tax-policy was introduced was informed by local circum-
stances and conditions and shaped in interaction among local officials, 
indigenous intermediaries and taxpayers. To support this argument, I have 
exemplified local economic decline and power structures in Ambon, the 
interrelated complex of labour duties, landholding principles and usufruct 
rights in Java, the inheritance systems, marriage conventions and socio-
economic and religious tensions in West Sumatra, the indigenous tariff 
and ruling systems of Aceh, and the patterns of ‘stateless’ social organiza-
tion on Seram. By including in its analysis these local conditions, as seen 
from the viewpoints of local officials such as Korn, Tichelman, Fokkens, 
Lulofs, Damsté and Sachse, this dissertation has demonstrated how all 
over colonial Indonesia, schemes and visions of improvement, rather 
than being imposed from above, in practice always worked through the 
local knowledge systems, social organizations and ruling practices of the 
targeted populations they were supposed to replace.9 Formalized by mixing 
it with colonial bureaucratic language, local knowledge was moulded into 
ordinances, stamped with requisite signatures and presented as the result of 
colonial inventions. As put by James Scott: “Formal order was always, and 
to a considerable degree, parasitic on informal processes, which the formal 
scheme did not recognize, without which it could not exist, and which it 
alone could not create or maintain.”10 The five different case studies of this 
dissertation explain on why and how this happened, from which six impor-
tant, overarching and interrelated factors and mechanisms can be distilled, 
as summed up below.
The first factor is that, contrary to what state archives suggest at first 
glance, the Dutch colonial state was not a unitary entity of undivided 
aims. While during the nineteenth century governmental ambitions and 
aspirations became clearer, strategies for intervention and administration 
did not. As put by T.M. Li, “Anxiety, nostalgia, and moral doubt figured 
strongly in debates because colonial officials — like their contemporary 
counter-parts — held different views on whether capitalism was the goal 
to be achieved or the nightmare to be avoided.”11 Officials held numerous 
disagreements and advocated different and contradictory ways to govern 
Indonesia, dependent on their individual experiences. They rarely reached a 
consensus, simply because what worked in one instance, did not necessarily 
work in another. Their parochialism channelled back into the resultant para-
doxical terms of the government, as its strategies and knowledge-systems 
pervasively influenced how officials observed, summarized, described and 
documented Indonesia in their administrative instruments such as (tax) 
9 T.M. Li, “Beyond ‘the State’ and Failed Schemes”, American Anthropologist 107:3 (2005), 
383-394: 384-385.
10 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 310.
11 T.M. Li, “Indigeneity, Capitalism, and the Management of Dispossession”, Current 
Anthropology 51:3 (2010), 385-414: 386.
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ordinances, registers and reports.12 The central government demanded 
to know the infinite details of social order, so as to summarize these into 
generalizations. However, their power was experienced much more 
strongly near centres of governance than in its discursive grids elsewhere.13 
At district level in the provinces, Batavia’s order was far away and local offi-
cials found that European-style bureaucracy rarely provided answers to the 
problems they encountered. The imagined boundaries between ethnicities, 
within legal systems and among rulers and ruled, were, in reality, vague 
and hybrid. Specific markers of ‘civilization’ distilled by officials, such as 
productivity, control over violence and monotheistic religious-orientations, 
were much more complex in villages than on the desks of administrators 
in Batavia and The Hague. As a result, the summaries and generalizations 
of ‘Batavian bureau men’ were rarely agreed upon in the province, and 
local officials such as Fokkens were picky in selecting the information they 
made ‘legible’, gleaned from the labyrinths of labour and tax principles that 
adat societies provided. They reported primarily what fitted pre-conceived 
colonial ideas, accepted their inability to adequately grasp, codify and 
control indigenous society, focused on upholding the pretence of order, 
and meanwhile maintained a certain reticence or distance by delegating 
governance and the accordant information gathering practices downward 
to increasingly corrupted local elites. Deliberate ‘blindness’ or ‘standoffish-
ness’ were indeed frequently at the core of colonial governmental practice, 
as this narrowed down the variety of social problems to which officials had 
to formulate an answer. As a consequence, the fiscal and governmental 
instruments of the government were bended, mediated and transformed 
by the practices through which they were deployed. This is not unique to 
colonial Indonesia, but happened and happens to states across the world.14
The second factor is that local knowledge systems, social organiza-
tions and economic, social and political conditions had been and remained 
integral to Dutch colonialism. The nineteenth-century cultivation systems 
would not have been feasible without using the deeply rooted ruling 
patterns, social hierarchies and communal land and labour schemes of 
existing polities already at work. Communally organizing and delegating 
coerced labour to elevated chiefs was a highly effective and efficient 
method of governance. After 1870, colonial officials repeated the admin-
istrative practices and mechanisms of ‘cultivation-system governance’, 
path-dependent as they were on the choices of their predecessors. To 
continue awarding chiefs collectors wages and privileges, was to continue 
12 Ludden, “Orientalist Empiricism and Transformations of Colonial Knowledge”, in C.A. 
Breckenridge and P. van der Veer (eds.), Orientalism and the Post-Colonial Predicament 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 250-278, 258.
13 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 40.
14 See for instance M.S. Hull, Government of Paper: The Materiality of Bureaucracy in Urban 
Pakistan (Berkely: University of California Press, 2012).
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the patterns of indirect rule of the cultivation systems, and with that of the 
ways local knowledge and conditions underpinned colonial governance.
Third, accumulation and codification of local knowledge was not only 
important for efficient taxation, but also to identify and minimize opposi-
tion. Local officials experienced constant difficulties, tensions and anxieties 
which ordinance-drafting directors in Batavia did not take into account.15 
Relying on local rulers and social organization generally provided safer 
responses to ‘solving’ problems than importing the solutions which were 
provided from above. In fact, the colonial government’s purported concern 
for welfare and improvement frequently required an interventionist kind 
of policy that endangered the ‘peace and tranquillity’ which local officials 
anxiously sought to protect. Failure to properly engage with local patterns 
of rule and social organization contributed to the hotbed of social tensions 
colonialism generated. Lack of caution, as we have seen in the cases of 
Banten and West Sumatra, could easily incite revolt. Thus, delegating 
power and continuing local order was also essential to maintain ‘peace and 
tranquillity.’
Fourth, as a result of the above, statesmen in Batavia and The Hague 
kept tweaking and twisting the tax system until it reached monstrous 
proportions. In its incongruency and unwieldiness, it induced only scorn 
and annoyance among many colonial field-agents. The government, 
obsessed with maintaining coherency, unity and equity, created a tax system 
so complex and inflexible that it was in many cases inoperable. As remarked 
by Korn in the introduction, controleurs often had neither the time nor the 
capacity to successfully use the ‘weighty paperwork’ of ordinances and tax 
registries. Instead, they relied on the negotiating strategies of indigenous 
rulers and civil servants, to whom the execution of the tax system was 
outsourced, and used personal, patrimonial forms of informal bureaucracy, 
which, as noted above, had been the cornerstone of rule and extraction 
across Southeast Asia for centuries, and would remain so throughout the 
colonial era.
Fifth, local systems of governance, adat and taxation were more adap-
tive, flexible and dynamic than Dutch legal systems. Adat provided excel-
lent starting points for local policy, as it provided better answers to local 
challenges than colonial policy could simply because as it had been doing 
so for centuries. This is why contemporary colonial experts like Snouck 
Hurgronje and Van Vollenhoven favoured the idea of people living under 
their own familiar conditions, in the societies built by themselves, rather 
than some utopian colonial-construct with which they were unfamiliar. So 
instead of replacing or transforming local existent adat orders, tax systems 
and redistribution schemes, officials used them as base ingredients to 
construct the tax system from the bottom-up.
15 This might also explain why many taxes were initially not termed as such (but rather 
‘land rent’, ‘patent law or right’ [patentrecht] or ‘head money’ [hoofdengeld]).
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Finally, various locally specific impediments blocked the implemen-
tation of government programs. In Ambon, the government refused to 
rearrange the social fabric of society because of economic decline. In Java, 
the addictive effect of coerced labour on the state and its indirect rulers 
prevented reform. In West Sumatra, the pragmatic choice of always relying 
on male-figures as both social leaders and taxpayers, was not the kind of 
reform that might have harnessed the expectations of taxpayers to the ambi-
tions of officials. In Aceh and Seram, the precarious situation and weak grip 
of the state over these provinces motivated officials to largely outsource 
taxation to local society.
Thus, colonial knowledge was based on interaction with systems of 
indigenous, local knowledge, and was constantly trying to fit in with the 
realities they were supposed to proscribe and influence. Officials recon-
structed the tax regime from the precepts they received from above, into 
a system which was workable on the ground. This had two important 
consequences.
First, while seemingly mapping, codifying and generalizing adat 
realities into new models supportive of the colonial liberal order, officials 
shaped a system that looked consolidated and uniform, but that in reality 
either remained disunified and merged or sometimes clashed with local 
convictions. Unifying the tax regime inevitably conflicted with fine-tuning 
tax policy to fit local discrepancies. Attempts at the codification of local 
knowledge to enable further unification and control, as exemplified by 
Fokkens’ corvée investigations, only demonstrated just how extremely 
divergent local knowledge was. Aligning the head tax regimes of Java 
with those of West Sumatra, Aceh or Seram, each having their own internal 
divisions and differences, was a task already virtually impossible, let alone 
unifying these systems with the income tax systems of Europeans and 
‘Foreign Orientals.’ Hence the unified, centralized tax regime remained a 
colonial farce that presumed a conformity and equity that simply did not 
exist. In fact, fiscal unification and reform, explained on paper as links in the 
same chain of fiscal modernization, obstructed each other. Reforming the 
systems of various regions required different approaches, while the idea of 
unification demanded these approaches to be similar at the very least. As a 
result, wherever the tax system remained relatively closely attached to local 
principles of social organization, such as Java, taxes were collected much 
more smoothly than in regions where it did not. So ironically, the prioritiza-
tion of fiscal coherence over practicality had produced a tax system even 
more disunified in its effect.
Second, while outsourcing the tax system to cherry-picked headmen, 
using contracts, suits and titles, made the operation of the tax system more 
efficient, it also prevented the Dutch from truly changing and interfering 
in the mechanisms of local society. Colonial governance was expressed 
through hefty paperwork and pomp and circumstance, as a unified 
and consolidated force. But for many controleurs, governance became a 
difficult balancing act, between the government’s interventionist and 
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uniform government agenda, the need for decentralized state-funding 
and ‘peace and tranquillity’, and the expectations, needs and conditions of 
local populations. Proposed policies were constantly sent back and forth, 
overanalysed and debated, passing through various layers of governance 
where they were reinterpreted and transformed by their own masters, 
before they arrived on the ground, quite beyond recognition of its original 
intentions, and increasingly contradictory in their supposedly reformative 
effects. Hence, the idea of a strong, concrete colonial state that made society 
‘legible’ and implemented schemes of reform, to ‘change the facts off which 
it took note’ for the purported benefit of society, is very wide of the mark.
The consequences of indirect rule
Colonial governance thus remained largely indirect, but at the same time 
monetary income taxes required a more impersonal and elaborate bureau-
cratic administration than coerced labour. So, what was the impact of the 
modernization of the tax system upon the relationship between the colonial 
state, indigenous intermediaries and subjects?
The relations between the state and its intermediaries grew stronger. 
We have seen that colonial officials always operated with an indigenous 
ruler by their side. Grouping people under a single ‘linchpin king’ was an 
efficient way to outsource organization of labour and taxation, allowing 
local officials to remain blind to levels of governance below that king and 
keep up the fiction of autonomy and self-rule towards the colonized popu-
lation. The government winnowed and selected the rulers it considered 
suitable from larger classes of village chiefs and lower aristocracies. These, 
of course, were not necessarily the rulers that best observed and preserved 
adat or guaranteed a specific level of autonomy and wellbeing, but rather 
those who best preserved the state’s order and accumulated the most taxes. 
By these means, the collection of social insights and reproduction of local 
knowledge also helped to mask the power-relations that were constructed.
Ultimately, the deconstruction of coerced labour politics did not delin-
eate the use of indirect rule. On the contrary, ‘path-dependent’ twentieth 
century-officials made the former ‘cultivation system elites’ responsible 
for collecting taxes. These elites were invested with increasing executive 
power to assess, levy and collect taxes as part of the colonial administra-
tion. In this way, they gained new opportunities to reform the state from 
within and manipulate and use its instrumentality and power for their 
own ends, causing social tensions and discrepancies to the supposedly 
unified administrative organization of the postcolonial state that the Dutch 
colonial government handed over in the 1940s.16 Rulers who, in precolonial 
times, governed through consultation and mediation increasingly used 
coercion and intimidation under the aegis of the colonial bureaucracy and 
16 See J. Darwin, “What Was the Late Colonial State?” Itinerario 23:3/4 (1999), 73-82.
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military. Their increased fiscal capacity, gained through collector’s wages, 
salaries, extended land and trading rights and labour entitlements, not only 
enhanced the relations they maintained with the state, but also provided 
them with greater wealth, enabling them to expand their power base even 
further.
The various services and taxes many of these elites levied for themselves 
imposed an extra burden upon their subjects, on top of the taxes levied for 
the government. This sometimes lead to the collapse of their authority and 
status and an erosion of the ties that traditionally bound them to the popu-
lations they governed. Thus, across Indonesia, indirect rulers developed 
into the authoritarian, extortive or even ‘despotic’ leaders the government 
professed to eradicate. This is not to say that indirect rulers were fully 
autonomous or independent in their behaviour; in fact, they were deeply 
influenced by the presence and expectations of the colonial government. 
The Dutch often made one single chief responsible for a variety of tasks 
that in Europe (and precolonial Indonesia) were separated: preserving legal 
order, communicating policies, delivering data, conferring tax assessments 
and collecting taxes. Within these various functions, the chiefs had consid-
erable manoeuvrability. And as the government expected chiefs to deliver 
specific, sometimes predetermined amounts of tax-revenue, ‘cheating’ or 
‘tampering’ was not only enabled but actively encouraged. Rulers were 
induced to care little for governmental theories of social elevation. Due to 
their transactional relationship with the state, these rulers became purely 
pragmatic in their approach to governance, prioritizing power and profits 
over welfare and justice. Across Indonesia, access to offices of leadership 
became increasingly exclusive, leading to further segregation and concen-
tration of wealth and power. The resultant pressure of over-exploitative 
behaviour drove many others to seek refuge in alternative sources of power, 
such as religious or nationalist movements, or to commit active resistance.
Yet, it was precisely the malfunctioning or absence of the just and trans-
parent administrative bureaucracy which officials promised that provided 
taxpayers opportunities to mediate the ever-expanding fiscal demands of 
the state. More elevated inhabitants of the colony operating at the frontier 
or in the margins of the colonial state, such as the inlandse burgers of Ambon, 
found various ways to gain access to the supreme government and its law-
making apparatus. The commercially powerful, such as European indus-
trialists, local nobilities or Chinese entrepreneurs, succeeded in lobbying 
through informal channels to influence tax policy. But the majority of 
Indonesia’s indigenous populations in colonial times was denied a political 
voice and had little influence over the ordinances drafted in Batavia. 
However, that did not render them helpless in neutralizing some of the 
state’s power. Rather than being ‘passive’ or lamentable’, as many colonial 
officials claimed they were, people made themselves heard – not in parlia-
ment buildings or through petitions, but by actively negotiating on the spot. 
Colonized people monitored the state as much as the state monitored them. 
From the viewpoint of many subjects the wavering policies and distance 
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maintained by colonial officials rendered the state into something that could 
be negotiated.17 This is exemplified by the annual tax gatherings, perhaps 
among the rare moments when most indigenous taxpayers established 
direct contact with the colonial administration, exerting influence over their 
assessments and verifying their status, incomes and social positions with 
their local rulers in the presence of European representatives of colonial 
authority. During the tax gatherings, people took the opportunity to breach 
through the walls of distinction that colonialism usually erected. This is also 
the most likely reason why tax bills – such as the two surat aanslag exempli-
fied in the prologue – were preserved by their owners; as palpable proof of 
their mediation with the colonial government, confirming their negotiated 
‘agreements’ with their chiefs and the colonial government.
Thus, the relations between state and subjects were characterized by 
continued negotiation and reinterpretation. In fact, practices of exchange, 
negotiation and consultation had been deeply ingrained in precolonial 
Indonesian governance, and were transferred along with its overarching 
incorporation into colonialism. In other words, Dutch rule ‘through’ local 
knowledge, hierarchies and adat, enabled interaction and resistance. Such 
resistance should not be interpreted as a mere counterforce to the state’s 
modernity as if the state and adat were each other’s opposites. Rather, 
resistance emerged from within, as the mechanisms enabling it had been 
integrated into the state and comprised an array of techniques, including 
late or non-payment, evasion, reregistration, avoidance, negotiation and 
revenue-bargaining. As we have seen, in the wide ranging-examples of 
popular resistance or non-compliance, tax revolts were an extreme resort, 
and often inspired by a hybrid mixture of motivations. The 100 plus tax 
revolts that occurred, in Java alone between 1830 and 1908 were about 
taxation as much as political representation and power, and should be 
contextualized in protests against injustices, experienced in matters of 
landownership and taxation.18 Tax measures could spark revolt, but only 
if political discontent already simmered under the surface. Further study 
of colonial tax rebellions in their wider political context might show that 
the “intertwining of tax, war democracy and rebellion” can be told in larger 
terms than simply “written in letters of blood and fire.”19
17 See also Crooks and Parsons, “Empires, Bureaucracy and the Paradox of Power”, 17-18.
18 Agustini Asikin, Tika Noorjaya, Yulia Himawati (eds.), Pajak, Citra dan Bebannya — Pokok- 
Pokok Pemikiran Salamun (A.T-PT Bina Rena Pariwara, Cetakan Kedua, 1990), 31, quoted 
in: M.B. Efendi, Kebijakan Perpajakan di Indonesia: Dari Era Kolonial sampai Era Orde Baru 
(Yogyakarta: Alinea Pustaka, 2006), 3, 38-39.
19 J. Passant, “Historical Note: The History of Taxation is Written in Letters of Blood and 
Fire”, Australasian Accounting Business & Finance Journal 10:2 (2016), 93-101: 94-95. To 
compare, in colonial America taxation was largely a matter of political confl ict, not only 
between colonizer and colonized, but also internally among landowners and traders and 
leading families and factions. See A. Rabushka, Taxation in Colonial America (Princeton: 
Princeton Princeton University Press, 2010), 14-15, 484, 574.
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Thus, as put by A. Keese in the case of Portuguese Africa, subjected 
taxpayers “were not all the passive victims of a European system imposed 
upon them. Many had a century of experience with regimes of taxation and 
tributes and developed their own means of responding to these pressures.”20 
People were not “recast as modern subjects” or “consumers of colonial 
modernity” because, firstly, few had access to the benefits modern colonial 
society had to offer (education, political rights, or simply automobiles, 
cinemas and trams) and secondly, assumptions that “colonial rule had a 
complete and political and cultural authority over those it ruled” under-
estimate the high levels of individual mobility and astuteness that many 
subjects possessed.21 Thus, the majority of the population expressed its 
demands and experienced the state on its own terms. Except for coercion, 
the state had little means of enforcement, but even the threat of violence 
was used both ways: by officials to use military intervention and by people 
to revolt.
Resultantly, rather than actively deploying improvement schemes, 
colonial officials were occupied negotiating with middlemen and taxpayers, 
responding to disruptions, and finding answers to problems of inefficiency 
and incapacity, as the more time these negotiations cost, the less cost-
effective the administration became. Taxes had to be collected at minimal 
expense, otherwise it was not worth it. On the spot, taxation became a 
problem of efficiency rather than social improvement or elevation.
To conclude this section, the relationship between state and society was 
not one where the former simply reformed the latter. Colonial states were 
no ‘modernizing entities’ and colonized subjects did not merely conform 
to European models. Instead, through interaction, the realms of officials, 
subjects and middlemen integrated and merged, thereby undermining the 
separations between class, power and position upheld by the state and 
reconstituting new forms of governance as creations in their own right. This 
changed the colonial state from within. The creation and use of knowledge 
used to dominate subjected populations was not in the sole domain of colo-
nial regimes or aristocratic elites. Within the colonial relationship, as each 
side internalized traits of the other, adaptation occurred. Hybridity was 
indeed at the core of the colonial encounter.22
The consequences of using local knowledge
Considering the limited effect colonial plans for reform and improvement 
had in practice, one final problem remains to be unravelled. Higher colonial 
officials still insisted that their policies represented a modernizing force. The 
political basis upon which they implanted the state’s fiscal operation was 
20 Keese, “Tax in Practice”, 93.
21 N. Wickramasinghe, “Colonial Governmentality and the Political Thinking Through 
“1931” in the Crown Colony of Ceylon/Sri Lanka”, Socio 5 (2015), 99-114: 106-107.
22 H.K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994), 19, 89, 109-111, 276-282.
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tightly connected to the normative aspects of how they justified the state’s 
power, relative to the societies being subjected. Even if we believe officials 
were genuine in their ambitions and promises of improving governance 
and administration (ambitions which, as demonstrated, are problematic 
and characterized by incongruencies), than still the severe limitations they 
experienced in materializing these ambitions, their structural reliance on 
local patterns of rule and the resultant form of taxation which in no way 
resembled the plans set out in Batavia and The Hague, should, if we follow 
colonial logic, be considered as undermining of their own self-justifying 
narratives. The promise of improvement and governmentality did not 
synchronize with the purported right to rule, when no actual improvement 
was reached. In what way did colonial officials believe their administration 
and economic organizational capacity was superior to indigenous ruling 
techniques, local knowledge and systems of social organization, if in many 
cases they relied precisely on these?
The answer to this question can be found in colonial uses of stereo-
typical tropes. As mentioned before, officials formally did not recognize 
the local elements they used as legitimate sources of power. Hence, these 
elements were legalized through ordinances, contracts and appointments. 
That way, they survived in the colonial order, inescapably supporting (but, 
in the long run, simultaneously undermining) the ambitions of the colonial 
government.23 Insisting on pejorative tropes like indigenous ‘despotism’, 
‘laziness’, ‘social paralyses’, economic ‘incapacity’ and ‘ineptitude’, framed 
around colonial stereotypes such as the ‘disorganized agriculturalist’, the 
‘uncivilized headhunter’, or the ‘violent Asiatic pirate’, had an important 
function in colonial ideology, and was as important in colonial practice as 
use of violence and force. They helped to continue nourishing the colonial 
claim of the need for improvement, to preserve the oppositions which were 
crucial to the self-conceptualization of Europeans in colonial spaces and 
shield the government from external and internal critique. Collected data 
and knowledge “constituted new facts for the creation of orientalism as a 
body of knowledge.”24 This helped to add to the ‘truth regimes’ already in 
place and legitimize policies in hindsight rather than to inform action or 
resolve integral problems of governance.25 Truly reforming the structures 
of indigenous society that higher Dutch officials condemned was not in the 
best interest of these same officials’ self-legitimizing narratives. Neither 
was admitting their inability to maintain a functional tax system without 
23 See also D. Kumar, Colonialism, Property, and the State (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 324.
24 D. Ludden, “Orientalist Empiricism and Transformations of Colonial Knowledge”, in 
C.A. Breckenridge and P. Van der Veer (eds.), Orientalism and The Post-Colonial Predica-
ment (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 250-278: 253.
25 See A.L. Stoler, “Reason Aside: Refl ections on Enlightenment and Empire”, in G. Huggan 
(ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
39-62.
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the support from corrupted local rulers. Only by insisting on indigenous 
inadequacy could the Dutch ratify themselves as the legitimate power-
holders in Indonesia. It was the constant need for improvement and reform, 
rather than actual improvement or reform itself that gave the colonial 
project significance according to colonial handbooks. Thus, during his term 
between 1931-1936, Governor-General B.C. de Jonge asserted that another 
300 years of Dutch colonization would be needed before any degree of 
independence was possible.26
This is frequently reflected in the colonial responses to disturbances, 
as we have seen throughout this thesis. Conservative officials in the 
higher echelons of bureaucracy were especially eager to insist on simple 
parameters like ‘native laziness’ or ‘religious fanaticism’ in cases of local 
intransigence to colonial schemes. However, interestingly enough, some 
officials at both lower and higher ranks, did not agree on this. Resident Van 
Höevell argued that economic collapse in Ambon was caused by colonial 
neglect rather than ‘oriental despotism.’ Fokkens explained Java’s poverty 
as resulting from excessive use of corvée rather than ‘native laziness.’ Resi-
dent Velders of Banten knew that rather than a “lust of rascals” there were 
deeper socio-economic factors underneath the resentment against the colo-
nial state. Governor Taylor Weber of West Sumatra resigned upon learning 
that the government intended to ignore the inviolability of pusaka lands. 
Snouck Hurgronje realized that the introduction of corvée in Aceh would 
never be fully accepted or solve problems of ‘laziness.’ Van Assen and 
Sachse were prudent in imposing head taxes in Seram, and were promptly 
replaced for ‘lack of leadership qualities.’ Such tensions within the colonial 
government signal the tensions and discomfort present within the colonial 
administration. While in Batavia prejudiced tropes had to be insisted upon 
for the sake of self-legitimization, locally the deficiencies of these tropes 
were too obvious to be ignored.
Once again, it was indirect rule that allowed the central government to 
remain blind to the necessity of acknowledging its limitations. Failure or 
‘malpractice’ was usually attributed to the purportedly inherent ‘corrupted’ 
nature of ‘despots’, so the government could uphold its self-image as a 
harbinger of development, welfare and progress. Thus, the government 
had a vested interest in the continuation of ‘oriental despotism’, which in 
fact was a colonial invention, not only as a historiographical trope, but also 
as a historical phenomenon. Though precolonial rule should not be overly 
romanticized – many precolonial Indonesian rulers simply lacked the 
potency to exert the full command over resources and people to which they 
aspired – the appearance of colonial officials as ‘stranger-kings’ provided 
many new opportunities for exploitation and autocracy. The ways in which 
indirect rule operated exemplifies how the image of a just, unified state 
mattered more than actually solving inherent problems of governance, 
26 Benda, The Pattern of Administrative Reforms, 591-592, n.598.
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problems conveniently attributed to the shortcomings of indigenous society. 
Whenever a large-scale rebellion broke out, they blamed its instigators. 
When the tax burden was too high, they blamed local chiefs. When quotas 
were not reached, they blamed village elites or the people. And when poli-
cies failed, they blamed each other.
And so, deeper rooted problems of governance were never resolved. 
This contributed to a “colonial administrative disconnect”, in which the 
colonizer was “less inclined and able to interact with the people who knew 
what was going on.”27 Throughout the colonial era, maintaining distance 
and dodging responsibility while keeping up the pretence of justice, gover-
nance and bureaucracy enabled the Dutch colonial government to preserve 
its ideologies and narratives. As the pretence of governance mattered 
over actual governance, Dutch “schemes to improve the human condition 
failed.”28
The consequences of tax modernization
In summary, the consequences of the modernization of the tax system on 
Dutch colonialism in Indonesia entailed the slow but steady fiscal central-
ization and consolidation of the territories that came under Dutch rule. 
This comprised the steady introduction of monetary taxes to all of those 
who lived in these territories and the construction of new ambitions of 
governance and improvement, conjoining with other expressions of devel-
opmental colonialism. It also entailed the elaborate design of a sophisticated 
bureaucratic machinery of ordinances, guidelines, registers and bills. But, 
most importantly, it entailed the emergence of widening gaps between 
what was promised and what was achieved. These gaps were filled with 
local knowledge or adat, use of indirect rule, negotiation, mediation, aloof-
ness, pretences, more promises, and a wide spectrum of colonial tropes to 
fulfil in a discursive licence to continue the Dutch claim to sovereignty in 
Indonesia. In trying to modernize their tax system, local officials were often 
“a-modern, or de-modernizing, in their governing practices.”29
That is not to say the colonial tax system was a failure, but rather that 
the Dutch created a system that worked contrary to the policies set out in 
Batavia and The Hague. Programs of reform and ‘improvement’ largely 
imploded in the process of travelling from desks in Batavia to the field reali-
ties of local officials and indirect rulers. As a result, colonized subjects never 
lived in the rational-bureaucratic tax state the colonial government had 
promised them. Instead, tax policies became an amalgam of Dutch and local 
interests, in which taxation provided an arena for contesting the colonial 
state. What was presented by the Dutch as ‘modernization’ was mediated 
27 Noor, Data-Gathering in Colonial Southeast Asia, 15, 214-215.
28 The quote refers to the subtitle of Scott’s Seeing Like a State.
29 Crooks and Parsons, “Empires, Bureaucracy and the Paradox of Power”, 20.
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at local level in such as way that policies sometimes became reasonably 
effective in spite of their flawed designs and even though taxes were never 
levied as smoothly as many officials had wished.
Implications
The implications of these findings relate to our wider understanding of 
taxation in the colonial context, as well as our view on Dutch colonialism in 
Indonesia and colonial governance in general.
Colonial taxation compared
Comparing Dutch colonial taxation to tax policies and practices in other 
colonial states shows many similarities. In Portuguese Mozambique for 
instance, proper unification and centralization of the fiscal system was 
hampered by diverging and uncompromising social realities.30 As in 
Indonesia, the effectiveness of Portuguese colonial tax systems depended 
on the cooperation of local officials, whose personal career perspectives 
were impacted by the level of success they achieved in levying taxes, and 
who often shared in the colonial system’s profits. In Portuguese Angola 
and Guinea, a similar transformation of compulsory labour to monetary 
taxation as in Indonesia took place in the nineteenth century, which was 
likewise presented as part of a ‘civilizing campaign’ to “ban backwardness” 
and teach “modern working habits”, but was also impeded by many similar 
pragmatic issues.31
Comparisons can also be drawn with French Indochina, which was 
built on an aggregate of precolonial kingdoms with divergent fiscal insti-
30 K. Alexopoulou and D. Juif, “Colonial State Formation Without Integration: Tax Capacity 
and Labour Regimes in Portuguese Mozambique (1890s–1970s)”, International Review 
of Social History 62:2 (2017), 215-252; Alexopoulou, “Local Conditions and Metropolitan 
Visions”, 240.
31 These issues comprised: lack of administrative capacity due to chronic lack of personnel 
and a bureaucratic apparatus buried in paperwork; a dichotomy between paper idealism 
and pragmatic complexity; high administrative costs of taxation resulting in limited 
effi ciency; the pursuance of uniformity in a reality fraught with differences; the desire 
to intervene and improve but a simultaneous anxiety for ‘unrest’; overburdening of 
the peasant population by coerced labour or use of coerced labour as punishment for 
non-payment despite attempts towards greater monetization and monetary taxes and 
consequent fl ight and mobility which posed a challenge to further imposition of direct 
taxation; corruption, obfuscation of tax money and lawlessness in matters of taxation by 
local chiefs who used the tax system for their own material gains, and similar responses 
of the state to such ‘corruption’ blaming the chiefs for unreliability and the population 
of laziness. See Keese, “Tax in Practice”, 84-86, 93-94, 102-103, 106-109, 110-114; Keese, 
“Taxation, Evasion and Compulsory Measures”, 118, 121-122, 122-123, 125-127, 130-131; 
Santos, “Peasant Tax in Northern Mozambique”, 161; Havik, “Taxing the Natives”, 
170-172, 176-177, 179, 183-189, 192, 202-205.
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tutions and conditions. The colony demonstrated a high level of diversity 
leading to an administrative-political complexity of extractive dualism, in 
which two co-existing fiscal states emerged, causing a really high burden 
per capita, with the surplus of one region making up for deficits elsewhere.32 
Meanwhile, across French West Africa hut and poll taxes had a similar civi-
lizing connotation, but also similar repressive effects in practice.33 In many 
of the British colonies in Africa, policies of self-sufficiency forced colonial 
administrations to solve prevalent issues of administrative efficiency.34
These are just a few out of many examples of recent research into the 
integrated processes and dynamics of colonial taxation, state-building 
and governance to which this dissertation contributes, and which shows 
an undeniable overarching dynamic in responses and attempts towards 
conditioning, ruling, governing and transforming colonized societies. Offi-
cials across the colonized world of the early twentieth century struggled to 
keep up with conflicting demands from above and found the answers to 
their administrative problems within local society. Ultimately, both “crisis 
and cure” arose from the within indigenous society.35 Thereby they grafted 
an institutional memory that consolidated long-term processes of state-
formation, economic development, the position of chiefs, the development 
of local knowledge and the imagination in local ‘traditions.’36 The greatest 
legacy of colonial taxation should hence be sought not just in the effects 
of extraction and the impact of the fiscal burden, but also in the colossal 
institutional changes colonial states tried to accomplish while structurally 
relapsing back onto local knowledge and indirect rule.
These observations fit in a recent, fresh understanding of longue durée 
processes of fiscal state-building in Asia and Europe as characterized by 
constant fragmentation and internal rivalry, as mentioned in the introduc-
tion. Both the central courts and armies of precolonial polities and the 
administrations of colonial states frequently lost their grip on society and 
saw its fiscal systems crumble. Few states before the twentieth century had 
full coercive capacity. Revenue bargaining and quasi-voluntary compliance 
always coexisted with coercion. Imperial and colonial governments moved 
away from centralization and bureaucratization as often as towards it, and 
in many cases were dependent on cooperation with local elites rather than 
32 M. López Jerez, “Colonial and Indigenous Institutions in the Fiscal Development of 
French Indochina”, In Booth and Frankema (eds.), Fiscal Capacity, 110-136: 131-132.
33 H.S. Challenor, “Strangers as Colonial Intermediaries: the Dahomeyans in Francophone 
Africa”, W.A. Shack, E.P. Skinner and H.S. Challenor, Strangers in African Societies 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 67-84.
34 Gardner, Taxing Colonial Africa, 242-244.
35 C. Firpo, “Modernity and the Body: Franco- Vietnamese Children in the Colonial Era and 
Beyond”, in Protschky and Van den Berge (eds.), Modern Times in Southeast Asia, 191-210: 
193.
36 See also J.L. van Zanden, “Colonial State Formation and Patterns of Economic Develop-
ment in Java, 1800-1913”, Economic History of Developing Regions 25:2 (2010), 155-176.
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on central state structures.37 Self-legitimizing truth regimes and ideologies 
followed these developments accordingly. This illustrates colonial Indo-
nesia was not unique, and fiscal modernization in many places a sluggish 
project of trial and error.
Reinterpreting colonial governance
When considering Dutch colonialism in Indonesia, the modernization of 
the tax system demonstrates that we cannot simply chart a linear evolution 
from ‘feudalistic’ systems of exploitation and labour to modern systems of 
taxation, production and organization, nor divide the history of colonial 
Indonesia simply into an era of cultivation systems (1830-1870), liberalism 
(1870-1900) and modern ethical colonialism (1900 onward). Instead, we need 
to acknowledge that in practice the developments in these ‘eras’ overlapped 
and alternated. The final remains of coerced cultivation in West Sumatra 
were only removed in 1908 – more than 25 years after the first central head 
taxes were introduced in Java. Across the archipelago ‘feudalism’ disap-
peared and recurred, bureaucracies emerged and collapsed, corvée was 
abolished and continued, and welfare increased and reduced. Indirect rule 
never lost its importance in the twentieth century. The concept of a ‘colonial 
modernization’ thus applies best to office realities of higher administrative 
echelons, whereas outside of these, the concept is less useful.
In fact, because colonial states accumulated, imported and internalized 
local knowledge and as its schemes, laws and ordinances consequently were 
permeated with it, the state, to some extent, was also tamed and disciplined 
by society. Colonial power-knowledge worked both ways, from above and 
outside as well as from below and within.38 Foucault’s governmental ratio-
nalities overlook the various (non-violent) forms of consciousness, agency, 
struggle, resilience and resistance of marginalized peasants, tribesmen and 
other subjects, unrecognized but omnipresent in the archives. Tax-leviers 
were (and are) never unlimited in their power. Rather, taxation was histori-
cally determined by negotiations between rulers and taxpayers. As a result, 
states, even colonial states, came about as a hybrid mixture of theories from 
above and practices from below. They were never the sole power in shaping 
themselves. Cooper argues that we should therefore exchange the agency of 
“‘colonial modernity’ and ‘colonial governmentality’” for “multiple agents, 
37 See, once again, Scheidel, “Tributary Empires”, 196-200 and Bang, “Tributary Empires 
and the New Fiscal Sociology”, 542.
38 See also A. Appadurai, “Deep Democracy: Urban Governmentality and the Horizon of 
Politics”, Environment & Urbanization 13:2 (2001), 23-43: 34; R.A. Litzinger, “Government 
from Below: the State, the Popular, and the Illusion of Autonomy”, Positions: East Asia 
Cultures Critique 9:1 (2001) 253-266; S. Maurer, “Thinking Governmentality ‘From Below’: 
Social Work and Social Movements as (Collective) Actors in Movable/Mobile Orders”, 
Counterpoints 292 (2007), 125-137.
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actions, forces and processes of historical explanations.”39 A focus on the 
negotiation strategies of taxpaying crowds and their institutions, as well 
as on the behaviour of local officials and intermediaries, will help us do so.
The increasing capacity of (colonial) states to ‘normalize’ tax payment 
by reading and influencing societies and unifying their own interests with 
those of the public, might have been only possible by the active integration 
of subjects and their agency. Hence, any historical or sociological study 
into tax policy, whether related to Europe or Asia, should look beyond the 
state and include and contextualize the activities, organization, interests 
and capacities of individuals, families, and other taxpaying entities. This is 
only possible if we shift our focus from government centres to peripheries, 
and focus on local developments. While, no doubt, it is already a valuable 
lesson to realize that colonial governance was not as overwhelming as 
sometimes imagined, we can perhaps do even more. Empires, as seen from 
the margins, are promising sites of research because, as mentioned before, 
they provide us with examples of interconnectivity, hybridity and mutual 
dependence between regions, cultures, and communities. Often, these were 
sources of new innovative ideas and practices, including perhaps what has 
been (misleadingly) seen as the ‘spread of European modernity’ to the rest 
of the world.
Finally, Dutch colonial taxation in Indonesia stopped on the demise 
of the Dutch colonial empire in the 1940s, but its capitalist, political and 
institutional underpinnings most likely continued to play a role in the 
postcolonial state. As the state was never truly ‘rounded off’, it rendered 
little foundation on which further fiscal institutionalization could be built. 
Ultimately, the colonial state did not fiscally integrate the islands, people, 
laws and social patterns of Indonesia into a uniform, coherent tax system 
to the extent it desired. In the opinion of Indonesia’s first prime minister, 
Sutan Shahrir (1909-1966), the colonial state ultimately collapsed, “not 
only because of the will of the people, but mainly because the colonialist 
opponent did not change in accordance with the changes in the world in 
general.”40
Discussion
This dissertation has demonstrated that taxation was at the core of colo-
nial exercises of power, processes of state-building and narratives of 
self-legitimization and central to relations between state and society. Of 
course, it has been selective in its scope. For instance, to preserve focus, it 
concentrated specifically on direct taxation, and therefore largely excluded 
import and export rights, tariffs, duties and excises, the studying of which 
39 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 134.
40 Quoted in R. Mrá zek, Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia (Ithaca: Southeast Asia 
Program, Cornell University, 1994), 426.
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discloses a range of other important issues related to trade and intercolo-
nial competition, left unaddressed in this dissertation. It also excluded the 
fiscal constitution and development of government finances of the Dutch 
colonial state. Using taxation as a lens on colonial governance has provided 
answers to questions of governance, not necessarily to questions of fiscal 
organization. Colonial fiscal history is a developing field, covering social, 
political, economic and legal processes. Different prioritizations of histo-
rians thus produce different research results. Which themes have remained 
unaddressed in this thesis? And is the perspective which taxation offers 
methodologically preferable to other perspectives or research topics?
Colonial inequality
First of all, (fiscal) governance is not only about extraction but also about 
spending. This dissertation’s focus on the introduction and elaboration of 
new taxes and levying techniques largely excluded the purposes for which 
taxes were collected, on what tax revenue was spent or what local fiscal 
motivations to levy taxes might have emerged. This would require further 
research.
Related issues of welfare and inequality also fell outside this disserta-
tion’s scope. Focusing on colonial governance leaves the metropole in the 
background and deprioritizes questions about the fiscal imbalance between 
colony and metropole, economic development, inequality and welfare 
redistribution. While not the primary interest of this dissertation, it is 
important to remain aware of the importance of the costs and benefits of 
empire, and how taxes extracted from the empire were used for the national 
benefit. These issues relate to the processes of nation-building and the rela-
tions of extraction emerging across the world, as empires were established 
and expanded.41 Who were included in the ‘privileged groups’ of taxpaying 
subjects who had a right to welfare policy, passports and voting? What 
differences existed between imperial and national taxpayers? Answering 
such questions will throw new light on how populations beyond national 
frames, but nonetheless part of imperial polities, were imagined.
A final, related point that I struggled with to fully resolve in this 
dissertation, is the question of compliance. Why did many people comply 
to the Dutch tax system, if they experienced no immediate benefits from it? 
Though this dissertation has charted various strategies to deflect, mediate 
and renegotiate the tax burden, it remains unclear if, and how, beyond nego-
tiation or violence, compliance was reached across the archipelago. This 
would require more detailed in-depth analysis at district or village level 
in an additional number of colonial provinces (see below), again based on 
the most local of sources. Thus, further analysis of the world of controleurs 
41 See for instance on the British empire M.J. Daunton, State and Market in Victorian Britain 
War, Welfare and Capitalism (Woodbridge/Rochester: Boydell Press, 2008), 29, 128-146.
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and local taxpayers is necessary, in order to understand the exact mecha-
nisms and techniques by which taxation played out on the ground. The true 
value of using taxation as a methodological tool in (colonial) history is thus 
perhaps best found in how it brings together issues otherwise seen as dispa-
rate, to discern the “thunder of history”, as produced by subjects and states.
Regional limitations
Perhaps another regional focus might have delivered different results. 
Picking case studies matters, and I have tried to be as balanced as possible, 
taking into account various parameters of societal and political influence 
and the course of colonial expansion. Through this selection, the differences 
between places where the Dutch had more experience in exerting rule 
(Ambon and Java) than elsewhere (Aceh and Seram) become clear, demon-
strating the tidal waves of tensions in colonial governance.
Yet, the simple fact remains that in some regions of Indonesia colonial 
governance remained more popular than elsewhere. For instance, the 
‘Batak-lands’ where Gerard Tichelman organized the tax-gathering exempli-
fied in Chapter 2, were considered to be a “bastion of obedience”; a ‘success-
fully converted’ region were people eagerly paid their taxes, subscribed to 
tax registers and rarely revolted.42 In Ternate, controleur Willem Coolhaas 
noted how relatively wealthy fishermen paid double the amount of their 
assessments in order “not to appear greedy.”43 Such observations stand 
in stark contrast to experiences exemplified in Aceh or Seram. This leaves 
us only more curious about the colonial tax experiences in central Borneo, 
Sulawesi, or on islands like Flores and Timor.
Beyond colonialism
The traces of colonial taxation did of course not disappear during the tran-
sition from colonial to nationalist state. The building blocks upon which 
the postcolonial tax system was constructed were unavoidably found in 
the debris of the colonial state, so the political-fiscal continuities between 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries signalled in this thesis may have 
blended into the postcolonial era. However, more than the simple coherent 
durability of colonial practices and extraction, “colonial constraints and 
imperial dispositions have a tenacious presence in less obvious ways.”44 
How is the legacy of Dutch colonial taxation linked to the postcolonial tax 
administration?
42  Anonymous, “Het Resultaat van de Invoering van de Algemeene Inkomstenbelasting 
van Stsbl. 1914 no. 180 in Habinsaran”, TBB 48, (1915) 139-142: 138-142.
43 Coolhaas, Controleur B.B., 21-22.
44 A.L. Stoler, Duress: Imperial Durabilities in our Times (Durham: Duke University Press), 4-5.
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Firstly, Indonesia naturally remained characterized by high levels of 
regional diversity. Therefore, Indonesian officials likely encounter(ed) the 
same local issues and constraints of circumstances, customary law and 
social organization as their colonial predecessors. Consequently, pressing 
and unresolved issues of compliance, inefficiency and legalisation presum-
ably still hang high over the Indonesian tax system. Recent academic 
research has emphasized the need for an improvement of the Indonesian tax 
administration by focussing on the training of tax officials, improving the 
audit system and transparency, and honesty and trust between taxpayers 
and the state45, but the historical factors in which these problem are rooted 
have not yet received the attention they deserve.46 Like the colonial state, 
the new nationalist regime had to invigorate, consolidate and legitimize 
itself, which informed the adjustments made to the tax system as well as 
the methods by which taxes were levied. Former layers of indirect rule were 
dismantled and the tax bureaucracy expanded.47 However, a social welfare 
state never emerged in Indonesia. The colonial state had remained rather 
detached, and was locally used for personal benefit by local rulers. This 
must have had consequences for compliance to taxes and the relations 
between the state, local rulers and people in the immediate aftermath of 
colonial rule. These are likely best understood when using a local scope, 
similar to the one applied in this dissertation, to trace the specific micro-
histories and daily realities of the successors of European controleurs, raja, 
bekel and the like, and further unravel the intimate relations between local 
governance and taxation.
Secondly, postcolonial fiscal legacies expand beyond administrative 
consequences. They also intertwine with persistent problems related to 
inequality, welfare redistribution and economic development, or more 
specifically, the fiscal imbalances between colony and metropole and the 
costs and benefits of empire.48 The collapse of the colonial state provoked 
new questions about the settlement and disentanglement of the intricate 
extractive economic and fiscal-financial relations between The Netherlands 
and the new Republic of Indonesia, and the repayment or demise of the 
45 A. Jens, Improving the Tax System in Indonesia (OECD Economics Department working 
papers No. 998A, Paris: OECD, 2012); F. Inasius, “Voluntary and Enforced Tax Compli-
ance: Evidence from Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in Indonesia”, in Advances in 
Taxation 26 (2019), 99-111; A. Rahman, Tax Compliance in Indonesia: The Role of Public Offi -
cials (PhD Thesis, University of Twente, 2017), 3-4, 23, 30-32, 41-43, 62, 118-119. Rahman 
emphasizes the role of “modernization in the tax administration system” in enhancing 
greater compliance.
46 An exception to this but slightly outdated (and a bit Java-centric in its historical 
approach) is Soebekti, Some Facets.
47 See Soebekti, Some Facets, 55-70, 103-109.
48 Booth, Colonial Legacies, 201-202; D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson and J.A. Robinson, “The 
Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation”, in American 
Economic Review 91:5 (2001), 1369-1401.
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colonial state’s debt.49 In the case of Indonesia, much remains to be discov-
ered about how such issues have kept influencing postcolonial statecraft, 
and if and how the relations produced by colonialism persisted beyond the 
deconstruction of the colonial empire.50 It is for this reason that continuing 
to critically analyse the role and rhetoric of states is important. Equally 
interesting would be to investigate the historical and current fiscal policy 
bonds between the Netherlands and Indonesia.
Finally, it would be intriguing to see if and how, by maintaining a legally 
racially partitioned class society, the Dutch added to problems of social 
inequality, wealth concentration and lack of democratic and redistributive 
justice, describe how this has impacted fairness and justice in the political 
order of the postcolonial state and investigate how elsewhere “equal treat-
ment in taxation” was an ideal of progressive liberals with ambiguous 
connection to reality. Who were included in the group of taxpaying subjects 
and had a right to participate in the welfare state?51 Further research will 
have to continue investigating such issues of administrative deficiency, 
distributive welfare, social inequality and fiscal injustice, and to chart how 
systems of governance might materially put promises into practice, rather 
than pretending to do so.
49 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 439-443. See also J.J.P de Jong and D.M.E. 
Lessing-Sutherland, “To Forget the Past in Favour of a Promise for the Future”: Nederland, 
Indonesië en de Financiële Overeenkomst van 1966: Onderhandelingen, Regeling, Uitvoering 
(Government Report; Den Haag: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2004).
50 C. Bourne et. al. (eds.) (2018) Special Issue: Colonial Debts, Imperial Insolvencies, Extractive 
Nostalgias, Discover Society 60 (2018).
51 Such questions are explored through recent developments in critical tax theory – which 
further studies taxation from the perspective of power and discrimination. See for 
instance B.J. Crawford and A.C. Infanti (eds.), Critical Tax Theory: An Introduction (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); B.J. Crawford, K. B. Brown and M.L. Fellows, 
“The Past, Present, and Future of Critical Tax Theory: A Conversation”, in Pittsburgh Tax 
Review 59 (2012).
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Promise, Pretence and Pragmatism: Governance 
and Taxation in Colonial Indonesia, 1870-1940
This dissertation investigates the long and complex development of a 
modern income tax system in the Dutch colonial state in Indonesia, or the 
Dutch East Indies, between 1870 and 1940. It discusses the colonial govern-
ment’s ambition to establish a unified, centralized and bureaucratized 
system of taxation in which all subjects paid their taxes justly, equally and 
according to their capacity. Taxation, the dissertation demonstrates, was 
used as an instrument through which officials addressed core questions 
of the relationships between state and people, and through which people 
negotiated with the state. Therefore, it serves as an excellent lens to study 
colonial governance.
The dissertation starts by noting how in 1920, after almost 50 years of 
fiscal reform, the Dutch colonial government attempted to resolve the previ-
ously upheld ethnic, socio-legal and regional fiscal separation in their colo-
nial state, by imposing a unified income tax system. However, the colonial 
administration appeared ill-prepared to carry out this unification, and the 
tax system proved difficult to maintain and perpetually frustrated by count-
less practical problems. To understand why this was the case, this disserta-
tion looks not only at colonial policies, but also at the interaction between 
colonial officials and local societies. By comparatively exploring the imple-
mentation of tax reforms in five regions (Ambon, Java, West Sumatra, Aceh 
and Seram), it tries to understand the local development and operation of 
taxation. In doing so, it provides a critical analysis of colonial governance 
and the intricate relationships between colonial officials, intermediaries 
and subjects. It analyses colonial ideology and policy and compares these 
to the administrative practices of local officials as experienced by on the 
ground, to uncover what colonial statesmen aimed for and how and why 
this differed from local governmental practice.
The first chapter investigates what motivated Dutch colonialism in 
Indonesia, against the backdrop of the construction and expansion of the 
colonial state between 1815 and 1940. It describes how in the nineteenth 
century, the Dutch monopolized agricultural production and profits under 
the framework of so-called ‘cultivation systems’, in which subjected peasant 
populations performed coerced labour instead of paying taxes, managed 
by semi-independent classes of indirect rulers who participated in colonial 
profits. Coerced labour had been of paramount economic importance and 
was legitimized by presenting it as a disciplinary tool to harness greater 
labour ethics and welfare. Simultaneously, colonial systems of coerced 
labour were often rooted in local indigenous principles of labour extraction 
and redistribution. This hardly befitted the principles of modern taxation 
envisioned by colonial officials of the later nineteenth century. Above that, 
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monopolization of production and trade conflicted with the interests of 
increasingly influential liberal politicians and private entrepreneurs. From 
1870 onward, the cultivation systems were therefore slowly deconstructed. 
The colonial state was opened up to private capital and entrepreneurs. 
These developments were conjoined by an increasing ‘ethical’ concern 
about indigenous welfare, infusing new forms of ‘civilizational imperi-
alism.’ This imposed a governmental rationality in colonial policy, which 
aimed to change and ‘improve’ the standards, behaviour and patterns of 
social organization of colonized subjects, to make these wealthier, more 
productive and more ‘orderly’ as in accordance to Dutch expectations.
‘Ethical colonialism’ aimed to not only control but integrally govern 
colonized populations under a legal bureaucracy, institutionalized proce-
dures and modern administrative techniques. Driven by contemporary 
ideas of European superiority, it provided a new narrative for legitimizing 
colonial power, in which indigenous people were portrayed as unfit to rule 
themselves and in demand for European tutelary guidance to advance to 
proper European, ‘modern’ modes of statecraft and taxation. These were 
made the standard against which non-European cultures were automati-
cally found inadequate. ‘Modernization’ in this case was presented as a 
movement from the allegedly ‘feudalist’, ‘exploitative’, ‘uncivilized’ and 
‘despotic’ forms of indigenous precolonial rule into the heights of European 
bureaucracy. In this supposedly bureaucratic state all were to be adminis-
tered, cared for, inscribed and tied to the state by paying unified income 
taxes, thereby contributing to the development of themselves, each other 
and the state.
The second chapter explores how the colonial tax policy changed in 
tandem with the ideological, political and socioeconomic transformations 
of the late 1800s. From 1878 onward, a series of new income taxes was 
introduced, to subject European, ‘Foreign Oriental’ and indigenous popu-
lations to increasingly similar forms of taxpayment. These income taxes 
were supposed to help reduce the use of coerced labour and expand and 
redistribute the fiscal burden as justly as possible over the shoulders of the 
entire population of the colony. These taxes were gradually merged together 
and fully unified in 1920. This was seen as the endpoint of the colonial 
state’s quest to incorporate, collectivize and standardize as many people 
as possible under a full-fledged system of tax administration. Many higher 
office-holders saw taxation as a tool to map and transform subjected popu-
lations, stimulate productive behaviour, maintain public order, enhance 
fiscal equity and shape a ‘civilized’ taxpaying society of governed subjects. 
They thought to have established the right tax system for these purposes in 
1920. To many of these Dutch officials, the reform of the tax system drove 
the development of the state and society into a uniform, consolidated entity. 
Hence, taxation in colonial Indonesia was at the forefront of ‘ethical’, ‘civi-
lizational’ colonialism.
Such, however, was mostly how the tax system developed on paper. In 
reality, even though taxes did become more important as a source of state 
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revenue, its governmental and ‘civilizational’ effects remained limited. 
Indeed, many of the formally abolished labour services had unintentionally 
remained in use – overall usage of coerced labour in the colony in fact only 
increased, following the economic and territorial expansion of the colony. 
Moreover, the tax system remained essentially discriminatory and exploit-
ative in nature, and characterized by segregation, corruption and inequality. 
The interests of international corporatism kept overruling local indigenous 
interests. The tax system remained unfavourable to smaller taxpayers. 
Ambitions to enhance popular welfare and stimulate indigenous participa-
tion in the colonial political economy through tax payment remained unful-
filled. In many places, the presence of the state itself remained disputed and 
taxes were structurally evaded. Instead of policies and ambitions, the local 
context and conditions in which colonial officials operated were crucial to 
the introduction of new tax policy. Policy, as a result, invariably became 
informed by these conditions, and was constructed bottom-up in interaction 
between officials and taxpayers through the intermediation of networks 
of indigenous elites and tax farmers. They participated in tax revenue by 
enjoying ‘collectors wages’ or by (ab)using the power provided by their 
crucial role in between state and society. Colonial officials made pragmatic 
choices and participated in established patrimonial networks of service and 
tribute levying which in fact they were supposed to change. This way, the 
colonial state itself became increasingly mixed with the local structures and 
practices it was actually supposed to replace. Instead of a force of extraction 
and reform, taxation provided an arena for contesting the colonial state.
In order to unravel how taxation was worked out, five case studies are 
analysed in the rest of this dissertation, each covering a specific location 
in the Netherlands-Indies, and also representing another stage of Dutch 
colonial expansion in the archipelago and another form of societal organiza-
tion. Thereby, this dissertation attempts to provide an as comprehensive 
and detailed as possible comparative exploration of the implementation of 
tax reform in different parts of the archipelago, unravelling the intricacies of 
governmental practices in the Dutch East Indies.
The first case study (chapter 3) concerns the island of Ambon, in the 
Central Moluccas, and discusses how in the seventeenth century the Dutch 
imposed a system of monopolized trade and coerced production of spices 
on this island. This system was largely coordinated in collaboration with 
indigenous rulers. When the spice economy collapsed in the nineteenth 
century, the Dutch continued to rely on these rulers, even though the 
economic decline caused erosion of their position and prestige. The transi-
tion towards monetary head taxes was unsuccessful, as, instead of imposing 
a just, bureaucratic and transparent system of governance and tax-levying, 
the Dutch kept relying on the past relics and glory of an increasingly obso-
lete and impoverished political order, which cost them their grip on the 
Ambonese population in the long run.
The second case study (chapter 4) investigates the persistence of coerced 
labour, and in particular corvée services, in Java. It explores Javanese prin-
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ciples of redistribution, reciprocity and exchange in the triangular relation-
ship among land, labour and power that were fundamental to the assorted 
colonial systems of coerced agricultural production and services imposed in 
the nineteenth century. The chapter reveals how, like in Ambon, the trans-
formation of coerced labour and services to monetary taxation was impeded 
by continuation of the same types of indirect rule that underpinned the 
cultivation system. The state vowed to root colonial prescripts of corvée and 
taxation in supposedly local principles of adat, by accumulating knowledge 
about and codifying these principles. However, thereby it provided colonial 
officials the possibility to produce, select and convert knowledge of these 
principles, rather than to accumulate knowledge on and describe them, to 
fit the needs of a state to which corvée remained an irresistibly cheap and 
convenient form of labour supply. Moreover, to accumulate information, 
colonial officials relied on the same local elites that often had an interest in 
the continuation of corvée. Consequently, use of corvée only increased, facil-
itated by, paradoxically, the codification of the exact principles that should 
have diminished its use to terminate the sort of serfdom and inequality that 
many Dutch thought characterized Java. Resultantly, taxes were levied next 
to, rather than instead of corvée services. Provided by the colonial state’s 
bureaucratic tools of enforcement and power to inscribe more and more 
people into all sorts of corvée and tax registers, many indigenous chiefs only 
got greater access to exploit the labour capacity of their people. Many peas-
ants, quite often successfully, tried to escape the high burden of taxes and 
services, by voting with their feet or revolting, but the Javanese kept being 
taxed at disproportionally heavy levels. Reports written between 1900 and 
1930, all recognize this problem and urge to reduce the burden of corvée. 
Yet, at the Forced Labour Convention of the International Labour Organiza-
tion held in 1930, the Dutch were forced to admit little had been achieved in 
reducing the persistent use of coerced labour or improving the conditions 
under which coerced labour was organized throughout Indonesia.
The third case study (chapter 5) studies the impact of specific forms of 
social organization on colonial taxation in West Sumatra. In the highlands of 
this region, property rights were communally held and inherited in female 
line – a concept to which the forced coffee cultivation system imposed in 
West Sumatra in the 1840s was indifferent, but which the modern colonial 
tax system could not comprehend. The Dutch struggled for decades to 
balance furnishing the female inheritance system with materializing their 
ambitions to standardize and redesign society to participate in the unified 
system of individual income taxes. They attempted to use the same models 
of indirect rule as in Java and Ambon, relying on patterns of (male) leader-
ship they considered to be standard, to tax individual men as they were 
used to: as being responsible for the incomes of their households. But 
political power and rights over property were not unified in West Sumatra; 
men were not the same kind of family heads, having claim to and authority 
over income and property, as the Dutch wanted them to be. By enforcing 
the imposition of individual income taxation and making communally held 
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property executable, the Dutch hoped to induce a social shift towards indi-
vidual income taxation through men. The tax burden increased, adding to 
popular dissatisfaction and social tensions culminating in regular rebellion 
and resistance, the heaviest one occurring immediately upon the imposition 
of personal income taxes for men in 1908. The Dutch, structurally unable to 
grasp and control local adat society on its own terms, blamed the inevitable 
rejection of their tax system by the Minangkabau on ‘radicalism’ and the 
‘shortcomings’ of society. This way, they limited the necessity of taking 
action, but also denied the structural defects underpinning their tax policies.
The fourth case study (chapter 6) discusses the Dutch invasion and 
incorporation of Aceh in North Sumatra. While Ambon and Java at the time 
had become core domains of Dutch colonial occupation in the early modern 
era and West Sumatra was conquered earlier in the nineteenth century, Aceh 
was subjected to Dutch rule only after 1870. This chapter demonstrates 
how the imposition of taxation in Aceh went hand in hand with violent 
conquest and the appropriation of existing structures of rule and systems of 
exploitation, as an integral part of imperial expansion. In Aceh, there never 
was a consolidated kingdom based on rice cultivation and redistribution 
of land and labour under an intricate aristocratic system or emperor like 
in Java. Instead, Aceh’s Sultan maintained commercial-political ties with 
often rather autonomous local rulers who paid him tribute but also pursued 
their own interests. Nonetheless, the Dutch attempted to implement a 
similar regime of corvée labour and direct income taxes as in Java. They 
did so by eliciting these local rulers to sign contracts acknowledging Dutch 
supremacy and govern in name of the Dutch as ‘self-governors’, while 
handing their rights to levy duties and tariffs over to the colonial state. That 
way, the Acehnese were in theory subjected and included as yet another 
‘normalized’, tax paying population, while in reality the tax system was 
practically outsourced to these indigenous rulers who simply continued the 
arrangements already in use, forsaking much of the Dutch promises of fiscal 
modernization. The chapter argues that the Dutch deliberately designed 
this scheme this way to keep up the pretence of a functioning tax system 
while imputing its limited success to the indigenous chiefs that carried it 
out.
With the final case study (chapter 7), about the island of Seram, the 
dissertation arrives back in the Central Moluccas. During the nineteenth 
century, the Dutch abstained from colonizing Seram. Contrary to nearby 
Ambon, Seram was considered unsuitable for economic exploitation due 
to its unfavourable geographic and social circumstances. However, ‘civili-
zational imperialism’, the drive for expansion and concerns about security 
and stability in the region ultimately drove the Dutch to colonize the island 
around 1900. Seram was considered difficult terrain to control, as it was 
inhabited by various ethnic groups that had maintained their independence 
and in Dutch eyes were completely ‘uncivilized’ because of their peripatetic 
lives, non-monotheistic religious orientation, organization in non-state-like 
entities and practicing of headhunting. In the mindset of colonial officials 
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this sort of ‘behaviour’ had to yield to the colonial drive for social improve-
ment, and the island was subjected to brutal conquest and the imposition of 
labour services and head taxes. Taxation was considered a tool by some offi-
cials to equip and establish the state on the ground, connect people to the 
state, protect them against their own ‘violent inclinations’, promote settled 
village inhabitancy and obedience to colonial officials and establish peace 
and tranquillity. But just like in Aceh, instead of truly working through 
ingrained patterns of organization and power, the Dutch favoured handing 
down authority to selected indigenous chiefs who, dressed up in European 
suits and bestowed with the appropriate titles and paraphernalia, were 
to independently collect taxes from their own populations. This colonial 
‘standoffishness’ allowed for various forms of state-avoidance and resis-
tance, and only use of violence, precisely what officials claimed to reduce, 
appeared truly effective in producing taxpaying subjects and reorganizing 
colonized society.
Together, these case studies demonstrate that Dutch colonial tax poli-
cies always preyed on indigenous tenets found on the spot, and were 
worked out by using the local knowledge, organizations and practices of 
the targeted populations they were supposed to replace. This was how both 
the cultivation systems of the nineteenth century and the monetary tax 
systems of the twentieth century were constructed. The best tools to learn 
to control internal order and govern local society appeared to have been 
those already in place, probably precisely because they were local and had 
been arranging taxation and governance already for centuries. Thus, as the 
dissertation concludes, tax policy was developed in interaction between 
Dutch colonizers and indigenous society. On paper it ended up as a mixture 
of local realities codified into ordinances, translated into colonial bureau-
cratic language, stamped with the requisite signatures and presented as the 
result of colonial inventions. This spawned, at least partially, from differ-
ences in ambitions, theories, ideologies and priorities within and among 
various levels of the colonial government apparatus. Whereas in the Hague 
and Batavia, statesmen and policymakers sought to safeguard the harmony 
and unity of their state, local officials often had little choice but to compro-
mise these ‘writing-table theories’ to the conditions they encountered on the 
ground. Ruling by staying close to local practices and customary law also 
helped minimizing opposition, and continuing ‘peace and tranquillity’ was 
essential to maintain colonial order.
As a result, tax policy only grew more complex and inflexible, while the 
goals of social reform and ‘improvement’ were not met. This was deeply 
problematic, as the promise of reform, improvement and change essential 
to the European self-image and to the ways colonial officials legitimized 
their policies and presence. This was resolved by perpetually insisting on 
indigenous inadequacy to adhere to the standards of ‘European modernity.’ 
By manipulating and selecting information and producing knowledge that 
served to legitimize policies in hindsight rather than to inform specific 
action, colonial officials closed their eyes to the structural problems that 
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characterized colonial governance and taxation. This way, they denied the 
need for more structural reform, and pretended to carry out a bureaucratic, 
just and transparent tax state.
Similar developments, as recent literature shows, also occurred in 
colonized spaces elsewhere. This helps us review the relationships between 
colonizer and colonized. Whereas the colonizer determined what tax poli-
cies were implemented, the colonized had an important part in how these 
were worked out in practice, and hence how difficult it was to manage the 
colonial empire. As colonial states accumulated, imported and internalized 
local structures of rule, social organization and taxation, its schemes, laws 
and ordinances were permeated with it. And by using the institutions, 
patterns and structures colonial officials claimed to replace or reform, they 
implicitly acknowledged the pragmatic value and power of these.
In general, tax-levying entities were never unlimited in their power, as 
taxes were historically always decided on through negotiation and inter-
action between those who levied and those who paid them. Hence, this 
dissertation calls to accept and acknowledge the agency of those who were 
colonized in bending the power of the colonial state. This helps us to look 
beyond the narrow frames of European modernity to come to a much closer 
understanding of how colonial governance actually worked.
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Samenvatting
Belofte, Schijn en Pragmatisme: Bestuur en 
Belastingheffing in Koloniaal Indonesië, 1870-1940
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de lange en complexe ontwikkeling van een 
modern inkomstenbelastingsysteem in de Nederlandse koloniale staat 
in Indonesië, of Nederlands-Indië, tussen 1870 en 1940. Het bespreekt de 
ambitie van het koloniaal gouvernement om een geünificeerd, gecentrali-
seerd en bureaucratisch belastingsysteem op te zetten, waarin alle onder-
danen hun belastingen rechtvaardig, gelijkwaardig en naar hun draagkracht 
zouden betalen. Belastingheffing, zo laat het proefschrift zien, werd tevens 
gebruikt als een instrument waarmee ambtenaren belangrijke vragen over 
de relaties tussen staat en mensen behandelden, en waarmee mensen met 
de koloniale staat onderhandelden. Daarom dient het als een uitstekende 
lens om het koloniaal bestuur door te bestuderen.
Het proefschrift begint met op te merken hoe het Nederlands kolo-
niaal gouvernement in 1920, na bijna 50 jaar aan fiscale hervormingen, de 
voorheen gehanteerde etnische, sociaaljuridische en regionale fiscale schei-
dingen in hun koloniale staat probeerden op te lossen door een uniform 
inkomstenbelastingstelsel in te stellen. Het koloniaal bestuur bleek echter 
niet goed in staat om deze unificatie te bewerkstelligen, en werd voortdu-
rend gekenmerkt door talloze praktische beperkingen. Om te begrijpen 
waarom dit zo was kijkt dit proefschrift niet alleen naar koloniaal beleid, 
maar ook naar de interactie tussen koloniale ambtenaren en lokale samen-
levingen. Door de implementatie van belastinghervormingen in vijf regio’s 
(Ambon, Java, West-Sumatra, Atjeh en Seram) op vergelijkende wijze te 
onder de loep te nemen, probeert het de lokale ontwikkeling en werking 
van belastingen te begrijpen. Op die manier voorziet het in de eerste 
kritische analyse van de verbanden tussen belastingheffing en bestuur in 
koloniaal Indonesië. Het proefschrift kijkt specifiek naar de ingewikkelde 
relaties tussen koloniale ambtenaren, tussenpersonen en subjecten. Het 
analyseert koloniale ideologie en beleid en maakt een vergelijking met de 
bestuurlijke praktijken zoals ervaren door lokale functionarissen ter plaatse, 
om uit te zoeken waar koloniale staatsmannen naar streefden en hoe en 
waarom dit verschilde van de lokale bestuurspraktijk.
Het eerste hoofdstuk bestudeert wat het Nederlands kolonialisme in 
Indonesië dreef, bezien tegen de achtergrond van de opbouw en expansie 
van de koloniale staat tussen 1815 en 1940. Het beschrijft hoe de Neder-
landers in de negentiende eeuw landbouwproductie en -winst monopoli-
seerden door ‘Cultuurstelsels’ in te voeren (naast Java ook op bijvoorbeeld 
Ambon en West-Sumatra). In dit soort stelsels verrichtten onderworpen 
boerenbevolkingen gedwongen arbeid (in plaats van dat zij belastingen 
betaalden), beheerd door semi-onafhankelijke inheemse indirecte bestuur-
ders die deelnamen in de winst. Dwangarbeid was van groot economisch 
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belang, en werd gelegitimeerd door het te presenteren als disciplinair 
instrument voor de ontwikkeling van arbeidsethos en economische voor-
uitgang. Tegelijkertijd waren koloniale systemen van gedwongen arbeid 
vaak geworteld in lokale inheemse beginselen van gebruik en herverde-
ling van arbeid. Deze pasten nauwelijks in de principes van het systeem 
van moderne belastingheffing die latere koloniale ambtenaren in latere 
negentiende eeuw voor ogen hadden. Bovendien was de monopolisering 
van productie en handel in strijd met de belangen van steeds invloedrij-
kere liberale politici en particuliere ondernemers. Vanaf 1870 werden de 
verschillende ‘Cultuurstelsels’ daarom langzaam afgebroken. De koloniale 
staat werd opengesteld voor particulier kapitaal en ondernemerschap. Deze 
ontwikkelingen gingen gepaard met een toenemende ‘ethische’ bezorgd-
heid over inheems welzijn en een imperiale ‘beschavingsmissie.’ Dit bracht 
een nieuw soort bestuursmentaliteit teweeg in koloniaal beleid, waarin het 
voorgewende doel steeds meer was om de sociale normen, het gedrag en de 
patronen van sociale organisatie van gekoloniseerde bevolkingen te veran-
deren en ‘verbeteren’, om deze bevolkingen welvarender, productiever en 
‘ordelijker’, in overeenstemming met koloniale verwachtingen, te maken.
‘Ethisch kolonialisme’ was erop gericht gekoloniseerde bevolkings-
groepen niet alleen te besturen, maar integraal te beheersen onder een 
stelsel van wetten, bureaucratie, geïnstitutionaliseerde procedures en 
moderne administratie methodes. Gedreven door het destijds gangbare 
idee van Europese superioriteit, verschafte het een nieuw narratief voor 
het legitimeren van koloniale macht, waarin inheemse volkeren werden 
afgeschilderd als ongeschikt om zichzelf te besturen en behoeftig aan 
Europese ‘voogdij’ voor hun ontwikkeling naar Europese vormen van 
staatsbestuur en belastingheffing. Deze werden verheven tot de norm waar-
tegen niet-Europese culturen automatisch ontoereikend werden bevonden. 
‘Modernisering’ werd in dit geval gepresenteerd als een beweging van 
de zogenaamd ‘feodale’, ‘exploitatieve’, ‘onbeschaafde’ en ‘despotische’ 
vormen van inheemse pre-koloniale heerschappij naar de verhevenheid 
van Europese bureaucratie. In deze, zo gezegd betere, bureaucratische staat 
zou eenieder worden bestuurd, verzorgd, ingeschreven en opgenomen door 
uniforme inkomstenbelastingen te betalen, en daardoor bijdragen aan de 
eigen ontwikkeling, die van elkaar en die van de staat.
Het tweede hoofdstuk onderzoekt hoe het koloniaal belastingbeleid 
veranderde in combinatie met de ideologische, politieke en sociaaleco-
nomische transformaties van het einde van de late 19e eeuw. Vanaf 1878 
werd een reeks nieuwe inkomstenbelastingen ingevoerd met als doel 
Europeanen, zogenaamde ‘Vreemde Oosterlingen’ en inheemse bevol-
kingsgroepen aan steeds meer gelijkaardige vormen van belasting te onder-
werpen. Tevens was het de bedoeling dat deze belastingen het gebruik van 
dwangarbeid zouden helpen verminderen en de groeiende belastingdruk 
zo rechtvaardig mogelijk over de schouders van de gehele koloniale bevol-
king zouden verdelen. Deze belastingen werden vervolgens langzaamaan 
samengevoegd en geünificeerd in 1920. Dit werd gezien als het eindpunt 
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van de zoektocht van de koloniale staat om zoveel mogelijk mensen te 
incorporeren, collectiveren en te standaardiseren onder een volwaardig 
administratief belastingstelsel. Veel hogere ambtsdragers zagen hierbij 
belastingheffing als een instrument om onderworpen bevolkingsgroepen in 
kaart te brengen en te manipuleren, ‘productief’ gedrag te stimuleren, de 
openbare orde te handhaven en een ‘beschaafde’ belastingbetalende samen-
leving van bestuurde onderdanen te creëren. Zij meenden daarvoor het 
juiste belastingstelsel te hebben geschapen in 1920. Voor veel van dit soort 
Nederlandse ambtenaren ondersteunde de hervorming van het belasting-
stelsel de verdere ontwikkeling van staat en samenleving in een uniform, 
geconsolideerd geheel. Daarmee had belastingheffing een voorhoederol in 
het ‘ethisch’, ‘beschavende’ kolonialisme in Indonesië.
Dit was echter vooral de manier waarop het belastingstelsel zich op 
papier ontwikkelde. In werkelijkheid bleef de bestuurlijke en ‘bescha-
vende’ impact ervan beperkt, ook al werden belastingen een steeds 
belangrijker bron voor de staatsinkomsten. In feite waren veel van de, 
formeel afgeschafte, gedwongen diensten in gebruik gebleven – het gebruik 
van gedwongen arbeid in de kolonie nam zelfs toe in navolging van de 
economische en territoriale expansie van de kolonie. Bovendien bleef het 
belastingstelsel in essentie discriminerend en exploitatief van aard, en werd 
het gekenmerkt door segregatie, corruptie en ongelijkheid. De belangen van 
het internationale bedrijfsleven kregen immer voorrang op lokale inheemse 
belangen. Het belastingstelsel was ongunstig tegenover armere belastingbe-
talers. Ambities om de welvaart van de bevolking te verhogen en inheemse 
deelname in het koloniaal politiek-economisch bestel te stimuleren door 
middel van belastingbetaling, bleven onvervuld. Op veel plekken bleef de 
aanwezigheid van de staat zelf omstreden en werden belastingen structu-
reel ontweken. In plaats van politiek beleid en ambities waren de lokale 
context en omstandigheden waarin koloniale ambtenaren optraden cruciaal 
voor de invoering van nieuw belastingbeleid. Beleid werd daardoor stee-
vast geïnformeerd door deze omstandigheden, en van onderop opgebouwd 
door deze ambtenaren, in interactie met belastingbetalers en diverse 
netwerken van inheemse elites en belastingpachters. Deze hadden aandeel 
in de belastinginkomsten via hun ‘collectorslonen’, of door misbruik 
te maken van de macht die zij verkregen hadden door hun cruciale rol 
tussen staat en samenleving. Koloniale ambtenaren maakten praktische 
keuzes en participeerden in de gevestigde patrimoniale netwerken die ze 
in feite moesten veranderen, waarin dienstverlening en tribuut centraal 
stonden. Op die manier raakte de koloniale staat zelf in toenemende mate 
vermengd met lokale structuren en praktijken die zij in wezen geacht werd 
te vervangen. In plaats van een extractief machtsmiddel voor hervorming, 
bood belastingheffing een platform om de koloniale staat tegen te werken.
Om te ontrafelen hoe belastingheffing werd uitgevoerd, worden in 
de rest van het proefschrift vijf casestudy’s geanalyseerd, elk over een 
specifieke locatie in Nederlands-Indië, die elk ook een ander stadium van 
de Nederlandse koloniale expansie in de archipel, en een andere vorm 
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van maatschappelijke organisatie vertegenwoordigen. Daarbij probeert 
dit proefschrift in een zo volledig en gedetailleerd mogelijke vergelijkende 
verkenning te voorzien van de implementatie van belastinghervormingen 
in verschillende delen van de archipel, waarin de fijne kneepjes van de 
bestuurspraktijk in Nederlands-Indië worden ontrafeld.
De eerste casestudy (hoofdstuk 3) betreft het eiland Ambon, in de 
Midden-Molukken, en behandelt hoe de Nederlanders hier in de zeven-
tiende eeuw een systeem van gemonopoliseerde handel en gedwongen 
productie oplegden. Dit systeem werd grotendeels gecoördineerd in 
samenwerking met inheemse heersers. Toen in de negentiende eeuw de 
specerijeneconomie instortte, bleven de Nederlanders op deze heersers 
vertrouwen, ook al veroorzaakte de economische achteruitgang een uithol-
ling van hun positie en prestige. De transitie naar geldelijke belastingen was 
uiteindelijk niet succesvol doordat de Nederlanders, in plaats van een recht-
vaardig, bureaucratisch en transparant stelsel van bestuur en belastingen in 
te voeren, bleven vertrouwen op de oude relieken en glorie van een steeds 
meer achterhaalde en verarmde politieke orde, wat hen op den duur hun 
greep op de Ambonese bevolking kostte.
De tweede casestudy (hoofdstuk 4) onderzoekt het voortduren van 
dwangarbeid, en dan met name herendiensten, op Java. Het verkent de 
Javaanse principes van herverdeling, wederkerigheid en uitwisseling in de 
driehoeksverhouding tussen land, arbeid en macht die fundamenteel waren 
voor de diverse koloniale systemen van gedwongen landbouwproductie en 
diensten die in de negentiende eeuw werden ingesteld. Het hoofdstuk laat 
zien hoe, net als in Ambon, de transformatie van dwangarbeid en heren-
diensten naar monetaire belasting werd belemmerd door de voortzetting 
van hetzelfde soort indirect bestuur die het cultuurstelsel staafden. De staat 
stelde dat zij koloniale voorschriften van herendiensten en belastingheffing 
zou verankeren in de veronderstelde lokale adat principes door kennis 
hierover te verzamelen en deze principes te codificeren. Echter, dit bood 
koloniale ambtenaren de mogelijkheid om, in plaats van kennis hierover te 
verzamelen en beschrijven, deze te produceren, selecteren en om te zetten 
in beginselen die in overeenstemming waren met de behoeften van een 
staat waarvoor herendiensten een onweerstaanbaar goedkope en gemak-
kelijke vorm van arbeidsvoorziening bleven. Bovendien vertrouwden 
ambtenaren voor hun informatie op dezelfde lokale elites die belang 
hadden bij het voortbestaan van herendiensten. Dientengevolge nam het 
gebruik van herendiensten alleen maar toe, gefaciliteerd door, paradoxaal 
genoeg, de codificatie van precies die principes die zogenaamd het gebruik 
ervan hadden moeten verminderden om een einde te maken aan het 
soort lijfeigenschap en ongelijkheid dat Java volgens veel Nederlanders 
kenmerkte. Als gevolg hiervan werden belastingen, in plaats van, bovenop 
belastingen geheven. Doordat zij vanuit de koloniale staat werden voorzien 
in bureaucratische handhavingsmiddelen en macht waarmee zij mensen 
konden inschrijven in allerlei herendiensten- en belastingregisters, kregen 
veel inheemse hoofden alleen maar meer gelegenheid om de arbeidsca-
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paciteit van haar eigen bevolking uit te buiten. Veel boeren probeerden 
te ontsnappen aan de hoge herendiensten- en belastingdruk door ‘met 
de voeten te stemmen’ op in opstand te komen, maar de Javanen bleven 
onevenredig zwaar belast. Verschillende rapporten, geschreven tussen 1900 
en 1930 erkenden allemaal dit probleem en drongen aan op vermindering 
van de herendienstendruk. Desondanks moest Nederland op de Conventie 
over Gedwongen Arbeid van de Internationale Arbeidsorganisatie in 1930 
toegeven dat slechts weinig was bereikt met het verminderen van het 
aanhoudende gebruik van gedwongen arbeid of verbetering van de voor-
waarden waaronder dwangarbeid werd georganiseerd in Indonesië.
De derde casestudy (hoofdstuk 5) bestudeert de impact van specifieke 
vormen van sociale organisatie op koloniale belastingheffing in West-
Sumatra. In de hooglanden van deze regio waren bezitsrechten gemeen-
schappelijk en erfelijk in vrouwelijke lijn – een concept waartegenover het 
koffiecultuurstelsel dat in de jaren 1840 in West-Sumatra werd opgelegd 
onverschillig was, maar dat het moderne koloniale belastingstelsel niet 
kon omvatten. De Nederlanders worstelden decennialang om evenwicht te 
vinden tussen dit erfenissysteem en het verwezenlijken van hun ambities 
om de samenleving te standaardiseren en te herinrichten voor deelname 
aan het geüniformeerde individuele inkomstenbelastingsysteem. Ze 
probeerden dezelfde modellen van indirect bestuur te gebruiken als op Java 
en Ambon, daarbij vertrouwend op de volgens hen gestandaardiseerde 
patronen van (mannelijk) leiderschap, om mannen individueel te belasten 
zoals ze gewend waren: als verantwoordelijk voor het inkomen van hun 
huishoudens. Maar politieke autoriteit en eigendomsrecht waren niet 
verenigd in West-Sumatra; mannen waren niet het soort familiehoofden 
dat de Nederlanders graag wilden, met aanspraak op inkomen en bezit. 
Door individuele inkomstenbelastingen door te drammen en gemeenschap-
pelijk bezit executabel te maken, hoopten de Nederlanders een sociale 
verschuiving teweeg te brengen richting individuele inkomstenbelasting 
van mannen. De belastingdruk nam toe, wat bijdroeg aan ontevredenheid 
onder de bevolking en sociale spanningen die regelmatig culmineerden in 
opstand en verzet. De heftigste opstand ontstond onmiddellijk na de invoe-
ring van inkomstenbelasting voor mannen in 1908. De Nederlanders, niet 
in staat om de lokale adat samenleving op haar eigen manier te begrijpen 
en te besturen, gaven de schuld van de onvermijdelijke verwerping van 
hun belastingstelsel door de lokale bevolking aan wat zij zagen als ‘radica-
lisme’ en de ‘tekortkomingen’ van de lokale samenleving. Op deze manier 
beperkten ze de noodzaak om actie te ondernemen, maar ontkenden ze ook 
de structurele gebreken die aan hun belastingbeleid ten grondslag lagen.
De vierde casestudy (hoofdstuk 6) bespreekt de Nederlandse invasie 
en inlijving van Atjeh in Noord-Sumatra. Waar Ambon en Java al in de 
vroegmoderne tijd kerndomeinen waren geworden van de Nederlandse 
koloniale overheersing en West-Sumatra wat eerder in de negentiende 
eeuw was veroverd, werd Atjeh pas na 1870 onderworpen aan Nederlandse 
heerschappij. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien hoe belastingheffing in Atjeh gepaard 
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ging met gewelddadige veroveringen en de toe-eigening van bestaande 
bestuursstructuren en exploitatiestelsel, als een integraal onderdeel van de 
Nederlandse imperiale expansie. Atjeh kende geen geconsolideerd konink-
rijk gebaseerd op rijstbouw en herverdeling van land en arbeid onder een 
complex aristocratisch systeem of keizer zoals op Java. In plaats daarvan 
onderhield de Sultan van Atjeh commercieel-politieke banden met, vaak vrij 
autonome, lokale heersers die aan hem tribuut afdroegen, maar ook hun 
eigen belangen nastreefden. Desalniettemin probeerden de Nederlanders 
een soortgelijk regime van herendienstarbeid en directe inkomstenbelas-
tingen als op Java in te voeren. Ze deden dit door deze lokale heersers te 
bewegen contracten te ondertekenen waarin ze de Nederlandse suprematie 
erkenden en in naam van de Nederlanders regeerden als ‘zelfbestuur-
ders’, terwijl ze hun rechten om belastingen en tarieven te heffen aan de 
staat overdroegen. Op die manier zouden de Atjeeërs in theorie worden 
onderworpen en ingesloten als een ‘genormaliseerde’, belastingbetalende 
bevolkingsgroep, terwijl het belastingsysteem in de praktijk werd uitbe-
steed aan deze inheemse heersers, die reeds bestaande instellingen gewoon 
voortzetten en veel van de Nederlandse beloften over fiscale modernizering 
veronachtzaamden. Het hoofdstuk stelt dat de Nederlanders dit stelsel 
opzettelijk zo opzetten om de pretentie van een functionerend belasting-
stelsel in stand te houden maar het gelimiteerde succes ervan toe te rekenen 
aan de uitvoerende inheemse hoofden.
Met de laatste casestudy (hoofdstuk 7), over het eiland Seram, keert 
het proefschrift terug in de Midden-Molukken. In de negentiende eeuw 
onthielden de Nederlanders zich van de kolonisatie van Seram. In tegen-
stelling tot het nabijgelegen Ambon werd Seram vanwege haar ongunstige 
geografische en sociale omstandigheden niet geschikt geacht voor econo-
mische exploitatie. Echter, het ‘beschavingsimperialisme’, expansiedrift 
en bezorgdheid over regionale veiligheid en stabiliteit brachten de Neder-
landers er uiteindelijk toch toe het eiland rond 1900 te koloniseren. Seram 
werd als moeilijk te beheersen terrein beschouwd, bewoond als het werd 
door autonoom gebleven etnische groepen die in ogen van de Nederlan-
ders compleet ‘onbeschaafd’ waren vanwege haar nomadische bestaan, 
niet-monotheïstisch religieuze oriëntatie, haar buiten-statelijke organisatie 
en het beoefenen van koppensnellen. Volgens koloniale ambtenaren moest 
zulk soort ‘gedrag’ wijken voor de koloniale drang naar sociale verbetering, 
en het eiland werd het onderworpen aan brute verovering en gedwongen 
diensten en hoofdelijke belastingen. Belastingheffing werd door sommige 
ambtenaren als een instrument beschouwd om de staat ter plaatse handen 
en voeten te geven en te vestigen, mensen aan de staat te verbinden, hen 
te beschermen tegen hun eigen ‘gewelddadige neigingen’, gevestigde 
dorpsbewoning en gehoorzaamheid te bevorderen en ‘rust en vrede’ te 
creëren. Maar net als in Atjeh gaven de Nederlanders, in plaats van echt 
te gebruik te maken van diepgewortelde organisatie- en machtspatronen, 
er de voorkeur aan het gezag over te dragen aan geselecteerde inheemse 
hoofden die, gekleed in Europese kostuums en bekroond met de juiste 
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titels en parafernalia, zelfstandig belastingen zouden innen van hun eigen 
bevolkingen. Dit soort koloniale ‘afstandelijkheid’ maakte verschillende 
vormen van ontwijking van en verzet tegen de staat mogelijk, en alleen het 
gebruik van geweld, precies wat ambtenaren claimden te bestrijden, bleek 
echt effectief in het scheppen van belastingbetalende onderdanen en het 
reorganiseren van de gekoloniseerde samenleving.
Tezamen laten deze casestudy’s zien dat het Nederlandse koloniale 
belastingbeleid constant aasde op inheemse grondbeginselen die ter plaatse 
werden aangetroffen, en uit werden gewerkt door gebruik van lokale 
kennis, organisatie en praktijken van de onderworpen bevolkingsgroepen 
die ze eigenlijk diende te vervangen. Op deze manier werden zowel de 
cultuurstelsels van de negentiende eeuw als de monetaire belastingstelsels 
van de twintigste eeuw opgebouwd. De beste instrumenten om interne 
orde te leren beheersen en de lokale samenleving te besturen, bleken de al 
bestaande te zijn geweest, waarschijnlijk juist omdat ze lokaal waren en al 
eeuwenlang de belastingheffing en bestuur arrangeerden. Zodoende, zoals 
het proefschrift concludeert, werd koloniaal belastingbeleid ontwikkeld in 
interactie tussen de Nederlandse kolonisator en inheemse samenlevingen. 
Op papier bleef het daarmee bij een mengeling van lokale realiteiten die 
werden gecodificeerd in verordeningen, vertaald in de taal van de koloniale 
bureaucratie, afgestempeld met de vereiste handtekeningen en gepresen-
teerd als een koloniale uitvinding. Dit kwam, althans gedeeltelijk, voort 
uit verschillen in ambities, theorieën, ideologieën en prioriteiten binnen en 
tussen verschillende niveaus van het koloniale overheidsapparaat. Terwijl 
staatsmannen en beleidsmakers in Den Haag en Batavia de harmonie en 
eenheid van hun staat probeerden te bewaren, hadden lokale ambtenaren 
vaak weinig andere keus dan deze ‘schrijftafeltheorieën’ te compromitteren 
aan omstandigheden die ze ter plaatse aantroffen. Besturen door dicht bij 
lokale gebruiken en gewoonterecht te blijven, hielp ook bij het minimali-
seren van verzet, en het bestendigen van ‘rust en vrede’ was essentieel voor 
het handhaven van de koloniale orde.
Als gevolg hiervan raakte het belastingbeleid alleen maar complexer 
en inflexibeler, terwijl de doelstellingen omtrent sociale hervorming en 
‘verbetering’ niet werden gehaald. Dit was zeer problematisch, omdat de 
belofte van hervorming, verbetering en verandering essentieel was voor het 
Europees zelfbeeld en voor de manieren waarop koloniale ambtenaren hun 
beleid en aanwezigheid legitimeerden. Dit werd opgelost door er voort-
durend te volharden in het idee van inheemse ontoereikendheid om aan 
de standaarden van ‘Europese moderniteit’ te voldoen. Door informatie te 
manipuleren en te selecteren en kennis te produceren die vooral diende om 
beleid achteraf te legitimeren in plaats van bepaald optreden te stimuleren, 
sloten koloniale functionarissen hun ogen voor de structurele problemen 
die kenmerkend waren voor koloniaal bestuur en belastingheffing. Op deze 
manier ontkenden ze de noodzaak van meer structurele hervormingen en 
deden ze alsof ze een bureaucratische, rechtvaardige en transparante belas-
tingstaat invoerden.
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Soortgelijke ontwikkelingen, zo blijkt uit recente literatuur, vonden ook 
plaats in gekoloniseerde gebieden elders. Dit helpt ons de relaties tussen 
kolonisator en gekoloniseerden te herzien. Terwijl de kolonisator bepaalde 
welk belastingbeleid er werd gevoerd, hadden de gekoloniseerden een 
belangrijke rol in de manier waarop deze in de praktijk werden uitgevoerd, 
en daarmee hoe moeilijk het was om het koloniale rijk te besturen. Door 
lokale structuren van bestuur, sociale organisatie en belastingheffing te 
verzamelen, importeren en internaliseren, raakten de regelingen, wetten 
en verordeningen van de koloniale staten ermee doordrongen. En door 
gebruik te maken van de instellingen, patronen en structuren die koloniale 
ambtenaren beweerden te vervangen of te hervormen, erkenden ze impli-
ciet de pragmatische waarde en macht ervan.
In het algemeen waren belastingheffers nooit onbeperkt in hun macht; 
belastingen werden historisch gezien altijd bepaald door middel van 
onderhandeling en interactie tussen diegenen die hieven en diegenen 
die betaalden. Daarom spoort dit proefschrift aan tot het accepteren en 
erkennen van het vermogen (agency) van gekoloniseerden in het ombuigen 
van de macht van de koloniale staat. Dit helpt ons om verder te kijken dan 
de nauwe kaders van Europese moderniteit om tot een beter begrip te 
komen van hoe koloniaal bestuur feitelijk werkte.
H10_Promise Pretence and Pragmatism_Summary_Dutch.indd   370 23-04-21   10:22
Ringkasan (Summary in Indonesian)
Janji, Kepura-puraan dan Pragmatisme: 
Pemerintahan dan Perpajakan di Indonesia 
masa Kolonial, 1870-1940
Disertasi ini menginvestigasi perkembangan yang panjang dan kompleks 
tentang suatu sistem pajak modern negara kolonial Belanda di Indonesia, 
atau Hindia Belanda, antara tahun 1870 dan 1940. Disertasi ini mendis-
kusikan ambisi pemerintah kolonial untuk mendirikan sebuah sistem 
perpajakan yang bersatu, terpusat dan birokratis, dimana para subyek 
pajak membayar pajaknya secara adil, setara dan sesuai dengan kapasitas 
mereka. Disertasi ini menunjukkan bahwa perpajakan digunakan sebagai 
instrumen dimana para pejabat menangani pertanyaan-pertanyaan inti 
mengenai hubungan antara negara dan subyeknya, dan negosiasi antara 
subyek pemerintahan dengan pemerintahnya. Oleh karena itu, disertasi ini 
berfungsi sebagai lensa untuk mempelajari pemerintahan kolonial.
Disertasi ini memulai dengan menggarisbawahi bagaimana pada tahun 
1920, setelah hampir 50 tahun reformasi fiskal, pemerintah kolonial Belanda 
mencoba menyelesaikan masalah pemisahan fiskal di negara jajahan 
mereka di Indonesia, yang tadinya berdasarkan etnis, sosio-legal dan regi-
onal dengan memberlakukan sistem pajak pendapatan terpadu. Namun 
demikian, administrasi kolonial terlihat tidak siap untuk menjalankan 
keterpaduan tersebut, dan sistem pajak terbukti sulit untuk dipertahankan 
dan terus-menerus digagalkan oleh banyak masalah-masalah praktis. 
Untuk mengerti mengapa hal tersebut terjadi, disertasi ini melihat tidak 
hanya pada kebijakan-kebijakan kolonial, tetapi juga pada interaksi antara 
pejabat-pejabat kolonial dan masyarakat lokal. Dengan membandingkan 
implementasi reformasi pajak di lima wilayah (Ambon, Jawa, Sumatera 
Barat, Aceh dan Seram), disertasi ini memberi pengertian mengenai 
perkembangan lokal dan pelaksanaan perpajakan. Karena itu, disertasi 
ini menyediakan analisis kritis mengenai pemerintahan kolonial dan 
hubungan-hubungan intrik antara pejabat-pejabat kolonial, para perantara 
dan para subyek. Disertasi ini menganalisa ideologi dan kebijakan kolonial 
dan membandingkannya dengan praktek-praktek administratif oleh peja-
bat-pejabat lokal di lapangan, untuk mengungkapkan apa tujuan pejabat 
tinggi kolonial dan bagaimana dan mengapa hal tersebut berbeda dengan 
praktek pemerintahan yang dialami para pejabat lokal di lapangan.
Bab pertama menginvestigasi apa yang memotivasi penjajahan oleh 
Belanda dengan latar belakang konstruksi dan ekspansi negara kolonial 
antara 1815 dan 1940. Dijelaskan bagaimana di abad ke-19 Belanda memo-
nopoli produksi dan keuntungan agrikultur didalam kerangka kerja yang 
disebut sebagai ‘sistem budidaya’, dimana populasi petani harus menun-
dukkan diri pada kerja paksa selain dari membayar pajak, dan dikelola 
oleh sekelompok kelas penguasa tidak langsung yang semi-independen 
dan berpartisipasi dalam keuntungan dari penjajahan. Kerja paksa sangat 
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penting secara ekonomi dan dilegitimasikan dengan cara menyampai-
kannya sebagai alat pendisiplinan untuk mendapatkan etika kerja dan 
kesejahteraan yang lebih besar, walaupun hal tersebut eksploitatif dan 
berbahaya. Kebijakan kerja paksa, pada faktanya, sering berakar pada 
prinsip adat lokal mengenai ekstraksi dan redistribusi tenaga kerja. Hal 
ini tidak sesuai dengan prinsip perpajakan modern yang dibayangkan 
oleh pejabat-pejabat kolonial di akhir abad ke-19. Selain itu, monopolisasi 
produksi dan perdagangan berkonflik dengan kepentingan para politisi 
liberal dan pengusaha swasta. Dari tahun 1870, sistem kerja paksa ini secara 
perlahan-lahan di dekonstruksi. Negara kolonial dibuka untuk modal dan 
pengusaha swasta. Perkembangan ini dibarengi dengan meningkatnya 
kekhawatiran yang ‘etis’ mengenai kesejahteraan orang pribumi, mena-
namkan model ‘peradaban imperialisme’ yang baru. Hal ini memaksakan 
governmental rationality dalam kebijakan kolonial, yang bertujuan untuk 
mengubah dan ‘memperbaiki’ standar, perilaku, dan pola-pola organisasi 
social para subyek jajahan, untuk membuat mereka lebih kaya, lebih 
produktif dan lebih ‘teratur’, sesuai dengan ekspektasi pemerintah Belanda.
‘Kolonialisme Etis’ bertujuan tidak hanya untuk mengontrol tetapi juga 
secara integral menjajah sebuah populasi dibawah sebuah birokrasi hukum, 
prosedur yang terinstitusional, dan teknik-teknik administrasi yang 
modern. Didorong oleh ide-ide kontemporer mengenai superioritas Eropa, 
‘Kolonialisme Etis’ memberikan narasi baru untuk melegitimasikan keku-
asaan kolonial, dimana orang-orang pribumi digambarkan sebagai tidak 
mampu mengatur diri mereka sendiri dan membutuhkan arahan untuk 
mencapai statecraft dan perpajakan modern yang layak dan ke-Eropa-an. 
Standar-standar dan kebudayaan-kebudayaan yang non-Eropa secara 
otomatis dianggap tidak memadai. ‘Modernisasi’ dalam hal ini dipre-
sentasikan sebagai gerakan melawan bentuk-bentuk adat pribumi 
yang dianggap feudal, ekspoitatif, tidak beradab dan lalim, dan untuk 
merubahnya menjadi seperti contoh birokrasi Eropa yang lebih tinggi. 
Didalam negara yang dianggap birokratis ini, semua orang akan dikelola, 
dirawat, didatakan dan diikat kepada negara dengan cara membayar pajak 
pendapatan terpadu, yang karenanya mereka ikut berkontribusi kepada 
perkembangan diri mereka sendiri, satu sama lain, dan negara. Rasionalitas 
dan teknik-teknik pemerintahan menjadi vital untuk perkembangan dan 
keabsahan kebijakan-kebijakan baru di akhir abad ke-19, termasuk perpa-
jakan moneter.
Bab kedua mengeksplorasi bagaimana kebijakan pajak kolonial berubah 
berbarengan dengan transformasi ideologi, politik dan sosio-ekonomi di 
akhir tahun 1800-an. Sejak tahun 1878, diperkenalkan serangkaian pajak 
pendapatan baru yang semakin merata terhadap seluruh populasi Eropa, 
Timur Asing dan pribumi. Serangkaian aturan perpajakan baru tersebut 
seharusnya mengurangi penggunaan tenaga kerja paksa dan memperluas 
dan mendistribusikan kembali beban fiskal se-adil mungkin kepada seluruh 
populasi koloni. Pajak pendapatan tersebut kemudian digabung dan sepe-
nuhnya disatukan pada tahun 1920. Ini dilihat sebagai titik akhir usaha 
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negara kolonial dalam menggabungkan dan menstandardisasi sebanyak 
mungkin orang dalam sebuah sistem administrasi pajak terpadu. Banyak 
pejabat tinggi melihat perpajakan sebagai alat untuk memetakan dan 
mentransformasi populasi jajahan, menstimulasi perilaku produktif, meme-
lihara ketertiban umum, meningkatkan ekuitas fiskal dan membentuk 
sebuah masyarakat pembayar pajak yang ‘beradab’. Mereka mengira telah 
memberlakukan sebuah sistem pajak yang sesuai dengan itu di tahun 1920. 
Di benak mereka, reformasi sistem perpajakan menentukan perkembangan 
negara dan masyarakat yang terkonsolidasi dalam satu negara kolonial. 
Singkatnya, perpajakan di Indonesia di masa kolonial berada di garis depan 
pemikiran kolonialisme yang ‘beretika’ dan ‘beradab’.
Tetapi, hal ini cuma berlaku di atas kertas. Kenyataannya, walaupun 
perpajakan menjadi sumber pendapatan negara yang penting, penga-
ruhnya terhadap pemerintahan tetap terbatas. Banyak dari layanan tenaga 
kerja (paksa) yang telah dihapus secara formal tetapi digunakan. Secara 
keseluruhan, penggunaan tenaga kerja paksa di koloni justru meningkat, 
mengikuti ekspansi koloni secara ekonomi dan territorial. Selebihnya, 
sistem perpajakan tetap bersifat diskriminatif dan eksploitatif, dan 
dikarakterisasikan oleh segregasi, korupsi dan ketidakadilan. Kepen-
tingan-kepentingan korporatisme internasional terus mengesampingkan 
kepentingan-kepentingan pribumi. Sistem perpajakan tetap merugikan 
para pembayar pajak kecil. Ambisi untuk meningkatkan kesejahteraan dan 
menstimulasi partisipasi pribumi dalam politik ekonomi kolonial melalui 
perpajakan tidak terpenuhi. Di banyak tempat, kehadiran negara tetap 
disangkal dan pembayaran pajak dihindari secara struktural. Kebijakan 
yang dihasilkan berasal dari kondisi tersebut, dan dibangun dari bawah ke 
atas dalam interaksi antara pejabat kolonial dan pembayar pajak melalui 
jaringan sosial para elit pribumi dan penyewa pajak. Mereka berpartisi-
pasi dalam pendapatan pajak dan menikmati ‘gaji kolektor’ atau dengan 
me(-nyalah)gunakan kuasa yang diperolehnya dari peran sebagai peran-
tara negara dan masyarakat. Para pejabat kolonial membuat keputusan 
pragmatis dan berpartisipasi dalam membentuk jaringan masyarakat 
patrimonial berdasar pada layanan dan upeti yang semustinya mereka 
ubah. Dengan cara tersebut, negara kolonial sendirinya menjadi tercampur 
dengan struktur dan praktek local yang semustinya digantinya. Bukannya 
sebagai kekuatan untuk ekstraksi dan reformasi, perpajakan menyediakan 
arena untuk beradu dengan negara kolonial.
Untuk mengungkapkan bagaimana perpajakan dikerjakan, lima studi 
kasus dianalisis dalam disertasi ini, yang masing-masing mencakup lokasi 
tertentu di Hindia Belanda, dan masing-masing juga mewakili tahap dan 
bentuk lain ekspansi kolonial Belanda di nusantara dan organisasi kema-
syarakatan. Dengan demikian, disertasi ini berupaya untuk memberikan 
eksplorasi komparatif yang selengkap dan sedetail mungkin mengenai 
implementasi reformasi perpajakan di berbagai wilayah nusantara, dengan 
mengurai seluk-beluk praktik pemerintahan negara kolonial Belanda.
Studi kasus pertama (Bab 3) mengenai pulau Ambon, di Maluku 
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Tengah, dan membahas bagaimana pada abad ketujuh belas Belanda 
memberlakukan sistem perdagangan monopoli dan produksi rempah-
rempah secara paksa di pulau ini. Sistem ini sebagian besar dikoordina-
sikan bekerja sama dengan penguasa adat. Ketika ekonomi rempah-rempah 
runtuh pada abad kesembilan belas, Belanda tetap mengandalkan para 
penguasa ini, meskipun kemerosotan ekonomi tersebut menyebabkan terki-
kisnya posisi dan gengsi mereka. Transisi menuju pajak moneter per-kepala 
tidak berhasil, karena, alih-alih memaksakan sistem pemerintahan dan 
pemungutan pajak yang adil, birokratis dan transparan, Belanda terus 
mengandalkan peninggalan masa lalu dan kejayaan tatanan politik yang 
semakin usang dan miskin, yang merugikan cengkeraman mereka terhadap 
penduduk Ambon dalam jangka panjang.
Studi kasus kedua (Bab 4) menyelidiki persistensi kerja paksa, dan 
khususnya layanan corvée di Jawa. Bab ini mengeksplorasi prinsip-prinsip 
Jawa tentang redistribusi, timbal balik dan pertukaran dalam hubungan 
segitiga antara tanah, tenaga kerja dan kekuasaan yang fundamental bagi 
berbagai sistem kolonial dari produksi dan layanan pertanian yang dipak-
sakan yang diberlakukan pada abad kesembilan belas. Bab ini mengung-
kapkan bagaimana, seperti di Ambon, transformasi kerja paksa dan layanan 
menjadi pajak moneter terhalang oleh kelanjutan jenis aturan tidak lang-
sung yang sama yang menopang sistem budidaya. Negara berjanji untuk 
mengakarkan peraturan kolonial tentang corvée dan perpajakan dalam 
prinsip-prinsip adat yang dianggap lokal dengan mengumpulkan penge-
tahuan dan mengkodifikasi prinsip-prinsip ini. Namun, dengan demikian, 
hal itu memberi para pejabat kolonial kemungkinan untuk, daripada 
mengumpulkan dan menjelaskan, memproduksi, memilih dan mengubah 
pengetahuan tentang prinsip-prinsip agar sesuai dengan kebutuhan negara 
di mana corvée tetap menjadi bentuk penawaran tenaga kerja yang murah 
dan nyaman. Selain itu, untuk mengumpulkan informasi, pejabat kolonial 
mengandalkan elit lokal yang sering berkepentingan untuk kelanjutan 
corvée. Akibatnya, penggunaan corvée hanya meningkat, difasilitasi oleh, 
secara paradoks, kodifikasi prinsip-prinsip yang tepat yang seharusnya 
mengurangi penggunaannya untuk mengakhiri jenis perbudakan dan 
ketidaksetaraan yang banyak dicirikan Belanda mengenai Jawa. Akibatnya, 
tambahan pajak dipungut alih-alih layanan corvée. Dengan alat penegakan 
birokrasi negara kolonial dan kekuasaan untuk memasukkan lebih banyak 
orang ke dalam semua jenis corvée dan daftar pajak, banyak kepala adat 
mendapat akses yang lebih besar untuk mengeksploitasi kapasitas tenaga 
kerja rakyat mereka. Banyak petani, yang cukup sering berhasil, mencoba 
melepaskan diri dari beban pajak dan layanan yang tinggi, dengan ‘voting 
with their feet’ atau memberontak, tetapi orang Jawa tetap dikenakan pajak 
pada tingkat yang sangat berat secara tidak proporsional. Laporan yang 
ditulis antara tahun 1900 dan 1930, semuanya mengakui masalah ini dan 
mendesak untuk mengurangi beban corvée, namun pada Konvensi Kerja 
Paksa Organisasi Buruh Internasional yang diadakan pada tahun 1930, 
Belanda dipaksa untuk mengakui bahwa sedikit yang telah dicapai dalam 
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mengurangi kerja paksa atau memperbaiki kondisi penyelenggaraannya di 
seluruh Indonesia.
Studi kasus ketiga (Bab 5) mempelajari dampak dari bentuk-bentuk 
khusus organisasi sosial pada perpajakan kolonial di Sumatera Barat. Di 
dataran tinggi wilayah ini, hak milik dimiliki secara komunal dan diwarisi 
dalam garis perempuan – sebuah konsep yang diterapkan sistem pena-
naman kopi paksa di Sumatera Barat pada tahun 1840-an, tetapi sistem 
pajak kolonial modern tidak dapat memahaminya. Belanda berjuang 
selama beberapa dekade untuk menyeimbangkan melengkapi sistem 
warisan perempuan dengan mewujudkan ambisi mereka untuk memba-
kukan dan mendesain ulang masyarakat untuk berpartisipasi dalam sistem 
terpadu pajak penghasilan individu. Mereka mencoba menggunakan model 
pemerintahan tidak langsung yang sama seperti di Jawa dan Ambon, 
dengan mengandalkan pola kepemimpinan (laki-laki) yang mereka anggap 
standar, untuk mengenakan pajak kepada laki-laki sebagaimana biasanya 
mereka bertanggung jawab atas pendapatan rumah tangga mereka. Tetapi 
kekuasaan politik dan hak atas properti tidak disatukan di Sumatera Barat; 
laki-laki bukanlah kepala keluarga yang sama, memiliki klaim dan wewe-
nang atas pendapatan dan harta benda, seperti yang diinginkan Belanda. 
Dengan memberlakukan pengenaan pajak penghasilan perorangan dan 
membuat properti yang dimiliki secara komunal dapat dieksekusi, Belanda 
berharap dapat mendorong pergeseran sosial menuju pajak penghasilan 
perorangan melalui laki-laki. Beban pajak meningkat, menambah ketidak-
puasan rakyat dan ketegangan sosial yang berpuncak pada pemberontakan 
dan perlawanan reguler, yang terberat terjadi segera setelah pengenaan 
pajak penghasilan pribadi untuk laki-laki pada tahun 1908. Belanda, secara 
struktural tidak dapat memahami dan mengendalikan masyarakat adat 
setempat pada istilahnya sendiri, menyalahkan penolakan tak terelakkan 
atas sistem perpajakan mereka oleh Minangkabau pada ‘radikalisme’ dan 
‘kekurangan’ masyarakat. Dengan cara ini, mereka membatasi kebutuhan 
untuk mengambil tindakan, tetapi juga menyangkal cacat struktural yang 
mendasari kebijakan pajak mereka.
Studi kasus keempat (Bab 6) membahas invasi Belanda dan pengga-
bungan Aceh di Sumatera Utara. Sementara Ambon dan Jawa pada saat 
itu telah menjadi domain inti pendudukan kolonial Belanda di era modern 
awal dan Sumatera Barat ditaklukkan lebih awal pada abad ke-19, Aceh 
baru dikuasai Belanda setelah tahun 1870. Bab ini menunjukkan bagaimana 
pengenaan pajak di Aceh berjalan seiring dengan penaklukan yang kejam 
dan perampasan struktur pemerintahan dan sistem eksploitasi yang ada, 
sebagai bagian integral dari ekspansi imperialisme. Di Aceh, tidak pernah 
ada konsolidasi kerajaan berdasarkan penanaman padi dan redistribusi 
tanah dan tenaga kerja di bawah sistem aristokrat atau kaisar yang rumit 
seperti di Jawa. Sebaliknya, Sultan Aceh mempertahankan hubungan 
komersial-politik seringkali dengan penguasa lokal yang agak otonom 
yang membayar upeti tetapi juga mengejar kepentingan mereka sendiri. 
Meskipun demikian, Belanda berusaha menerapkan rezim pajak tenaga 
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kerja dan pendapatan langsung yang serupa seperti di Jawa. Mereka 
melakukannya dengan mengajak para penguasa lokal ini untuk menan-
datangani kontrak yang mengakui supremasi Belanda dan memerintah 
atas nama Belanda sebagai ‘gubernur sendiri’, sambil menyerahkan bea 
dan tarif kepada negara kolonial. Dengan cara itu, secara teori orang Aceh 
menjadi sasaran dan termasuk sebagai penduduk yang ‘dinormalisasi’, 
membayar pajak, sementara pada kenyataannya sistem pajak secara praktis 
diserahkan kepada para penguasa pribumi yang hanya melanjutkan peng-
aturan yang sudah digunakan, mengabaikan banyak janji Belanda untuk 
fiskal yang modern. Bab ini menyatakan bahwa Belanda sengaja merancang 
skema ini dengan cara ini untuk menjaga agar sistem pajak tetap berpura-
pura berfungsi sementara menyalahkan keterbatasannya pada para kepala 
suku asli yang melaksanakannya.
Dengan studi kasus terakhir (Bab 7) tentang Pulau Seram, disertasi tiba 
kembali di Maluku Tengah. Selama abad kesembilan belas, Belanda tidak 
menjajah Seram. Berlawanan dengan Ambon yang berdekatan, Seram 
dianggap tidak cocok untuk eksploitasi ekonomi karena keadaan geografis 
dan sosialnya. Namun, ‘imperialisme peradaban’, dorongan untuk ekspansi 
dan kekhawatiran tentang keamanan dan stabilitas di wilayah tersebut 
akhirnya mendorong Belanda untuk menjajah pulau itu sekitar tahun 1900. 
Seram dianggap medan yang sulit untuk dikendalikan, karena dihuni oleh 
berbagai kelompok etnis yang mempertahankan kemerdekaan mereka dan 
di mata Belanda sama sekali ‘tidak beradab’ karena kehidupan mereka 
yang berpindah-pindah, orientasi agama non-monoteistik, organisasi 
dalam entitas non-negara dan praktik-praktek buru kepala. Dalam pola 
pikir pejabat kolonial, ‘perilaku’ semacam ini harus tunduk pada dorongan 
kolonial untuk perbaikan sosial, dan pulau itu menjadi sasaran penaklukan 
brutal dan pengenaan layanan tenaga kerja dan pajak per-kepala. Perpa-
jakan dianggap sebagai alat oleh beberapa pejabat untuk melengkapi dan 
menegakkan negara di lapangan, menghubungkan orang dengan negara, 
melindungi mereka dari ‘kecenderungan kekerasan’ mereka sendiri, 
mempromosikan penduduk desa yang menetap dan kepatuhan kepada 
pejabat kolonial dan membangun perdamaian dan ketenangan. Tetapi 
seperti halnya di Aceh, alih-alih benar-benar bekerja melalui pola organi-
sasi dan kekuasaan yang sudah mengakar, Belanda lebih memilih untuk 
menyerahkan kewenangan kepada kepala adat terpilih yang, mengenakan 
pakaian Eropa dan dianugerahi gelar dan perlengkapan yang sesuai, secara 
mandiri mengumpulkan pajak dari populasi mereka sendiri. ‘Kebodohan’ 
kolonial ini memungkinkan untuk berbagai bentuk penghindaran dan 
perlawanan negara, dan hanya penggunaan kekerasan, persis seperti yang 
diklaim oleh para pejabat untuk dikurangi, tampak benar-benar efektif 
dalam menghasilkan subjek pembayar pajak dan menata kembali masya-
rakat terjajah.
Bersama-sama, studi kasus ini menunjukkan bahwa kebijakan pajak 
kolonial Belanda selalu memangsa prinsip-prinsip adat yang ditemukan 
di tempat, dan dikerjakan dengan menggunakan pengetahuan, organisasi, 
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dan praktik lokal dari populasi sasaran yang seharusnya mereka gantikan. 
Beginilah cara kedua sistem budidaya abad kesembilan belas dan sistem 
pajak moneter abad kedua puluh dibangun. Alat terbaik untuk belajar 
mengontrol tatanan internal dan mengatur masyarakat lokal tampaknya 
sudah ada, mungkin justru karena mereka lokal dan telah mengatur perpa-
jakan dan pemerintahan selama berabad-abad. Dengan demikian, sebagai 
kesimpulan disertasi, kebijakan perpajakan dikembangkan dalam interaksi 
antara penjajah Belanda dan masyarakat adat. Di atas kertas itu berakhir 
sebagai campuran realitas lokal yang dikodifikasi ke dalam peraturan, 
diterjemahkan ke dalam bahasa birokrasi kolonial, dicap dengan tanda 
tangan yang diperlukan dan disajikan sebagai hasil penemuan kolonial. 
Hal ini, setidaknya sebagian, melahirkan perbedaan ambisi, teori, ideologi, 
dan prioritas di dalam dan di antara berbagai tingkatan aparat pemerintah 
kolonial. Sedangkan di Den Haag dan Batavia, negarawan dan pembuat 
kebijakan berusaha untuk menjaga keharmonisan dan persatuan negara 
mereka, pejabat lokal sering kali tidak punya banyak pilihan selain meng-
kompromikan ‘teori meja tulis’ ini dengan kondisi yang mereka hadapi 
di lapangan. Memutuskan dengan tetap dekat dengan praktik lokal dan 
hukum adat juga membantu meminimalkan oposisi, dan melanjutkan 
‘perdamaian dan ketenangan’ sangat penting untuk menjaga ketertiban 
kolonial.
Akibatnya, kebijakan perpajakan menjadi semakin kompleks dan tidak 
fleksibel, sementara tujuan reformasi sosial dan ‘perbaikan’ tidak tercapai. 
Ini sangat problematis, karena janji reformasi, perbaikan, dan perubahan 
penting bagi citra diri Eropa dan cara pejabat kolonial melegitimasi 
kebijakan dan kehadiran mereka. Ini diselesaikan dengan terus-menerus 
bersikeras pada ketidakcukupan masyarakat adat untuk mematuhi standar 
‘modernitas Eropa.’ Dengan memanipulasi, memilih dan menampi arus 
informasi, pejabat kolonial menutup mata mereka terhadap masalah struk-
tural yang menjadi ciri pemerintahan kolonial dan perpajakan. Dengan cara 
ini, mereka menolak perlunya reformasi yang lebih struktural, dan berpura-
pura menjalankan negara perpajakan yang birokratis, adil dan transparan.
Perkembangan serupa, seperti yang ditunjukkan dalam literatur juga 
terjadi di ruang-ruang terjajah di tempat lain. Ini membantu kita dalam 
meninjau hubungan antara penjajah dan yang terjajah. Penjajah menen-
tukan kebijakan pajak apa yang diterapkan, sedangkan yang terjajah 
memiliki peran penting dalam bagaimana hal ini diterapkan dalam prak-
tiknya, dan karenanya betapa sulitnya mengelola kerajaan kolonial. Ketika 
negara-negara kolonial mengakumulasi, mengimpor dan menginternalisasi 
struktur pemerintahan lokal, organisasi sosial dan perpajakan, skema, 
undang-undang dan peraturannya diserap dengannya. Dan dengan meng-
gunakan institusi, pola dan struktur yang diklaim oleh pejabat kolonial 
untuk diganti atau direformasi, mereka secara implisit mengakui nilai dan 
kekuatan dari semua ini.
Secara umum, entitas pemungut pajak tidak pernah tidak terbatas 
dalam kekuasaan mereka, karena pajak secara historis selalu diputuskan 
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melalui negosiasi dan interaksi antara mereka yang memungut dan 
mereka yang membayarnya. Oleh karena itu, disertasi ini menghimbau 
untuk menerima dan mengakui hak pilihan (agency) orang-orang yang 
terjajah dalam membengkokkan kekuasaan negara kolonial. Ini membantu 
kita untuk melihat melampaui kerangka sempit modernitas Eropa untuk 
mendapatkan pemahaman yang lebih dekat tentang bagaimana sebenarnya 
pemerintahan kolonial bekerja.
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Appendix 1. Composition of government revenue in the Dutch East 
Indies in fl. 1000, 1867-1915. 1
Appendix 2. Revenue from the Wage Tax, Land Rent and Corporate Tax 
compared, 1935-1939 in fl. 1000, 1867-1915. 2
1 Van Zanden (et al.), “Government revenue in the Netherlands East Indies 1848-1940” 
(Dataset, Amsterdam: IISH, 2003).
2 ibid.
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Appendix 5 Nagari population, corvée labourers and proposed 
accordant salaries in Ambon, 1903




Proposed Chiefly Salaries 
in guilders 






39 } 100 1200
Amahusu 482 101 50 600
Asilulu 1082 215 75 900
Batu Merah 307 35 50 600
Cesih[?] 701 - 50 600
Ema 657 80 50 600
Hakurila 87 8 50 600
Halong 83 12 50 600






54 } 75 900
Hative Kecil 75 14 50 600
Hatu 414 69 50 600
Hila 780 144 50 600
Hitu Lama 1166 198 75 900
Hitu Mesing 444 48 50 600
Hutumuri 1270 164 75 900
Kaitetu 238 42 50 600
Kilang 589 62 50 600
Laha 330 60 50 600






15 } 75 900
Leahari 121 11 50 600
Liang 1440 4 75 900
Liliboi 710 120 50 600
Limah[?] 741 125 50 600
Mamala 823 181 50 600
Morela 829 48 50 600
Naku 256 20 50 600
Paso 213 30 50 600
Rumah Tiga 68 12 50 600
Rutong 394 8 50 600
Seith x 138 50 600
Promise Pretence and Pragmatism.indb   386 22-04-21   17:35
387Appendices




Proposed Chiefly Salaries 
in guilders 






2 } 50 600
Suli 885 122 50 600
Tengah-Tengah 789 98 50 600
Tial Salam 467 88 50 600
Tial Serani 78 10 50 600
Tulehu 1824 425 75 900
Urimesing 144 16 50 600
Uring [?] 593 91 50 600
Waai 780 128 50 600
Wakal 394 4 50 600
Wakasihu 705 122 50 600
Total 26471 3825 2425 29100
Source: ANRI AS MGS 4263, herein: MGS, 22-6-1903: ‘Nota, betr. request der regenten van Ambon gehoudende verzoek
bij bewijze van tractement een geldeijke tegemoetkoming te verlenen, Controleur J. van Lier.’
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Appendix 6 List of Officials
Ministers of Colonies, 1834-1942
A. Brocx (a.i.) 1834 – 1834
J. van den Bosch 1834 – 1840
J.C. Baud 1840 – 1848
J.C. Rijk (ad interim) 1848 – 1848
G.L. Baud 1848 – 1849
E.B. van den Bosch 1849 – 1849
C.F. Pahud 1849 – 1855
mr. P. Mijer 1856 – 1858
J.J. Rochussen 1858 – 1860
J.S. Lotsij (ad interim) 1861 – 1861
J.P. Cornets de Groot van Kraaijenburg 1861 – 1861
J. Loudon 1861 – 1862
G.H. Uhlenbeck 1862 – 1863
G.H. Betz (ad interim) 1863 – 1863
I.D. Fransen van de Putte 1863 – 1866
P. Mijer 1866 – 1866
N. van Taack Trakranen 1866 – 1867
J.J. Hasselman 1867 – 1868
E. de Waal 1868 – 1870
L.G. Brocx (ad interim) 1870 – 1871
P.P. van Bosse 1871 – 1872
I.D. Fransen van de Putte 1872 – 1874
W. baron van Goltstein van Oldenaller 1874 – 1876
F. Alting Mees 1876 – 1877
P.P. van Bosse 1877 – 1879
H.O. Wichers (ad interim) 1879 – 1879
O. van Rees 1879 – 1879
W. baron van Goltstein van Oldenaller 1879 – 1882
W.M. de Brauw 1882 – 1883
W.F. van Erp Taalman Kip (ad interim) 1883 – 1883
F.G. van Bloemen Waanders 1883 – 1883
A.W.P. Weitzel (ad interim) 1883 – 1884
J.P. Sprenger van Eijk 1884 – 1888
L.W.C. Keuchenius 1888 – 1890
A. baron Mackay 1890 – 1891
W.K. baron van Dedem 1891 – 1894
J.H. Bergsma 1894 – 1897
J.Th. Cremer 1897 – 1901
T.A.J. van Asch van Wijck 1901 – 1902
J.W. Bergansius (ad interim) 1902 – 1902
A.W.F. Idenburg 1902 – 1905
D. Fock 1905 – 1908
T. Heemskerk (a.i.) 1908 – 1908
A.W.F. Idenburg 1908 – 1909
J.H. de Waal Malefijt 1909 – 1913
T.B. Pleyte 1913 – 1915
J.J. Rambonnet 1915 – 1916
T.B. Pleyte 1916 – 1918
A.W.F. Idenburg 1918 – 1919
C. Ruijs de Beerenbrouck (a.i.) 1918 – 1919
S. de Graaff 1919 – 1925
H. Colijn (a.i.) 1919 – 1919
C. Welter 1925 – 1926
J.C. Koningsberger 1926 – 1929
S. de Graaff 1929 – 1933
H. Colijn 1933 – 1937
C. Welter 1937 – 1939
C. van den Bussche 1939 – 1939
C. Welter 1939 – 1941
P.S. Gerbrandy 1941 – 1942
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Governor Generals of the Dutch East Indies, 1808-1942
H.W. Daendels 1808 – 1811
J.W. Janssens 1811 – 1811
G. Elliot, Lord Minto 1811 – 1811
T.S. Raffles 1811 – 1816
J. Fendall 1816 – 1816
G.A.G.P. baron van der Capellen 1819 – 1826
H.M. de Kock 1826 – 1830
J. van den Bosch 1830 – 1833
J.C. Baud 1834 – 1836
D.J. de Eerens 1836 – 1840
C.S.W. graaf van Hogendorp 1840 – 1841
P. Merkus 1840 – 1844
J.C. Reijnst 1844 – 1845
J.J. Rochussen 1845 – 1851
A.J. Duymaer van Twist 1851 – 1856
C.F. Pahud 1856 – 1861
A. Prins 1861 – 1861
L.A.J.W. baron Sloet van de Beele 1861 – 1866
A. Prins 1866 – 1866
P. Mijer 1866 – 1871
J. Loudon 1872 – 1875
J.W. van Lansberge 1875 – 1881
F. ’s Jacob 1881 – 1884
O. van Rees 1884 – 1888
C. Pijnacker Hordijk 1888 – 1893
C.H.A. van der Wijck 1893 – 1899
W. Rooseboom 1899 – 1904
J.B. van Heutz 1904 – 1909
A.W.F. Idenburg 1909 – 1916
J.P. van Limburg Stirum 1916 – 1921
D. Fock 1921 – 1926
A. C. D. de Graeff 1926 – 1931
B.C. de Jonge 1931 – 1936
A. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer 1936 – 1942
Directors of the Department of Finances, 1866-1942
A. Rutering 1866 – 1872
H.J. Bool 1872 – 1874
J.P. Sprenger van Eijk 1874 – 1877
L.J.J. Michielsen 1877 – 1883
H.A. de Groot 1883 – 1884
L.W.G. de Roo 1884 – 1887
E.A. Rovers 1887 – 1893
J.A. van Dorsser 1893 – 1894
Ch.R. Bakhuizen van den Brink 1894 – 1900
H.J.M. Baumann 1900 – 1905
N.J. Struick du Moulin 1905 – 1906
J.P.C. Hartevelt 1906 – 1909
F.A. Liefrinck 1909 – 1918
D. Talma 1918 – 1920
C.W. Bodenhausen 1921 – 1926
C. van den Bussche 1926 – 1932
B.J. de Leeuw 1932 – 1935
G.F. Bruyn Kops 1935 – 1938
L. Götzen 1938 – 1942
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Directors of the Department of Interior Administration
M.H.J. Kollmann 1866 – 1867
F.G. Bloemen Waanders 1867 – 1869
H.D. Levyssohn Norman 1869 – 1873
A. Fitz Verploegh 1873 – 1875
C. Bosscher 1875 – 1876
G.Th.H. Henny 1876 – 1882
D. Ples 1882 – 1884
P.F. Wegener 1884 – 1885
J.M. van Vleuten 1885 – 1889
H. Kuneman 1889 – 1892
A.C. Uljee 1892 – 1894
G.A. Scherer 1894 – 1895
P.C. Arends 1895 – 1903
D.F.W. van Rees 1903 – 1906
S. de Graaff 1906 – 1910
D. Tollenaar 1910 – 1916
H. Carpentier Alting 1916 – 1919
F.L. Broekveldt 1919 – 1920
L. J. Schippers 1920 – 1924
W.P. Hillen 1924 – 1925
A. H. Maas Geesteranus 1925 – 1929
A. Mühlenfeld 1929 – 1933
P.C.A. van Lith 1933 – 1936
F. A. E. Drossaers 1936 – 1942
Advisors / Heads of the Division ‘Administrative affairs of the Outer Territories’ 
(Bestuurszaken der Buitengewesten)
H. Colijn 1905 – 1909
W. Frijling 1909 – 1913
C. Lulofs 1913 – 1914
W. Frijling 1914 – 1916
W. Frijling 1916 – 1917
C. Lulofs 1917 – 1918
A.J. Knaap 1918 – 1921
Ch.F. Staargaard 1921 – 1922
A.J. Knaap 1922 – 1925
Ch.F. Staargaard 1925 – 1928
A. J. Hamerster 1928 – 1930
P.C.A. van Lith 1930 – 1933
- 1933 – 1935
Ch.H. ter Laag 1935 – 1936
W. Hoven 1936 – 1938
Advisors for ‘indigenous affairs’
C. Snouck Hurgronje 1899 – 1907
G.A.J. Hazeu 1907 – 1913
D.A. Rinkes 1913 – 1916
G.A.J. Hazeu 1916 – 1920
R. A. Kern 1920 – 1926
E. Gobée 1926 – 1937
G.F. Pijper 1937 – 1942
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Abdi ‘Serves’; people who performed personal 
services to their chiefs and Sultans without 
anything in return
Adat Complex of customary law and practices, 
social, behavioral guidelines and etiquettes
Adat labuan Docking tax in Aceh
Adat tanah Land(holding) rights
Admodiatie Practice of negotiating the land rent in Java, 
between the colonial state and village chiefs 
and between chiefs and the population
Afdeling District, usually governed by a controleur
Afkoop Buy off (of labour services)
Algemene Secretarie General Secretariat
Alifuru Collective term used historically for 
non-monotheist (animist) Indonesian peoples 
in the interiors of eastern Indonesian islands, 
nowadays referring to the indigenous peoples 
of interior Seram
Alune Overarching tribal group inhabiting the north-
western part of West Seram
Aman Constituting part of an uli (see below)
Amil In Banten: religious village officials managing 
matters of marriage and divorce, and 
increasingly taxation
Angguran Desa services performance by permanently 
appointed (usually wealthy) villagers who in 
return were (partially) exempted from other 
corvée duties
Assistant-Resident Dutch colonial official, governor of an 
‘Assistant-Residency’ or sub-province below 
the level of Residency
Baileo Central, custom or ‘village house’ in the 
Moluccas used for meetings of the saniri (see 
below)
Baku (or kepala rumah) House or family chief in Banten
Balai Adat council of a nagari in West Sumatra 
consisting of the accumulated penghulu (chiefs)
Batig slot Profit shares of the Cultivation System flowing 
to the Netherlands
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Bekel Village official in Java, assigned by the colonial 
state to organize corvée and desa services and 
collect taxes
Belasting- en Accountants 
Dienst
(Colonial) Tax and Accountancy Service
Belasting op de bedrijfs- en 
andere inkomsten
‘Tax on company- and other incomes’; income 
tax
Binnenlands Bestuur; ‘BB’ Interior Administration; European civil service 
in colonial Indonesia
Blablag Desa service for maintenance of desa roads, 
dams and bridges
Blandong Forestry service; the obligation of peasants in 
Java to collect firewood for chiefs and lords
Buah gadang (Sub-)lineages in Minangkabau context
Budi Utomo ‘Prime Philosophy’ Name of the first 
Indonesian nationalist political movement 
founded in 1908
Buitengewesten ‘Outer Territories’, islands and regions outside 
of Java and Madura
Bujang Landless dependents in a Javanese peasant 
household
Bupati Title for a high official or Regent; Javanese 
district (Regency) ruler
Cacah Household in Java, consisting of a family chief 
and of extended family and dependents, also 
used as unit for taxable objects
Cakalele Traditional dance in the Moluccas
Cidako Loin cloth worn in the Moluccas, especially on 
Seram
Controleur ‘Overseer’; fundamental Dutch colonial 
official, below the rank of assistant-resident
Corvée (labour) Encompassing term for public coerced labour 
performed by the indigenous population of 
Indonesia in service of the colonial government
Cultuurprocenten Cultivation percentages; profit shares from the 
Cultivation System paid out to officials
Cultuurstelsel Cultivation System
Darat The traditional heartlands of the Minangkabau 
realm in West Sumatra, distinct from the rantau 
(see below)
Dati Social group on Ambon that held shared 
usufruct rights to cooperatively exploit specific 
lands; transformed into labour groups under 
VOC rule
Dayah Islamic boarding schools in Aceh
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Demang Title of a Javanese middle-ranking provincial 
official or district head, usually with special 
tax-collecting responsibilities, residing at court 
of a higher noble
Desa Village, usually including the surrounding rice 
fields, gardens and lands
Duiten / Duit[s] Copper coins
Dusun Sagu garden (see below) in the Moluccas
Erfpacht Ground rent or lease, or perpetual lease 
allowing the holder the perpetual right to the 
enjoyment of a property on condition of proper 
care, payment of tax and rent
Extrawinstbelasting ‘Extra profit tax’
Gamel Desa service to collect firewood and water for 
desa chiefs and officials
Ganggam bantuek Use rights to harta pusaka (see below)
Gemeenteraad Municipal council, established in the Dutch 
East Indies from 1903 onward
Geschenk gaji Salary gifts awarded to chiefs by the VOC on 
Ambon
Geucik (or keucik) Acehnese village chief
Golongan Specific working group for labour services in 
Java
Gondol Tax or corvée liability
Gouvernementsgebied ‘Government territory’; territory directly 
governed by the colonial state, as opposite of 
the ‘self-governing territories’ (see below)
Gugur gungung Labour service to perform emergency aid and 
repairs after, for instance, a natural disaster
Gundal Desa service to accompany and assist desa 
chiefs and officials on (inspection) tours
Gugur gunung Services levied by the Sunan of Java for 
emergency repairs to infrastructure after 
natural disasters (vulcanic eruptions, 
landslides, etc.)
Haji Title awarded to someone who has been on 
pilgrimage to Mecca (haj)
Hak Right
Hak balé Laws applying to marital affairs in Aceh
Hak milik Right of ownership
Hak praké Laws applying to inheritance affairs in Aceh
Hak ulayat The usufruct rights of nagari over uncultivated 
wastelands within the nagari (in this thesis in 
West Sumatra)
Harta pencarian Uninheritable lands reclaimed and owned by 
Minangkabau land until death
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Harta pusaka Shared, communally used lands inherited in 
female line in West Sumatra
Heerendiensten See corvée labour
Heerendienstleggers Corvée registers
Heerendienstwegen Corvée roads; roads constructed using 
government corvée services, sometimes also 
refered to as ‘Grote post- en binnenwegen’
Hilir Hills or inland, mountainous regions, as 
opposite of pesisir
Hongitochten Hongi expeditions; annual expeditions in the 
Moluccas in the 17th century in which the VOC 
Governor commanded a fleet of hundreds 
of indigenous rowing boats (kora-kora) from 
Ambon to raid surrounding islands, burning 
down all ‘illegal’ clove trees
hoofdengeld Head tax
Hormat Respect, honour, used to prescribe cultural and 
lingual behaviour in Java
Indigenous inlander Indonesian person living in his place of origin 
(for instance, an Ambonese on Ambon), 
as opposed to ‘non-indigenous inlander’ 
(an ambonese living in Java)
Indisch Indo-European
Indische Partij Political nationalist movement in the Dutch 
East Indies founded in 1912 and prohibited in 
1913
Indische Tariefwet Tariff Law of 1872 that ended the 
differential rights that had prohibited free 
entrepreneurship and trade in the colony
Indung pekerangan (or kuli 
karangkopek)
Term used in Central Java to indicate those 
people who had half or minor use rights to 
rice fields and therefor were not fully liable to 
perform services and pay taxes
Inheems Indigenous or native to a given region
Inlander ‘Indigenous person’; Dutch colonial term used 
for the (sociolegal) category of Indonesian 
people
Inlands Bestuur Indigenous [Interior] Administration
Inlandse burgers ‘Indigenous citizens’; specific legal category 
of indigenous people, mardijkers and mestizos 
across Indonesia (in particular Ambon and 
North Sulawesi) who enjoyed specific rights 
and privileges
Intiran Services levied by the Sunan of Java for 
construction, repair and maintenance of 
infrastructure and major irrigation works
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Ipan Genealogical social units in Seram
Isi adat Village taxes in West Sumatra
Jago Strongman; men in Java who had supposed 
spiritual power and who had much local 
influence and charisma, and often had an 
important role in village politics.   
Jagul Replacement corvée labourers in Java; people 
who took over the corvée duties of other 
peasants who ‘bought-off’ their services
Jaksa Indigenous public prosecutor in Java
Jawi Malay in Arabic script
Kakean Secret, religious masculine society or 
‘brotherhood’ on West Seram that coordinated 
various aspects of political and social life, such 
as headhunting
Kampung Settlement, village; usually used in context 
of an urban environment, and sometimes 
referring to a specific ethnic community 
(‘Kampung Cina’; Chinese kampung)
Kapitan ‘Captain’; headman or chief of usually urban 
Chinese, Arab or Malayan communities 
throughout the Dutch East Indies
Kaum Familial lineage in West Sumatra
Kemajuan Progress
Kepala Chief
Kepala dati Dati chief (on Ambon)
Kepala nagari Nagari chief; village head
Kepala soa Soa chief (on Ambon; see below)
Keraton Royal palace of a Javanese ruler
Kerja rodi Working groups and services for forced coffee 
cultivation in West Sumatra
Kerja trop Forced clove cultivation services on Ambon
Knevelarijen Punishments, extortions, ‘maltreatments’ and 
abuses of indigenous people, used mostly in 
context of Java during the Cultivation System
Koelie Ordonnantie Coolie Ordinance; law of 1880 that drastically 
expanded the possibilities of plantation owners 
to hire, maltreat and exploit coolie labourers
Kohieren Tax registers
Kongsi Chinese networks of partnering or 




Royal Packet Company; Dutch colonial 
shipping company in 1888-1966
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Kuli gundul Term used in Central Java to indicate those 
people who did not possess their own house 
and lived on the plot of another peasant, but 
who were nonetheless in possession of some 
land rights
Kuli kenceng Term used in Central Java to indicate those 
people who had full use rights to rice fields 
and therefor were fully liable to perform 
services and pay taxes
Kunduran Communal labour, specific form of labour 
service to assist desa chiefs in maintenance of 
their households
Kuwu Title for a village official or chief in Java
Kwarto Coerced labour service sin service of chiefs on 
Ambon
Kwitantie Receipt (of an assessment bill)
Kyai Honorific title for senior (noble) men of 
exceptional Islamic knowledge; in colonial 
context used for religious teachers trained in 
Mecca and leaders of pesantren (see below)
Ladang Dry rice field
Landraad Regional court
Landschapskas Local treasury, of a local colonial district or 
Residency
Landskas National Colonial treasury
Lange Verklaring ‘Long declaration’; specific model contract 
used to redefine and strengthen the relations 
between indigenous rulers and the colonial 
government
Laras Sub-district in West Sumatra; in precolonial 
times: nagari federation
Luma inai ‘Mother houses’, lineage or clan in Seramese 
interior nagari
Lungguh Services, or the right to levy services in Java
Lurah Title for village chiefs in Java
Mamak kepala waris Familial chief in West Sumatra that held the 
responsibility to guard the shared pusaka lands
Mancaneagara Outer regions of the sphere of influence of the 
Sunan in Java, governed by semi-autonomous 
bupati
Mandala Political structure of inner kingdom-relations 
among different rulers
Mantelgeld Clothing allowance for nagari chiefs on Ambon
Mardijkers (mardika) Specific ethnic group consisting of descendants 
of formerly enslaved people in the Dutch East 
Indies




Colonial army unit composed of special troops 
specialized in counter-insurgency in Aceh and 
later on other places in the archipelago
Marinyo Assistants to the kepala soa on Ambon (see 
above)
Mata rumah (or rumah tau) Exogamous patrilineal family clans on Ambon, 
constituting the soa (see below)
Mauweng Specific chiefs or priests on Seram
Menumpang ‘helpers’, sharecroppers participating in a sikep 
household (see below)
Merantau In West Sumatra: ‘to go beyond the darat’, 
i.e. to leave the traditional heartlands of the 
Minangkabau realm into the wider world to 
accumulate wealth and experience; see also 
rantau
Mukim Community of various kampung organized 
around a single mosque in Aceh
Mupakat Consensus or agreement, supposedly reached 
in inter-nagari meetings in West Sumatra
Nagara agung Core domain or crown regions of the Sunan in 
Java
Nagari Village or village state
Nederlandsche Handel-
Maatschappij (NHM)
Netherlands Trading Society; Dutch trading 
company established in 1824 that held 
exclusive rights to trade, shipping and 
agriculture
Negorijman ‘Nagari man’; indigenous person of local 
descent living in a nagari and taking part in 
traditional social life on Ambon
Njora Wives of chiefs on Ambon
Onderhoorigheden ‘Dependencies’
Ontvoogding The colonial idea of ‘emancipation’ and 
education of indigenous populations
Opcenten Surtax(es); increment tax levied by Dutch 
municipalities or colonial local governments
Orangkaya Title in use across the archipelago for specific 
chiefs
Orangkaya 1. ‘Rich person’, title used across the 
archipelago for various officials
2. In Aceh: wealthy merchants forming a 
powerful political class
Overwinstbelasting ‘Excess profit tax’
Pachtenstelsel Revenue farming system
Pacumpleng ‘Door tax’; Javanese house tax
Padi Paddy; rice when harvested but uncooked
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Padri Muslim clerics from West Sumatra returning 
from their Haj who aimed to impose strict 
enforcement of Islamic law by overthrowing 
the old adat order
Pajak (Pajeg) Tax
Pajak badan ‘Body tax’; head tax
Pajak bumi Land rent
Pajak pencarian Income tax
Pancen Personal services performed by people for the 
aristocracy in Java
Pangeran ‘Prince’, Javanese title for male offspring of a 
ruler
Pangkai The rights to found and exploit pepper gardens 
in Aceh
Panglima High noble officials, usually commander of the 
army of a king or sultan
Pangreh Praja ‘Rulers of the realm’; Javanese term for the 
Indigenous [Interior] Administration (see 
above) 
Passangrahan Government travellers lodge
Pasar Market
Patalima One of the two coinciding ancestral origination 
groups in Seram
Patasiwa The other coinciding ancestral origination 
group in Seram
Patasiwa Hitam ‘Black patasiwa’; part of the ancestral 
origination group in Seram that wore black 
tattoos and engaged in headhunting
Patasiwa Putih ‘White patasiwa’; part of the ancestral 
origination group in Seram that did not wear 
tattoos or engaged in headhunting
Patentrecht Patent Law; Dutch tax, originally a 
contribution to gain a license to trade or 
exercise a specific profession, in colonial 
context translated as a 2% income tax
Patih ‘Prime minister’ or chief deputy of a Bupati
Patrol spor Services to guard railway crossings
Patuh Apanage holders (or holding) of the Sunan in 
Java
Pax Neerlandica Term used for the full imposition of Dutch 
authority and civil governance in the 
Indonesian Archipelago
Pela Village networks or alliances of socioeconomic 
partnership in the Central Moluccas
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Penghulu 1. In Java: Islamic head officials who played an 
important role in Islamic courts, absorbed 
into the colonial Indigenous Interior 
Administration
2. In West Sumatra: family chiefs (of a buah 
gadang or kaum)
Perang War
Pesantren Islamic boarding schools
Pesisir Coast or coastal regions, as opposite of hilir
Peutuha pangkai ‘Pangkai’ holders; those who had rights to 
found and exploit pepper gardens in Aceh
Pikul Weight measure comprising approximately 
62 kg
Poenale Sanctie Penal sanction; penalty included as a clause in 
the Coolie Ordinance that allowed excessive 
punishment of coolies
Posthouder ‘Postholder’, lowest ranking colonial adminis-
trator in the Moluccas, particularly appointed 
on Seram, usually of Indo-European descent
Priyayi Administrative elite of aristocratic officials 
from the Javanese nobility
Puputan Balinese term for the final suicidal battles 
fought in a desperate but doomed attempt to 
stop the Dutch colonial conquest of Bali
Pusaka Collective term for the inherited goods, titles 
and lands of families in West Sumatra (lit. 
‘heirlooms’, also used outside West Sumatra as 
a term for important inherited regalia
Pusaka eigendomsaktes Ownership deeds issued by the colonial 
government in West Sumatra
Raad van Indië ‘Council of the Indies’; colonial advisory board 
seated in Batavia
Raja Title for a ruler of diverging stature
Rantau The peripheral frontiers areas around and 
beyond the darat (see above) in Minangkabau 
society in West Sumatra
Rapat Meeting, discussion
Ratu Adil ‘Just King’; the messianic idea of an iconic, 
rightful, Islamic ruler who would arrive to 
bring peace, harmony and justice to the realm
Recht van overschrijving Transfer rights or duties
Regeeringsreglement ‘Government Regulation’; colonial constitution 
stipulating the legal, political, administrative, 
socioeconomic and fiscal principles of the 
colonials state
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Regentenbond Regent Federation; federation of indigenous 
chiefs represented in the Volksraad
Rencong Acehnese dagger
Resident Dutch colonial official, highest authority in and 
head of a Residency, representative of Dutch 
colonial governance
Rijksdaalder ‘Rixdollar’, silver coin used in the Netherlands 
and the Indies at a value of 2.5 guilders
Rijksgroten Grandees; the important officials and family 
members of a ruler
Ronde desa (or patrol desa) Desa patrol services
Ronde galong Inter-desa patrol services
Ronde or ronda Patrol services, usually at night, to guard the 
desa in absence of a police force
Ronde pompa Services to man fire extinguishing installations
Rumah gadang Traditional longhouse in West Sumatra
Rumah tau See mata rumah
Rust en orde ‘Peace and tranquillity’, term used by the 
Dutch to emphasize how Dutch military 
conquest of Indonesia would harness peace 
and political order allegedly to the benefit of 
local, colonized societies
Sagi Federations of mukim (see above) in Aceh
Sagu (sago) Starch extracted from the centre of sago 
palm stems, an important staple food in the 
Moluccas and Papua
Sakti Supernatural power
Sambatan Communal labour, specific form of labour 
service to assist desa chiefs in maintenance of 
their households
Saniri Village councils in the Moluccas
Saniri Tiga Air ‘Council of the Three Rivers’; most important 
inter-nagari council on Seram
Sarakarta Deed of appointment, issued by the Sultan (of 
Aceh)
Sarekat [Dagang] Islam Islamic [Trading] Union; trading cooperation 
annex political independence movement in the 
Dutch East Indies
Sawah Paddy field; flooded parcel of arable land used 
for rice cultivation
Sawah desa Sawah held under rights belonging to the 
village as a community
Sawah kesultanan Sawah exploited by a Sultan
Sawah kewargan Sawah exploited by the family members and 
courtly dependents of a Sultan or ruler
Sawah negara Sawah held as property of the ruler
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Sawah pusaka (or sawah 
ganjaran)
Individually inherited sawah
Sawah yasa Individually reclaimed and owned sawah
Schutterij Citizen militia
Sebuah perut Household in Minangkabau, i.e. a mother with 
her daughters and their children, living in a 
traditional long-house
Sengaji Title of a ruler in Eastern Indonesia
Serayo Local form of communal labour in West Sumatra 
transformed by the Dutch into corvée labour
Sikep ‘Servicemen’; ‘landholding’ peasants in Java
Soal Specific social group or clan consisting of 
multiple, originally kinship related family 
groups on Ambon
Suku Tribe or ethnicity
Sunan (Susuhunan) Javanese ‘emperor’, title for the ruler of 
Mataram
Syahid Martyr in Islam (lit. ‘witness’)
Tanah Land (soil)
Tanah bengkok Salary fields as an entitlement to village 
administrators (especially in Java)
Tanah dati Land held under shared rights of the dati on 
Ambon
Tanah ewang ‘Wild lands’; lands not held under any rights 
on Ambon
Tanah nagari Land held under rights of the nagari on Ambon
Tanah pusaka Land held under rights owned by families or 
individuals
Tanaman pajeg  ‘Tax crops; crops cultivated to raise money to 
pay taxes
Tarekat Islamic brotherhoods
Tegal Dry agricultural land 
Teungku Acehnese noble title
Tongkat Staff or cane
Tuan tanah Landlord
Tuanku Islamic teachers
Tuanku laras District chief in West Sumatra, appointed by 
the colonial government
Uang adat Specific form of village or communally paid 
taxes in various parts of Indonesia, in this 
thesis specifically mentioned in the case of 
West Sumatra
Uang hasil Fixed salary awarded by the VOC to chiefs 
on Ambon for their participation in the clove 
monopoly; also known as uang barah
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Uang pitis Tax of 4% of the value of harvested clove levied 
by chiefs on Ambon
Ulama Islamic scholars; interpreters and transmitters 
of Islamic law, knowledge and doctrines
Uleebalang Rulers in Aceh, appointed by the colonial state 
as territorial chiefs
Uli Specifically constituted clans in the Central 
Moluccas
Verponding Tax on land or immovable property, in 
colonial context levied over land not used for 
agricultural purposes
Volksbanken ‘Popular banks’; network of local banks 
established by the Dutch
Volkscredietwezen People’s Credit System’; system set up 
by Dutch colonial authorities to enhance 
monetization by lending money against 
favourable tariffs
Volkshoofden Popular chiefs; indigenous office-holders
Volksraad ‘People’s Council; parliament of the Dutch East 
Indies, established in 1918
Vorstenlanden Principalities; referring to the four 
semi-independent Javanese Sultanates 
of Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Pakualam and 
Mangkunegara in Central Java
Vreemde Oosterlingen ‘Foreign Orientals’; Dutch colonial term used 
for the (sociolegal) category of people from 
Asian, but not Indonesian (‘Malay’) descent, 
largely consisting of ethnic Chinese and Arabs
Warung Small eating houses or business selling food 
and supplies
Wasé Specific form of import and export duties 
levied by the Sultan and uleebalang in Aceh
Wasè jalan Toll levied by uleebalang for use of roads
Wasé lueng Duty paid for use of the irrigation networks of 
uleebalang for pepper gardens in Aceh
Wasé sultan
(also refered to as wasé àm)
Import and export duties levied by, or for the 
Sultan of Aceh
Wayang Indonesian puppet theatre
Wedana Javanese district official
Wemale Overarching tribal group inhabiting the south-
eastern part of West and Central Seram
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Wingewest ‘Area of profit’; term used particularly eagerly 
by Van den Bosch to stress that the crown-
domains of the Dutch in the colonial world 
needed to be used by the Dutch solely to make 
profit and be beneficial to the mother country, 
and not to ‘spread civilization’ or educate the 
native inhabitants
Wong cilik ‘Non-aristocracy’, class of commoners and 
peasantry in Java
Zakat Mandatory charitable contribution in Islam
Zelfbesturend landschap ‘Self-governing regions’; term used to indicate 
the various semi-independent territories ruled 
by a local indigenous ruler whom by contract 
accepted Dutch supremacy but still maintained 
a level of authority, to maintain the fallacy of 
local independence in the mindset of de facto 
colonized populations
Zelfbesturende landschappen ‘Self-governing territories’; specific regions of 
the Dutch East Indies, governed autonomously 
by an indigenous ruler who signed a contract 
with the colonial state accepting Dutch 
supremacy
Zelfbestuursregeling ‘Self-governance regulation’; regulation to 
stipulate the details of ‘self-governance’ of 
rulers of ‘self-governing territories’ in the 
Dutch East Indies
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